Appendix 3, Part 3, Section B

APPENDIX 3 – PART THREE – SECTION B

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC)

TRANSCRIPTS OF
THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS
DECEMBER 1992 COUP TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS

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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
THEMATIC & INSTITUTIONAL HEARING, 30th July 2003
TAPES 37-38– VALENTINE STRASSER

Commissioner Kamara:    I would like to welcome you again to another day of hearings this week.  As you know we always remind those of who are here with us and those listening to us in their houses and other places where they maybe having their radios, that we treat this exercise very seriously and particularly our witnesses.  They need all the respect and regard that we can give them.  So while the evidence is proceeding, we wouldn’t like anybody to laugh, clap, boo or do anything that will distract our witnesses.  So we want you only to sit down and listen and not interfere or interrupt in what goes on.  Even for photographers, only such accredited people are allowed to take photographs, and even they can only take photographs before or after the evidence has been given.  But before we start even the hearings we normally have prayers, inter-religious prayers and I would like to ask somebody to lead us first in Christian Prayers and then in Muslim prayers.  

Prayer was done both in Muslim and Christian faith
            
Commissioner Professor Kamara:    And Leader of Evidence, have we got witnesses for today?

Mr. Charm:    Thank you Mr. Commissioner. As for now we have two witnesses present.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Two witnesses, so shall we have the first witness please.

Mr. Charm:    Mr. Commissioner, our first witness for today is Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    For purposes of our records will the first witness here give his full name?

Valentine Strasser:    Valentine E.M. Strasser

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    What’s your religion please?

Valentine Strasser:    Christian.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    So you take the bible and repeat after me.  

The oath was then administered to the witness by Commissioner Kamara.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you Mr. Strasser again.  We are happy that you are able to come to us to give us your statement and I want to remind you of this if you have not heard it before: we want to tell you that nothing that you say here will qualify you for any prosecution, we are not a court, we are just seeking the truth and we expect you to just feel relaxed and tell us what ever information you want to give us.  Thank you.

Valentine Strasser:    Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to be here and I would like to use this opportunity to first of all apologise for being late.  And that is due to the heavy traffic on the main roads that I used to get myself here.  Now Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, you would remember that I was here some days ago, and I was officially informed by your good self and your Commission that you would have to call me on one stated day and time and then comment on four major issues.  I am here today actually to comment on the four issues that you raised. The first issue that was raised was the December 1992 executions and the tribunal hearings.  The second issue was the war and its prosecution by the government that I was heading.  The third issue was the overthrow of the government that I was heading and the fourth and final issue was the government human rights record, and its economic management policies.  

Mr. Chairman, I would handle the issues around them and I would like to say before I start addressing the issues…  I would like to say that the life of the government that I headed was just two and a thousand days.  And I would also say this additionally that the four main priorities of the government then at the time was one, to end the war quickly, to eradicate if you like corruption, to turn the economy around, and lastly to return the country to a democratic rule.  Those were four major objectives or priorities of the government that I was heading.  I start with the third issue that had to do with why the government was overthrown.  Now my feeling is there might have been three main reasons why the government was toppled by officers who were members of the same government; specifically the deputy who was Brigadier General Maada Bio.  The first reason had to do with proposed constitutional change and succession.  Now at the time when the programme for returning the country to Multi Party democracy had been published, dates for registration in primarily presidential elections were set.  And some people might have felt that I had intentions to change or amend the constitution so that the constitution will make it possible for me to run in the presidential elections so as to succeed myself.  You would perhaps know that our constitution has an upper age limit of 40 years, that if you want to put yourself up as a candidate in the presidential elections you have to be 40 years old and above.  Now there were those who were arguing that if somebody has attained …… that person had to be voted for if he or she wants a public office.  Now I will say this clearly: I had no intention to succeed myself because I knew then at the time the constitution made it impossible for me to contest in that particular presidential election in 1996.  But some of the members of the government might have felt that I intended to change or amend the constitution with parliament in suspension so that it would be possible for me to put myself up as a candidate in the presidential election and in so doing succeed myself; that might have been one of the reasons.  So, that may be why the government was overthrown.  I actually don’t know.  The second likely reason, or the second possible reason, will have to do with perhaps selfishness and greed.  I think that the Deputy at the time was selfish and was pursuing his own selfish interest and was greedy and he had wanted power for the sake of power, so that he could acquire wealth, and then leave the country.  That’s another reason. Now the third might have been because this would have to be with what I chose to see as nepotism.  He hails from Bonthe, he is Mende by tribe and he is a southerner. Now in my part the idea that they would be of interest for that party to win the general elections, might perhaps have been another reason why he did what he did on January 16, 1996.  That’s all I can say on the issue of why I think the government was overthrown.

I go on to the second issue, which has to do with the war and its prosecution.  If you remember in my introduction line, I stated that one of the government’s mandates was to end the war quickly.  Now at the time when I took office the army had a lot of problems.  In fact I was serving before I took office, so some of the problems I was aware of.  One of the problems that the army had at the time had to do with the very size of the organisation.  It was very, very small, we had about three infantry battalions at that time.  And these units were at the south where heavy fighting was going on with the government soldiers and the rebels belonging to the Revolutionary United Front.  It was small and badly organised. The first thing I had to do was to reorganise it.  Now I argued that if we had three infantry battalions then we should have a brigade headquarter or a brigade.  That was how the first infantry brigade was actually established.  The other problem that the army had at that time was insufficient training. Now most of the personnel lacked the basic skills to fight the sort of war we were fighting at that time; so that was another problem.  Another problem also had to do with the equipment or the weapon systems that the army was using at that time.  The army never had tank, no armoured, no artillery.  The army was only using mortal and light weapons and most of these light weapons were old and so therefore it was almost impossible for the army to deal with the guerrillas.  So another problem had to do with re-equipping the army, I mean my challenge was re-organising, retraining and re-equipping the army that I was commander in Chief of when I took office.  

When I took office I made sure that machine guns were acquired and issued to the front line units, which was why it was possible to reverse the advances of the rebels to the city.  The other area that I would want to touch in with regards to the army handling of the war at the time when I was there in office is related to how many of those killed in action, those who were wounded in action and those who were missing in action, now those figures that I would be given you are actually … I will suggest that if you want accurate figures, you can actually find perhaps these figures with the different forces.  Now these are just basically rough estimates.  My assumption is that there were about 37 personnel who were killed in action at the time when I was in office.  There was about 112 that were wounded and 8 missing in action, but like I said you will have to confirm these figure with forces records.  Another area that I would also want to touch in is equipment that was lost or destroyed.  Now one armour was lost in an ambush, it was ambushed by rebel troops in one attack to re-capture a tank that was under the occupation of rebel forces.  One amour was lost, several networks were also lost and several three quarter turn land rover were also lost, and some personnel actually died or got killed in action, or got missing in action or wounded in action as the case might be. 

I’ll go into the fourth issue, which has to do with the government human rights record and its economic management policies.  Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to make the point that I have never seen a perfect government anywhere in the whole world.  Now for me to say that, that government that I was in heading was the best government I have ever seen will be an under statement.  Mistakes I will admit and for those mistakes I would like to use this opportunity, ladies and gentlemen to actually apologise to those friends and families, or to those ones who might have been hurt in any way, by the actions that that government took at the time when I was in office.  I would like to remind the audience here and you Mr. Chairman and your commissioners there the face of the crises at that time, and it was such that that country’s security was threatened.  And the rebel army was predetermined to take the capital city.  I will tell you because I was at the front myself and I could see how determined the rebel forces were to actually over-run the entire country.  

On the government human rights record, nobody was killed that had to do with a political motive.  What I’m trying to say here is that there were no political motivated killings.  There weren’t any political motivated killings at all.  Nobody was tortured while in detention, that I can assure you.  One soldier was reported missing, you might want to ask if there were any disappearances, there was none actually but one soldier was reported missing who was at the Military Hospital and a report came up, that someone did kidnap him, abducted him from his bed where he was receiving treatment and took him to some unknown location and eliminated him. I investigated it and it was found that this soldier actually died on his bed of wounds that he sustained while he was in action in one of the operational areas.  So I can tell you as well that there were no disappearances at all.  Now there were fourteen detentions without trial and those ones who were detained without trial were predominantly politicians who held offices with the previous government.  But these ones were later released from detention after a period for about 26 or 27 days put under house arrest pending investigations in one of more of the public enquiries that were actually going on.  Now after compliance with white papers orders, there were lots of them we set free.  Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is sad to say that 26 were executed by firing squad for fomenting what you might call treason.  It was actually military intelligence that indicated that a group of army and police officers were plotting to overthrow the legitimate government.  Now I would want to make this clear that at the time when this report was actually given to the government, there wasn’t any time for a proper trial. I use the word again – for a proper trial to go on.  Because then the war was serious and commanders were needed more at the front than in Freetown.  That I would have to say, on the human rights record that’s all I would have to tell you.  

Now finally on the issue number one which has to do with December Executions and coup trials, I would say this: the 26 who were arrested and detained by the police, I mean the 26 army and police officers who were arrested and detained by the police were given to the government by one intelligence officer, with the military intelligence branch.  In fact he was stationed in the group to find out exactly what the plans were, or what their intentions were, how they were going to carry out the coup, where they were going to hide their arms and armour that they will use to carry out the operations, and so on and so forth.  And after this report the police came out with their investigations and a number of searches were carried out as well.  Now caches of arms and armoured ammunition were found in several addresses, including the address of one Mr. Salami Coker, somebody I never knew before and one Miss Salima O. Kamara, somebody I have never known before as well.  After the executions, there was a public tribunal hearing.  Now the public tribunal hearing did found 26 of the army and police officers guilty of treason and the death warrant was subsequently signed by my very self.  That’s all I could say.  

Now on the government economic management policies, I’ll make the following points.    The country’s debt loan was wiped out at the time of the very year that the government took power.  The government also was able to undertake a major educational reform.  It was that government that actually introduced a new school system, the 6,3,3,4 system of education and brought into the syllabus of schools subjects like basic technology and so on; that government was first on health care and sanitation.  More beds were introduced into our public hospitals, and I can also tell you that the patient waiting list was almost exhausted in the first hundred days that that government was in office.  Now on sanitation I think the government did very well as well.  The government worked with various or several youth groups throughout the country in terms of street cleaning and so on and so forth.  On sports, the government also did well, it was only during that regime Sierra Leone won the Amical Cabral cup twice and qualified for the African Nations cup.  On transport the government also did well.  There was a public transport system of coaches and bushes, ordered and were in use for communities.  The government also did well on road construction. In fact it was the government that actually rebuilt the city and undertook major road construction projects including the Freetown-Masiaka highway; electricity and water were never in short supply and the government also did well with telecommunications.  There were public pay phones all over the cities and in the provinces and so on and so forth.  And the government also never allowed petrol, diesel, or kerosene to be in short supply. Ladies and Gentlemen, that’s all I have to say, thank you very much for this opportunity for me to say this.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you very much Capt. Strasser.  As I said before, we appreciate your coming to talk to us, and the procedure here is that haven given us your statement, the Commissioners will ask you questions for clarifications.  And following that we will ask the Leader of Evidence to also ask any question that he may have before we come back to you to make a statement or make recommendations if you feel like making recommendations.  So I will start with the Commissioners and ask them to ask you a few questions.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser, I want, on behalf of my colleagues Commissioners, to thank you for your cooperation in coming to help us re-write the history of this nation.  I want with my colleagues to use this opportunity to send a message to the nation.  The Truth and Reconciliation Commission will not and should not engage in finger pointing.  We are not here to levy blame because we want to levy blame.  But our mission, our mandate requires that we are to establish an impartial historical record of what went wrong in this country, we are to have an in-depth story.

Then we wrestle with the question of how we can in fact make a change in the country. I want also to use this media to say that the Commission in our hearings all over the country, has come to this conclusion and we categorised and assessed into one, perpetrator; two, victims; three, victim-perpetrator; witness four; and five, perpetrator-victim; six, victim- witness.  You would from this analysis discover where you are; where I belong.  Your presentation, the Commission will be dealing with these areas, which you have touched on.  But they go into the records so that we have a clear consistent and analytical presentation to help us in our work.  You’ve responded to most of these but I have written this down so that my colleagues will capture this, so that whatever they leave out I’ll come there later.  Why did you and your people in the very first place stage a coup to overthrow a democratically elected government, a legitimate government, why did that happen?  You’ve mentioned about the trials and executions in 1992, Bambay Kamara, Sallami Coker and others. How did it go?  Is the Court Marshall trial judge alive, if he is alive where is he at the moment, how can we reach him? It’s of importance, of significance for the Commission. What went wrong within your administration during the course of your work, did anything go wrong, if so what was wrong, what happened.  Number four, the Commission would like to know from you why the unilateral cease-fire? From the information we gathered all around said and the rebels themselves said that they were almost in the verge of extinction in Koidu, you have already cleared them off the country and suddenly there was a unilateral cease-fire, and so they regrouped.  Why did that happen, what went wrong what motivated this? Not to be seen as the only bad guy …. Good and bad guy or combination of all.  And what you and I and the people of Sierra Leone will do to turn the table.  This is my submission and I would let the Commissioners engage you now.  Whatever you leave out I will come in.

Valentine Strasser:    Thank you very much Mr. Commissioner. Now I would like to make one point clear, I did not topple a democratically elected government.  In fact the government was a one party dictatorship.  Momoh’s government wasn’t a democratically elected government.  This man was chosen by President Siaka Stevens to succeed him.  And he legitimised his own power in a referendum; he was not democratically elected as our president in the world today.  What I can tell you was that his regime was a one party dictatorship.  Fundamentally, when the army took a decision to change the regime or to go for a regime change was because troops in the front had not the support that they needed to fight the war essentially, both the economic problems aside and the corruption and so on and so forth.  Basically I would say that again, if I would stress that out, basically it has to do with the government’s lack of support for the troops.  Government troops, I mean government soldiers, at the front line against rebels.  Rations were not available, re-enforcement was not made available, and re-supply was not made available and so on and so forth.  So it became clear or it became evident that the government was negligent in its handling of the war.  And officers and men were losing their lives.  That answers your first question.  Now I want to deal with the second question but…

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    The Commissioners will deal with those. I thought I wanted to give a general preamble.

Valentine Strasser:    You wanted to know if the trial judges are still alive as well.  Now the trial judge at the time was in fact the President of the tribunal. I heard that he is out on a course.  I think he is out of the country.  I think he is in Nigeria.  There is another point that you also made and this has to do with the cease-fire.  The government was doing everything it could do to defeat the rebels… Militarily, the government failed and I was to find a diplomatic solution, to end the crises.  You know it wasn’t the way that I saw things at the time.  I felt that if the government from a position of strength declared a cease-fire it would demonstrate to the rebel forces that it was serious about peace talks.  But at the time the rebels were determined to overrun the country and take it, and they made it clear by counter- attacking the government in their positions and so on and so forth.  They were not interested in a diplomatic solution to the crises in the country.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    I would like to thank retired Capt. Valentine Strasser for coming to the TRC today and for the testimony he has given.  My question has about three branches.  I wonder whether you were, retired Capt. Valentine Strasser, in complete control of your government until you were ousted.  And if not at what stage did you begin to lose control and what were the signs that you were losing control?

Valentine Strasser:    Thank you very much for your assumption.  That’s an assumption; I don’t think I lost control at any one time.  The deputy mounted the coup that’s all I can tell.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Well, that leads to my next question and that you can give us a step by step way in which the officers, the people, the coup plotters as alleged came to be executed.  Now their arrest, their detention, their trial and their execution and your signing of whatever you have to sign at the end.

Valentine Strasser:    That’s step by step you know… the very question that you rule and you just answered the question as well.  But I would add to that that they were executed by firing squad, very much the same way 24 people were executed in this country by firing squad for collaboration.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    They were executed by firing squad, can you tell us at what location?

Valentine Strasser:    We don’t have a firing squad range in this country.  We’ve never had experience with firing squads in this country.  I wonder if you are aware of that.  Well I will tell you that one was constructed at the Sierra Leone infantry battalion in that general area. That was where the execution took place.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    I am sorry, I haven’t got you clear.

Valentine Strasser:    The seven battalion area, where the seventh infantry battalion is.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    So they were executed at the seventh battalion?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes, in that general area.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Can you recall the date?

Valentine Strasser:    December 29.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    December 29?

Valentine Strasser:    Correct.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    My next question is: had you any reason to believe that anyone in your government had sympathised with the rebels and was having communication with the rebels?

Valentine Strasser:    What I can tell you in response to that question is that there were talks going around that elements within the army were actually dealing with the enemy, the rebels.  But no evidence was shown to prove that.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Did you make any attempt or any effort to find out?

Valentine Strasser:    They were basically baseless and unfounded.  Because if somebody can say that this particular officer or this particular soldier are, I mean with pictures and with video tapes for example this particular officer or particular soldier was seen in rebel controlled areas exchanging arms or ammunition for money or whatsoever, I mean on video tape or picture for example that will be a credible evidence wouldn’t it, but there was none.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Thank you.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser for coming to the Commission the second time.  We will surely benefit from your testimony.  But before I go on to my questions I thought that there is an area of the question that didn’t actually satisfy me very well that I still need you assistance on. You overthrew a government that was not democratically elected, that was imposed in power by somebody else, corrupt, that had all the ills, and there was every reason that it shouldn’t be in power.  My confusion is, was it the responsibility of the army to change a government of that type?

Valentine Strasser:    My honest answer in response to that question is that the government should be chosen by the people in a democratic way.  Yes through the ballot box that’s my honest opinion.  But in cases where it might seem impossible to change a regime democratically it now becomes useful in the interest of the masses to change such a regime the way the army normally does.  But that’s essentially not the army’s business really.  The army should be in the barracks and stay out of politics.  You know what it’s like in Africa and so on and so forth.  It might become useful if you like to go for regime change that way  where it seemed impossible that such a government will not be changed in a democratic way.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser. Another unfinished business that should be made clear to me before I proceed on to my question, was the one asked by Justice Marcus Jones that at some point in your regime you lost control within, you lost power. I want to quote a submission here from your Minister of Defence who was Secretary of State Defence.

Valentine Strasser:    Hang on, point of correction, I never had a Secretary of State Defence, I had an Under Secretary of Defence.

Commissioner Torto:    Under Secretary of Defence, the ………..

Valentine Strasser:    I say at what period?

Commissioner Torto:    Secretary of Defence under the NPRC.

Valentine Strasser:    At what time because there was…

Commissioner Torto:    I don’t want to drop names. The first time in 1992, I can’t exactly remember the date.

Valentine Strasser:    You are talking about Komba Kambo, he is not in the country, he is in the US.

Commissioner Torto:    Well I am talking about a Secretary of Defence or Under Secretary of Defence who served the NPRC while you were leading.

Valentine Strasser:    Go ahead.

Commissioner Torto:    There were cases of ……. and I quote: there were cases of raids done by members of the army.  These cases were most times not handled with strong hands because of sentiments.  And there was no military tribunal to deal with such defaulters.

Valentine Strasser:    That’s not true, that’s incorrect.  Because I can tell you that soldiers who commit a military offence will be charged and taken for orders and subsequently punished.  That’s a lie.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Capt. Strasser.  My question is: was the NPRC regime a failure or a success in view of the following factors that I want to itemise so I want your assessment on it.  One in your statement that you took over power to end the war, the war didn’t end. Another reason was to eradicate corruption.  That’s a far-gone conclusion, it was never eradicated.  

Valentine Strasser:    But I would expect those allegations to be backed with solid evidence.

Commissioner Torto:    That’s why I said they are submissions.

Valentine Strasser:    You know I had people who make assumptions without evidence.  You know you don’t accuse me of any wrong doing when you don’t have evidence got back you up.

Commissioner Torto:    I am just putting instances from submissions.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    We do not …..

Commissioner Torto:    These are from submissions, Capt. Strasser.

Valentine Strasser:    You don’t just come here and state allegations against me, I would like the evidence.  Now if you are accusing me of being corrupt, I think I would like the evidence to show that I was, but if there aren’t any it is …

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser, we’ve asked you to come here voluntarily to help us discover the truth.  We are not having any confrontation with anybody, either with Commissioners or even with other witnesses.  The allegations are mentioned to let you know that other people have come and given us information.  And we try to check that information when we see somebody who can confirm or refute information that we have received, all we have to do this to deny or confirm the information.  So as I said before you started talking you are not going to be indicted, you are not going to stand before a court of law or be punished in any way for anything that you say here.

Valentine Strasser:    If I had done anything criminal or wrong I would expect that I would have to face the full penalty of the law.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    But now not for us…

Valentine Strasser:    I’ll cooperate with you because I recognise the value of the work you do.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes. Thank you.

Valentine Strasser:    But I hate people who make baseless and unfounded allegations.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes, but also we can’t stop anybody from making any statement.  We do not take any statement as fact on the face of it, that’s why we confront other people with those statements to find out whether those statements are correct or not.  So if you reject them we also note that, that you have rejected those statements.  Thank you very much.

Commissioner Torto:    Mr. Chair, I will at my discretion want to leave that question alone and go on to another one.  Pardon me, I would want to be a little brief about the participation of a few fighting forces or mercenaries, as to how they actually got involved in the war during the NPRC time and on what conditions briefly.  Those were the Executive Outcomes, the Gurkhas, the ULIMO forces, the Ukrainian group. I would want to know how they actually became involved in the war and at what cost.

Valentine Strasser:    Good question.  Well, with the Gurkhas and the Executive Outcomes including the Ukrainian group, I said this that they were basically providing similar services that the IMATT is providing right now.  They were essentially training troops and they were supporting operations from time to time.

Commissioner Torto:    They never engaged in fighting?

Valentine Strasser:    I said supporting combat operations from time to time

Commissioner Torto:    What does support mean here?

Valentine Strasser:    Well, actually…

Commissioner Torto:    Another question, or another area of classification, about the involvement of the CDF in the war?

Valentine Strasser:    CDF?

Commissioner Torto:    CDF.

Valentine Strasser:    Oh you, mean the militia…

Commissioner Torto:    Yes, Civil defence forces.

Valentine Strasser:    Well, actually…

Commissioner Torto:    Let me conclude my question here – I have here again on submission, presented again by a personality, high standing personality.  Allow me to read: “by the year of 1992 when the NPRC was now in power the rebel war had involved the whole of Kailahun and Kono Districts.  At about the same time, Lt. Tom Nyuma the then Secretary of State Eastern Region addressed us the elders in a meeting in Kenema town.  At that meeting, Kenema town had hosted most of the chiefs and elders from Kono, Kailahun and other parts of Kenema District that were under rebel control.  He told us that a decision had been taken in cabinet to request us to mobilise our hunters called Kamajors to help the regular Sierra Leone army to guide them in our bushes, etc.” He said, according to him, America did not win the Vietnam War because they did not now the terrain. My question is was the involvement of the CDF in the rebel conflict in Sierra Leone sanctioned or approved by a cabinet under your care?

Valentine Strasser:    Well, what I can tell you is part of the government’s own strategy to deal with the war is that it felt that militias could actually guide the army in the areas where they were operating.  Now I do know that the constitution doesn’t transfer the role of the military to any other group.  And therefore cabinet would not – that’s not correct – cabinet would not sanction the use of militiamen as active service personnel.  What happened eventually was that some of those militiamen were actually enlisted as regulars in the armed forces or in the military.

Commissioner Torto:    I would advise myself to stop at this point; I have no more questions for retired Capt. Valentine Strasser.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Alright, thank you very much retired Captain Valentine Strasser.  I have a few questions anyway to supplement to questions you have been asked before.  And I start with the Kamajors: our information is that your regime introduced the idea of local hunters who later on acquired the name Kamajors, is that correct?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Is that correct also that you utilised them and we have also information that about the time when you declared your cease-fire with the rebels, the rebels had almost been pushed to the corner and they were going to give up.  My question is: did you have full information about what was going on in the country and in particular at the war front?  Or put in a different way, would you have declared a cease-fire if you knew that you were making success in the front?

Valentine Strasser:    I have made the point that government declared a cease-fire from a position of strength.  Now all of the towns that were under rebel occupation fell to the government soldiers.  But because the rebel forces were not serious about embracing the cease-fire as a demonstration of the government’s own commitment towards finding a solution, what they did was they obtained reinforcement from Liberia and they regrouped and counter-attacked government positions.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    I mean really my question, and this information came from the RUF.  This I think was around 1993 or 1994 that they were so pressed that if you and the Kamajors or hunters had just pressed on a little bit more, you would have done …

Valentine Strasser:    The war would have been won.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes.  This was what they told us in Kailahun.  But when you declared the cease-fire, that gave them the opportunity to regroup.

Valentine Strasser:    To re-organise…

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes.

Valentine Strasser:    And counter-attack government positions.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    So my question is if you had known that that was the point at which you were in the war, will you have declared a cease-fire?

Valentine Strasser:    I knew that was the point I was at that time.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:     And yet you declared a ceasefire?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes, which was essentially why the cease-fire was declared realising that the war had been won, a military and diplomatic solution will still be needed in the interest of longer-term peace stability.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Well, I have two supplemented questions for you that first if you knew the extent of your strength why did you not put in place means to control and make effective the gains that you had already made to prevent the RUF at the time from regrouping and reversing the situation, why?

Valentine Strasser:    There was sufficient preparation for the rebel counter-offensives.  Now you know what the rebel war was on, now rebel troops will occupy this town today and the next day government soldiers will retake the town.  If you see what is going on in Liberia that tells you exactly how rebel wars are in Africa; which was why I actually saw the need for a diplomatic solution to the crises.  Now if we continue that way, the war wouldn’t have been ended. I mean it could be government troops will occupy this town today, two days after rebel forces will re-capture that town from government soldiers and so on and so fourth and that’s what we will continue to have. If you take places like Angola, that’s what they are having right now.  Now the government would have made gains but those gains would have been reversed by the rebel forces and it will happen to move on for as long as 20 to 25 years and so on and so forth.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Some reasons had been put forward for this and I would like your opinion on it.  Have you ever heard the word “sobel”?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes, I heard it all.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    You’ve heard it.  And that meant soldiers acting or converting …

Valentine Strasser:    Soldiers by day, rebels by night.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Rebels.

Valentine Strasser:    It’s one of those propaganda I heard; I don’t think it’s true because no proof was shown. That a soldier is a rebel with the rebel army you know at night and he is a soldier by day in the national army.  I’ve never seen any civilian or anybody come up with any evidence to prove those allegations.  This is the reason why I have already emphasised the need not to stress on allegations.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Alright now, I think you were asked before about the effectiveness of the NPRC.  My own question is on hindsight knowing what you experienced during that period and also assuming because you joined the army to defend your country about your patriotism.  If you were to have the same opportunity now, would you do what you did in 1992, overthrow a government?

Valentine Strasser:    If I was serving in the RSLAF?

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes.

Valentine Strasser:    Would I..?

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Knowing what you went through, how you performed, the effect on this country and knowing your patriotism because you must have had some patriotic feelings to join the army for you to defend your country.  With all this background, with all this information, if you had the opportunity again, would you overthrow a government?

Valentine Strasser:    No, no, no, because the government that we have right now is a democratically elected one.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank You.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser, there are allegations, and this commission has reservoir of evidences to talk about sobels in this country and some of your brothers have come before us, we have their information.

Valentine Strasser:    If you can produce names that can be fine.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Excuse me, we have them, don’t worry about that, they will soon come out.  They have come and have confessed and are now in the army. I am just saying nothing but the plain truth.

There are certain facts that are undeniable.  I thought I needed to share that with you before we go any further.  Thank you very much.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Leader of evidence, have you got any questions to ask?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much Hon. Commissioner.  We have a few questions to ask Capt. Valentine Strasser for purposes of clarification.  Please Captain, I’m asking you in relation to submissions we have received and also investigations and research we have conducted.  We need to have your input to clarify some of these issues.  Some are basically a follow-up on the questions asked by the commissioners earlier on.  You have made it clear to us this morning that in November 1992 twenty-six people were executed.  What we would like to know is you’ve also indicated that after the executions there were trials, they were found guilty and subsequently you signed their death warrants. What was the nature of the trial?  Was it a court martial or a civil trial?

Valentine Strasser:    It was a military tribunal.

Leader of Evidence:   Could you please explain to us why civilians among these 26 people tried, died from court martial.  The people who were executed, some were civilians.

Valentine Strasser:    Correct, that’s right.

Leader of Evidence:     Could you please explain to us why these civilians were also posthumously tried?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes, that’s a very good question.  Actually, they were tried under decree twelve. Decree twelve actually gives powers to the government to try civilians for certain category of offences.

Leader of  Evidence:    Thank you very much. Still on this issue, you have mentioned in your submission this morning, that your government made some mistakes, we really want to hear your opinion, and do you consider the executions of 1992 in this respect as one of the mistakes your government probably made?

Valentine Strasser:    I consider that as perhaps the biggest or only mistake my government made, yes.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much, we still need certain clarifications particularly on our research issues.  Could you please confirm that the government employed the services of ULIMO to fight on the side of the government, your government?  Did you enter into an agreement for ULIMO forces to fight on behalf of the government?

Valentine Strasser:    Actually, to understand…

Leader of  Evidence:    Give us a background.

Valentine Strasser:    That’s the point I was going to make, some background into who ULIMO. Essentially, in my period, it was made up of Krahns and Mandingos, Liberian refugees who crossed the border from Liberia fleeing the fighting in Liberia.  If you remember in Liberia the fighting was essentially between the Krans and Mandingos on the one hand and Gios and Manos on the other hand and Congos perhaps as well.  The Krans and the Mandingos were seen as those people and when the NPFL occupied some parts of Liberia, the Krans and the Mandingos were actually targeted or killed and so on and so forth. So they fled and crossed through the borders and came into Sierra Leone.  When war broke out here in our own country …

From Taylor that I can tell you, sufficient evidence are there,  I guess that would indicate Taylor’s involvement in the civil war in Sierra Leone.  Now, the Liberian refugees who fled Liberia from Taylor’s forces said that they needed also to take up arms and defend themselves against the RUF and some of Taylor’s national Army.  That is how more or less ULIMO became our partners against the RUF and some of Taylor’s other forces.

Leader of Evidence:    The ULIMO forces actually initiated the move and approached your government?

Valentine Strasser:    In fact ULIMO was not established under that government.  It was established under Momoh.  ULIMO was formed when Momoh was Head of State and commander in Chief actually. You might as well try asking Momoh why ULIMO became involved in the war.  What I did was to actually demobilize.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much.  Still on the issue of mercenary involvement, we would like to know, you have indicated clearly that the services of the Executive Outcomes from South Africa and the Gurkhas were secured to support the government in the fight against the rebels.

Valentine Strasser:    They were essentially there to train or retrain the army.

Leader of Evidence:    You actually clarified it.  What we would like to know is that how were these services paid for?  Was it by money or was it by giving them mining concessions?

Valentine Strasser:    Well, actually, it was paid with mining concessions, yes.

Leader of Evidence:    Mining concessions?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes.

Leader of Evidence:    Could you explain why the government paid them by granting them mining concessions as opposed to funds?

Valentine Strasser:    Because then the government lacked the resources to pay them for their services.

Leader of Evidence:    Ok, thank you very much.  Could you please also clarify: during your term of office the government entered into an agreement with the government for the Guinean Army to fight on behalf of the government of Sierra Leone?

Valentine Strasser:    Actually, the Guinean troops were under the defense pacts within the Mano River Union.  You know, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea signed the Defense pact under the MRU, so that was how we came to be there.

Leader of Evidence    Please, still one question, could you give us the names of- still revisiting the issue of 1992 trials- could you please give us the names of those who presided over the trails?

Valentine Strasser:    Actually I don’t have all the names but the President of the tribunal was called Kes  Boya.  The judge advocate I cannot remember.

Leader of Evidence:    Could you also remember the Minister of Justice at that time?

Valentine Strasser:    The Minister at that time was Arnold Bishop Gooding.

Leader of Evidence:    And the Attorney General?

Valentine Strasser:    Yes.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much for your cooperation.  Thank you Honorable commissioner, we don’t have any further questions.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you very much Rt. Capt. Valentine Strasser.  We appreciate everything you have done this morning, going on to early afternoon now.  Haven answered all these questions and following your delivery, we now want to ask you if you have any questions to ask the Commission.

Valentine Strasser:    I don’t have any questions for now.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    No questions, do you have any recommendations you would like the Commission to consider preparing it’s report, any recommendations on things affecting the army, Sierra Leone in general, what this country should not do again?

Valentine Strasser:    What I would say is that I would expect that after you would have been able to document crimes committed against innocent Sierra Leoneans during this civil war , at the end of the day you would be in a position to pay final reparations to victims as is the case in South Africa?

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Well, okay.

Leader of Evidence:    Retired Capt. Valentine Strasser, could you please inform this Commission about your current status and also generally about your conditions of life?  Would you want to address the Commission about it?

Valentine Strasser:    My mother is well and alive; I share an apartment with her.  I have written through the office of the President indicating that.  I would expect his government to make pension and benefit payments available to me in the capacity of being a former Head of State.  At a time when Dr. Joe Demby was the Vice President, he was ready to argue that the constitution doesn’t make provision for benefits or pension payments to be made available to former heads of state but to ex-presidents.  Now in the letter I addressed to the President, I made the point that I think his government is giving a very narrow interpretation to that provision and I would expect a broader interpretation to be given because the purpose of that provision was, still remains, to provide benefits and pension payments to somebody, anybody, who so ever had held that high office for whatever period.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you very much retired Capt. Valentine Strasser. As I’ve said before, we appreciate your coming here and since you have no further statements to make and you’ve given us your concersn to consider when preparing our report, I now again thank you and ask you to step down.

Valentine Strasser:    Thank you very much.

---

THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DAYS
W7 BRIG. GEN. (RTD). KELLIE CONTEH CONTEH

TRANSCRIBER:    KADAY JALLOH

SECRETARY:    MARIAMA J. BAH

Commissioner Torto:    Ladies and gentlemen, we once more welcome you to today’s session of TRC hearings here at the YWCA hall.  For those of you who might be listening in on the radio, I am Sylvanus Commissioner Torto, chairing today’s hearings.  May we start the process with prayers please?  Could we stand up and then pray in the Muslim and Christians ways respectively

        Prayers

    …. May we have the first witness please?

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    May it please the commission; the first witness for today is Brigadier Kelli Conteh.

Commissioner Torto:    Brigadier Kelli Conteh, we welcome you to today’s hearings and the procedure is that you will actually present your paper as opposed to reading it.  But please chose whichever is more convenient for you in conveying your information to us and after your presentation, commissioners here on this side will ask you questions.  After which, the leader of evidence will ask you questions if he has any.  At the end of it all, we will also expect from you questions as pertains to our work and then whatever recommendations you may have that you think you can pass on or include in our report or analyse and considered in our recommendations.  So this is the usual procedure.  May we now hear from you?  Your name please in full.

Kellie Conteh:    I am Brigadier Retired Kelli Hassan Conteh

Commissioner Torto:    Christian or Muslim?

Kellie Conteh:    I’m a Muslim.

    Oath taken.

Kellie Conteh:    Chairman of the TRC, honourable Commissioners, let me first of all say I would like to present my paper, reading exactly what I have written and if there is further information and if I have time for that I’ll go on and explain further.  I’m thankful to God almighty for me to be here today to witness the beginning of the healing process of what many of us thought a couple of years ago, would never come and that if it came, we would not be here.  I thank the TRC in inviting me to contribute in throwing light on the terrible tragedy that befell our nation and perhaps in that way, guide us away from a similar tragedy in future.  My presentation will therefore focus on the following issues, my work prior to the conflict as well as my experience during the conflict and current activities carried out by my organisation; specific knowledge I might have of the 1992 coup and of the events leading to the executions, including judicial processes for the trials and the impact on the regime and the political context; the peculiarities of the situation on how these played out in the political and social context in Sierra Leone; the consequences of all the foregoing and whether any existing structures or processes provide any remedies and the levels of access that exist, to the remedies and; finally, to make recommendations.  I hope I’ll be able to adequately address myself to these issues.  Please permit me Mr. Chairman and Commissioners of the TRC, at this juncture to express my wish to dedicate this presentation to all those who fell in the conflict, fighting for the government of the day for it was they who paid the ultimate price to allow us to be here today.  Let me then start with my work prior to the conflict.  I was in my 15th year of military service before the war broke out in 1991.  I was enlisted in 1976 as an officer cadet together with 11 others who underwent officer training in Tanzania, with 11 of us graduating in 1977 and commissioned second Lieutenant into the then Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces.  By the time the war started, I was a General Staff officer, working in the operations department, the G. Branch for short at the military headquarters, Murray Town barracks which a little later, was transferred to Cockrill barracks.  My responsibilities included operations, training – local and overseas – and sports.  Our department had the responsibility to draw plans for operations, prepare the commanders orders for operations and generally direct policies on training, sports and the general preparedness of the army.  We worked alongside the support and logistics department responsible for providing logistics for the army, the O branch for short and the administration department responsible for personnel matters including recruitment, the A branch for short.  These 3 branches, the G,Q and A branches, effectively controlled the day to day functioning of the military on the overall directives of the force commander.  By 1989, just 2 years before the war, the headquarters had assessed that the army needed to organise a series of large-scale training exercises in readiness for the increasingly disquieting indicators that has started rearing their heads in the Mano River Union basin.  Intense political interference at the time had suppressed most training initiatives. The military had less and less training of whatever kind since its last 3 exercises in the Port Loko district, in 1980.  Almost all our RSLMF troops at the time had not had “the privileged” of practising their skills at the range for instance, for long periods even with their personal rifles.  Most of them as long as 10 years or more.  It seemed the deliberate strategy to make the army a non-effective fighting force.  In 1989, field exercises were reluctantly approved.  I will not bore you with my personal role in the strategic thinking that went into putting these exercises together.  My hob required a lot of teamwork either with other staff officers at the strategic level or with commanders and their staff at the operational and tactical levels.  Much of what I would therefore say today would be about relevant issues in which I was a key player.  

We had come to appreciate by 1989 that if the army was going to fight a war, it was most likely going to be as guerrilla kind of warfare, far more than the one the army experienced during the “dorgbowusu operations” in Kenema and Pujuhun districts in 1983.  Our objective therefore, was to exercise the troops on guerrilla warfare operations with special attention in the support and logistics areas.  The results of the training exercises were quite revealing.  By the end of the field exercises, it was clear that the RSLMF grossly lacked the logistic support required even for the small fighting manpower it could boast of.  The army had less than 3 infantry battalions, that is, about a thousand five hundred men, many of whom needed much more training.  It had less than 30% of its transportation required; it had less than 20% of support weapons and many more essential equipments in drastically short supply or non existent.  In the late 80s also, the headquarters had reviewed the army’s policy on developmental training linked with promotions of officers.  The army still had laid down criteria upon which officers were promoted.  Officers had to pass, for instance, a lieutenant or captain exams to be promoted to captain.  I review in addition into these 2 stages even before qualifying for the Lieutenant or Captain exams, namely, progressive qualification schemes levels 1 and 2, PQS 1 and 2.  These exams were for combatant commissioned officers only.  Specialist officers and administrative commission officers being exempted.  It was the policy that combatant officers, who failed to pass their lieutenant or captain exams after a second chance, would have to resign their commission or convert to administrative commission officers.  Captain to Major exams to gain promotion to major were also reinstated.  Of course those training and examinations that follow were only a part of a list of criteria, not least of which was the conduct of the officer.  I played a key part in the formulation of these initiatives to improve on our standards.  We managed to conduct only about 2 sets of PQS training programme before 1991 when the war started.  Most of our junior officers who had benefited from these training programmes excelled themselves very well in the initial ECOMOG operations in neighbouring Liberia.  Our hope was that we would continue with the programmes and insist that all officers undertake them as they progress through their careers.  This was the state of the army when the war started on Saturday March 23rd 1991, with an incursion into Bomaru and Sengah in the Kailahun District.  The NPFL rebels in Liberia and a small contingent of RUF elements had attacked a small unit of army engineers stationed at the time at Bomaru and had killed an officer and another officer at Sengah.  The latter was on his way to support the former.  The officer was coming from Sengah to meet the other one in Bomaru.  As the state of the army was, these 2 separate units that were supposed to be supportive of each other, never had the means of communication between them.  So as it turned out, a second officer with little knowledge of the true situation of Bomaru simply ran into operations without any kind of communications or equipment remained a critical witness throughout the war.  The army and the nation paid dearly for this.  I was assigned on the afternoon of that same day to go to Daru and assess the situation.  I was also to visit other troop positions in the border areas.  On arrival at Daru, it was clear that something unprecedented had happened in that area.  There was a visible, panic stricken and unsettled public with various versions of what had happened and what was to come.  So much was exaggerated especially in respect of the number of rebels that had crossed the border.  Some said they were about a thousand whilst some put the figure upward to 5000.  I was beginning to learn first hand, how exaggerated messages can filter down to Freetown, for indeed, some messages had already been sent to Freetown from the police and military net, speaking of some 5000 NPFL rebels, advancing deep into Sierra Leone territory and some even added with tanks and artillery.  Most of what we heard in Daru and read in signal messages sent from Kailahun proved to be grossly exaggerated.  I left Daru the following morning for Bomaru and Sengah.  The rebels had retreated.  I inspected the house in which the first officer was killed, spoke to soldiers and civilians alike.  The engineer unit had been attacked.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    We consider records very important for history and wondering whether the military still has on its record all these self styled Brigadiers and Colonels and Generals and if that is so, whether those records should not be expunged.  If you cannot answer the questions at all keep it for another witness we’re going to have later on.

Kellie Conteh:    Please permit me madam to leave that question for you to ask a more competent person.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Thank you, you told us that the NPRC from their movement perhaps were not interested now in doing the most important things concerned with the war.  From what you said that’s the idea I got that they were not interested in prosecuting the war and I am wondering whether apart from that, whether they were not interested in having the RUF defeated.  What do you think about this that they were not even kin on having RUF defeated?

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much Madam, I am not sure, I think if one has to be fair I think I am not sure about this but I want to believe that they actually felt the need to really finish the war.  They saw a lot of gains out of it.  I believe they wanted to, but its their approach to it, and the way they did things would frustrate a lot of people because if you actually wanted to finish this war then, if I was in their position, maybe, say pass it on to people who know how to do it.  We were not short of experts who were around to support us.  One such was the Nigerian assistance in training group that was sent here.  That was headed by a very seasoned Brigadier General who was himself on the ground here, he had his unit to help us train but they would not even listen to him.  As a matter of fact, one of the papers I attached to this presentation, he had to go and meet them and ask them, have you seen this one?  They said yes. ‘What are you doing about it?’  But of course they were not ready to listen to that.  We were not short of any of those advice at all, but they simply wanted to have a lot of publicity about themselves, how great they are how gallant they are, so and so person has just returned form the front and you know he managed to Push the rebels from maybe two miles form the ground and here in Freetown people did not even know the distances they were referring to.  All of that affected the way people saw it.  Personally I told them about this, ‘look I think you guys are not serious for us to finish this war.  Because there is a way to do it. Probably we do not have the full capacity, but we were not short of the assistance to do that and that’s why we need some sober attention to what we do, on a day to day basis.  This is not a one-off issue.’  They would grumble my probing.  They did not like to see maps drawn.  If you go to any country today, even if they are not in operation, they will get their maps to show their troops position, the enemy’s position, they don’t play around with it. But if you don’t want these things you think they are wasting your time, then you think you could just go off to the front and do what? So the point I’m making, the highest level they handled was the platoon level, 30 men that’s what a lieutenant will control and that were your tactics or operational ability stops.  There is no magic about adding to that, you cant, and you have to go through series of training and experience for you to be able to manage anything higher than that.  You maybe able to patch up probably with a company that is twice of thrice a platoon level which you were commanding.  But. thinking that alright we commanded a platoon therefore I can now command the army, of course it’s so different.  You looking at an entire theatre of operation, not your small platoon that was fighting probably on the bridge somewhere. This is the entire theatre so if one looks at the way they prosecuted the war, one will say clearly, that the NPRC was not ready.  And therefore the army in its entirety was not ready.  We had very very brave senior and Junior officers, very very brave and competent soldiers in the fronts and these were seen in particular battles that went on.  One of the other witnesses here will bear testimony to that.  He was himself a commander of one of those units; we had people who were ready to fight.  And they were better trained, they were ready, they were simply looking for the leadership to trickle down.  But when they receive complimentary orders, what do you do?  I was left with no other conclusion to make but to come up to them and say look, we are not serious about this.  Another instance I will mention why I said I don’t think they were serious is the question of these tanks.  There are officers at the military headquarters trained on transporting some of these things, over rivers.  They know the weight of some of these equipment so that you could know which bridge they will cross and which ones they should not use.  These are technical issues, and until you go through such training during your career you will not know. You think that a tank is a tank therefore it could walk over anything, no.  There are officers trained who will ask you what is the weight of this tank.  But if you ask them that, for what does it matter.  So one day we had a whole battalion that was to cross a particular river.  They said the tank must go first. Whilst sending the tank across first, what about the troops to protect them on the other side?  But as we turn out, the tank went on this ramp; it was a ferry and the ramp sank, end of story.  So nobody crossed, the tank was lost, nobody went across to the river there was boat, nothing like that was there.  They saw that clearly but they would not accept that this comes with knowledge. You must know about it to use it properly.  Or if I put all of that together some say, there is a loop, you guys you are really not serious some of us are wasting our time doing this and we might get killed for nothing.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and I will like to join my fellow commissioners in thanking you retired Brigadier Kellie Conteh Conteh.  Listening to you and reading the document you have given us, I get the feeling and I hope I’m right that you still very strongly feel about what was going on in the army in period 1991 – 1995, now if you have that strong feeling for the preservation of this country I want you to make a comment on the concern of people for the inclusion of the military officers who were serving at the time, and particularly those officer whom you did not give us their names but whom you know, were responsible for the deterioration of the army at the time?

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much Sir, you are right Sir but I feel still very very strongly about the activities of many of those officers during the NPRC rule, some of them even before that.  I am not sure whether I would like to even name them.  I will not name any of them. I may not go into the specifics of what government should do with those officers.  Already as I mentioned my office is central to many decisions on national security matters.  I think that forum has been given to me officially, so that forum is being used for some of these detailed issues and in the interest of the military, I’m sure the government has been considering very seriously, for the last two years or so on what they will like to do by way of restructuring the armed forces.  It is on, we all know, the army is bloated, its well beyond what is required and certainly government will have to take the decision on downsizing. But certainly we have a target, government has a target for that as we increase the strength of the police.  Now on what government should do against those officers, I’m sure is being considered at the highest levels and the defence council is the most appropriate body to think about that.  But I am sure the structure itself will sort itself out.  So that by the end of the day what we want to see is that the people of the country and the country itself must come first and not individuals.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you very much but I will like to go back on it and say from what you have told us about your current position, that your responsibilities include and I quote…… “advising the government on matter of national security”.  Now when we come to write the report and we begin to mention national security, we may want to make a recommendation and because of that it may be necessary to invite you to speak to us in camera.
 
Kellie Conteh:    Yes, I would like to come but for that particular issue I think I need to have clearance from the National Security Council especially the Minister of Defence himself who happens to be the president. I think it is a critical issue which they are looking at, and many many others shall be more than delighted to discuss with the TRC in Camera.  But I think it would be proper for me to obtain his own blessing before going further into the details, if that is not against your own conditions or rules.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    I think the Commission will explore that possibility, perhaps not even writing to you directly but writing to the Security Council

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much.

Comm.. Kamara: All right I could not follow up statements you made about silent political sanctions can you just elaborate on that?

Kellie Conteh:    Alright Sir, what I meant about that is well nobody came out openly to say that the army should not be improved, nobody, it was not rule.  Nobody wrote any instruction say the army should not for instance receive their weapons, that they should not buy weapons, they should stop training, they should stop field exercises. It started creeping slowly until eventually the only training place we had was Hill Cut Road. And even that, one day, I think, somebody sent a bad message up at State house to say we were advancing into Freetown and probably it was a coup.  That was the end of it.  All training areas were taken away.  So nobody said it was it was a policy, but the army was stagnant, there was nothing happening so I felt there was silent sanction on the general development of this army.  And mine you, side by side with the army we had the SSD, well equipped, better equipped, I’m not sure if they were better funded, but one will not rule that out, but I am sure they were better equipped.  I know that because at a stage when the army was looking for support weapons and mortals, we had to go the SSD to help us.  They gave us mortars, for the army did not have any, except for the few that were in Daru barracks for training purposes, which was just for demonstrations.  I wonder whether they even had firing pins.  So all of these things were happening to an army which you want to use for your defence, I am not sure what you are talking abut.  That’s what I meant sir, you know everything was closed.  No training was encouraged, sometimes we had to have our officers trained in Ghana, Nigeria, but sometimes even those resources were cut. But if you don’t train the officers and you don’t train the men, I am not sure you are even preparing for the defence of the state.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Alright, thank you, my final question is about politicising the army.  Now you’ve had your experience with this situation where the country or nation was told that there will be greater security.  But now that you are in a position to advice government, will you even advice it convert the army from purely professional military to a political body as was in the case from 1975?

Kellie Conteh:    Certainly not Sir, I have a very strong view on taking away completely any form of politicisation in the armed forces and I think one should extend that also to the police.  All the primary forces in Sierra Leone should not have undue political interference.  We’ve seen what happened with APC, with the NPRC and there has been some changes of late.  We still need to strongly educate our elites, not just the politicians , but all our elites in this country.  The soldiers themselves and the politicians because it takes two to tangle.  The soldiers, if an officer is well trained, he really does not have much to do with politicians.  I don’t ever  visit a politician in his house.  I mean in the absence of a specific instruction to go there. I knew some of them, yes, but I will not, I don’t see it as a habit, it is not part of me.  It is not that you don’t like them but your paths do not cross.  You have an officer’s mess, which is your club if you like, so I would even end up not knowing clubs in Freetown, for instance.  You see you will stay away from trouble.  You go to the officer’s mess you drink your beer, sergeants and warrant officers will go to their sergeant’s mess; the NCOs have a canteen they will go here.  So I strongly strongly advice that those who think they will still toy with idea of having so called boys in the army or the police are simply wasting their time because clear examples have been made. The very first people who fired the first shots against people like Bambay Kamara we were told were his so called boys that he brought into the army.  Indisciplined street boys, the very first one that fired the shot and everybody said it was him it was so and so so officer that did it.  Well that was his so-called nephew who did that.  But he brought him in, I am sure he did not look at all his other characters, but he brought him in because he happened to be a relative of him.  The army is a national institution for the defence of the country, period.  If you treat them that way and give them what they want and give them the instruction on day to day basis, on month to month basis, year to year basis, they’ll remain professional. Your task is not unduly coming to them to know why Private Sunu was posted for instance to this place and not to my village.  Why don’t I have troops in so and so district?  That was what affected the army when we had one hundred and twenty four deployment areas at a point during the war.  Out of the 10,000 you do the mathematics, you will find out how many soldiers were in each of these places.  So they were just piece meal,  eaten away by the RUF because of political interference.  So I will strongly advice they keep away completely from the army.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    I said that, this was my last question but just remember that you mentioned targeting the Limba Officers in 1992 when NPRC took over and there was that extra judicial killing or execution.  Now how did that come about?  Was there strong tribal feelings within the army?  Because we are getting information that is pointing away from tribal reasons for the war that we have just gone through, but if from this statement there existed tribalism in the army, we would like to know about it.

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much Sir, I don’t think one would describe it as tribalism per se in the army.  But what I was referring to there was that we had a group of NPRC officers who felt very very bitter against the APC and as we generally now say the SLPP is a mende man’s party,  the APC was referred to as the Limba man party.  We had ill informed people both in the military and outside that felt something against Limbas. In the military with those new guys who came in for instance the officer who was responsible for logistics happened to be a Limba officer that was Colonel Kaotta Dumbuya, he was a Limba Officer, he was not there because he was a Limba Officer, he only happened to have been posted to that particular seat as a logistics officer.  Some of the grievances they had were that these were the guys that are starving us.  They were eating the money in other words; the APC has their own people in these key positions starving us in the front so he was one key person that was targeted.  That trickled down to all his other brothers or relatives that were in the army.  And we have quite a good number of Limber officers that again maybe coming from the card system.  Since they were many politicians coming from those areas you had many of their own kith and kin in the armed forces.  So whether that was misplaced or not but many of the NPRC officers felt that these Limba Officers were the ones that enjoyed the fruits of the APC rule.  So for any little thing if they met to discuss, it would be interpreted as something sinister.  They must be discussing us, they must be discussing the NPRC.  They must be planning to overthrow.  Now I’m not sure if that happened at all.  But clearly the so-called executions, the so-called trials and execution in 1992, let us look a the statistics.  I’m not sure and even the civilians, who were also brought in to that number turned out to be similar tribes.  And these were two separate issues but they put them together, why did that happen?  It must have been some kind of thing going on in their minds.  And it never stopped.  Many who ran away to the United States, to other part of the world, I think were the smartest of them that thought, no this is no place for me to stay.  They left, I know many Junior Officers who did and they will not come near here.  That’s what I mean Sir, but one will not describe it as tribalism generally in the army.

Comm. Sooka:    Mr. Conteh may I join my colleagues in thanking you for your submission, but I want to take you back to page 11 of your submission. You mentioned in paragraph 26 that you were not convinced and you are still not convinced that there were any coup plans. Why you think there was this allegation made about the coup?

Kellie Conteh:    Well, to start with, nobody came to explain any story or any straight reason to any of us in the army, that’s one.  And two nobody made any, there was no trial, no hearing about this, and though we held high positions in the country to have heard some talk about t.  Yes at later stages there were rumour that President Momoh made had the thought of making a come back.  You cannot rule those things out, but I think it was put on specific people, at least people turned out to be kith and kin of President Momoh, he was a Limba too.  So it was like as these rumours grew in the country, these officers became more targeted.  Many of them were posted, for instance, I know of many of them that were posted form their offices to up country or to some other instructions to be watched or things like that.  I know that a report came one day.  They came to the headquarter, why don’t you remove this officer form so and so location?  I replied ‘but what has he done?’  Well we have information that so and so is communicating with President Momoh in Conakry.  I said that I did not have that, but will you want me to interview the officer?, oh no just keep it secret, this is State Security thing don’t discuss it with him. I said no, if it is state Security, then it is more reason why I should bring in the officer to interview him.  Because our first goal should be correct him, and bring him back on track, but if you want to keep it under cover, and then take some action later, I will not buy that.  But of course it happened, many of them were removed, many of them were posted to places they were not trained for and eventually things happened, they got what they wanted, brought in many of them and I believe it was some kind of cooked up stories, put together that they did this. Whether they did, I am not sure.  I’m still not convinced that it happened.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    My second question is you said in Paragraph 27 that quite morally bankrupt Senior Officers say they carried out the so called trials.  And one is executed the other is alive and still serving now. Why would you allow morally bankrupt officers to remain in the army and what will that do for a new morality and culture that you are trying to establish? And before you answer I will expect that you give us the names?

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much Ma, I quite agree with you. I mean that goes back to my answer, which the Commissioner there asked on whether I would like to discuss some of these things in camera.  Of course, I agree with you, if you continue to keep an officer who is morally bankrupt or who could do anything for money or some other favours, you are really not helping the institution and certainly you are not helping the state.  In the long run that officer will become very dangerous to the state itself and that’s why I said in the beginning that I don’t think we should be condoning any of these things.  If the military is meant for one thing, and it needs the best boys and girls the country can provide to go into that institution.  Equally the police, the security forces should be looked at that way.  It is only when we look at them very very seriously, and bring the very serious elements into them, that we will take our security very seriously.  So I agree with you.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    On paragraph 30 on page 12 you said many key issues of government were discussed and decided by an inner circle of the coup makers themselves. Again it will be helpful if you give us in writing those you considered that constitute the inner circle.  But it will also be useful if you tell us what were some of these key issues that were discussed.

Kellie Conteh:    Alright thank you, I don’t think I’ll be able to write it exhaustively here because I will need to think about it a little bit more.  Yes, they discussed issues in some close just as in any other grouping; you would have a few at the top to discuss issues with..  In their own case certainly it was that small group of the coup makers, because they considered many in the military as threats. But most of the decisions that were taken were back handed decision.  For instance, equipment for the military I mean these brought fat returns because the contractors would make some deal with them.  But I don’t know why.  But most of the decision of equipment, very heavy equipment will be discussed by them.  When it comes to economic issues with the Commercial Bank of Sierra Leone that was mainly their own area.  And some times also diamond cases.  Some fake, some just cooked up things against somebody to grab their wealth.  Those sort of things will be discussed by them, because they trust themselves. Of course over time, many people knew what these people were doing and I’m sure the decision like the execution itself must have been taken by those people.  I am damn sure that those key people were there.  They must have been there to take such decision, for they will not do it in the absence of some of them.  In addition to that man, we had two sets of mercenaries that were brought into Sierra Leone.  Now it will interest you commissioners, that army headquarters never knew about those arrangements. The first group that came Gurkhas, the armed Headquarters was informed on the day of the arrival, we had some people who are coming to help us train and we did not know about them.  And we asked them who were they. So the army was left out of decision to receive some kind of reinforcement or assistance to prosecute the war. All of those kinds of decision they just dumped into the army and say prepare these people for fatigue today, we are withdrawing Land rovers, take them down to so and so place because are going to bring in people.  Who are these people? Mercenaries. For God’s sake it is the army that was fighting the war.  Yes you are also part of it, but certainly you are the politicians.  What about the main stream army don’t you think out of courtesy to tell them that look we are receiving mercenaries. A lot of these kind of decision went bad and it was taken just at that level.  They had a few civilians I think, who were like phoning them.  People who thought that they have read a lot of war books and because they read some of these things and saw some of these things, they thought they knew it all, those were the Generals they were listening to.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    Thank you one final question and you may want to address this to as when you will want to do it in camera.  You talked in paragraph 29, you gave us recommendations and practical solutions, but in paragraph 39 you said to achieve these goals, the elites must reflect on all our ills and their true causes.  Firstly who do you considered to be the elites? Second question one of the ills and the true causes of what was wrong in the country at that time.

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much madam, again I will like to ask here that I address this issue when I address the others.

Commissioner Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Brigadier for your testimony and we hope we have not subjected you to a very hectic time at the Commission.  I have some photographs and some clips that I want to pass on to you to identify the personality,  and what advantages are of the presence of such people in the army in view of what they are doing here..  So I want you to take a look without calling name.

Kellie Conteh:    No. Mr. Chairman I don’t think there is any advantage in keeping him.  As a matter of fact he is a bad example, you know, for the others.  The military stresses on leadership by example and to get a good soldier you need very strong and good real models and that is why people take the pains really, to not only ensure that officers who are brought in as officers cadets are the right kind of materials.  But also pay attention to their development right through their career. A man who has in his hands the lives of others and the country at large must be exemplary.  So again I’ll stress on that, that we shouldn’t have any place in our new army for these type of people, and again we have every opportunity now.  The war is over, we have been beaten very seriously, we have our wounds which is what we are trying to heal and we are very grateful that the TRC was set up.  And so therefore some of their ills must be treated, properly so that they don’t come back and if for instance it is one man that has to be thrown out then by all means we have to do it.  Why?  Because he is no better than the very institution itself let alone the country which the institution is serving.  So we shouldn’t be condoning them at all.
 
Commissioner Torto:    Again in your testimony both written and verbal, no mention is made of any kind of military campaigns you may have directed, and won against the rebels.  It is not stated in the written testimony nor have I heard it in your verbal presentation.  During your tenure as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) your primary responsibility was to fight the rebels, and then protect citizens.  Did you at any time undertake that kind of campaign, and if you did what was the result?

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I’m sorry I did not make mention of any specific operations which I undertook.  But I think it suffices to say that in my position at both levels, starting first of all as a General Staff Officer my responsibilities included operations in the broad sense and that therefore required me to visit these units, first of all deliver their orders and be present when they are launched into operations, and be there to wait for reports as they come back, to feed it back to headquarters.  Obviously that went on as force commander equally, I commanded the whole forces.  Now if you are talking about specifics relating to when I was platoon leader, well I was not, I was never a platoon leader.  I had past those positions by the time the war started.  So you will need someone like a platoon leader who will say my platoon was deployed at Senga for instance. I was beyond that, I was already a Senior Staff Officer at the army headquarters.  So my job will require, if you like brain storming for the force commanders and planning, making plans for him.  Of course together with the Q branch which is the quartermaster branch, and also the A branches of the administrative branch, and those were my roles.  But I think I paid several visits in the front that I met every unit that was deployed, and in many cases was present when they launched their operations.  Well I personally will not talk about my specific roles, it belongs to those who like to brag about specifics. But I think it is enough to say, on two occasions I was with a battalion, for instance, virtually directing, it is not correct to do that, but virtually directing the battalion commander. He is the battalion commander and he should be seen in charge.  But it turned out largely that I was like giving him such direction, whilst they were in the same theatre fighting.  These things happened several times in my capacity as operations officer. And as commander, virtually every of those commanders where under me taking directive from me.

Commissioner Commissioner Torto:    Thank your Brigadier, according to testimonies before this commission a major source of discontent among the private soldiers, since the APC days up to the NPRC days when you were CDS, has been the fact that welfare supplies were not reaching the private in the correct proportions.  For instance the APC started compensating soldiers with bags of rice, onions and tomatoes, and things like that, and it was by then a bag of rice to a soldier. But there are reports that majors and captains, and colonels were receiving things like 150 bags, 50 bags,, and at times the private sharing a bag of rice or none at all, or instances where private soldiers will be required to move from say, Bonthe, if there was a platoon their to collect his bag of rice in Kono.  When the cost of transportation alone was more than the salary he was receiving, will you actually throw light on this kind of practice during your tenure?

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, I think there is a mixture of a number of issues here, I will try my best to give a clear picture for you to understand the dynamics at the time.  We will start first of all by blaming the self-posting by soldiers; people wanted the softer side of things at the time.  Again this stemmed from the indiscipline we started talking about.  We knew of soldiers who would post themselves form one area to another area.  They decide on where they want to go.  This is not sent down to military headquarter or even to his own battalion commander. Some times, we go to a battalion, whilst the commander is telling you about a 1,200 or something like, but he has physically on the ground far less than that.  You also found at times when officers are posted officers platoon leaders and you found them moving around with soldiers. You must have noticed during the NPRC days, when officers as junior as Lieutenants had about 20 to 30 people going around with him in two jeeps driving all over the place.  If such officers are posted form their units to another unit, what happens is that his men, his close men will simply go with him.  But things don’t work like that in military.  Because it takes time for those records to be sent out to the personnel department for logistics to know that these people have moved form point A to B.  Now mind you, at this same time, the army had serious problems of wired communication, we also had serious problem of even mobility. We used to have a company, a civilian company Marican who used to lend us trucks, civilians trucks, like cattle trucks, where you will have to pack soldiers to move them from point a to point B.  It is difficult for the pay office or administrative office to have taken note of such movement of personnel. So sometimes you find people in one location and they are paid by another paymaster in another location.  So well, what we have is that this man is supposed to be here.  Oh they say no he is still at the other location.  That was a big problem really for the military and I don’t think it was solved until when this whole problem, AFRC was toppled.  And I think it took some time even with the new set up for IMMAT to even figure out where these soldiers are.  So that one reason, indiscipline from the soldiers, second reason was this political deployment I am talking about.  Some in the NPRC who had rapport with politicians made certain posting themselves.  Moving people because a friend has asked you to post people in his village for no tactical reason. You find seven soldiers eight soldiers in that area.  Well these were cut off entirely from the main stream military.  I am aware sometimes when people sometimes do not receive their salaries.  Yes there was a lot of problems with some of these unit commands, but mainly the quarter masters themselves.  The commanding officers were not the people responsible for collecting the items from wherever it is.  It is the quarter masters whose responsibility it is to take these items to the units.  And from all records held at the military headquarters everything was accounted for. If you had a thousand men, which is calculated by the amount of money a man must have per day, I think it used be Le300 or so, it was calculated and sent to that unit.  Well on the way the quarter master is expected to purchase every item they required for that location.  Whether they were purchased is the question.  And I believe yes that was happening to go up from to talk to troops.  And I visited units, eat publicly from the pot of the soldiers to see how it taste.  Because when they know I do that, they will increase the standard of the food itself.  But now let’s face this, with the problems the army had you find some units sometimes don’t even have a pot, so you have to rely on the civilians.  Even if they work for the rebels you have to ask them for things like that.  The army could not serve all of these locations.  And even when you have the pot would you like to cook?  If there were other methods to prepare their food, that would have been very welcome. But no, so sometimes you find the troops themselves agreeing not to even prepare these foods.  For many many reasons, for instance they would not like to be seen, from afar by them enemy. But what else will you give them?  So there were a lot of problems really in terms of logistic support to troops.  I am aware, yes there are certain officers who will do away with rice, for instance, and prevent the items from reaching the troops.   But bye and large the units were supplied with their own quota as approved by the army headquarters.  

Now coming to the rice as compensation to the soldiers. I don’t think it was compensating the soldiers per se.  This was a regulation that was given that every soldier will be given a bag of rice.  It is similar to what is happening today.  It has be monetised, that’s what has been done.  But I think there were a lot of good points for doing that at the time.  We had rice scarcity, we had other issues other than going to look for rice and I don’t think one would have liked to add the unruly boys to the equation of fighting for rice in public. I think those good reasons to have the soldiers issued the rice was exploited by unscrupulous and corrupt officers and civilians who were contractors for the issuance of the rice.  Yes I knew that officers had far more than the quota they required and that’s why some of us when we took over command, reduced the quotas drastically. And what happened again, people thought some of the officers who did that, were stupid; maybe they did not like to make money.  But we saved thousands of bags of rice by the time I left.  And I was proud of that because I told them that I would keep rice sufficiently as reserve just in case you come to a point you will not be able to supply the army.  But yes, that happened a lot. You have a free for all kind of situation and with poor leadership from the top, seeing these young officers who just came in earlier, living in the best of houses, driving the best of cars, that was no good example for a quarter master. Those are some of the intricate things that happened.  People ran away with whole salary of a whole company and having collected it from Freetown on his way, came up with a cooked up story that he was ambushed on the way by one person or the other.  Although some of those ambushes that happened were actually real, those pay masters lost their lives.  So it came to a point paymasters stopped even travelling.  You see, you’ll like the paymaster to go right to the front, that’s how it should be, he goes to the front and they organised a pay parade and he pays them.  But then pay masters started falling into ambush so what do you do, what’s the compromise?  You ask their own unit commander to come and collect their money.  That worked for a time and the unit commanders begin to fall into ambush.  Who was doing that, was it the soldiers themselves, was it the rebels, who knows precisely when an officer is going for salary?  Was it that kind of arrangement nobody knows?  But those things happened and those are the realities that impacted on how people should or should not receive their salaries on time or late.  All of these ones I think are the factors that affected the army.

Commissioner Commissioner Torto:    Interpreter just before you interpret that, I just want to add a little bit to the question.  Do you consider rice to be motivational enough for the fighting forces and why was the process continued after the APC Do you think it was right and should it be continued?

Kellie Conteh:    I don’t think I personally sat down at any time to think of whether it was right or not right.  And especially so when I became force commander.  I think we had more serious priorities to talk about then, than to talk about slashing the rice or stopping it.  I think it would have been disastrous if that had happened in the middle of war. I was trying to bring the army back to its feet and I don’t know what would have happened if I had just cut off rice supply. Even though yes some people would claim they were not receiving their quota.  But I don’t think it was bad idea at that time. Because one reason I will give which some of the sergeant majors were giving, although at a stage we knew some of them were simply lying, but we had these soldiers up country in various deployment areas and some stayed for years without coming down to Freetown.  You have their families down in Freetown.  The first thing a wife of a soldier wanted was her bag of rice.  This was the case ever since we were kids, I grew up in a barracks I know that for a fact. I am a son of a soldier myself, and I knew the mothers were always happy the soldiers come with their ration.  And in old days they used to be given rations like we did with the rice. The ration was changed to a sack of rice per month, depending on the number in your family.  The other time is that some of our junior soldiers that come in teamed up with girls and called it marriage. They were not responsible enough to ensure that they had the money at the end of the month to pay for rice.  So the army was taking care of the welfare of his family to ensure that family was fed.  So what happened in some of these companies, in fact the sergeant collected the rice of those bad soldiers that have been reported by their wives that they’ve not been receiving rice for two three months.  The Sergeant major will collect that rice and go to those houses and distribute them himself.  That is the only way you can ensure that those families have received their rice.  Because if you give it to soldiers they will sell it.  That was what simply happened.  So that was a strong argument for soldiers to be given the rice, because at the end of the month many soldiers, and I saw this clearly with my father, by the time the month ends he would be penniless, nothing In the house.  So the first thing they will fight for is to come and drop that bag of rice, the rest is left with our mothers to find fish and other condiments to prepare the food.  He can now go on his own you know, whether he wants to find money or to do any other thing that’s his business, but at least the house will be fed.  And I believed that was the  consideration that continued, that the army should be given rice.  Over time, the army kept asking for more and more for many many reasons and they were given, and officers saw that they have an opportunity.  I have a thousand of bags left, they distribute to the officers.  But I’m sure people realise later that it was fair, it wasn’t because I know of many other institutions that were with that and that was perhaps why  my staff advised that we do some savings of these rice and I think we saved quite a lot.

Commissioner Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much. The last coup, AFRC coup, according to testimonies was staged by private or how do you call them officers or rank and files working in the physical education department. A group of footballers met and decided on a coup. And also several of the bat men of very Senior Officers who saw their bosses living lavished life styles and acquiring property. Is that not indicative of the fact that officers of the army were really living well?  And that’s when their bat men waylaid them there by causing problem for the whole nation?

Kellie Conteh:    Yes, I’ll agree. Partly there were no good examples from those senior officers and you must combine that also with the indiscipline of the soldiers themselves, because you have other rules, or other channels to redress some of those wrongs if you saw it that way.  So there are two sides to it.  For some of the Senior Officers they were merely reckless, besides their being corrupt. They were unfit really for military service, because it was these very same soldiers that they were using as their labourer, to build the mansions or whatever they were putting up, and these soldiers saw exactly what was happening.  It would make any man bitter, really. Although I will not support the kind of action they took. They should not overthrow the government.  Every soldier has the right to see the commander in chief if you channel your report properly.  Every soldier, to the last private soldier in the armed forces has the right to see the president.  So I think if you have that and that the ceiling who else cant you see about a problem you think is affecting your morale.  So I think the lavished lives of Senior officers, those who were in positions to be very corrupt and collect the loot from wherever and showed it recklessly outside, that they had the money.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much, leaders of evidence do you have questions for Brigadier Kellie Conteh?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you commissioner, a very few brief questions for Brigadier Kellie Conteh.  The first will be to confirm the date in relation to December 1992.  Brigadier General would you like to confirm that the announcement of the coup of December occurred on the 28th of December, that’s when government announced about the coup attempt and people began to be arrested.

Kellie Conteh:    Again I am not sure when that coup took place.

Leader of Evidence:    I’m not talking about coup taking place, I am talking about the announcement. 

Kellie Conteh:    If it was made on the 20th of December I think those fellows must have been killed already because …

Leader of Evidence:    I was not only coming to that because the information available was that they were killed on the 29th of December,  but you were an insider so you could even have better information and the commission will love to hear what are the right dates form you.

Kellie Conteh:    I think if there was announcement at all, they were already dead.  If there was any announcement made over the media, those people were already executed.

Leader of Evidence:    Because the amnesty international report on the coup indicated that there was an announcement on the 28 of December and then a court marshal was to be convened by mid night on 29th of December 1992.  Which will imply that the time from the announcement to the court martial to the execution was less than 24 hours. Now even you are saying that even by that 28th before even the announcement was made, they were already dead.

Kellie Conteh:    I want to think so, because I happened to know about it when we were at the officer’s mess.  People were in corners I said what’s happening? And somebody whispered and said, they have killed these people.  I said who were these people, they said Kaota and others.  I said for what reason?  So if there was any announcement prior to that, I would have known that oh yes, there is some coup being reported of.  But the very first time heard about it was about the execution. So if anybody wanted to patch it or make it nice afterwards, it must have come a day or so after or maybe the very evening, having realised that it was hasty.

Leader of Evidence:     Thank you very much. The highest decision making body was the supreme council and you confirmed before this commission that the supreme council never discussed setting up a court martial, neither was there a meeting confirming any sentences from any court martial in relation to the 1992 coup.

Kellie Conteh:    Nothing like that.

Leader of Evidence:    Would you like to tell the commission what was the circumstance that led to the retirement of Mrs. Lucy Kanu?

Kellie Conteh:    Oh no I don’t quite remember, I cant place that now.

Leader of Evidence:    Up to that point you were in charge of administration branch

Kellie Conteh:    No, I was never

Leader of Evidence:    In 1993 after the coup

Kellie:    No No No No, It must have been Michael Conteh, Lieutenant Colonel Conteh, Michael, not me

Leader of Evidence:    But you were still a member of the supreme council and there is a letter saying that the council had approved her retirement. What we want to know is what was the offence she committed apart from being the wife of one of the alleged coup plotters.  What was her offence that would lead to the retirement form the army?

Kellie Conteh:    Again, really I am not sure. I’m not even aware of the letter you are talking about, and I don’t think it was the supreme council that actually met.  Probably it was that Supreme Council which I will keep referring to as the inner circle.  But Lucy was a fine officer, and I didn’t remember her causing any trouble. I would, should have known.  I don’t remember her causing any trouble to warrant her dismissal.  Again those are some of the things I was talking about, about witch hunting.  Her husband was bad so she is bad.

Leader of Evidence:    You could clarify this for me now.  Was there an army council that was responsible for military recruitment and promotion or was that the supreme council’s responsibility?

Kellie Conteh:    It was a mixture of both, it was supposed to be handled by the military body, the headquarters, but we also had them to stamp it.  Sometimes they even did posting.  That was the other unfair thing they did.  They didn’t know the officers, but were also posting people, just because they don’t like you , sometimes they will post an officer who has been a tailor  or some kind of job, for all his service, they tell him to go command a battalion, what do you expect from that man?

Leader of Evidence:    So to your knowledge, Mrs. Lucy Kanu did not commit any offence to warrant retirement?

Kellie Conteh:    No

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much.  Would you like to mention the name of the Limba officer who was wrongly executed? Because if his rights were wrongly violated, the commission has the responsibility to investigate the nature of the violation and engage the military authority or authorities with view to discussing about the appropriate compensation for this family, for the violation of his right.  So we would like to know the name and the circumstances of his execution so that we can investigate this case?  Or was he part of the December 1992 execution?  So my next question will be to ask you, may be by the time you became force commander you saw some of the paper work, to give us the names of some of those people who were executed in December, 1992.  You can remember because we will also engage the current military authorities on the rest of the names.

Kellie Conteh:    I think I will come up with the  few I remember.

Leader of Evidence:    And send it to us in written form?

Kellie Conteh:    Yes

Leader of Evidence:    Excellent.  You have told the commission that the young soldiers who took over power were very inexperienced and they had number of civilians who were advising them, and misleading them.  So in your opinion, would it be right to say that these civilians were also culpable for most of the decisions that the young officers took during the regime of the NPRC.

Kellie Conteh:    Yes, I mean one should blame them also squarely because the boys admired most of them, some of them were said to have back rolled the entire operation for the coup.  They must have had a lot of influence over the boys, and they had people outside of Sierra Leone also who were also civilians, both Sierra Leoneans and other nationals, but were part of the cabal, which they set up.  

Leader of Evidence:    Two final questions, very briefly, would you like to talk about the regional balance of the officer core of the army when you were force commander, and whether this created any problems for you or for the management of the war?

Kellie Conteh:    Yes, certainly there was an imbalance in the officer core of serving personnel from the various regions.  Quite a lot of officers from the North and within that bracket you had more Limba Officers, yes, and I think I mentioned that earlier on that because of the system that was introduced, some of these people were in larger numbers.  You had that affecting the thinking generally in the country, like all other things, which the government did in many other institutions.  The army was not left behind in having its own share of interference and therefore the repercussions that followed.  Like every other institution that had a taste of that kind of interference, the army was not left behind at all.

Leader of Evidence:    Army officers who were in the NPRC according to you promoted themselves. And some of them are still holding important positions both locally and internationally, serving the government of Sierra Leone.  What will be your opinion about what next should be done?  Particularly where in terms of the ranks that they currently carry, they are now the superiors to some of those who were actually their senior at the point of enlistment and in terms of experience?  What needs to be done in relation to some of these officers?

Kellie Conteh:    Thank you very much can I also have that for the…

Leader of Evidence:    Okay, finally the sobel phenomenon started when you were force commander.  Do you accept some element of responsibility, for what the army did to the people of Sierra Leone?

Kellie Conteh:    If you look at the entire situation, I think armed forces have a lot of apologies to make, that one is given.  I think I was the very first force commander that openly said to the public that yes, there are bad soldiers amongst us. And there are records about this. I’m sure they have recording about this at SLBS TV, Radio.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:         No more questions ..       We want to thank you for coming and your presentation made to the Commission. You may step down

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BRIEF TO THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN RESPECT OF THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR. FROM COLONEL KOMBA SM MONDEH
CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT.

The civil war in my mind was caused by a myriad of factors. However, the major factors to me that caused the conflict were namely;

a. Lack of Proper Intelligence; credible intelligence was not available to the government and security planners due to lack of training and funds.

b. Unemployment: Large number of unemployed youths (Lumpen Youths) who went about in a very idle manner around the big cities, were encouraged to form loose gangs of `weed smokers’ who were ready tools for trouble makers. They formed the nucleus of the fighters on all sides during the war.

c. Tribalism; This was the cankerworm that ate deep into the psyche of the society. The then `statusquo’ favoured one tribe/region over and against all others, despite their inadequacies in all sphere that was largely the portion of that group of people/region. They held vibrant positions that they were unqualified for largely due to political patronage.

d. Underdevelopment of the Country; The underdevelopment of the infrastructure in the country due to lack of credible and enduring infrastructural facilities nationwide also contributed to the outbreak of the crisis. As a result of lack of basic amenities (such as light and pipe borne water) in the major cities of the country, plenty of the citizens opted out of those areas for the capital city – Freetown or moved out of the country entirely. This helped a lot in breeding bad blood as people felt neglected by the central government.

e. Large scale illiteracy; Ignorance due to lack of adequate education was a serious problem that impacted, positively on the war. People were quickly conscripted by the rebels largely due to ignorance and lack of information on governments’ plans and activities. In plenty cases of capture of villages and towns especially, the rebels played on the psyche of the citizens who were getting information via such news agencies like BBC, VOA and RFI, only.

f. Lack of Credible Democracy;& Perpetuation of political party; The one party system of government which was introduced by the Siaka Steven led APC administration also created bad blood in the polity. The opposition which existed in reality was coerced so badly that they could not properly articulate any sensible issues against the government. This led to lots of them to flee the country due to threats on their lives.

g. Poor Security Deployment Nationwide; The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) since independence was largely ceremonial. This kind of posture did not help matters when war broke out because basic military hardware and good intelligence were lacking. In addition, the strength and ORBAT (i.e. Order of Battle) of the army was very faulty, thus could not effectively thwart Rebel advances on the outbreak of the war.

h. Diamond Greed and Lust for Power; The entire war seemed to revolve around the issue of Diamonds and Power. The RUF rebels and their bosses wanted to continue plundering Sierra Leone in order to sustain themselves, thus they embarked on their senseless campaign. They claimed they were initially against the JS Momoh led APC government, but even after the NPRC overthrew Momohs’ APC, they refused to stop fighting. This therefore meant they were only interested in gaining political control of the state and also to loot the resources of the state. Thus the determination to control the mining regions of Kono and Mokanji.

ROLES OF ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND COUNTRIES
Various institutions and groups fought in the 11 years civil war. Amongst the groups, the following were prominent actors, namely;

a. Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); This was the national Army of Sierra Leone. Though ill equipped, that institution defended the country with determination against all odds (especially the lack of logistics). There were cases of extortions and raids done by few members of Army. These cases were most times not handled with `strong hands’ because of sentiments and there was no deterrence (in form of a standing military tribunal which would have dealt with defaulters). The attrition rate was very high amongst the rank and file due to lack of training and the NPRC military intervention of 1992. This further weakened the strength of the RSLAF. The final straw that broke the camels’ back was when the AFRC sacked the SLPP government through a Coup of May 25 1997. They also did the unbelievable by inviting the RUF rebels (whom they had been fighting against for six years) to join them in forming a government. This action finally brought all forms of discipline and regimentation of the RSLAF to zero and ultimately finished the image of the RSLAF.

b. Revolutionary United Front; The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) brought a senseless war to Sierra Leone which caused untold deaths hardship and suffering to an otherwise peaceful country. They carried out a `scorched earth’ policy thereby burning whole towns and villages indiscriminately which has distorted the cartography of the country. They also raped (including the underaged and elderly), forcibly extorted monies, killed and mutilated in very gory manner and terrorised the poor and innocent people who lived in the hinterland. They really had no ideology and adopted a `reign of terror’ to coerce people into their fold. The main leaders/actors in this group were Foday Sankoh, Mohammed Tarawallie aka Zinno, Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito, Gibril Masaquoi, Mike Lamin and Dennis Mingo.

c. Civil Defence Force; The Civil Defence Force (CDF) came in as a handy support group to the RSLAF. It comprised of mainly group of hunters who have knowledge of the bush surroundings of their respective regions. They were divided by region in the following manner;

a. Kamajor -Southern Province
b. Tamaborahs/Kapras Northern “
c. Donsos – Eastern ” d. Hunters/Ojeh – Western Area.

This group was a very determined lot who felt they needed to support the National Army in defending the state. They really performed well all through the war by giving limited intelligences and acting as scouts during operations. However, due to lack of training and logistics, they could hardly bear the rigours of jungle life in pitch battle/war situation. Furthermore, due to ill training and no formal command structure, including lack of education (ignorance) they became largely indisciplined. On the advent of democracy. This role was misinterpreted by their masters who believed they were more important in the security equation than the National Army. Friction naturally occurred several times and this led mainly to the May 25’97 crisis.

SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE: The GOSL contacted the under mentioned groups to help them with the prosecution of the war due to shortage of personnel and reverses in the war. The groups were

a. Executive Outcomes; A mercenary outfit largely made up of ex-South African Defence Force Officers who fought in Angola and Namibia. They made a positive impact in the war by giving the RUF a bloody nose. However, the maintenance cost of this group was very high.

b. Ex-Gurkhas – This group of ex-British special forces suffered a terrible shock defeat in the very first campaign they embarked upon. They underrated the RUF who cut the throat/head of their leader at the MALAL HLLS defeat of May 1995. They withdrew immediately after this incident.

c. ULIMO; This group was made up of ex-Liberian soldiers and a cross section of civilians from Liberia. They were mostly indiciplined but needed to survive, so opted in fighting alongside the RSLAF. They were largely a menace to society as they were full of lies and intrigues. Their internal power tussle led to its disintegration.

A few countries helped the GOSL positively in its prosecution of the war. Such countries were Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, USA and China. China, USA and Nigeria need to be singled out as they contributed immensely with software (incl.; Uniforms, webbing, boots and tentages) hardware (incl.; Weapons, ammo, trucks etc) and personnel especially by Nigeria. The personnel Nigeria contributed provided security around the western area, Bo and Kenema district. This helped the RSLAF to deploy more men forward.
Burkina Faso, Cote d’voire and Liberia on the other hand, aided the RUF rebels with personnel and logistics in their bid to seize control of the state. A few Burkinabe and Liberian soldiers were killed inside Sierra Leone where they fought alongside their RUF cohorts. Arms and ammo bearing Burkinabe, Liberian and Libyan marks were retrieved at various times from the rebels. Cote d’voire provided the political leadership of the RUF with a base to operate from.

INTEGRATION OF PERPETRATORS
The perpetrators of the war can be integrated into the society in the following manner; namely;

a. Through mass literacy/adult education campaigns which could form the basis of indoctrination lesson.

b. Reconciliation in its entirety (by forgiving perpetrators of all atrocities they committed).

c. Education for all to bridge illiteracy gap.

d. Creation of jobs/enterprise set-up with GOSL cash support/learning new skills. This would stem the Lumpen youth culture.

e. Housing to be arranged as a low cost scheme for mortgage by all perpetrators.

ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS
The victims of the war who have been identified as genuinely innocent victims can be assisted in the following ways, namely;

a. They can be given cash assistance to set-up various small/medium scale industries especially in the hinterland after some form of training sponsored by International NGOs.

b. This set of people should benefit from free housing facilities provided for them by the GOSL in the areas they come from

c. Children who were victims of rape or conscription should benefit/receive scholarship from GOSL for their entire education.

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OFFICE OF THE DEFENCE ADVISOR
SIERRA LEONE HIGH COMMISSION
PLOT 2858 DANUBE CRESCENT,
OFF IBB WAY, MAITAMA
FCT – ABUJA.
Tel: 0802. 316.9831
Fax: 00-234-9-3149172
E-Mail: [email protected]

Date-.1 9 March, 2003

Ref: ,SLHC/ABJ/DA/011/A

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
114 PADEMBA ROAD
Freetown
Sierra Leone

Attention: RT. REV JOSEPH C HUMPER

Sir,

SUBMISSION OF BRIEF

1. Thanks for your letter of 29 November 2002. This letter was only received by me on 12 March 2003 (kindly find attached photocopies of letters and dates received). I believe the delay was caused as a result of Nigeria’s poor postal facilities.

2. I have sent you in brief, (kindly find attached), my observations and comments about the Sierra Leone Civil war from the informed point of a major actor. This submission covers the period October 1991 – July 1996 only, (I left Sierra Leone since July 1996) and suggestions as you spelt out in your letter.

During that period; (i.e. October ’91 – July ’96) I happened to have been previledged by the Grace of the Almighty to hold the following Army/Armed Forces appointments; namely;
a. 1991-1992 – Platoon/Company Commander
b. 1992-1993 – Deputy Defence Minister
c. 1995-1996 – Director Training & Operation at Defence Headquarters
d. Jan. ’96 – July 21 ’96 – Chief of Army Staff

It is hoped my submission will be useful to the TRC for the sake of posterity.

While I wish you and the members of the TRC success, kindly accept the assurances of my highest esteem.

KOMBA SMMONDEH COLONEL

DEFENCE ADVISER

Copy to
– Deputy Defence Minister; Ministry of Defence, Tower Hill, Freetown
– HE, Sierra Leone High Commissioner to Nigeria
– Chief of Defence Staff;Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) – DA (P/F)

TAPE 35

DAY 2, WEEK 3

TRANSCRIBER:    LANSANA D. SESAY

SECRETARY:    MARIAMA J. BAH

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE,

HON. EKE HALLOWAY ON THE 1998 DETENTION TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS

Commissioners Present:
Chairman Bishop Joseph Humper
Commissioner Justice Laura Marcus-Jones
Commissioner Sylvanus Torto
Commissioner Professor John Kamara

Leaders of Evidence:
Martien Schotsmann
Lydia Akporie

Leader of Evidence:    Madam Chairperson, the next witness for today is the Attorney General and Minster of Justice, Hon. Eke Hamad Halloway.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    What is your full name please?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Eke Ahmed Halloway.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones: Are you a Christian or Muslim?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Christian.

The witness was sworn on oath on the Bible by Commissioner Justice Laura Marcus-Jones, the Presiding  Commissioner.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Mr. Attorney General, we would like to thank you very much for coming to answer to our invitation and there is nothing strange here to you and so we just turn over to you and we’re all anxious to hear your testimony.

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Madam Chairperson, Commissioners, I thank you for the invitation and in having this opportunity of making a submission to this Commission in relation to the 1998 detentions, trials and executions; in my capacity then as a defence counsel.  I shall concentrate on the trials; I’ll give a gloss on the detentions and a  gloss on the executions.  The year 1998 will be remembered in the annals of this country for treason trials; three of which were civil and one special Court Martial.  I participated in all these trials as Defence Counsel; I was partly briefed by the government to defend and partly by the accused persons themselves. At the Special Court Martial, I represented Col. A.K. Sesay, Major Kulla Samba – the only woman in the Special Court Martial, Col. Nelson Williams, Col. Bashiru Konteh and Col. Sinna.  They were all found guilty; the first two were executed and the others are still alive and holding prominent positions in the army.  All accused at the Special Court Martial were represented by defence counsels and the majority of the defence counsels were briefed and paid by the Government of Sierra Leone to defend. Every opportunity was given to the accused in open court by testing the credibility of witnesses of the prosecution and presenting their cases in their defence.  Reasonable access was granted to defence counsels to visit and interview their client in prison.  To that extent, the trial was carried on in accordance with the due process of the law.  I would however make this observation that the court martial tribunal cut me short in depriving me with the opportunity to address them on the penalty when it was death by firing squad and that penalty was not mandatory.  The tribunal would nowhere had exercise it discretion to impose imprisonment rather than the death penalty.  I would also like to comment that the accused persons had no right of appeal although that has now been restored.

In the civil treason trials, I represented among others before the Hon. Justice A.D. Rashid Savage, before the Hon. E.K. Cowan, Mr. Hilton Fyle before the Hon. Justice Cowan, Mr. A.B. Sesay. I succeeded in freeing a few of these accused persons.  Again in this trials, the accused persons were represented by defence counsels most of whom were briefed and paid for by the Government to defend.  The accused persons were given every opportunity to be defended in open court and to have access to their solicitors, to be interviewed and to prepare their cases.  Those who were convicted were sentenced to death by hanging unlike the court martial, they had the right to appeal.  They appealed against their convictions and sentences but withdrew their appeals so as to benefit from the amnesty granted by the Lome Peace Agreement.  The environment then was hostile and tense and defence counsels were subjected to verbal assaults and threats for defending according to them “these animals” especially the court martial accused persons.  The position however temporised as the trials progressed because they understood that we were doing our jobs as lawyers and finally end by respect of the detentions, there was a lot of detentions especially at Pademba Road Prisons and in respect of the executions, I learnt about it after the event of…

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much Mr. Attorney General and Minister of Justice for your testimony.  Now the procedure here is that Commissioners ask you questions if they have any and the Leader of Evidence too.  And after the questions, you may ask the Commission questions if you have any.  And we’d be pleased to have your recommendations.  I don’t know whether you’ll be able to give them now or you would like to send them written to the Commission and we’ll get to that later.  Chairman, have you questions?

Bishop Humper:    Hon. Minister of Justice and Attorney General, we want to commend you for coming to be part of the process of the Commission in accomplishing its mandate.  I do not have many questions, only a few questions for clarification.  You did say; we want to recall that the accused were given the opportunity to have defence counsels in the trials.  Did I hear you say that this defence counsels, all of them were paid by government?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Most of them; State briefs so to speak.  Cases were capital offences and that’s the area where legal aid is usually given not much but at least with something by the Government of the day.

Bishop Humper:    To what extent can you say that the trials were carried out in accordance with the due process of the law from your own perspective?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Well it’s a question of what do you mean by due process of the law?  In so far as the court was concerned, the accused persons were defended by counsels of their choice and secondly it was done in open courts and thirdly they were given opportunities especially with a counsels to represent and argue their cases.  And then of course they were tried by their peers; in the civil courts by the Judge in Jury; especially the Jury.  In the tribunal a special court martial by a military tribunal.  To that extent one can say the due process of the law or the rule of law prevailed.

Bishop Humper:    Hon. Attorney General, you are one of those personalities who have held and still hold very important positions in the community now, as a citizen of this nation i.e. Sierra Leone, in your personal judgement given the historical context in which they are now and discussing about all of these trials and execution, what would you say hampered or high jacked or prevented the administration of justice or facilitated the administration of justice i.e. given the historical context during which these events took place for which people were put on trials either in the civilian court as those independent and those in court martial we are just thinking about their historical context, the activities, the things that happened in the country which involved all of these people.  As a citizen, how would you respond?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    There was a lot of atrocities, a lot of things done to the people of this country and they suffered a lot in all respects so justice had to be done.  There were these persons who were brought to trial and indeed brought to trial because (1) to save mob justice, if they had not been brought in, perhaps there would have been a state of anarchy, so to contain the situation it was necessary that the persons who were alleged to have committed these atrocities to have been brought to justice.  So it was worthwhile and it also further worth the while that in fact we’ve not only ended with the trials, but we’ve been able to put into a frame work the Commission of this nature as well as the Special Court so as to exercise what one would call transitional justice.  So this the way, I see it historically – and we do hope that like in the present treason trials, I made a statement that we hope that this will be the last of the treason trials in this country.  We have to develop; we have to behave as civilised people in a democratic society.

Bishop Humper:        Thank you very much.

Commissioner Torto:    Hon. Attorney General, we thank you very much for responding to our invitation and we are elated that you are here to show a shining example like the Vice President did. To the rest, some of those who are actually dragging their feet to come before us.  Now that you people have come, we believe you will be here with interest and your spirit so we thank you.  I only have two questions for your clarification for you to make not really a question.  One is more generic.  One, were you defending those people because they were innocent or justifying their actions?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Well, according to our criminal jurisprudents, a persons is deemed innocent until he is proven guilty.  I was not there to say they were innocent that is not to the tribunal as a lawyer, I was there to represent and argue my clients case whether they are guilty or not guilty was left to the tribunal.  As I said in the civil court it was left to their peers i.e. the Jury and in the Special Court Martial to their peers – the military tribunal.  So my function there was purely and simply as a lawyer.  Not to say they are innocent or they are guilty and we have to accept that verdict and in the civil, the Jurors said they were guilty so we have to accept that verdict until it is challenged e.g. where there is a right of appeal.

Commissioner Torto:    Or do you think their actions were justified?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    In so far as the court had pronounced their guilt, it was not justified in so far as the court has pronounced their guilt, their actions were not justified.

Commissioner Torto:    Another general question.  The Commission by the schedule we have, I think you have the names of the following people mentioned in there that we are going to have to require talking to them.  I am just asking if your office will be kind enough to continue its assistance to the Commission by producing or forwarding these people to us, the following people:

1. Sam Maskita Bockarie

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Sorry Sir.

Commissioner Torto:     I am calling names that the Commission have, it’s list; that we would want to be talking to should we have problems after we subpoena them and they fail to appear, would your office continue its assistance to the Commission to identify…

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    That’s a focal point for the Commission.  The Attorney General’s office is a focal point for the Commission as well as the Special Court.

Commissioner Torto:    So you are not interested in the names?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    No, No, we are saying it is our responsibility to assist the Commission as well as the Special Court, for example I think the Commission went there to get certain records had been taken or I don’t know whether they were made available to you by the Special Court in terms of the Treason trials executions and detentions.  Yes we will be in a position to assist.  

Commissioner Torto:    Including Johnny Paul Koroma?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Yes, if we can get information as to his whereabouts, although as alleged that he’s dead, that has not yet been proven.

Commissioner Torto:    Dead!

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Well that’s what we heard.  Of course Maskita as you know, his body has been brought here, it has been confirmed that he’s dead, and infact his corpse/body should be handled over to the City Council for burial.  But burial at a place where we would be able to exhume it in the future if further evidence is required in respect of Maskita.

Commissioner Torto:    Then I also have a few names here that especially the last and featuring very prominently at the Bonthe hearings.  King Dr. Kondowai of Tellu Bungor and of course Hinga Norman, Foday Sankoh.  Would those, should we need them…..

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    So far as Foday Sankoh is concerned, and Hinga Norman, they are now receiving the jurisdiction of the Special Court.  They are indictees.  I am sure if you require them, if the Commission makes an application to the Special Court I think that it is necessary as I see it that  they should come and say something to the Commission, we will be there to assist the exercise.  It is very necessary as I see it.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones: Leader of Evidence.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much Madam Chairperson.  Hon. Minister I would like to address this question to you in your capacity of former Defence Counsel in these treason trials.  I want to refer to the questions I asked before to His Excellency, do you think as a Defence Counsel, the Defence Counsel that you were at that time that it would have been possible to amend the law and to allow an appeal before the Court Martial.  Would it have been possible to make amendment to the law before the trials took place?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Which law, which of the laws?

Leader of Evidence:    The law on the court martial that at that time didn’t allow an appeal and….

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Giving time and the environment, yes.  I said time because when government came in in 1996, within less than a year, the government was toppled by the 1997 coup and so they went into exile.  They came back in 1998; so at that time 1998 there was no Parliamentary sitting.  The Cabinet was not sitting because it takes a process.  The process in changing the law depend first of all; you have to go through cabinet and after cabinet it has to be taken to the legislature.  So I say giving time and the environment because the environment was pretty hostile at the time.  This is where expediency comes into show; giving time and the type of environment, I think Government ought to have restored appeal for court martial.  But the situation as it was then in terms of time and in terms of the hostile environment, it would have created a big problem in this country.

Leader of Evidence:    My last question is what did you think at that time as Defence Counsel of the amendment of a criminal procedure act before the trials started?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Well, this was a state of emergency.  And a state of emergency have on these regulations that promogated by the president under the constitution so there could be changes so as to facilitate for example in terms of evidence.  We have the rules of evidence, which talk about original evidence.  So if yes have these original evidence, we will be able to get secondary evidence and a change in the law instead of that, we were thinking of the…… and majority as the case may be.  So as I said like when you take America and what happened in the United States of America September’s date – 11…………………… That certain regulation, war time regulations emergency regulations that can come in to shorten the process and remove a lot so that a trial can go on to vindicate at least atone the feelings, the agreements of the people.  So again as I said whatever regulations were past, were done under the constitution because when the government came in they restored the 1991 Constitution and under the 1991 Constitution there is this part invested in the president to put out regulations.  And such regulations haven’t been done under the law.  It is a question of law and not a question of morality.  Having been done under the law, I think it was quite in place.

Leader of Evidence:    So as Defence Counsel at the time you didn’t object to the use of this public…………………………………….?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    I did not object.

Leader of Evidence:    You did not?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    No! it was something done according to the law.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much I have no further questions.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much Mr. Minister, Attorney General for coming and answering our questions.  Now we’ve asked you a few questions and we wonder whether you would have a question for us on our processes and procedures.

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    There is a reconciliation process, to what extent has the NCDDR exercise complemented your exercise of reconciliation?  Has it complemented?

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Well they have assisted us and I should say yes it is complementary and then in some cases after listening to some witnesses we’ve been able to make some referrals to them for their help and assistance.

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    I see now I saw on TV the Chairman up the provinces where reconciliation came in by people stooping down, begging for forgiveness how sustainable would that be?

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Well, reconciliation cannot be done in one day and so we generally talk to the tribal heads, religious heads to continue the process and even to the community themselves because reconciliation concerns every one to continue with the process.  I don’t know whether chairman wants to add.

Bishop Humper:    Generally the Commission serves as a facilitator.  We establish the process and we expect that after our work the civil society, the NGOs, the traditional rulers and religious rulers all of these will take up from there to carry out the reconciliation process.  And as the Deputy had said, it is not a one-term event.  The real sustained reconciliation …. Not come perhaps during the reign of some of us who are now alive.  It could take longer than others but the beginning is almost always the most important aspect.  And we are gratified that all the districts we have been, we have been, we have had this break through for people to clearly understand where we are as a nation and that we cannot remain polarised nor divided or disintegrated and the only way we can come together, we can be reintegrated is by taking the first step which is reconciliation.  So we invite NGOs, local people, community members, those who have influences like in sections, in chiefdoms I districts to carry out this work as reconciliation and a religious leaders who have greater constituencies in this whole country it is our responsibility either in the church, mosque or to her religious contexts will continue to sing the song of reconciliation – healing and reconciliation

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    What’s the provision of those who do not subscribe to religion.

Bishop Humper:    Those who would not subscribe to religion but I believe have conscience and they live within the community, regardless of their non-religious affiliation, they are compelled by community integration to be part of that process.  If they are not part of that process, they themselves will feel the pinch of it because the community itself will teach them a lesson that they will have no alternative but to join the people whether they like it or not.  It may not be out of religious compulsion but the quest to live together and to unite and to co-exist.  We still have the traditional process as far as we have in fact reconciliation had started long before the English people began to talk about reconciliation.  Traditionally when you offend an elder, there is a Court barray; they go sit down there, the only evidence of true reconciliation is to postrate before the people.  If they don’t touch you then they have not forgiven you and in a quest to say “we have accepted you” there is a token of something that you give to the chief to hold and then you become his friend.  So that process had been existing and has been only reincarnated or reintegrated.

Take another example in Pujehun; a Kamajor killing another kamajor’s father and they were living in the same town but they were miles apart.  There is peace, the President said let us forgive and stay together.  But these were vulnerable creatures, they were able to come together for the first time to embrace each other at the ceremony.  For us, that was a real symbolic act of reconciliation which the people themselves appreciated because they thought that they were sitting on a time bomb where ex-fighters would come to engage each other, that would create another problem.  So we believe that if only our traditional rulers and our religious leaders in their respective communities will promote the process of reconciliation, things would change and ultimately that will be our hall-mark, that will be our end result of attaining sustainable peace in this country, when people will put the past behind them and move together.  It will take sometime for others, the wound is so deep that they cannot heal overnight.

Commissioner Torto:    I just want to add to what Chairman had said.  There is also another aspect of reconciliation where it happens to be issues of mass killings or massacres.  There are several places in the country from the history of the war itself you will be aware that there has been mass massacres, killings at a place like Tombodu in Kamaya Chiefdom where the Commission went; we saw the pit, the famous SAVAGE PIT where over two, three, four, five hundred people have been dumped, we saw the building where they were burnt alive.  We have visited a village in Port Loko district called MANARMA where about according to the town chief he mentioned about fifty or sixty people were buried in a mound of earth.  We have heard of the TALIA, GBONGBO – TELU, Telu massacre in Bonthe.  On Saturday we were at TIHUN SOGBINI Chiefdom, Bonthe District where there was an incident of killing.  The Chief was talking about hundreds and hundreds; we actually reconciled and I hope our media people will show that on Television where the Paramount Chief performed their kind of reconciliation ceremonies with the Paramount Chief and the chiefdom elders stooping down about two or three times and so on doing certain recitals.  And we were being elated by the fact that we saw their countenance changed by the time we were leaving…………………….  We didn’t stop there, we went to the site where the chief said they gathered the bones and buried them all of about five or six hundred people.  I don’t know the exact number according to that chief.  So, we lit up candles, stood around, I hope the television people will show that.  The Deputy Chair and myself and everybody and the village Chief and the Paramount Chief again performed the traditional healing process which you know the act that established us allowed us to do.  So we are very much doing this and both teams are satisfied at the pace we have been achieving this.  It is usually symbolic; we cannot apologise or crave a kind of system to everybody in this country because everybody was affected.  We will do some of these things so that the messages go down.  As people see things by that they will take courage on the examples and from that kind of thing and then adapt their own psychological feelings to the whole town.

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    I am gratified anyway.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Do you have any other question?

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    No questions.  I want to put in about three recommendations, but before I do that, I’ve spoken with the Executive Secretary, I think the Commission requested government to make a submission but since I was not in government, I ought to have come and make the submission.  I have requested the Director of Prisons, which is an arm of government, the Inspector General, which is an arm of government at the time as well as the CDS an arm of government, they would do a presentation.  That presentation, the submission of government will come in and fortunately the Vice President has come in and I think he’s brought a lot of submission which concern the government of the time.  So I felt I should inform the Commission about that case they say government.  I don’t want to be held for contempt of court.

And then my recommendation:  1.  I think to sustain your work after you have completed your exercise whether it will not be advisable for a human right commission to be established by law.
2. The abolition of the death penalty as a sanction for capital offences.  Enact laws in so far as it touches murder the death penalty is mandatory because those were laws that………………….. but when it comes to the treason trial, the offences it say shall be liable, an that has been settled that there is a discussion.  But to clear every doubt of the future I think now that we are a democracy, a civilised country I think we should begin to think about abolishing the death penalty.  Then so far as the court martial is concerned, we are happy that the appeal has been restored.  But I think it is an appeal to a special appeal court martial tribunal.  Not the normal appeals to the courts of appeal, to the supreme courts but a special court martial appeal tribunal perhaps we should consider that.  So it doesn’t go back as far as the civil appeal are concerned because when it involves the military it’s a different matter, there must be speed so to speak.  At the same time given an opportunity for the exercise for the rule of law.  I think one stage is sufficient not going through the horror, the court of appeal and to the supreme.  They should set a Special court of military appeal.  It will be a court of appeal constituted by the soldiers themselves.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    May I suggest that you send these recommendations written so that you will be able to elaborate on them.  We won’t call you to read them.

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    OK. I’ll do that.  And then finally, perhaps you might need time because I don’t think you will be able to complete within the specified time I don’t know.  If that is so, then we are willing to extend the time.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Well, yes I think we’ll be very happy if you add and with the additional funds.

Eke Ahmed Halloway:    Yes indeed and finally I must thank you very much for the public service you give to this country at least to bring justice at least by speaking the truth.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much Mr. Minister and Attorney General, thank you for coming and for the time you’ve given to us.  You may step down now.

I think this will be the end of our hearings for today the Commission has just returned from the provinces and we still trying to find our western area legs and so we close down a little earlier than usual today to come back at 9:30 tomorrow morning.  Our apology to Mr. Victor Foe but he is here with us anyway and he’ll come again.  Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen see you tomorrow at 9:30.

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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS ON THE 1998 DETENTION TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Ladies and gentlemen, the TRC has just come back from the provincial tours, Team A from Magburaka and Team B from the Bonthe District and we are about to start again our Institutional and Thematic Hearings.  As usual we should start with meditation and I’ll ask you all to stand up and silently pray according to your different precision.  Ladies and gentlemen this morning, I am presiding, Lawyer Marcus Jones and later on you will be able to hear the Chairman of the Commission Bishop Humper and the other commissioners as we go along.  At the beginning of the week. I’ll like to remind you of our procedure here.  All the witnesses who come up to give their testimonies are treated with respect and as they give their testimonies photographers; those accredited are asked not to take photographs, they could after the testimonies or just before and while the testimonies are going on, we would ask you please not to talk, not to laugh, not to boo, not to clap but to listen quietly.  We would not like to have the cause to ask anyone to leave the hall, thank you very much.  Leader of Evidence are your witnesses here?

Leader of Evidence:    Madam chairperson, our first witness for today is present.  It is Mr. Solomon Berewa, Vice President of the country.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    We may have our first witness, His Excellency the Vice President Solomon Berewa and on this occasion for record purposes, we are going to allow photographers to take photograph.  While still he’s here……………. Please give his name in full.

Solomon Berewa:        I am Solomon Denma Dominic Berewa.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Are you a Christina or Muslim?

Solomon Berewa:        I am a Christian.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Please take the Bible and say after me.

The Witness was sworn on oath on the Bible.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Your Excellency we are pleased to have you here this morning and particularly so that you’ll be setting an example to others who are still dragging their feet to come and we are looking forward to your testimony.  So please if you could tell us what you want about the topic for this morning and if you could please go a bit slowly because we have an interpreter and also we have people taking down your testimony.  Thank you very much.

Solomon Berewa:        Thank you my lord.  Can I proceed?

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Yes.

Testimony:

Mr. Chairman, Members of the commission, in answer to your summons, I had prepared a brief statement on my activities as Attorney General, Minister of Justice during the period the commission is looking into.  Please permit me to read that statement… I’ve already furnished the Commission with copies.  I’ll be prepared to answer any questions that may follow from it.  I believe the matter concerning me and which I believe the commission would like to know about will be my activities during the period that I was Attorney General and the amount of prosecutions that I was involved in.  so I will be confining myself to that topic unless honourable members of the commission would wish me to go outside it.  I was appointed Attorney General and Minister of Justice in April 1996 following the presidential and general elections of that year.  I held that position until May 2002 when I became Vice President of this country.  As Attorney General and Minister of Justice, I was the principal legal adviser to the government.  I was in charge of the prosecution of criminal matters and I represented the government in all civil litigations, including litigations against government officials sued in their official capacities.  My office has the responsibilities for drafting all legislations and legal documents for the government.  I served also as a link between the judiciary and the executive and between the legislature and the executive.  As attorney General and Minister of Justice, I also have the responsibility of leading the government’s delegations to the several peace negotiations held between the government and the RUF leaders, the RUF rebels within and outside Sierra Leone.  This resulted in the peaceful resolution of the eleven year armed conflict in this country.  My first concern as Attorney General and Minster of Justice was to restore the full force of the 1991 Constitution which was suspended by the preceding NPRC junta and to remove from our laws all the draconian and obnoxious decrees introduced by that junta.  The government also introduced legislations which will promote good governance, human right and reconciliation.  These were the first, the very first measures I and the government took on assuming office.  During my period as Attorney General and Minster of Justice, the only capital offences I prosecuted were treason trials conducted in the civilian court and treason trials by court martial.  I am, I’ll give an account of one of those types of cases, treason trials conducted in civilian court.

One, the democratically elected government of President Amad Tejan Kabba took over office in 1996 from the military junta the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).  There were several reports of efforts by the military to destabilise the government.  Early in 1996, a coup plot was discovered, as a result of this a number of junior military personnel and a military officer Major Johnny Paul Koroma were apprehended.  Because of the prevailing mood then in the country and the desire to have a fair and objective investigation into the matter, His Excellency the President asked for and received from the Nigerian Government a team of experienced investigators.  They conducted further investigations into the alleged coup plot and out of a total of over thirty suspects in custody, the investigations revealed the active involvement of about nine of the suspects.  Although all these nine suspects were military men, I chose to charge them with treason in the civilian court.  The charges were duly preferred under the treason and state offences act 1963.  So now if you see I’m not stating exact figures because I cannot now recall exactly how many of them they were and I have to go to the records.  I’ll try to get the indictments so that I can see precisely how many of them… eh… these suspects were.  So I can only say they were over thirty (30) or more than that.  I checked with the Law Officers Department for the files that are no longer there.  I understand they have been either taken by the Special Court or by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  It’s five (5) years ago so I can’t remember the exact figures.  All the persons charged being military men were liable to be court martial but I chose to have them tried by a civilian court because as the law then stood, the right of appeal existed only after a conviction by a civilian court and not from a conviction by a court martial.  In addition to the other procedural advantages the accused persons would have in a civilian court, I wish then to exhaust all the judicial processes of appeal in the event of their being convicted in the high court.  The trial of those accused persons was in an advanced stage when the coup d’etat of 25th May 1997 occurred.  All the accused who were then in custody and other convicted prisoners were released from prison, the trial was aborted.  Major Johnny Paul Koroma then headed the resulting military junta the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and a number of his co-accused were appointed to various offices in the government.

The next stage of treason trials is the one I’m coming to now.  When the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabba was restored to power in Freetown in February 1998, I was one of the officials who together were dispatched by him from exile in Conakry to act as a vanguard party to kick-start the government and prepare for the return of the President of Sierra Leone.  For a few days after the ECOMOG intervention and the routing of the AFRC junta form Freetown, there was a vacuum in the governance of the country.  Because of this our vanguard team had to return to Freetown without delay.  On our arrival at the Lungi international Airport I came to know that hundreds of AFRC members and their active collaborators have been arrested largely by the civilian population and were then detained at the airport and also at various detention centers in Freetown including the Pademba Road Prisons.  I was also informed that the civilian population had taken reprisals of the number of those AFRC members and their collaborators who were then perceived as enemies of the people and were seen as those responsible for the torture, maiming and suffering the people have endured during the nine months rule of the junta.  One of the first things I did on my return to Freetown was to comply with the instructions I received from the President before I left Conakry namely:  To take measures to ensure that no one took the law into his own hands and that all persons in custody anywhere in he country were duly protected and not subjected to any form of ill treatment.  At the first opportunity, I relayed this instruction to the ECOMOG officers on the ground and by and large they did everything to afford the necessary protection.  
I then directed that all persons detained were to be removed to the Pademba Road Prisons be removed to the Pademba Road Prisons or police stations where their personal protection safety would be better assured, this was done, neither I nor the government ordered the arrest of any person after the restoration of the democratic government in February 1998.  This was not necessary because all those who needed to be detained were already in custody.  
In due course, investigations were conducted into the events leading to the coup d’etat of 25th May 1997 and the conduct of the members of the junta and their collaborators during the period of the junta rule.  This resulted in preferring treason charges against a total of about 60 civilians and the preferment of charges against about 30 military personnel in the same category in a court martial.  All the trials attracted a lot of public attention local and international.  A number of foreign and local journalists witnessed the entire trials.  I took extra care to ensure that there were due process and that the trials were truly fair and transparent and the accused persons received proper legal representation of their own choice.  Various international human right organisations, the International Bar Association and the British Bar have representative witnessing the trials.  The conduct of the proceedings were on the whole commended by all as fair.  
Out of the four indictments preferred against the civilians, three were tried to conclusion and all the accused persons were convicted and sentenced to death.  The trial on the fourth indictment was never completed.  While the appeals of the accused persons sentenced to death were pending, the atrocities of the 6th of January, 1999 leading to the huge massacre and destruction in Freetown occurred.  This was followed by the peace negotiations in Lome, Togo which I led on behalf of the government.  Because of the amnesty provision in the resulting Lome Peace Agreement, all those convicted on the three indictments and those still to be tried on the fourth indictment were amnestied, that brought an end to those treason trials.  

Then the first set of trials, the 34 or so military personnel who were charged with treason for their roles in the Coup d’etat of 25th May, 1997 and for their activities during of the junta were tried by court martial convened by the Chief of Defence Staff under the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces Act 1961.  Again strict due process was observed at these trials and the same foreign and local observers as of the trial of the civilians witnessed these trials.  The accused persons were duly represented by lawyers of their own choice.  I led the prosecution, I was very sensitive to the fact that the accused persons were facing capital offences and that they had no right of appeal under the law, so I ensured that the trials were even further transparent by seeking and obtaining the permission of the court martial for a live television and radio broadcast of the entire proceedings.  The proceedings were acclaimed as very fair by both local and international observers.  It resulted in the acquittal of two of the accused persons and the conviction of the rest.  Their convictions were duly confirmed as required by the 1961 Act.  After the consideration of the prerogative of mercy committee established under Section 63 of the Constitution, some 23 of the accused persons were executed.  It needs to be noted here that the 1961, that is the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces Act originally contained an elaborate appeals provision for trials by court martial, but the then APC government in 1971 had repealed.  The entire appeals provision in that Act there by rendering appeals not available to persons convicted by court martial, the right to appeal after conviction by a court martial has now been restored by the present government.  So court martial now have the right to appeal.

Then, the last topic I have written down is that dealing with the establishment of the review committee now hundreds of persons have been detained mainly by aggrieved civilians in the wake of ECOMOG intervention in February 1998.  I discovered that I could not…. That I could obtain credible evidence to prosecute only those who have been subjected the false civilian indictment and the court Martial.  The rest were in custody on basis of insufficient evidence.  There was intense popular agitation and resentment against the release of all those still in custody, and there was repeated and often violent demand from the population for their trial.  Professional I could not……………………… to such demands as the evidential materials then in my possession were not sufficient to warrant the preferment of any charges against such persons.  I therefore had to find a way of ensuring the early release of such persons and at the same time prevent a popular unrest having regard to the precarious security situation then prevailing in the country for this reason I caused the appointment of a committee to review the cases of all persons……….. any charges.  The committee was given wide powers including the power to order the immediate release of any person who after the review of his case deserved to be released immediately.  The only power this committee did not have was the power to recommend the prosecution of such person.  The committee was headed by a senior legal practitioner and its membership included representatives of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, Sierra Leone Association of journalist, the University and Students Organisation and other civil society bodies, even the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone was represented on it.  It was through this process that we were able to bring an early end to the detentions and at the same time prevent a popular uprising following the restoration of the government in February 1998.  That’s my brief statement. …Eh……. members in the Commission.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much, Your Excellency for your testimony.  The Chairman and Commissioners will ask you questions just for elucidations of some points, and the Leader of Evidence will ask you questions too if she has any. And after the questions, if you have questions for the Commission, we’ll be pleased to have your questions and then your recommendations, which you would like us to include in our final report.   Chairman,

Chairman:    Your Excellency I want to join the presiding chair our Deputy in thanking you for honouring or invitation.  Your presence and before this time that of the Attorney General who is also present here will send a signal to the Sierra Leone community that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission cannot accomplish its mandate without the total cooperation of every Sierra Leonean.  Your Excellency, the Commission is now engaged in thematic and institutional hearings, we had before this time dealt with the 19… December 1992 trials and executions and we come to 1998 about detentions trials and execution.  In the case of the 1998 trials and detentions, there are two schools of thoughts I want to establish before we go forward in asking those . some of those questions for clarification and for our proper understanding.  But that’s the sum total of it all in dealing with this theme; one school of thoughts maintains that the trials were done hurriedly and therefore devoid of justice, that is one school of thought.  The second school of thought maintains that infact there was no need for those trials and therefore the government dared in the execution of those they executed.  Those are the two schools of thought.

Solomon Berewa:    I thank you very much for raising these two issues.  I never, never really thought that anybody would hold the view the trials were done hurriedly.  After the restoration of the government and as I said we didn’t spend any time arresting people, they were already in custody and we set in motion, the mechanism for investigating those in custody, one the prison was very full and there was a lot of taunting by members of the public of suspects, their families and so forth.  So it was necessary for an early action to be taken on their matter.  I decided to concentrate on the case of the civilians in the first place.  I set up a large team of investigators; Special Branch investigators, CID men, I drafted a lot of them to do the investigation, to obtain statement from almost everybody who was in custody and then… that is the civilians first, went through those, I shifted then those who were to be charged and as I said the category the vast majority of them were not to be charged.  So we narrowed it down to a very small number and preferred those charges… am took the civilians to court while the trials were on, the same team that investigated that large number of civilians investigated the military men.  They did the same, they took the same time, the same care to investigate and narrowed their number down to the 30 or so I have given. And that was submitted as it is, as the law required the findings from the investigators were submitted to the CDS.  They too have a council that looked at these things and then they okayed the findings.  The statements and the findings.  The statements and the findings were submitted.  They took some time there then they gave their clearance, the confirmation for the court martial to be held.  Then we didn’t go to the court martial immediately, there was the other question of even convening the court martial.  That itself took sometime because as.. we needed a.. one a military man who was also a lawyer, the Sierra Leone army doesn’t … nobody have those types of combining papers.  So we tried to get somebody from outside who was a military man and also a highly qualified lawyer to act as Judge Advocate.  It was only after we put all those things together that the trials started.. eh.. we distributed to each of the accused persons… I mean the… all the material that was against them.  Now we served them all to their lawyers.  They had them all, we gave them time to study them before we came to court, the court settled down and then we started taking the evidence, and no accused person or any of the observers either local or international complained that any accused was prevented from putting his case.  In fact the court bent so much back to accommodate them.  Their lawyers took a very dilatory process putting their case and all that, asking for adjournment we endured all that.  We had a televison set in the Court room, played video sets, video cassettes of activities in which the accused persons were involved, not just the statements but the cassettes of activities which they were involved.  They saw it, those.. the the, the audience in court saw it and I believe the nation too saw it and from all that piled up, anyway we spent a long time on it.  I cannot tell you the… I wish I knew or either searched to tell you how long it took.  It took months, not weeks.  It took months for the matter to be concluded.  The defence were given enough time to put their defence.  The Judge Advocate addressed the Court for days analysing the evidence then the panel took their decision.  So if there is any accusation of having been… the trials having been hurriedly carried through, I don’t think with respect there is any basis for that.  We were so particular about that one.  I can assure you of this because even if, even though that’s what I would have done in anyway but the mere presence of those international observers, reminded my doing, my exercising a little bit more caution.  Then the next thing that the trial… there was no need for the court-martials, well we now know we now know why there is a need for just or some type of accountability for things.  If after the coup, after the restoration of the government in 1996, those who were involved in the malpractices during the NPRC junta period, if they had been tried, we may never have had the 1997 coup, we may never have had the problems we had, we may never have had the 6th of January in the country.  That’s why some of us are so happy that the TRC is there now, the Special Court is there.  People can now know that they will not treat the citizens of this country just anyhow.  Deprive them of their properties, their lives, their arms, their eyes,… something had to be done and I can say this… eh.. in 1998 if the government did not act, there will be a real backlash against the government and it was necessary that to be done .  Now you mentioned the executions of 1992, there is no comparison.  The executions of 1992, there is no comparison.  The executions of 1992 were extra judicial  nobody even knows where the trials, if any trial, where it was held.  Nobody even know where their executions were held, nobody knows who presided, nobody knows whether it was in day time or night time, nobody even knows under what law, nobody knows what offences they committed.  That is it, that was the state of affairs at that time.  So they are not comparable with respect at all, infact these were some of the obnoxious laws I referred to in my statement.  The NPRC enacted a decree, Decree no. 12 of 1962 which came out after the executions, we saw it after the people have been executed which authorized them to try civilians in what they call court martial without specifying the place of trial, the panel for the offences, so those are the early decrees that we disposed off, so they are not comparable.  This one as I was saying, so I carefully referred to the legislation that was in force and infact it’s just now that we have really amended… eh…eh drafted the new Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces Act.  But the 1961 legislation which was based on the English Army Law – Army Act, it was based on the English Army Act, very fair with all inherent protection for the accused are there except that appeal thing which the APC government removed, the whole appeal section, they removed it in 1971.  Of course we could not introduce it retrospectively to meet the due then at hand in 1998, but after that we have reintroduced it.  So there is now an appeal system like for any civilian court.  So I think there was real need for those trials to take place. I mean we now know even ..eh.. after the trials we came to know more of the atrocities that were committed by those people at that time.  So to have left them without some type of punishment, I think that means we would not have done justice to the population or to the victims concerned.

Bishop Humper:    Yeh… Excellency I follow up on that last point of .. em.. so to speak meddling with the constitution.  I am asking a hypothetical question, if APC had not meddled with the Constitution repealed the right of trial in the constitution, would the government or the trial body have used a different mechanism in handling this situation at that time?

Solomon Berewa:    I mean; infact it was not the constitution it’s the Act.

Bishop Humper:    the Act?

Solomon Berewa:    Yes the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces Act.

Bishop Humper:    Correct.

Solomon Berewa:    The APC had removed the whole as I say the whole provision dealing with appeals.  If they had not removed it of course we would have been bound by it, just like with the civilians.  Eh..e… we would have been bound by it, the accused persons or those convicted would have had a right to appeal and the government would have abided by that.  But then there was… it didn’t have it… there was no right to appeal and no appeal court will hear you if it did not.. eh..eh…eh. . your sister there knows the appeal court will not hear you unless you tell them the authority under which you have involved them… you see, so they couldn’t have gone before them to… so there was no right of appeal.. yeh… but because we knew it was dangerous, that’s why as soon as the government settled back, we reintroduced it.  We just cancelled their repealed provision and we say we go back to where it was before 1971.  So the military people have now the same right of appeal;  the court of appeal to a supreme court like any civilian and we would have abided by it of course we couldn’t have done otherwise, even if it took ten years, we would have been on it, we would have gone to the court of appeals, the supreme court taking our time… we were not in any particular haste, and there was nothing more left to be done after their conviction except the consideration that the prerogative of mercy committee.  First the confirmation of the conviction by the .. eh.. Chief of Defence Staff.  He had to confirm it, then he sends it now to the prerogative of mercy committee which will consider it and advice the president accordingly.  So all those processes were scrupulously observed.

Bishop Humper:    your Excellency, the general assumption is the .. em.. the government detained those people and from your explanation you go back to the penultimate paragraph on page 4 of your presentation, you’ve given us some new dimension as to “who detained those people who were already at Pademba Road before you finally came back to take over, and who were at Lungi and other areas already detained?”, but the question we yearned, we are very much particular about detention, that is the detentions, so you’ll need to give us some more clarification on that one you see, whether it was government parse who came in began burning up people all over or you already found that in place?

Solomon Berewa:    Yes that’s interesting.  Infact as I look in this hall, I can see some of those who were already detained at Lungi when we arrived.  Some of them are sitting in this hall, .. eh… they were there and there were a number of them at the central … eh.. eh.. George Street, that’s the Police Headquarters.  There were also a number of them at the Central Police Station just by Big Market.  I knew there were more of them again at .. eh.. Congo Cross but of course there were non of them in Kissy, at the Kissy Police Station.  Instead of arresting them further we put an end to further arrest, because they were just arresting people left and right for different reasons… I mean you know this place.. eh.. this our place, our country, people will be self thing that perhaps people have some motives other than just to ensure that justice was done, so we had to put an end to any further, infact I had to make an announcement in the radio that no civilian had the right to arrest any other person.  So we put an end to the arrest and as I said in my paper, there was no need for government to arrest anybody, our concern really was to reduce the number of them because the government came there was no money, there was no food… when they are in custody they had to be fed.  So it was important that the number of those in custody was reduced as quickly as possible so we did not go on arresting more increasing the number, but at the same time as I say the mood of the population was such that if we have precipitate about it, there would have been a real problem again and they would have turned against the government or some of us… the few of us who had returned from exile.  So we had to go very carefully and therefore those we deemed it who did not deserve to be in custody stayed a little longer like they would otherwise have been… if was a normal situation.  I would not have asked for a review committee to be set-up as Attorney General, we would have just looked at it and instructed and they released them but if I dared do that, that time, we would have been in real trouble.  So we tried to bring all those who can talk ..eh.. civil society those who we have.  Who could.. who would oppose this, we put them all together, we say you look at them and you decide and as soon as they say there was no case against any particular one, lets allow him.. Don’t tell me just order his release.  A very senior lawyer was chairman of that body.  University lecturers, journalists, trade union members, council of churches were all represented there.  So we threw the bulk at them with one condition that doesn’t recommend that any of them would be prosecuted.  Because if they recommended that they should be prosecuted I would have been bound by it and I knew there was no evidence.  So we did not arrest anybody, this I can say almost to certain, from the day we came back from exile, this could have been about two, three days after the ECOMOG intervention.  I.. my office had nothing to do with the arrest and I don’t know of any government order given that any person must be arrested.  The place was too full, the place was too full.  Everybody… the young man would go and arrest a big man like that,… but who would sent him there, we say no this was too bad, there was chaos… then it was leading to a chaotic situation.  So that was the first thing we tried to put an end to.

Bishop Humper:    Your Excellency, my last question for now is .. em.. is a question I myself have been….. with as Chairman.  People come to me… in Article 9 of Lome Peace Agreement, you have amnesty and pardon for those who in pursuit of their objectives would be granted amnesty and pardoned from 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement the 7th July 1999 the pertinent question interesting while I’m interviewing one…. That people asked is that, when in early 1996 Johnny Paul Koroma and his chronies attempted an abortive coup, was that part of their pursuit of their objective and what objective was he as a military officer using government’s tax payers money to be sustained.  Was he or pursuing an objective.  Then the next question that follows I do not want to have a second one, .. as you looked at the AFRC-RUF government in 1997 of which the same Johnny Paul Koroma became Chairman in, would it be rational for one to infer that most of those who constituted his government were the previous coup plotters whose trials was aborted because of the development which took place later.  In other words, did the Lome Peace Agreement covered those set of people? If so how much did it cover Johnny Paul Koroma and his chronies particularly? Thank you very much Sir.

Solomon Berewa:    Well the Article 9 of the Lome Agreement is… I mean very simple, very straight forward.. eh… it gave amnesty to persons irrespective of what they did in pursuit of their objective.  Now there were factions in this thing.  There were government factions, there was a government faction, there was the rebel faction and… eh… the .. the rebel faction comprised as you know the RUF who had initiated the civil conflict in the first place, they as we all know later on came to articulate what their objective was.  For years nobody knew what their objective was except to overthrow the APC government which they described as corrupt and inept.  Later on we came to know that they want power or at least to participate in the governance of the country, so we can take that as their objective.  But that objective was not won.  I suspect that could be shared by a military which has its own objective clearly spelt out in the constitution.  The constitution state the purpose for the military to safe-guard the nation against external aggression, to protect the population and also to protect the achievements of the people, that’s the objective of the military.  So anybody in the military who does not pursue that, then he is not pursuing the objective of his vocation.  Rebels by definition are to object or oppose the government if possible destabilize it, that’s their own objective.  Military man, a military ma, a commissioned military man who has taken the oath of his office is to protect the government, not to overthrow the government, that’s not your objective. So the amnesty provision in the Lome Agreement could not be said to be applicable to those military men who did what was directly opposite, the opposite of their objective, an objective for which they’ve taken an oath to protect… they were to protect the constitution not to suspend it.  Yes they swore solemnly that “well protect the constitution, uphold the constitution”, not to suspend it.  To suspend it was to act contrary to their sworn objective.  So I’ll say with respect that the Lome Agreement article 9 does not extend to them.  They cannot avail themselves of the benefit of that provision and this would apply to all the military men there.  The government interpreted the Lome agreement very widely.  There were a number of civilians who were opportunist, they were neither RUF were not military men but when the coup happened they looked at that as an opportunity to enrich themselves, they jumped on the bandwagon then they started plundering the wealth of this country.  They started giving very wrong advice to the AFRC.  They started purporting that they have the authority to interpret the constitution, which they didn’t understand at all.  They started misleading the public, going on the radio with the constitution under their hands purporting to be lawyers and then misleading the whole publicly because they were benefiting from it, it benefited them.  They even attempted to have access to the external resources of this country.

So that the basis of the nation can destroy them.  They were opportunists.  They were neither rebels initially some even had official positions with government before the coup they were not soldiers but he government in his generosity allowed them all to benefit form the provisions of the amnesty, they didn’t deserve it. But the government allowed all of them to benefit from it.  So that’s how generous the government was in the interpretation of Article 9.  Of course Johnny Paul Koroma says he could not claim the benefits of the amnesty at all so also the question as I said in my statement the number of those who were facing the trial in 1997 became head offices in the AFRC some were just the lowest military officers they were made to head the Athens of government.  So that’s why their conduct was so reckless because they were not responsible people.  You will see a Lance Corporal given a Ministerial position, he could not even sign his name, doesn’t know what was the dignity of the law that’s why they went and executed any number of students without trying them.  It was no business of theirs seeing dead bodies on the street every morning because they were not responsible people in the community.  So they became heads of various departments controlling people around so I don’t think they too can avail themselves of the provisions of Article 9.

Commissioner Torto:    Yes I have a few areas of clarification that I will want his Excellency to really make clear for us.  But I must join my colleagues in thanking you for your appearance before the Commission and that you are aware of our mandate appearance before assistant. Mandatory so for a very high ranking government official to offer to appear before us is a very good example that we are very much happy about.  So I have to join my colleagues to congratulate you for that.  I would now come to areas of clarification.  1.  Earlier in your report you stated that on page two that just after the NPRC had handed over power there were persistent attempts of coup or rumours or the exact words there are what?  “Several reports of efforts by military to destabilize the government which went on until 1996 when a senior government officer in the name of Johnny Paul Koroma was arrested.”  Why were those attempts at least the first ones were two attempts not nipped in the bud to forestall a recurrence of a military coup in this country?

Solomon Berewa:    Well you see everything was done, let me say this, everything was done in 1996 to forestall any further military coup those who were in the NPRC who handed over power to President Kabbah, a very generous arrangement was made of them and a lot of them, it was arranged for them to be out of the country.  The President had thought, had taken care to restructure the upper echelon of the Military.  So we thought those who had tendencies towards destabilising the government had been removed.  But in spite of that you get people making statements some not so well informed or some not having access to accurate information, they will come and tell you things about people planning to destabilize the government.  If you follow everyone, you’ll spend all your time doing nothing else.  So those types of rumours were coming round until that morning when ordinary batsmen to the NPRC boys who had gone, their batsmen were the ones who joined Johnny Paul Koroma who were caught in 1996 – late 1996 in the coup plot that was charged to court that one was, I think a very substantial one because when the rumours became repetitive of course the intelligence people started pursuing it.  It was the combination of those rumours that led to that plot and the arrest of Johnny Paul and his junior military officers.  Not that nothing was done about it but they had to be pursued otherwise even they would come today and say “this man is plotting a coup against me” then they will send soldiers there, the thing will become very unsightly, the government will become so unpopular because some people will even enjoy a creative exhaust stories to create more unpopularity for the government.  So discreet investigations will have been done by the intelligence people from their earlier reports and that led them to increase their vigilance and that led to their discoveries of the coup plot in which Johnny Paul Koroma was involved.

Solomon Berewa:    I agree with you outright that the mechanism, the security mechanism was very weak and that is so true.  Remember that the government has succeeded to a military regime, which had been in office for over four years.  The military Junta is not a government, a systematic government.  I mean, we were in the country we know how they were doing things.  The way they handled security is the same way they handled public finances, everything.  So there was nothing that the government succeeded to which it could build upon.  Everything has to be started from scratch so this was what was on.  Let me tell you that within two months of the elections of 1996, the government had succeed in bringing a team of Ghanaian intelligence experts to study the situations and to help us put together a security outfit and those have just submitted their reports when that first coup was discovered.  Again intelligence is not something I mean you can just teach people with books, they had to have some real training, the police force, we know how the police force was.  So you have the military intelligence which was completely destroyed; you have the police force which was nil.  So the two sources of information, meaning the security information were not available to the government in most cases some of them believe in misleading the government so that was the first attempt the government was doing to put in place a structured intelligence structure.  Now of course, we have all of these things put in place.  We have a whole department  of National Security.  But those were not there when the government took over.  And that Johnny Paul Koroma’s Coup took place within seven months – less than seven months when the government took over.  Those fires were on.  You must also remember that the government immediately took over, President Kabbah embarked on this peace process because government believed that if there was peace, if there was no rebel war other things could be put together so within days the government was fully involved with that as well so these were, if it was the question of having waited for two years there was nothing in place, then one could blame the government, one could say the government was negligent but you see the lapse of time between the elections of 1996 and the coup, the first coup of 1996, a matter of months then the May coup was just within  a year.  After that after 1998 the preparation, the security outfit that is there now is so cat-eyed that I think if there was none like that by now then one would blame the government for negligence but now when the government has had enough time sending people out for training and the correct gadgets have been acquired, there was no money in fact of collectors they would have acquired peace.  But now, those that have been acquired, the proper outfit is now in place, so I don’t think, in as much as I agree with you that the security situation or mechanism was weak in 1996, but that’s not the cause of the government’s negligence the regime that the government succeeded to did not have anything in place they were just busy collecting money, sending monies abroad, so that was the NPRC.

Commissioner Torto:  Thank you, my next question is why did the Judiciary Department, or your Department charge military men with treason in a civilian court and maybe if the answer was or is going to be a top leniency, was that not being too lenient enough to compromise the state security because the people were brought back into the army and they succeeded what they had attempted.  So these are, I don’t know if my question is really clear?  Why did you charge military men it should have been a military matter that should have been dealt with by court martial or some form of military discipline, was that not compromising the state security?

Solomon Berewa:    It was not.  Really it was not I don’t think it was compromising state security.  Whatever way they were charged the end result would have been the same only that charging them in a civilian court will make them avail themselves on the appeal process and therefore the final determination of the matter would have been longer.  When the evidence is good in the court martial it will be good in a civilian court – maybe convicted, they have to go to court of appeal and then the supreme court but the end result will be the same only that the process will be longer.  So either way they will not go back to the military if the evidence had gone against them as we knew it was.  Then you are right again that, you know we were lenient perhaps, lenient in the sense that we wanted them to have the best procedural advantages that the law could give an accused person.  Because it is to the average lawyer it is repugnant to the average lawyer that there could not be an appeal against a capital offense an offense for which the person may be convicted – executed.  So we wanted, it’s a matter of conscience really by taking a man to court one grain conviction without that conviction being tested by a higher court then he is executed.  It’s a matter of conscience so we thought we are to play it even if we are accused of being lenient for that first occasion – let us do it that way.  But we realized that our leniency was misplaced and that gave rise to the other coup so its not because we were compromising as I say whatever it was the result will be the same if the matter had gone to conclusion, if the first trial of 1996 had gone to conclusion to the final court from a civilian court to the same thing it would have been the same, now you see it would have been the same.  If a court martial is now held somebody is convicted there he had the right to go to the court of appeal at least.  You have no right to the Supreme Court even now, but you have the right to go to the Court of Appeal.  And in addition to that whatever the appeal court may say, that judgement will have to be confirmed by their own military body.  So its not a question of delaying it but I don’t think it is intended to compromise the security of the state  its just a matter of treating people fairly, which I think the government should really aim by doing that to all its citizens.  Except those who could prove that they don’t deserve it.  As the members of the AFRC showed.  When they showed that they don’t deserve it they went to the court martial.  That’s why we didn’t try them in the civilian courts again in 1998, we went to the court Martial we said this is what we had.  We are very lenient with you that’s why you did all those things and staged the 1997 coup.  So the other time we took them there.  We are now justified there were no concoction of conscience anymore.  We say you are now getting what you deserved.  If we did anything less we will be at fault.

Commissioner Torto:  Thank you – second to my last question.  Its going to be in two parts: 1.  On your return from exile in Guinea you found out that according to the written submission I have here the numerous citizens arrest were made by civilians rampantly and not to mention the extra judicial killings, my question is where the citizens legally right to have made those arrests, not to mention the extra-judicial killings?  2.  The second part is that, were any efforts made to actually investigate some of the extra-judicial killings that took place?

Solomon Berewa:    Well these are two questions in one.  Generally, generally I will say every citizen has a right to effect arrest in respect of certain crimes which you know have been committed.  Generally, you find that in our criminal procedure act-its there.  Felonies – if I see anybody stealing this book I have the write to arrest him.  Whether I am a policeman or not.  The policemen can arrest on mere suspicion.  Citizen, he must know that the crime is committed.  The conduct of the AFRC at the time, people knew, I will not want to go into some of those things.  But people knew some of the things they did which led to the death of so many people in this country.  They remembered the student demonstration and the number of students that were shot there.  They remembered the extra-judicial execution of the number of young men who were opposed to their conduct citizens saw those things and they were urging the AFRC not to do those things because they never concealed what they did.  Anything they did they will take a camera there, a video camera film it and show it on the Television.  The population were seeing that.  So when it comes to popular violence – popular agitation, any government has to be very careful.  Especially a government that is on his way out or that they ousted.  We are hearing that in other countries now.  The civilian who were not talking, because is there now.  That was the time they didn’t want these people to escape justice at all.  Because a lot of them were prepared to go away.  A lot of them ran away even Johnny Paul Koroma and others ran into the bush.  So the  civilians wanted justice to be done to those who had suffered in the hands of the AFRC.  Because of that they tried to arrest as many as they could.  Then as to whether any investigations had been conducted into the extra judicial executions, to be honest with you, no formal investigations have been conducted.  Because you wouldn’t even know where to start.  These were mob actions.  Mob reprisals and nobody has ever, as far as I know, I’m not a policeman but if it had gone to the police when I was Attorney General I must have known.  Nobody had ever gone to the police as far as I know who will say that I know this and that who were ever present when a particular person was executed extra judicially as a need to follow-up on the investigations on those matters.  So frankly speaking, no investigation had been conducted.  I know about two or three of them, I heard about two or three of them, there might have been many more but the prominent ones, I mean I know some of them even when we were in Conakry some were going there taunting us in Conakry.  I know them.  So when I knew they were far away we thought we were in a safe haven there.  Some were going there they meet us on the street in Conakry they will taunt you.  They will try to provoke you and then come back to Freetown.  So when the 1998 intervention happened and I heard that some of those who were going up come from here to Conakry to provoke us there.  When I heard that some of them had been executed I was not surprised.  Because if they could do that to us there, I wonder what they were doing to the people who were resident with them, living with them here who could not go anywhere.  So I was not surprised that mob action – mob justice was what they earn for themselves.  I’m not justifying it, but I mean one should avoid it.  Avoid creating a situation where you can face mob justice.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you my very last question Sir is to know before the departure of Johnny Paul he was a very important legislator – Member of Parliament as such senior government functionary – politician so to speak.  My questions are in two parts, first where is he now?

Solomon Berewa:    Where is he now?

Commissioner Torto:    That’s right.

Solomon Berewa:    I wish I knew.

Commissioner Torto:    That’s the first part of my question as to his whereabout.  Secondly, if he is absent from this country how would one describe his absence, what would be the position of government with regards to his absence, would I be right to conclude that to government his absence is sad, happy or just plain lip evadance of bad rubbish.  Is that the kind of – what the position of government along those lines?

Solomon Berewa:    Well the first answer to the first question is that I do not know where Johnny Paul is, and I tell you if I knew where he was I would have got that information past so that he will be brought to justice.  So I do not know. As to the second part of your question I wish he was alive, because like the process we are on now which we are all hoping that at the end of this exercise people will learn how to behave.  So I believe if Johnny Paul was around he would have been made to account for a number of things he did.  Which people saw, that whether you are president, you are Attorney General, you are governor, whatever you do, you have to account for it one day, those in authority will learn to act properly.  It’s not so much for him but for others to learn that because they are in office today, that doesn’t give you a license to do whatever you want to do to everybody at any hour and that there is a reckoning day one day so that those who may be in office after him will know how to behave next time so it would have taught a lesson to people and because he is not available now for that lesson to be taught, I think I will regret it, I will regret his absence and I believe a lot of members in the government will regret that absence.  And I believe he has acted like a real coward, not like a soldier. He should have come like a soldier and own up the………. And justify what he had done but to run away before he was indicted, I think he behaved like a big coward.  An attribute which we do not associate with soldiers.  It’s a matter of opinion really that aspect.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Leader of Evidence have you any questions?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much.  I have a few questions for His Excellency.  Mr. Vice President, you say in your written submission that during the court martial trial in 1998 there was no right of appeal.  Of course the APC government had repealed the appeals provision in 1971.  You also say in your submission that when you took office as Attorney General and Minister of Justice you started modifying legislation and also removing from the legislation all the draconian and obnoxious decrees introduced by that Junta.  So some laws were amended but this particular law that repealed the right of appeal for the Court Martial…………

Solomon Berewa:    ……………………..introduced by the Junta and the repeal of the appeals provision in the Court Martial was not introduced by the Junta.  In any case, we honestly thought that during our term of office we’ll never try anybody before a Court Martial.  As I told you we thought coups were matters of the past so nobody thought of procedures or Court Martial at that stage.  All I was concerned with, like for instance removing decree No 7 which I mentioned just now which the Junta introduced.  They introduced a number of decrees, those were to be removed immediately before the government could function and they suspended a number of provisions of the constitution by way of decrees or proclamations so I had to get those repealed immediately otherwise the government could not function.  But this 1971 thing has nothing to do with the Junta.  It had occurred over twenty-three years before the Junta came into office.  It could have been repealed later on anyway but it was not a matter of any immediacy. There are still a number of laws which we were removing gradually.  We could have done this as well as if we had remained in office for one year, two years, three years before the coup.  But the coup happened within months after we had taken office – after the elections.  So it is an – that one is obnoxious, I am aware of it but at that time I was not aware that it was going to be removed from the statute book even though I was a lawyer in practice, I was not practicing court martial law.  Its one of the most archaic things which lawyers have ever practiced.  

Leader of Evidence:    But as soon as it became clear that you had to organize trial before the court martial, why didn’t you change the law at that point?

Solomon Berewa:    We don’t change laws retrospectively, you don’t change laws – let me say this….

Leader of Evidence:    Please let me finish my question first.  Since the right of appeal is so fundamental and since it is not against general principles of law to change the law retroactive as long as it is to the advantage of the person who has to stand trial – of the accused?

Solomon Berewa:    Now it was – I try to create a scene for you.  Now we are sitting here in 2003 its quite convenient.  There’s no problem there but I told you even to just release accused persons suspects whom I knew has nothing to answer,  it was not safe, it was not safe for all those policemen or myself whoever was involved in those matters, it was not safe.  Now if I look upon myself at that time to say here was an appeal – even the question – let me tell you one thing, I didn’t want to say this but if you allow me I’ll say it.  The – we had a situation wherein the NPRC had confiscated people’s properties.  The government came and say no let us return some of – let us return them; set up a judicial process since it was not a trial, it was just a commission of inquiry.  Let us return them.  If they were trials, okay but they were not trials.  The government got, people became so angry that it is not you why should you bother with it.  That was when there was no problem yet in the country.  When there was no coup yet.  Now those who were facing those court Martial were regarded as number one enemies of the country.  So it would have been, I would have taken personal risk if I did not pursue the law as it stood.  The law had to be enforced as it stood.  There was no injustice to them, by applying the law as it stood and that was the state of the law at the time.  Why should I change the law?  I had a duty to do a favour to them.  I tried it once, when I tried, when I had military men who could otherwise have face a court Martial, tried by civilian court and as commissioner Torto asked me, it appeared I was compromising the security of the State.  So if at all again I did not apply the law, as it stood, I try to have it changed.  I give the impression that I wanted to confer some favours on the accused persons.  I would have run a personal risk to allow the law to be applied as it stood thereafter we’ll brought in an amendment.

Leader of Evidence:    But if you wanted to apply the law as it stood, why was the re-modification of the Criminal Procedure Act 1965 by public notice number 4 of 1998 right before the treason trial started?

Solomon Berewa:    I knew that there is…. Can you repeat that for me?

Leader of Evidence:    Yes so if you wanted to apply the law as it stood, why was then amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 by public notice number 4 of 1998.  Dated 9th April 1998 before the treason trial started and more in particular, why was the rule that asked for unanimity of the jury to sentence someone to death changed into the rule of eight votes on twelve which are required to sentence someone to death.  Why was that modification, amendment brought to the criminal procedure act before the treason trials?

Solomon Berewa:    I did not say that there was anything wrong in amending the law.  What would have been dangerous for me was to amend the law to give the perception that I wanted to compact favours on the accused persons.  That would have been wrong.  You have said that introducing an appeals provision in the law is a fundamental thing.  The law you refer to is a procedural amendment.  Procedural amendment can be made at anytime whether retrospectively or prospectively.  What you cannot do is to make an amendment.  The substantive law or a fundamental law as you referred to.  But the law you referred to is a procedural provion.  You might leave it to the jury,  those are procedural things.  So, and the public notice you are referring to, they all dealt with procedure as evidence.  For instance we made provision so that secondary evidence could be received in less stringent measures than normally could have been – we made provision for certain things which were all procedural.  So those could be done retrospectively or prospectively.  But the one you have referred to as an appeal, I could not have done it – 1.  because it was fundamental as you yourself have said.  2.  it will give the impression that I wanted to confer favours on the person which would have been improper for the prevailing situation at the time.  So I didn’t bother with it.  But as soon as it became possible after all the treason trials have been concluded, the amendment was made.  But let me just end that by saying, we all accept that an accused person has no property in procedure.  The procedure goes on, it could go on, it could go on as the case is going on.  What cannot be changed according to the constitution is for instance penalty, or charging, creating a substantive offense after the event.  Those ones are not allowed in our constitution.  So it was noting like that that we did in 1998;  the procedure is to facilitate the trial without necessarily doing – appearing to have done injustice.  And in our system even a single judge can try an offence except of course capital offences.

Leader of Evidence:    But apparently in 1996 you just said that this right of appeal was so fundamental that you brought the military accused of the coup before a civilian court instead of a court Martial.  So in 1996 apparently you judged that the right of appeal was so fundamental that brought the military accused of the coup in 1996 in front of the civilian court, which did not happen in 1998.  As you stated before because you said that the AFRC had shown that they did not deserve it?

Solomon Berewa:    As I, that’s correct, I mean we tried it in 1996 and as I say again as Commissioner Torto raised his question, he said by doing what I did in 1996 would be interpreted as my compromising the security of the State.  And I didn’t deny him.  I tried to be very lenient then because of this disadvantage which existed in the court martial.  But in 1998, I said well lets apply the full force of the law.  We do nothing wrong if you apply the law as it stands and that’s all that we did.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you.  My other question is about the review committee.  I would like to know what the legal status of this committee was and was there a law which established this committee and how were the members nominated?  That’s one and secondly, I would also like to know how many people were tried between (by this committee) since it didn’t have the power to send someone into – to order the prosecution of someone, have all these people been released and if not what happened to the people who have not been released?

Solomon Berewa:    In the first place, under the constitution, it is the absolute description of the Attorney general to decide on whom to prosecute, whom not to prosecute.  That was my own, my entire discretion.  I could have done it without reference to any other committee but we must always remember the prevailing circumstance.  I could have been stoned to death.  So I delegated my power to these committees.  I delegated my powers to this committee.  There was no legal statutory basis to it.  I delegated my powers to this committee just as the Attorney General does to the police. To the Attorney General or prosecute a particular case – that’s what I did.  But because of the sensitivity of the matter, I brought in all the groups that were very articulate.  I tried to bring in the opinion formats.  And I tried to bring in persons who will be very objective in their assessments of facts and rule to understand it.  That’s why I brought in members of the association of Journalists because they are very inquisitive rightly so that their job I brought in students they too are quite vocal and articulate.  That too is natural, I brought in university lecturers, I brought in members of the CCSL – that’s a religious group, they will balance it.  I tried to bring in the Trade Union people –  all of them.  I mean this people whose collective decision will be accepted and above all I already knew that there was nothing to charge them for.  I didn’t want them to recommend that I do what could not be done.  So I excluded from their powers the ability to recommend prosecution.  From what I have seen already, from what I have…… this again shows how fair we where.  When we get some people who had been investigated but just a limited number of them could be prosecuted.  So I told them I will give it in the end nobody was prosecuted, and nobody no -no penalty of any sort was inflicted on any of those that I left.  We just submitted to them all the statements that pertained to the rest of the people and they went through them and look at it and decide there was a very-very – one of the most senior lawyers in this country was Chairman. Of it – to guide them.  So if you want for the things to be done transparently let a decision in that matter not be taken by one-person even though he was the Attorney General.  So this was it, our desire was to be fair.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you, I want to come back to the second part of my last question it is said that some 5000 people had been arrested at that time, can you confirm that all those 5000 have been released? Or are some still in prison?  Or what became of them?

Solomon Berewa:    As far as I know, all those who were detained, arrested by these civilians, they were either prosecuted, or their release was ordered by these review committee.  And I even had a list of them.  When they ordered the release of anyone they will copy, they will write to me, they will write to the Director of Prisons and I will tick those other people could have been there after that but for those whom we met in custody I don’t believe there’s any one left after the review by that committee.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you Your Excellency, I think what is left is for you to ask us questions and then to give your recommendations for the Commission.  But I think it would be fair to you if you submitted your recommendations later on, we have written recommendation from you and it will be more helpful to the Commission.  We will call you in again about the recommendations.  And so for today we’ll just take your questions.  Have you questions you’ll like to ask about our process, our work?

Solomon Berewa:    Except to say that I feel the government has been vindicated in – I will say the insistence on having these procedures – this commission, establish the other court there.  Because as we follow the evidence that comes out here, I can say – the provincial tours of the commission particularly where you conducted these reconciliation ceremonies I think that is going to accelerate the process of that reconciliation so much.  I don’t just know whether it is possible for persons who come before this commission and give evidence to any wrong doing on their part against people in a particular area whether the commission has the facility for sending that person to that area in the company of an official of the commission to go and reconcile that person with the community there?

Solomon Berewa:    If at all it was followed up really the practical sense by the Commission sending that person with an official of the commission to that locality for him to go and repeat what he said to the Commission here and then the commission’s officials who goes with him to reconcile that person in the community, I don’t think that is possible at all.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Well so far we have been dealing with communities the communities where we are or communities not too far away from where we’ve been having the hearings but I understand what you mean and I’ll hand over that to the Chairman.

Bishop Humper:    Your Excellency we are engaged in reconciliation with the self’s reconciliation with the community and reconciliation with sections or chiefdoms as well as district level.  This means that where we perform the reconciliation ceremony on the last day and get these perpetrators to come, on behalf of the District or the chiefdoms, the Paramount Chiefs and the religious leaders will accept these people.  We have discovered that some of these people have dual residence.  They have their original homes like somebody coming from Pujehun and then meeting him at Tonkolili.  Now what the commission has done is that we tell the person you have to be accepted here in the reconciliation process. But this has to be repeated in the home.  We have come to discover that infact some of these boys did such atrocious acts in their places of origin that they came over here and are thinking that having been reconciled here will be the end of it all.  Now we are working out a problem that whereby we would take these people themselves to take them to their own community of origins and to have the reconciliation process replicated.

Solomon Berewa:    That is it!  That’s very good sir.  Because I  noticed like Makeni for instance, there are a lot of young men from the South and East in Makeni who might have committed atrocities in both places.  Their places of origin and Makeni as well.  You may reconcile them to the community in Makeni but still they won’t be willing to go to their places of origin so that will be hanging over their heads indefinitely and those ones will be watching for the time he will go for them to have theirs back at him.  So to make it wholesome, sometimes they will tell you their correct places of origin because they don’t want to be put on the spot.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Any other Question?

Solomon Berewa:    Yes Except to say thank you also for a service well done to this nation.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you I would like to thank you for coming here and giving your testimony and for answering our questions.  Thank you.  You may step down your Excellency.

Silent prayers

---

The hearing was called to order by the Presiding Commissioner Bishop Humper

My name is Victor Foh.  I am a Christian.

 The oath was administered by Presiding Commissioner.

SUBMISSION
I am the Regional Chairman in the Southern District.  I covered Bo, Bonthe, Pujehun and Moyamba.  I am here to represent the APC party, my topic is about The 98 Detention trials & execution.

The All Peoples Congress (APC) Party hereby acknowledges receipt of your letter  requesting it to make submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
 The APC considers this an opportunity to present its side of the story relative to the causes of the war which has devastated the country.

THE ALL PEOPLES CONGRESS (APC) – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.
(a) The APC was founded in the wake of Sierra Leone’s Independence struggle, and was officially declared a political party on the 17,h October 1960. This was in response to the clarion call by democrats to address injustices emanating from the poor colonial dictatorial form of governance that the British were bequeathing to the SLPP in the wake of the wind of change in Africa. A populist grassroots democratic political party, the APC was formed to address the needs of the poor, deprived, abused, underprivileged, depressed and marginalized within the elitist and undemocratic SLPP setup. In addition, there was a demand for “ELECTIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE” as was the case in other former British Colonies. Elections are the best form of eliciting the participation or concurrence of the electorate. This demand to involve the masses of the people was flatly rejected by the SLPP Government, hence the formation of the “ELECTIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE M0VEMENT” which later metamorphosed into the APC.

(b) The history of the APC in office is one that is chequered with coups and attempted coups instigated by some SLPP big guns. On the very first day the APC won the 1967 Elections, the late Brigadier David Lansana ordered Lt Hinga Norman (now Minister of Internal Affairs and Co-ordinator of the SLPP Kamajor Militia) to arrest the Governor-General (Head of State), the newly sworn-in APC Prime Minister, Siaka Stevens, and other APC stalwarts at gunpoint, and declared Martial Law. That treasonable action was the genesis of military coups and political instability in our country. We in the APC will always remember that horrible incident and for which we hold the SLPP responsible as the original cause of the continued political instability in Sierra Leone. Because the SLPP refused to bow to the democratic wishes of the people expressed through the ballot box in 1967, free and peaceful elections and consequent peaceful change of government has not been the norm in our country for a long time.

(c) To blame the APC for the devastating war that ruined almost every infrastructure which our Party in government constructed, is not only unfair, but glaringly shows a lack of knowledge of the source of our country’s instability. Since the APC was returned to power after the SLPP led Military interregnum in 1968, the ever present threat to remove the party from office by force of arms, forced successive APC governments into a self-defense and state defense posture. In the process, internal security and stability assumed a very prominent place on government agenda thus slowing down the full impact of our development strategies. Even so, the APC is proud to present to this nation significant achievements in nation building, a reality which even our political opponents will acknowledge.

(d) In spite of this stark reality, those opponents have continued to engage in an intensive smear campaign of vilification, mudslinging, misinformation and downright lying against the APC. This evil propaganda gained prominence during and after the Strasser Coup d’etat of April 1992 and the devastating 11-year-old war. Eleven years thence, there is still no discernable national development in the country. We in the APC proudly look back and affirm that the only significant infrastructural development in Sierra Leone since Independence was provided by our party in government.

TREASON TRIALS AND COURT MARTIALS
The APC is making reference to the various Treason Trials by successive governments with a view to ascertaining whether due process of the Law was observed. Thereafter, we request that efforts be made to ensure that extra judicial killings are addressed and discouraged. Also, the APC appeal to the TRC to recommend that the Laws of Treason be delicately and scrupulously guarded to avoid abuse and misuse.

TRIALS DURING THE APC GOVERNANCE
i) Brig. David Lansana and Others
The first treason trial was the case of David Lansana and others in 1968. That case is reported in the All England Law Reports, 1969 (Sierra Leone Edition). The APC stand by the records in those reports. That action by Lansana and Hinga Norman directly aborted our democratic experiment and brought the military into the politics of this country. In spite of this, during the APC administration, David Lansana, Berthan Macauley and others appealed against their conviction and the Court of Appeal presided over by judges of high integrity upheld the appellants appeals and they were accordingly freed.

ii) Brig. John Bangura and Others
The APC inherited an Army and a Police Force that were already very politicized. The first few years of APC rule were spent at repelling coup attempts by the Army and in the process valuable time was spent on consolidating national security. After several attempts by Brig. Bangura to overthrow the government, he was tried and convicted by a Court Martial through due process of the law. The views of the new Leadership of the APC regarding political executions is radically changed and our hope is that the Laws of the country relating to Court Martial would be revised in view of current international human rights considerations.

In particular the APC would urge that the process of appeal be maintained for Court Martial cases.
iii) Mohammed Sorie Fornah and 14 Others
Those treason trials lasted for almost two years and went through the due process of the Law. Death sentences were subsequently carried out. It will be recalled that both Mohammed Sorie Fornah and Ibrahim Taqi were senior cabinet ministers in the first Stevens’ government in 1968. They left the APC and formed a new political party which unleashed unprecedented violence in the country. The violence was so extreme that the government was left with no alternative but to ban the Party. In their frustration, they resorted to subversion and treason for which they were tried and found guilty. Records of those trials are a testimony of the truth in defense of the APC and the Laws of Sierra Leone.

iv) G. M. T. Kaikai, Francis Minah and Others
That matter went through all Superior Courts of judicature. In all those courts – High Court, Appeal Court, Supreme Court, Mercy Committee, the verdict was guilty. The Chief Justice at that time was the late M. S. F. Kutubu, a Mende of known SLPP sympathies. That verdict was carried out in accordance with the Laws of Sierra Leone.

EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS BY THE NPRC JUNTA
The NPRC Junta was an illegal, treasonous, brutal and inhumane regime. The APC believes that no legality could come out of an illegality and we humbly submit that whatever the NPRC did cannot be justified let alone the brutal extra judicial killings they committed.

The NPRC executed 29 people who had been allegedly convicted by a Military Court headed by Lt. Col. Kesboyah for allegedly plotting to overthrow the junta. All those executed with the exception of a handful of military officers including Major A. S. Jalloh and Col. Kahota Dumbuya were already in prison having been arrested on the 29th of April 1992 on the day of the coup. Bambay Kamara the ex-Inspector General of Police and Lt. Col. Yayah Kanu for example had been arrested and detained on the day of the said coup. All 29 people were allegedly tried on the night of 29th December and executed on 30th December 1992. The APC submits that no formal trials were conducted, but rather those 29 unfortunate Sierra Leoneans were tortured and killed extra judicially.

The victims of those extra judicial killings included 19 civilians who were arrested in a drinking pub at Lumpa village. Police had declared all of them innocent of the alleged crime. However, whilst detained at Pademba Road Prisons under the State of Emergency, they were dragged out of the Prisons and killed.

It is strongly alleged that those extra judicial killings were far in excess of 29 persons as announced by the NPRC Junta at the time. We appeal to the TRC to ascertain the number of bodies dumped in a mass grave at Kingtom Cemetery after those executions. In the interest of national reconciliation, the APC appeals to the TRC to recommend compensations to the families of the victims of this heinous crime. In addition we request that the TRC recommends that the ring leaders of the NPRC junta including its leader, Capt Strasser and their Advisors come forward and confess their sins and ask for forgiveness.

THE 1998 SLPP TREASON TRIALS / COURT MARTIALS
When President Kabbah was re-instated in 1998, he abandoned the pacific and reconciliatoiy line as was required by the fluid military and political situation then. The SLPP vigilantes and Kamajors were let loose like wild dogs on defenseless people. In a most unprecedented manner, Public Servants and many others who were collectively called collaborators were arrested and tortured. It is reported that the number of so-called collaborators who were detained at the maximum-security prison at Pademba Road numbered about 5,000 people. This is a prison with a capacity for less than 400 inmates. Perceived political opponents of the SLPP government were all rounded up, tortured and detained. Many unfortunate Sierra Leoneans were lynched or burnt alive by hysterical SLPP youths and Kamajors. People like Musa Kabia, Sheikh Mustaba, Sakoma and Abu Black – all members of the APC – suffered this fate. Radio 98.1 played a decisive role in instigating those murders.

The SLPP 1998 Treason Trials
Those trials were vengeful acts and a travesty of justice. All suspects were tortured and brought before the three established treason courts. They were described by Solomon Berewa, now Vice President, as “collaborators”. The Treason and State Offences Act 1963 has no place for collaborators! Was President Kabbah himself not a collaborator during the NPRC Junta which he served as Chief Advisor?

Public Notice No. 4 of 1998 issued by Vice President Berewa, then the Attorney General, is a disgrace to the integrity of all Sierra Leoneans. By that Public Notice which was issued after the offence of the alleged treason, Solomon Berewa deprived the accused persons of FAIR HEARING and violated Section 25 of the Constitution.

Public Notice No. 4 of 1998 also changed the old age Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 and the standard, historic and the unanimous 12-man verdict of the jury to a politically manipulated 8-man verdict of the jury. This was at the expense of the lives of innocent ordinary citizens of our country.

The treason trials were irregular, unfair and emotionally dressed up as the law even though they were not legal. In a desperate and exasperating effort by the Kabbah/Berewa SLPP Administration to exterminate perceived political opponents, that obnoxious Public Notice was issued. The APC appeals to the TRC to address that miscarriage of justice against political opponents in the interest of national reconciliation.

THE 1998 SLPP COURT MARTIAL
Never in the history of Sierra Leone has a government proclaiming itself a democratically elected government of the people, descended to such barbarous depths of brutality and revenge killings. When President Kabbah was re-instated in 1998, he appealed to all rebels and soldiers to surrender and promised that those who surrendered would be protected. A large number of soldiers thus surrendered to ECOMOG or to the Guinean authorities in the Republic of Guinea. Killing surrendered soldiers did not encourage their colleagues in the bush to lay down their arms. As a result, some soldiers joined the RUF rebels in a self-defensive move. It was that group that invaded Freetown, broke into Pademba Road prisons and set free all inmates.

With indecent haste and reckless indifference, the Kabbah SLPP administration having Solomon Berewa as hatchet man, killed 24 (twenty -four) soldiers – most of them Senior Officers – They were shot and killed after a very poorly conducted Court Martial.

The current head of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone and Nigerian Military Officers helped President Kabbah and Berewa to do this dirty job. No appeal was allowed! Can such act engender national reconciliation in a democracy? The answer is an emphatic No!
Of the 24 soldiers executed, only 2 (two) were coupists – Tamba Gborie and -Abu Sankoh a.k.a Zagallo. Both Gborie and Sankoh confessed in open court but Kabbah and Berewa refused to listen. To satisfy their whims and caprices, they tied valuable lives to stakes and shot them in cold blood. A woman Military Officer, Major Kula Samba in charge of rehabilitating child soldiers and combatants, was amongst those killed in cold blood.
We appeal to the TRC to investigate those Court Martial trials. The APC believes that President Kabbah’s revenge arrests, trials and executions cannot promote national reconciliation. They are a bad precedence for our fledging democracy.

CONFISCATED PROPERTIES AND THE DEPRIVATION OF ENTITLEMENTS, ETC
The APC strongly requests the TRC to address the issue of confiscated properties to the State by Military Juntas starting with the National Reformation Council (NRC) under the late Lt. Col. Juxon Smith in 1967 to the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of Capt Valentine Strasser in 1992. Whenever the Military intervenes in the affairs of state governance, they are quickly surrounded by opportunistic opponents of the ousted government who chart a course of action which invariably targets marked individuals of the previous government. Commissions of Enquiry in Sierra Leone have been used by Military Juntas as a quick method of vilifying officials of deposed governments and justifying their illegal act of overthrowing a legitimate government.

Commissions of Enquiry were set up by both the NRC and NPRC Juntas. Whereas the former formulated their white papers and followed the recommendations submitted by reputable judges of the Commissions and based their actions on those reports, the NPRC mostly disregarded the recommendations of the judges and vengefully punished all those they perceived to be implacable enemies of the NPRC from among the selected Ministers and Civil Servants who were summoned to appear before the Commissions. Furthermore, whereas the NRC allowed those adversely affected to appeal against the decisions, the NPRC disallowed all appeals. Also, the NRC published the Reports of the Commissions, but the NPRC refused to publish their Commissions Reports contrary to Article 149(4) of the National Constitution, which stipulates that Reports of Commissions of Enquiry should be published within 6 (six) weeks of their completion.

The NPRC reports were only made available to the Cross Commission four years later, in 1996. The said Cross Commission selectively absolved top SLPP members who were Vice Presidents and Ministers in the overthrown APC government of J. S. Momoh.

President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Vice President Solomon Berewa, as Chairman and Member respectively, of the NPRC National Advisory Council, played decisive roles in influencing the bungled Commission Reports for which Berewa was a hostile Prosecuting Counsel.

The treatment meted out to Ex-President J. S. Momoh, his former Vice President Abdulai Conteh and other APC officials by the Kabbah sponsored Cross Commission was very selective and unjust. The decision of the Kabbah government to strip them of all their titles and properties was not done in the interest of national reconciliation. Particularly unfair is the decision to deprive the President and Vice President of their retirement benefits. Former Leader of SLPP Salia ]usu Sheriff and who was also Vice President under Momoh was curiously rehabilitated- by Kabbah in spite of the fact that there was an adverse report against him. Our Party frowns at such high handedness and vindictive injustice handed down to our APC Leaders and Officials.

President Kabbah has been less than candid in his promises to restore to Momoh entitlements due him as a former President of Sierra Leone. The public and the international community are given the impression by Kabbah that he has returned properties confiscated from Momoh and rehabilitated him. President Kabbah told the UN General Assembly in 1997 that he had rehabilitated Momoh and accorded him treatment befitting an Ex-Head of State.

Compare the above treatment meted out to ExPresident Momoh to the humane reconciliatory gesture made by Momoh to President Kabbah when he returned home from his over 20 years self-imposed exile. The gesture included restoration of his own properties earlier confiscated in 1967 by the NRC Junta. President Kabbah ignored the implementation of the provisions of Act No2 of 1986 relating to Retirement Benefits for Ex-Presidents and Vice Presidents.

Even the late Dr Siaka Stevens was not spared the wrath of the NPRC Junta to which President Kabbah was Chief Advisor. The Parent decree establishing the Commissions of Enquiry did not cover the period of the late Dr Stevens’ administration. However, a witch-hunt was directed against the late President. In the end, Dr. Stevens’ properties were confiscated to the state in an unprecedented show of vengeance. As if that was not enough, the late Dr Stevens was stripped of all his titles and honours post-humously. In our view, this is a bad precedence which cannot engender national reconciliation and unity.

Against this background, Kabbah is believed to have dished a lucrative retirement package to his erstwhile Vice President Albert Joe Demby. We request the TRC to ensure that Ex-President Momoh and his Vice President Abdulai Conteh are given their gratuities and pensions using the same parameters. National Reconciliation demands compliance with legislative enactments.
The TRC may wish to find out where the NPRC leaders, who assumed a holier-than-thou attitude to their APC victims, stored their loot after they were removed from power. Most of them are believed to have bought mansions in Europe and America. Other civilian NPRC Junta leaders like John Benjamin and John Karimu who championed the 1992 coup d’etat and known to have acquired considerable wealth both within and outside Sierra Leone were also instrumental in the seizures of APC properties under the NPRC Junta. Interestingly, they are today members of the SLPP holding high offices and receiving favours from the current government.

The APC requests that properties confiscated by the various Commissions of Enquiry from 1967 be returned to their owners in the interest of National Reconciliation. The TRC is requested to ensure that retirement benefits deprived of people affected by the Commissions be re-instated.

At this stage, it is pertinent to state that the SLPP Government continues to illegally occupy APC properties. These include the Party’s National Headquarters at 39 Siaka Stevens Street and its Multipurpose (We Yone) Building situated at Old Railway Line, Brookfields. These properties were never the subject of any Commission of Enquiry. Their continued occupation by the present SLPP government is unfair and will neither enhance national reconciliation nor promote our new democratic dispensation.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
i Our submission ends on the note that the strength of the APC lies in the many infrastructural developments the party undertook all over Sierra Leone. Our greatest pride and strength are found within the pages of the 1991 Multi-Party Democratic Constitution (Act No. 6 of 1991). This is the APC gift to Sierra Leone.

ii To our political adversaries, the SLPP, we ask that they kindly hold sacred this Constitution in the interest of National Reconciliation, Democracy, the Rule of Law and Freedom of the Press. We regret to note that President Kabbah has deliberately yet consistently violated many sections of this Constitution in his vengeful and autocratic tendency to downplay democracy and strangle opposition to his SLPP administration. Such a tendency cannot enhance national unity and reconciliation.

iii Politics in our country is an APC / SLPP affair even in the context of Multi-Party Democracy.

iv. Like the chicken and the egg situation relating to which of them is older, so it is with the SLPP and the APC with regard to which party did what and during what period in the history of the country.

v. The SLPP accuses the APC for all the evil befallen Sierra Leone. We in the APC flatly deny this charge and instead, we blame the SLPP, the oldest political party in our country for being the architect of all dirty political tricks and evil that have befallen Sierra Leone including, but not limited to, the under listed:

a. Nepotism
b. Tribalism
c. Corruption
d. Vandalism
e. Election Rigging
f. Military intervention in politics and coup d’etat
g. The tribal “Ndorgbomvosoi” war in Pujehun District in the early 1980s h.
h. The Foday Sankoh RUF War of destruction and devastation
i. Legislation of bad laws: The Public Order Act of 1965
j. Expulsion from Parliament of Opposition Members of Parliament
k. Political interference in judicial appointments – the Gershon Collier appointment as Chief Justice and Desmond Luke as Chief justice
1. Political interference in appointment in the Civil Service – the Peter Tucker and John Kallon appointments as Head of Civil Service and Establishment Secretaries respectively in the early 1960s.
m. Banishment of Paramount Chiefs and political opponents from their home chiefdoms into strange lands. n. n. Cannibalism and Ritual Murders
o. Use of Secrete Societies in politics – Poro Societies.
The list of examples is unending.

Vi. Accusing President J. S. Momoh of promoting the Limba Tribe through his love of Akutay is as good or bad as accusing Prime Minister Albert Margai of promoting Mende Tribesmen in all sensitive positions during his term as Leader of SLPP and Prime Minister of Sierra Leone.

Vii. Can anyone deny the fact that it was Prime Minister Albert Margai who refused to accept SLPP defeat at the polls in 1967?
viii. Can anyone deny the fact that the SLPP Prime Minister Sir Albert Margai urged Hinga Norman and Brig. David Lansana, Head of the Armed Forces to stage the first coup d’etat in 1967?

ix. Can anyone deny the fact that the Beoku Betts Commission of Enquiry into the special coffee deal indicted SLPP President Kabbah in 1967 and declared him unfit to hold public office for which good character and integrity are prerequisites?

x. Is it not a fact that with the approval and blessing of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, ECOMOG Forces and Sandlilne Mercenaries invaded Sierra Leone and killed thousands of innocent civilians and destroyed properties in the pursuit of his inordinate desire to be restored to the Presidency? Did he initially obtain ECOWAS and UN approval? No! No! No!

xi. Is it not true that President Kabbah killed 24 soldiers in October 1998 after a sham Court Martial? Kabbah also got 69 civilians condemned to death for Treason for serving a Military Junta even though Kabbah himself had served the NPRC military junta as Chief Advisor.

xii. These and many more unsavoury actions on the part of the SLPP are hard to forget. They are the issues that make national reconciliation difficult.

xiii President Kabbah and the SLPP have given the most inhumane treatment to former President Momoh. This treatment of Momoh is the worst any democratic country has ever given a former President. Rehabilitating Ex-President Momoh who is today a destitute in Guinea will be a big step towards national reconciliation.

xiv.    Sierra Leone has been torn apart because of the vices of political administrators in the two political parties in this country – the SLPP and the APC. These vices are most prevalent and inherent in the political prostitutes with alternating allegiances. The likes of Dr. Sama Banya, S. B. Marah, Alex Koroma, Solomon Demby, J. B. Dauda, Harry Williams, Alhaji Daramy Rogers, Francis Conteh, Abu Aiah Koroma, Michael Abdulai and many more are dangerous in the context of national reconciliation.

xv. The APC is under political persecution at the hands of the SLPP. Democracy is threatened by the over bearing ambition of the SLPP to continue breaching the Constitution in a desperate maneuver to hold on to political power even against the wishes of the people.

xVi. National reconciliation cannot be achieved with an SLPP hand picked National Electoral Commission. The APC accepted this commission’s conduct of the May 14, 2002 Parliamentary and Presidential elections in the interest of National Peace and National Reconciliation.

xvii. The PEACE we are currently enjoying is a result of the resolve of all Sierra Leoneans to have PEACE. The APC congratulates all Sierra Leoneans for accomplishing this feat.
xviii. The APC denounces all evil elements and over ambitious politicians in the ranks of the SLPP for encouraging and supporting the criminal and ruthless RUF to wage war on and destroy this country.

xix. Can the RUF and the Kamajors – CDF and their collaborators justify cutting off hands and feet of our unfortunate countrymen? The APC is saddened at such heartless inhumane treatment the RUF / Kamajors have left as indelible scars of their unnecessary fratricidal war in the name of a conspiracy to overthrow and remove the APC administration from office. In our quest for national reconciliation, the APC submits that AMPUTEES should be appropriately cared for and compensated.

xx. The APC is proud of her records in office and these records are visible developments all over Sierra Leone. However, politics is not saintly and it becomes dirty with greed., impropriety and undemocratic overtures on the part of the players. As we urge our brothers and sisters in the SLPP to play the game according to the rules, we at the same time extend to them and all our countrymen and women, an open and forgiving heart and a hand of friendship and reconciliation. To all who the APC may have hurt in anyway what so ever, we say SORRY. Please forgive the APC and let us move this country forward.

xxi. For and on behalf of the APC, the Honourable Ernest Bia Koroma, Leader and Head of the All Peoples Congress (APC) extends to every Sierra Leonean his personal sympathy for the sufferings all Sierra Leoneans have been through. At the same time, the APC Leader extends to the entire country, love, friendship and good will.

xxii. In the words of Honourable Ernest Bat Koroma, Minority Leader of the Sierra Leone House of Parliament and Leader of the All Peoples Congress (APC) Party –
“The APC has forgiven the many people who connived to dismantle the APC and in the process, destroyed Sierra Leone and Sierra Leoneans”

“The APC embraces the 1991 Constitution, an APC gift to Sierra Leone and Sierra Leoneans”

“I invite Sierra Leoneans, in the democratic spirit, to put country before self and to turn a new page in the politics of this country.”

“To all my countrymen and women, please note that a political party is like a soccer team playing a game. The coach and players keep changing and so are the rules governing the game. The APC blends the old and the new membership and as a party both new and old APC are our valuable assets to play the game of politics.
However, my countrymen and women, be assured that our coach has been changed; our rules of the game are changed within democratic parameters and the current Leadership of this glorious party is an embodiment of change for the betterment of Sierra Leone.”

“The All Peoples Congress (APC) is urging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to exercise its mandate without fear or favour. I believe that only the truth can heal the many wounds inflicted on the people of this country and on both sides of the cultural and political divide.”

“Forward Ever, Backward Never. Truth crushed to earth shall rise again.”

Bishop Humper:    Thank you Brother Foh, we have collected and collected evidences information that comes before the Commission and it is only then that we ,…………… to establish points of issues for clarification.  Yesterday again, while the Vice President was making is presentation here, he shared, because and that is also in his submission, that the 1961 session of treason trials or what have you or Court Martial was repealed in 1971, when APC was in power that they did not allow the accused to appeal after conviction.  They found that in the records.  And they have gone ahead to do something about it but the fact of the matter is that is it the case that that particular laws was repealed.  In 1971 as was stated by the Vice President?

Victor Foh:    In answer to the Chairman’s question whether the law of appeal for Court Martial was repealed in 1971 is correct, they were repealed in 1971.  Out then, the Vice President’s statement about conducting the Court Martial under the existing law, is like   I do know, here who were tried and …………………… according …………..nor it substantially changing a whole lot of issues fair trial of government were appearing, if government were not vengeful, if those list were not drawn from Conakry, that is the same taken by which public notice No.4 was promulgated, government is the be all and end all.   They could have gone to Parliament, they could have amended the court martial law, there was no need for the rush.  It was indecent rush and haste the lives are gone, they cannot come again.  I am saying for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, if even where the law is law, I will expect the Government to say yes the law took the course.  It is regrettable that it happened.  The law is not always right.  And also a Court of first instance, 10 days after those people were remind, one day after the 10th day, they were all slaughtered.  Is that law?  We are going to stand by these laws.  For the sake of unity and reconciliation in this country, is that law?  The APC killed many people, through treason trials and court martial.  And I regret those killings.   I regret it for and on behalf of my party.  I said we were sorry for such loss of lives, valuable lives, I expect and I expected this from the Vice President yesterday, the law has killed those people.  But we regret it .  By …….. is not forth coming.  I will be going to reconcile this country, those who have gone have gone, but they have families.  And it is a small society, 4 million people in Sierra Leone, one farm, one city in America has 10 million plus.  12 million plus, 15 million plus, why can’t we come together, have we taken politics of revenge, all the 22, 18, years of APC, well never even send people to the …………. Reaching 24.  Few years of SLPP rule, at one go 24 people were slaughtered how we are going to reconcile all of these, the APC was wrong, and I regret that we went wrong.   If only so, and I stand bold that the SLPP was ………. Wrong.  They should stand bold to say they were wrong.  And then we reconcile, we talk to families, we talk to people, so this country can go before.  That is the way I can answer.  Shorten the stable, ………… does not pay.  If they have put back the laws of repeal, are those laws going to bring back the 24 people killed?  No, those laws ought to have been put back before the trials; so putting the laws now does not help the situation of course they do if we follow those laws, but by the same token they may ……………… taking them tomorrow.  However, we are promising now that the APC of now under Ernest Bai Koroma’s leadership will not tamper with those treason laws.  And we as a party, again ……….. that we don’t want these killing extermination for political crimes.  We should stopped it, …………… sentence should e repealed must be revisited.

Bishop Humper:    So brother Foe, on the question of extra judicial killings is not part of our association here, but is your concern and is also the concern of the Commission.  The 1992 trials and execution, we only hope that Brigadier Kelly Conteh, he had made the submission but had not had the opportunity to get him here, and to make his public submission to us, we also hope that Captain Tom Nyuma and Brigadier Maada Bio, and Captain Valentine Strasser will make themselves available for us to get detailed of those things that happened during their reign.  It is very crucial, ……….for this country.  But it is these personalities, who were quote unquote the key players, who could help us to get to the root of those extra judicial killings and we will make sure that we follow up that and we   

Ask you and the public to help us contact these personalities, so that we will be able to arrive at the core of protest here.  I will now ask the Leader of Evidence if he has any questions to ask.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you Chairperson, I have some brief questions, and I hope that perhaps that your answers might be brief and brief as possible.  My first question is what was the official accusation if the APC on the AFRC coup in 1997 and how was this accusation expressed?

Victor Foh:    The official accusation of the APC on the AFRC coup and every military coup is they are illegal, the APC never support change of Government by using means of force.  So the APC as a party, decries, the AFRC coup, that is the official accusation, and that official accusation if you look at my statement personal experience, Friday 1st July on the very first stage, under item two, the APC never sent me to do what I did, during the AFRC period.  The APC came as a result of democracy at independence elections before independence we stand by Section five of this Constitution wherein says sovereignty belongs to the people, not of the barrel of the gun.  

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you, my next question goes about the treason trials 1998, one of those criticism on this trial is that there was not right of appeal for those trials by the Court martial but the strength of appeal has been abolished by the APC in 1971 if I am not mistaken.  So why did the APC abolished it and why during the 20 years I think the APC could have restored this right to appeal, why they did not they restored it?

Victor Foh:    In our parent submission, we accepted having gone round on many fronts in governance.  Within these rounds, we did a whole lot of development.  A whole lot of group changes, it was mixed bad.  The bad side of governance at the time.  In 1971 one of them was the repeal of that law.  But I have said quoting Prof. A.B. Dicey an expert of unconstitutional law, some parliament government does not band in successful.  So if APC in yester yeas was doing bad, do we expect SLPP today to continue doing bad?  No so there is no excuse that they had to deal with bad laws.  Bad laws must be expunged from the laws of this land.  And I will assure you when the day comes, when APC get into governance, under Ernest Bai Koroma, we will look at the bad laws whether they were passed by the SLPP or the APC so that this country will be given good laws, to go straight.  So bad laws, it was bad that the APC repealed the appeal, the right of appeal.  It was equally bad, or it was even worst, that the SLPP that is in the other political divine could go with the bad laws.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you, in your written submission you, said that President Kabba when he was staying in Conakry in 1998 sent a task force to Freetown to carry out a nasty but hasty and killed anti SLPP elements in Sierra Leone.  Do you have any evidence of this?

Victor Foh:    I have, I was in jail with Abu Black who was a Temne headman for the Western Area.  The Kamajors beat him up and put him in a wheel barrow and dumped him half dead in the cell.  He laid there for 9, 10, 11 days unconscious and died.  I was in jail with Sankoh Filed Martial, the first name I have forgotten, they beat him and he went momentarily blind, he went deaf, he went drunk and he died, we have evidence we know that.  It is because we want to reconcile some of these names I can call them here.

Leader of Evidence:    Excuse me, I am not asking if you have evidence of the violations.  I would like you to tell us if you have evidence on the effect that there were these ten men task force and that this task force were sent by President Kabbah.  I said if you have any evidence on that?

Victor Foh:    Yes this evidence was elucidated here yesterday by no other person but the Vice President who called it another name.  He said they came ahead and they were doing this and they were doing that, that is before, the same thing he said in his statement, I don’t know why he …………… to, but check the records yesterday, he named the force.  He was part of it.  Julius Spencer was part of it, Alie Bangura was part of it. .Anthony he name the task force, and this was the task force that metamorphosis into a screening panel.  There were a lot of cautions on the screening panel which I said went into a money making screen.

Leader of Evidence:    Yes, but I think you gave it a different purpose, in your statement you said that the task force had to carry out a hit on the Anti SLPP elements. ……………………… that is my question, Do you have any evidence of that?

Victor Foh:    The abounce, whilst we were held, so many people were said right at the Bank of Sierra Leone, dressed on the walls of State House.  They took us to jail I have told you here in my public testimony that I traveled by land, sea and air from George Street Police Headquarters to Pademba Road.  They were taken us from here and there to kill us.  They killed so many people some of them they said were ……….. crimes, but they were never brought before the law.  There is sufficient evidence, I have it, infact we have compiled list of people so  …………. We have it.

Leader of Evidence:    So perhaps if you have any ……….. of the link between this task force and the visitations you can submit it.

Victor Foh:    Everything that happened it was a government sponsored, if it were not, what was the kamajors doing at Brookfields Hotel?   What were they doing there? If it were not government sponsored, I have given a …………………………….. made to them, it was part sponsored.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you, I have one last question.  Do you think there was a link between the treason trials and the invasion of January 6 1999, and what should be this link?

Victor Foh:    Yes in our view, my personal view and as a party’s view, is in this submission that heals the situation.  When the Government was restored.  If it were managed better, perhaps the January invasion should have been avoided; but when government said the army avoided; but when government said the army was disbanded in one throne they said again no, the army is not disbanded.  That was sending the wrong signals to the military.  It send so many of these soldiers, most of the soldiers into the mission.   They took up arms, and those intension, when some of these people saw their colleagues  ………………………….. in that way, they send a wrong signals.  I think the Greminer Convention does not allow one to kill a surrender soldier.  If you surrender, you should have the protection of the law.  But this people surrender and they were brutally killed.  So there was a direct link within those detentions huge amount of people, the majority of them were soldiers.  And when the soldiers and rebels broke the jail, some of us who cannot fire a gun did not hold a gun.  But the soldiers, the guns is their own tools so they came and fought.  I think there was a direct link between the miscalculations of the treason trials, the detention, the court martial and the January 6 invasion.   And that is expressed hereby in our party position.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you.  

Bishop Humper:    We thank you again brother Foe, it is now your turn, if you have any question or recommendation you can now make.

Victor Foh:    I want to take this opportunity as some body representing the political party the APC to ask this question, the TRC may not answer it but I hope it could be answered.

We have said in our submission that political players in the two parties in this country, the APC and the SLPP are responsible for the problems of this country.  My question is, why is it that foreign heads of states are trampled the ……… and then ………… ……………. Of their right in this country?  Why is it that the foreign heads of states of Sierra Leone will come in and go and by the next meeting we are disgraced, is disgraced?  We have denied everything all our right, why is?  And what can the TRC do to ensure that there is equity, there is law, human right of foreign heads of states are not violate, excessively violated?  Unnecessary because in Nigeria there are so many heads of states, foreign heads of states, but here in Sierra Leone our foreign heads of state are disgraced and how do we stop it?

Bishop Humper:    That is a good question and the nation is listening to you, we at the Commission can only receive this one and then we begin to put it in context whether it falls within our mandate.  The question though, the first part of the preamble which will concern with the Commission here you have categorically said this and this is not the first time, that the  political turmoil in this country has to be twist to particular political in this country, the APC and the SLPP were we have heard that over and over again.  And the Commission will look at that statement very seriously, but the question of foreign elements coming and going those are arms that are not immediately within our competence as the case may be, within our mandate, and I see my colleague will want to make a comment on that one.

Commissioner Torto:    Mr. Victor Foe I thought as you actually remind you of somebody who has been in Parliament and as a matter of fact one of those who actually passed the act as to the benefits of former heads of states     I believed you are very much aware of the benefits that should go to former heads of states after serving two terms, you qualify for Ex.

Victor Foh:    Those who have left office fallen, those who have left office.

Commissioner Torto: That’s what I am really addressing, there were now laws you will agree with me very well, you were one of those, you actually passed the act, that there is a legislation as to the entitlement of foreign or fallen people ex-heads of states so to speak, people who have served before, that is if they have served for two terms.  There is a package for a head of state and the vice, well the Vice President that you be, I think you will agree with me on that.   So to say they have been trampled on, I don’t know what else or what you exactly mean by that.  Because I remember very well, you were a member of parliament what that act was passed.

Victor Foh:    Commissioner Sir, we are not entirely wrong, I was not in Parliament but there was an act, Act No,2 of 1986, benefits of Presidents and Vice Presidents Act. No.2 of 1986, but I posed this question because this party that I am representing, All Peoples Congress, made the submission here.  President Momoh plus many others who have fallen from grace this country, had been deplored.  His military pensions, seized his presidential pensions and he is languishing.

Bishop Humper:    May I interrupt brother Foe, I would like us to have ourselves focused and the issues of the day, that is the 1998 detentions trials and executions.  Those other components are all the things that have been piled up here.  What we will do as a Commission, we had not have this report that leaders who have been out of this office are trampled upon that has to do with the Immigration and the process of law in the country which the Commission is not mandated as it were to go through but to go through those related ones.  What we would do instead of spending much time on this, is the information we have received from you.  We are the Commission will use our necessary instruments to find out whether these things are happening.  And if they are happening what the nation can do in order to prevent them from happening.

Victor Foh:    Yes I will appreciate that, but that is in our submission.  I appreciate the precision of the TRC for continuity for reconciliation for the betterment of this country we should learn to respect our leaders.

Bishop Humper:    Thank you, any recommendation?

Victor Foh:    So we will recommend to the TRC some investigations still, boarding on, you know you have said it all, if it could be recommended that, let government investigate one of this extra judicial killings and two, the killing of Musa Kabbia and others, let some Commission of Enquiry, when it was said yesterday and that nobody has complain to the police, there is silent majority, or let the government come out bold and set up an enquiry.  That is our recommendation from the party.  For the majority of people who have suffered this way of such brutal fate are our party people.

Bishop Humper:    Alright, I thank you very much.  Any other one that you need to recap that you have already recommended this time you were talking, now is the time for recommendation is here.  That has to do with the right of appeal court martial.

Victor Foh:    Yes the right of appeal for all classes of citizen be you a military man or a civilian, that right of appeal should be entrenched.  It should not be tampered with.    

Bishop Humper:    Any more?

Victor Foh:    And we have said this is just a repletion, the death penalty, I think we should, as a party, we are not in favour of, this death penalty, more for this political offences, the trivialities people loose their lives.  The death penalty, I think I will and here do for today.

Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much Mr. Foe I think you have always been helpful to us, and even with these recommendations which are very critical our existence as a nation we be taken into good part.  I want to continue to thank you for your cooperation and even more so far one today, I will now ask you to stand down.

Victor Foh:    So before I stand down Sir, so the party still has two according to the programme one the destruction of Koribondo, and finally reconciliation, unity and reconciliation.  I think by tomorrow next tomorrow I submission the destruction of Koribondo will be in and early next week, the submission for national reconciliation unity and reconciliation will be in.  I am sure the party leader will personally deliver the national unity and reconciliation paper.

Bishop Humper:    Thank you

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THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION HEARINGS

DATE 14 JULY 2003

NAME OF WITNESS:      FODAY S. CONTEH   (DIR. OF PRISON)

Leader of Evidence:      Chairperson our next witness for today is Mr. Foday S. Conteh, Director of Prisons.

Bishop Humper:    Witness of religious affiliation.

Foday Conteh:    Foday Soko Conteh, Christian.

Bishop Humper:    Please take the bible and repeat after me. (The oath is taken.)

We welcome you here Mr. Conteh and we will now count on you as one of those who will help the Commission in accomplishing it mandate.  This is no main task, all of you who appear before us will constitute part of the history of the Commission and the history of designing the new Sierra Leone. We will now as a Commission in joining you to share with us what you have proposed to do.

Foday Conteh:    I have submitted an ………. Copies of what I propose to do and I will ask the Commission to read from it.

First of all I will define the role of prison service in the Community.  The role of the Prison service is first under the law to hold those committed to custody, whether on remand, committed for trial, convicted and awaiting sentences or lawfully detained by Court of Order or executive actions and to provide conditions for their detentions which are currently accepted in the society.

Secondly in dealing with conditions of those offenders, there is an obligation on the service to all that could be possible within the occurrence of the sentence to encourage and assist them to be law abiding and on their discharge.

In addition to that we have two main functions that of custodian which I have just defined, and the other is to reform and rehabilitate the individual to fir back to society.  Now on the conflict, on divers dates in February, March and April 1998, several arrests were made by ECOMOG, CID and other personnel of those who worked in collaboration with the AFRC regime and overthrow the legitimate government of the SLPP.  Those arrested were brought to Pademba Road Prisons as detainees for safe custody to protect them from extra-judicial executions and other re……………  And honestly Mayiba was tortured and maybe one was killed, when they were in our custody.  In fulfilling our roles and responsibilities, well contained civilians and military personnel who were brought into our custody, when the constitutionally elected government was re-instated.  We held these …………. In the Commission of security, as supervision, wherein were appropriate for them.  They had access to legal representations, they are provided with food, medical facilities ……………. And the main conditions that were required of them are spelt out in our needs and ………….   All of those who were referred for medical attention as for the cases who were conveyed to the military hospital and were treated there, and the complement of their treatment were brought back to the prisons.  We even allowed private medical practitioners to visit in with and travel or prescribe medication for them.  In addition to that we granted visits by family members and loved ones to all the detainees.  On divers days in May 1998, those brought to the detention at the Pademba Road were ……….. and escorted out of the prison by CID and Ecomog personnel to obtain statements from them.  There after they were brought back into the Prisons to be detained.  In June 1998 after the investigation had ended at the CID, those detained at the Freetown Central Prisons were categorized into three divisions.

1. The military officers were charged to attend Court Martial
Presided by senior military officers i.e. the military tribunal.
        
2. The civilians that worked in collaboration with the then AFRC
were to face treason trials presided over by judges.

3. And the third groups those that have little or no connection with…

The AFRC were to face the Tejan Cole Committee.  All of them were in castrated at the Freetown Central Prisons.  As the then Attorney General stated most of these people had nothing to do with the ……………………………… but because of hatred, jealousy, individuals arrest them, and take them as collaborators, but it was later proved, that they were not so these people were taken to the Tejan Cole Committee to look into their cases.
The Court martial started on around the 23rd of July 1998.  During the sittings the Prison Department provided ……….

END OF TAPE A
 
TAPE B

The something applies to the treason trial and those who face the Tejan Committee.  They provided escort to take them to these various areas and them back.  And before the 12th October 1998 when the court martial ended 34 senior military personnel including one female were condemned to death at the military tribunal.  The under mentioned three military personnel were acquitted and discharged and were released from the Freetown Central Prisons on the 26th of October 1998 upon the orders of the Attorney General.  These were Lieutenant A.B. Bah. Lieutenant  Alimamy Ketta and Colonel S.A. Sinah.  The undermentioned 10 officers were sentenced …………. Imprisonment by the Court Martial. They were later on granted Presidential Pardon on 17th of July 1999 by His Excellency Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabba and were released from the Freetown Central Prisons on the same day.  They were SLA 333 Major 555 Major Tamba A. Abu, SLA 415 Lieutenant Commander AB Harrod, SLA 527, Captain Abdul Hassim SLA 652 Freight Officer Arnold H. Bangura, SLA 157 Colonel Alpha Saba Kamara, SLA 215 Colonel A.C. Nelson-Williams, SLA 848 Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Dowie, SLA300 Lieutenant Colonel Bashiru Conteh, SLA 214 Colonel A.B. Mansaray, SL 18163392 Warrant Officer 2 Showers J.D.

On the 12th of October 1998 24 male including one female had/were/condemn to death by firing squad,  SL 674 Captain Abu Bakarr Kamara, SL 272 Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Foday, SLA 18163271 Sergeant Abu Sankoh, Elias Zagalo, SL 429 Captain Idrissa Tommy Lahai, SL 51501, Captain Sima Sankoh, SL 301 Colonel James Max Kanga, SL 44 Colonel David K. Anderson, SL 462 Captain Albert Johnny Moore, SL417 William Abdul M. Koroma, SL200 Brigadier Hassan K. Conteh, SL 223 Lieutenant Colonel Boizie Palmer, SL 495 Major Bayor Conteh alias ………, SL 531 Lieutenant …………. Sesay, SL 412 Lieutenant Commander Abdul Aziz Dumbuya, SL 240 Colonel Samuel FY Koroma, SL 250 Lieutenant Jimmy Kelly, SL 220 Colonel John A.S. Conteh, SL 339 Major Kula Samba, SL 465 Major Augustine F. Kamara, SL 405 Lieutenant Colonel Bai Samuel K.B. Gilbert, SL 448 ………. Leader Victor King, SL 434 Captain Josiah Boise Pratt, SL 1816 4384 Captain Tamba Gborie, SL 287 Colonel Abdul Karim Sesay.  On the 18th of October
   
I was informed by then acting Inspector General of Police who was ………….. that he had received orders for the execution of 24 Junior and senior military personnel who were condemn to death by firing squad at the court martial.  On the 19th of October 1998, the Sheriff, the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was acting Inspector General of Police came into Central Prisons demanding for the 24 military personnel.  He handed them over to the Sheriff handcuff with no resistance.  Later the Prisons Officers escorted them out of the Prisons into the Police vehicle that was packed infront of the prisons.  All the 24 sentenced military personnel boarded the vehicle and ECOMOG provided security.  The vehicle drove off from Pademba Road Prisons into the Goderich firing range where they were handed over to another military personnel they met at the firing range.  The 24 were escorted to the firing range for execution by firing squad.  The then Inspector General of Police Mr. Kandeh Bangura, the Prison Imam, the Assistant Superintendent of Police Mr. Ibrahim Sankoh, the then Prison Chaplain Rev…………….. Williams, the Prison Medical Officer, Dr. J..B. Sandy and myself were present during the execution by firing squad.  The execution took place on the 19th day of October 1998, and was done by military pass.  They were ………….. dressed in military uniforms at the Goderich firing range in Goderich.

After they were executed, the Prison medical doctor, Dr. J.B. Sandy examined them to satisfy that they were dead.  There after the corpses were handed over by the Prisons Department.  And were buried at the Kissy Mess Mess cemetery at the east end of Freetown.  Immediately after the execution 24 death certificates were issued to me which were signed by the Deputy General of Police, the Sheriff in the presence of the Prison Imam, the Prison Chaplain and the Medical Doctor, for the records.  That is all and the Sierra Leone Prison Service welcomed and appreciated the establishment of the TRC by the Government of Sierra Leone in patient with article 3b of the Lome Agreement 1999 to address impunity both in the circle of violence, provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators, of human right violations to tell their stories and get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate general healing and reconciliation in order to prevent the re-occurrence of what happened?

Bishop Humper:    We want to thank Mr. Conteh very much for this presentation, we listened
intensely and that I am sure the Commissioners will have a few question for clarification especially as it pertains to the detention and the ……… that the execution of those people.  I will now call on my colleagues to engage you.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Mr. Conteh for the testimony, I have very few areas for clarification and I will suggest you help me with.  In your brief introductory statement, you said the Prison Department serves two major functions, one is custodial detention of prisoners and the second is reformation of rehabilitation something like that, that is to reform people, and get them back into civilized society.  How much of this aspect of reformation responsibility or activity is the prison department doing apart from the custodial one?  How much of they?

Foday Conteh:    In order to attain our objective, we have so many decisions in prisons to carry out to play our role in society.  And the first of all according to the rules and ordinance, the prison officers should be an example to the unit, to be …………. As a ………. But we have a religious aspect of it.  That is why we have an Imam, we have a Reverend , we have a Church and a mosque, to reform the soul, because the soul is the most important element in reforming, if you cannot reform the soul you can not reform the individual.  So we introduce the religious organizations and we even allow outside religious organizations to visit the ……. So the Reverend and the Imams preach to them, pray for them and to certain extent counsel them.  And also ……….. various workshops where in those  that are sentenced a long term imprisonment were asked for their areas of interest so that they will train in various skills, so that on discharge they will be self employed or they will be employed by people.  Secondly they also train them in the hospital, they train them in the offices and some that were/are/skilled personnel when they go there, they encourage them to continue preaching their skills which they have acquired before being imprisoned so that they will not forget all those tortures are there.  And then we trained officers who are there to supervise them or to train them, in order to acquire these skills.  We have various workshops.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you, what facilities do you have for child offenders?

Foday Conteh:    We don’t accommodate child offenders.

Commissioner Torto:    What happens to them?

Foday Conteh:    Well when ever they are brought, we draw the attention of the Ministry of Gender Affairs, Ministry of Gender and Child Affairs and then they will inform the Attorney General that these people were brought for detention but we have no room for them.  And something is done to take them to their respective place.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you, I don’t know if you were here yesterday, if not you may have been listening on the radio, there was a testimony ………. Before the Commission that on the return of the Attorney General from exile, they found thousands of people in the prisons and in a testimony submitted this morning, which it happens to actually witness and listen to, there is an exact figure quoted here that there were about 5,000 people in the prison cells.  On whose orders, according to the “PP” they found people in prisons at Pademba Road about, thousands, and thousands, they did not know how they got there, they did not give the orders, and that testimony is confirming that, are here before us, that there were up to five thousand on whose orders were you detaining five thousand people at that particular moment in time?

Foday Conteh:    By then ECONOMOG was in charge and the ECOMOG Commander ask that we ……….. these people so that no one will kill them, no one, will ………………………….. so that we can contain them and until some time when there is calm.  And then this 5,000 will be a record recorded by some people, but they were not there at the same time.  They taken them, sometime they leave them, they take them and leave them, but there was no time we got up to 1,000 prisoners in our prison at the time.

Commissioner Torto:    So am I to understand that the 5,000 of 50 people including the previous witness before you who was among the 5,000 were detained purely for protection reasons?

Foday Conteh:    That was the case infact, we classify them as for protective custody.  That was the language we use at the time.

Commissioner Torto:    so it was not a question of unlawful detention?

Foday Conteh:    It was a question of unlawful detention because the first commanders explained to us that they don’t want this extra judicial killings and also ……….. hazards, so as a result, infact some people gave themselves up to ECOMOG personnel who took them to us for safe keeping.

Commissioner Torto:    OK the very last question is again testimonies have been addressed before here about conditions in prisons.  A particular witness explained his ordeal that there about 5, 6 10 people in a small cell without or with an expose toilet facilities right in front of them, in a small room is that true?

Foday Conteh:    Probably it might be true because of lack of space.  That institution was built for 324 onwards and then having up to 900 or a thousand means we have to be located in that number.

Commissioner Torto:    So it is true that there were 10 people in a room with their sanitary facility exposed?

Foday Conteh:    That is true, the sanitary and up to now we are still using the bucket system.

Commissioner Torto:    Up to now is the process?

Foday Conteh:    But we have started replacing them with flush toilets squirting toilets.  Infact the new prison that have been built with squirting toilets or flush toilets for the ……..

Commissioner Torto:    Is that in line with the International ……….. standards, that International conditions of Imprisonment?  Are you practicing that act in line with what is described by international standard, is that the way it should be to prisoners of similar offences else where?

Foday Conteh:    Well, that was the condition available to us at the time.

Commissioner Torto:    So it is not in line?

Foday Conteh:    At all.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Chairman.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much Mr. Conteh for your testimony, I am interested in the group of people taken to the Tejan Cole Committee, I wonder whether you can help us by telling us exactly how many of them were taken to the Tejan Cole Committee and at what stages they were released, and you authorized their release?

Foday Conteh:    With respect to that, I am asking the Commission to allow me to do my homework and come out with figures, because as I ………… to us inter alia that the institution was vandalized and all the records was destroyed, we are only now trying to put them in place, we are searching frantically to get this information for you.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:        ………. Submit the details of what I have asked about to the Commission.

Foday Conteh:    Yes ma.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Well I will join my other Commissioners for thanking you for this submission and presentation.  I was going to ask some of the few questions but some of them have already been answered.  On the question on the capacity of the prison we have, you said that, normally, it should carry only, hold only 324 inmates, how many inmates have you got there?

Foday Conteh:    The number we have now is around 700.

Commissioner John Kamara:    You have 700?

Foday Conteh:    Is around 700, I don’t know for the figure for today.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Or more than double?

Foday Conteh:    More than double.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Is the capacity.  Prisons are known throughout the world to be a place for torture all horrible acts.  Will you say that the Sierra Leone Prison is not different from this kind of accusations or claims?

Foday Conteh:    I think I will clearly state here that none or the inmates in castrated in that institution were tortured even at present no torturing take place.  I will refer you to the Amnesty International report.  And the ICRC report will show that we don’t torture.  And even Victor Foe would have stated that here if he had been tortured.

Commissioner John Kamara:    The other question is what influence is brought on you in the treatment of prisoners by politicians?  Do politicians influence the way you treat prisoners in the prison?

Foday Conteh:    Not at all we go strictly by our rules and regulations.  That is why we don’t torture, we try to keep them in a humanly condition.  Give them all that the law permit us to give them

Commissioner John Kamara:    So you are saying that all prisoners are treated the same?

Foday Conteh:    They are all treated equally according to out rules and ordinance because they are in classes and then some are given treatment recommended by medical officer on medical grounds.

Commissioner John Kamara:    So the only difference is difference that is recommended on the main ground.  Only, that when the medical doctor recommends that a prisoner be treated on way, then you will treat that prisoner, according to that prescription or recommendation?

Foday Conteh:    Yes.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Also have you ever, I don’t know how long you have seen, not only Director of Prison but have been a member of the prison institution but did you notice throughout your service that care of the institution and the treatment of the prisoners change with the change of the administration, change of government?

Foday Conteh:    It is true that if the treatment changes, there is a change of government and that to be frank with you it is improving.

Commissioner John Kamara:    So the position now is that Prison conditions have been improved?

Foday Conteh:    They are improving.

Commissioner John Kamara:    They are improving?

Foday Conteh:    Compared to those days because the death rate has reduced drastically.  Even the public has noticed that.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Alright thank you.

Bishop Humper:    Thank you Mr. Conteh.  I would want to come first of all to the detentions which part of our concern here.  There has been and still continue to be the notion that is why infact the Commission is going through this.  It has to establish and understood and grasped.   The perception of many people before then and now had been worse than it is that the detention in 1998 within this given period that we are talking about were illegal, unwarranted, uncalled for and unnecessary and infact they should not have happened.  That is the general assumption will come to those details that have been asked.  You mentioned something why did the detentions took place would you respond to that before I go to the other?

Foday Conteh:    My own personal view, I think that was done purely to …… the situation.  By then if that had not been done, there would have been chaos because people will be fighting here and there.  They see people take ……………………………. Because is antagonist of somebody that has done bad to him has been taken to Pademba Road Prisons for detention and of course just as previous speaker has said, that there were a lot of extra judicial killings maiming etc. etc.  Had that not been done, I think there would have been chaos in the city at that time.  Because I will clearly with confidence say, none of those detained in our institution was tortured at the time, or killed or maltreated, with the exception of the lack of space which we cannot be …………. of.

Bishop Humper:    We all believe not just believe, we know that Pademba Road was built during colonial days.  Now somebody came here and we want to cross check and not only assumed that because somebody had said it so therefore it is the ………….. But somebody came here to say that there were 5000 of them in that cell.  Is that the case?

Foday Conteh:    That is not true.

Bishop Humper:    My last question as Director of Prisons and the arm of the government that is responsible for maintaining order and discipline in the country, sends an accused to you for a safe keeping as it was, where or not you have enough space what will you do?

Foday Conteh:    In such cases, we have to receive them, and if once institution is over filled, overcrowded  to the extent that we cannot accommodate we transfer others to other districts …….. prisons so that we provide space for that prison.

Bishop Humper:    Well this is the sub question that follows if then, how many people in your estimation at any given time within the time frame you have, did you keep at Pademba Road, from February to April 1998 this is the question we are talking about those detention at any given time how many can you guess were accommodated there?

Foday Conteh:    We give and take about 3,000.

Bishop Humper:    Leader of Evidence:

Leader of Evidence:    I have some questions as well, regarding this arrest.  You said at that time the Ecomog Commander was in charge, and asked you to maintain these prisoners, was Ecomog the only institutional instant troop that brought prisoners to you?  Or were groups or civilians also bringing prisoners to you at that time?

END  OF  TAPE  B

Another group was the Police.  Some of these people surrendered themselves to the Police and when ECOMOG got wind of that they ordered the police to take them to the Prisons for safe custody.

Leader of Evidence:    And do you know who initially arrested those people before ECOMOG and the police brought them to you, who had initially arrested them?

Foday Conteh:    I cannot tell for now because that was a time of too much confusion, commotion.  It was difficult to really recognize any particular person.

Leader of Evidence:     And then in answer to Commissioner Torto’s question, you said that normally you don’t detain children.  You will inform the Ministry of Social Welfare etc.  At that time were there only children amongst those 3,000 detainees?

Foday Conteh:    At the time we had that number, infact that number was swollen by military personnel that were at Lungi at one time and when there was this threat of invasion from the Northern part of Sierra Leone, they were brought to Freetown and there was no safe place for them to be contained.  So they were taken to Pademba Road Prisons and frankly we didn’t even lock them up because there was no space.  We allowed them to use the corridor.  It was an open detention so to speak. Some of them were in the fields.  We don’t lock them up because we don’t want any tragedy to occur by death because suffocation etc.  They were around, they were in corridors, they were in the campus of the prison.  We didn’t lock them.  That was the only time we had up to 3,000 but when they were removed there, we never had up to 1,000 inmates.

Leader of Evidence:    And I think normally when you keep in a prison that has the capacity of about 300 people, and you keep 3,000 people in it, I think you are aware that that involves some risks to the health of those people.  Did you ……. Mind you consider to another question that normally when people are sent to you and there is overcrowding that you try to transfer them to other prisons.  Was that possible at that time to transfer them?

Foday Conteh:    It was not possible by then because by then even the provincial prisons were not safe.  Some of them have been vandalized and the war was in all parts of the country except Freetown.  Infact it was less tan two weeks when Freetown was invaded and they were all freed buy the invaders.

Leader of Evidence:    Can you tell us how many of those several thousand and people who were arrested at that time died before they were tried or before they were set free?

Foday Conteh:    I cannot tell you that number because those people were only kept there not for offences they committed but they were kept there for security reasons so that they will not fill the number of the invading rebels.  That was why they were kept there.

Leader of Evidence:    So did any die or none of them died during detention?    

Foday Conteh:    I cannot think of any death of the time because they were there for less than two weeks.  We made all provisions to make sure that we take care of them.

Leader of Evidence:    I think the period we are talking about is February 1998 at least until April 1998 when you had the Treason Trials and the January 6 Invasion was in January, several months later.  So we are talking about more than two weeks I think.

Foday Conteh:    These people were brought in close to close to January 6, 1999 when Freetown was invaded.  During the treason trials we did not have that number.  We had less in that number.  We did not have to up to 1,000.  When the question was posed that whether at any one time the number of people we had at the prisons that was why I gave that answer.

Now let me talk ………… the period I am referring to is the period between the reinstating of Tejan Kabba as President and the invasion in January 6 1999.  That is the period I am talking about.  So during this time did any of those civilians that were arrested for their protection as you say, did any of them die during detention?

Foday Conteh:    Yes, some of them, few of them died, one was Abu Black ………. I cannot tell the exact name and others.  I have to consult the records.  So if you want a list of those that died during that process but is very few.

Leader of Evidence:    Yes please I think the Commission will be interested in that: you say that nowadays ICRC (The International Committee of the Red Cross) is making report on the conditions of detention was that also the case in the period of referred to?  Was ICRC present and making reports on the conditions of detention in that period?

Foday Conteh:    They were not around but I was just explaining about conditions of treatment of inmates.  That was why I made that generalized statement and even at that nobody will testify here that Prison Officer actually tortured any of the inmates.

Leader of Evidence:    No I am not talking about torture.

Foday Conteh:    No I am just explaining.  They were not around at the time but even at that there were living witnesses.  People were there living witnesses.  People were there; they will come and give testimony.

Leader of Evidence:    And did you make any report to the authorities, to the authorities, to the government or to the Minister of Justice on the overcrowding at that time in the prisons and the possible risks that that involved?

Foday Conteh:    I cannot remember but we sent in the figures to our Minister by then?

Leader of Evidence:    Isn’t that ……. It sounds to me a bit bizarred that you will arrest those people for their own protection because they were likely to be killed instead of arresting those that were likely to kill them, that you will arrest the potential victims instead of the potential perpetrators.

Foday Conteh:    We don’t arrest.  We only receive people that are brought to us for custodial reasons and the reason we were given …………. that that reason is tenable that to prevent them from being killed by civilians as a reprisal etc.

Leader of Evidence:    Is this kind of protective custody as you call it still practiced nowadays?

Foday Conteh:    No, that has been ……..   After the conflict we no longer keep people for protective custody.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you my last question is about the execution of the military who were sentenced to death by the Court Martial.  There have been some criticisms on the way they have been executed.  Was this the normal way of executing people after death sentence like for instance the people who were executed in 1992 under the NPRC were they executed the same way?  Secondly who executed them?  Were they Sierra Leonean soldiers or prison officers or others?

Foday Conteh:    In the case of 1992, I have not got much to say.  I only knew that military personnel came with their vehicles and demanded the release of certain personnel which were handed over to them.  What happened next we were not a party to it.

Leader of Evidence:    So you were not part of execution?

Foday Conteh:    Pardon?

Leader of Evidence:    You were not involved in the execution?

Foday Conteh:    We were not involved.

Leader of Evidence:    Okay, thank you very much I have no further questions.

Bishop Humper:    Conteh do you have any of questions or recommendations to make?

Foday Conteh:    Well I think I will go and write my recommendations and submit them together with a response to some of the issues
    You want me to clarify.

Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much.

Bishop Humper:    In the context of Sierra Leone just before you go, we want to establish or the commission wants to establish the process we are following. We have others, when the judiciary or the government, or the appropriate authorities take orders in the Prisons like to Director of Prisons and his inmates, they also have their own responsibilities; specific responsibilities that they must carry out or they ought to carry out or else they themselves will stand trial for not carrying out these orders.  So what we are saying here is that we need to understand clearly what the limitations of these people are, what is within their own combat.  For example, if one is taken to Prisons, it is the responsibility of the Director of Prisons to accept that person for safe keeping or for custody as the case may be until if that person is demanded by law and then in terms of execution the Director of Prisons has to control over the process of execution.  It is the law that carry out its processes and condemns and not condemns, and when those people are demanded by law, the Director of Prisons is required by law to hand over those personnel and his work terminates as her the law itself terminates and according to the law of Sierra Leone, if it is execution by firing squad, there are specific people who are supposed bylaw to be present at the scene of execution and the final death certificate is given to the Director of Prisons for safe keeping.  That is the process that we understand in Sierra Leone as far as the constitution is concerned and the prerequisite principles or procedures involved.  We just want the records turn out to be straight enough before we say thank you to Brother Conteh for having carried us through this process and we hope that we will receive these recommendations from you in due course.  Thank you very much.

Foday Conteh:    Thank you.  To make things clearer, to the Public, it is the Sheriff that is responsible for execution and not the Prison Authority.

Bishop Humper:        Thank you very much.  You may stand down.

Leader of Evidence:     Honourable commissioners, our next witness is Mr. Oliver O. Nylander, the President of the Bar Association of Sierra Leone, making submissions on behalf of the Association.

Oliver Nylander:    Oliver Ogunade Nylander

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Are you a Christian or a Muslim.

Oliver Nylander:    Christian

The witness was sworn on oath on the Bible by Commissioner Justice Laura Marcus-Jones the Presiding Commissioner.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    We welcome you Mr. Nylander for the second time to the TRC and you watched the CJ give his testimony and it is a very fortuitous thing that you are coming right after him.  So, we continue our education about the judiciary this morning,  we take another aspect of it and that is the lawyers?

Oliver Nylander:    yes Madam chair because going by my instruction from the letter, it only says that we write to confirm that the date for your appearance at the public hearing of the commission, the subject judiciary will be on Monday 26th July.  So I shall be looking at the judiciary.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    From your own perspective

Oliver Nylander:    From the perspective of the legal practitioners.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Alright thank you very much.  You may begin.

Oliver Nylander:    madam chairperson, Commissioners, as President of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, I will have a look at the judiciary from the practitioners point of view.  The judiciary is one of the three arms of government, others begin the executive and the legislature. Successive governments have over the years neglected and failed to pay due attention to the needs and problems of the judiciary.  As a result, there had been a sharp decline is the quality of justice dispensed by courts which has resulted in the rule of law being eroded and the public loosing confidence in the judiciary.  It is our opinion that the most pressing problem facing the judiciary is the lack of personnel and trained personnel to manned the courts.  There has been an acute shortage of magistrates on the lower bench and judges of the superior court of judicature that is the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  My own valuable Chief Justice dr. Abdulia Timbo, can confirm this as he has on several occasions made public pronouncement of this fact.  The last being at the annual conference of the Sierra Leone Bar Association held on the 2nd of July 2003 at the British council.  In view of this shortage of Judges and Magistrates, there is a heavy workload of cases of the few Judges and Magistrates available.  Its not uncommon for at least 20 cases to be a day for hearing before a High Court Judge, especially civil matters and also about 30 criminal cases to be listed for daily hearing before a magistrate, particularly the Magistrate Court No.1.  this might be a contributing factor to the long delays in trial of cases thus making litigation very expensive.  Hen there is the issue of numerous adjournments.  It has been alleged that lawyers take on too many cases for which they have not got the capacity to handle.  This necessitates or give rise to request of frequent adjournment  of cases.  There might be some truth in such allegation form some of our colleagues but most times, adjournments have been requested because the parties or litigants and their witnesses have failed to appear on the day for the trial.  In such situations the lawyer will have no alternative other than to apply for an adjournment.  Therefore lawyers are not entirely responsible for the numerous adjournment of cases.  There is also the burning issue of shortage of materials like stationery.  At times Council will request that notices be sent out to both absent parties and their solicitor.  This request might be granted by the judge, then comes the next adjourn date.  Parties and their solicitor might fail to appear.  The reason being failure by the Registrar to sent out notices as requested and this will be due to the fact that printed notices forms were not available.  Then the lack or need for continuous legal training for both legal and para-legal supporting staff of the judiciary, like the Registrar Court Clerks and Bailiffs is also lacking.  Then I have proceeded to make recommendations as we see the plight of practitioners.  May I proceed?

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    You say you have something lacking in what we have here because the next ……… Alright carry on

Oliver Nylander:    The government must improve the conditions of service for judges and magistrates so as to attract the right calibre of people to the bench.  Firstly, the salary should be made more attractive, the supply of electricity to the residence of judges and magistrates should be made a priority so that they could be made readily available for prompt delivery.  The medical allowances given to judges and magistrates should be increased the allocation of vehicle to each judge so as to enable them to arrive in court promptly for court sittings.  Provision of legal aid.  Government should seriously consider the establishment of a legal Aid and Assistance scheme, which will enable indigene litigants who could not afford the high cost of litigation to access justice and not to be deprived of their rights to seek redress in court for wrongs done to them because they are impecunious.  Already a group of lawyers know a LAWCLA has established a form of assistance to indigent litigants.  The Bar Association has also been running a few clinic at the Bar Association Secretariat whereby, free legal advice are given to persons who cannot solicit the service of a lawyer because of the high cost involved in litigation.  The reforming of our laws especially absolute ones in this area, I must commend the government of Sierra Leone, who has recently activated the Law Reforming commission, who will be holding a seminar on the commercial use of land in Sierra Leone from the 30th – 31st of July 2003.  It first major activity to reform of the law relating to the commercial use of land in Sierra Leone.  Another problem has been the absence of reported Sierra Leone law cases and this has hampered the work of judges, since the last reporting of Sierra Leone on law cases was in 1973.  My association with funding from DIFID, has embarked upon the publication of Sierra Leone law reports covering a 10 year period from 1990 – 200 of cases presided in the court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  On completion of the first phase, my association will embark in reporting cases presided by the High court for the period 1973 to date.  Recently, some members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association came together to form a local non-governmental association known as Legal Reform Initiatives.  They are committed to support legal reforms in Sierra Leone and to provide a bridge between the national and international ongoing justice efforts.  We believe that the legal community must be at the forefront of promoting justice and impartial rule of law and to participate in difficult vital and important projects of improving the country’s judicial system.  The government should also seriously consider the provision of continuous legal training for both judges and magistrates and the para legal staff of the judiciary.  I was privileged together with the Honorable chief Justice Dr. Abduli Timbo, the learned Attorney General ,  Mr. Eke Halloway to have attended the all-African conference of law, Justice and Development held in Abuja Nigeria sometime in February this year.  At this conference, the need for continuous legal training for judges, magistrates and barristers was stressed, if  we in Africa are to leave the challenges and opportunities offered by globalisation.   Thanks to the UNDP who conducted sometime in March 2003 a course for Justice of the Peace, clerks and Bailiffs of the judiciary.  Within a very short time, we the legal practitioners have started seeing the benefits of such legal training especially among Justice of the Peace, who presides over our cases, over cases in the Magistrate Court as they now have the law stored in their bosom.  We the members of the  legal profession, are sure that now that we have the President, the Vice President, who are both lawyers by profession that the need of the judiciary will continue to be looked into.  That is my recommendation.  The Bar normally involves legal practitioners, the lawyers who are practitioners from the Sierra Leone Bar Association and the judiciary comprises of the Bench that is judges of the Superior Court of judicature, that is the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court and the Lower Bench, the magistrates, so there are two distinct situations two distinct offices.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Alright my next question which follows this and will recommendations coming from the Bar Association or the judiciary have a multiplying effect on the effectiveness of these two bodies.

Oliver Nylander:    Yes because we have very frequent consultation for example, the President of the Sierra Leone Bar Association is a member of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission.  Likewise, we also have both formal and informal meetings with the chief Justice, Honorable Chief Justice so at least we could put across the views of our clients and also what we see as impediments in the way forward as far as just administration of justice is concerned.  We are always given the opportunity to put forward our ideas and I must commend my Lord the Honorable Chief Justice is always willing to listen to our views although at times he done not agree entirely with our views but he gives us the opportunity to be heard.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Thank you Mr. President, then my plea with you if this is workable is for you to work with the judiciary having listened to the CJs presentation here, then to get us a comprehensive recommendation that will bother on the judiciary and the Bar Association because the Commission has this is one of its very important things, areas of concern in this country and your first town sentences in this presentation summarises everything for me as far as I am concerned and the subsequent recommendations, probably you will be working countenance with the Law Reform Commission or other arms body to get a workshop, to get a real comprehensive document for the Commission’s consideration that is my plea with you.

Nylander:    Mr. Commissioner, I whole-heartedly agree.  As a matter of fact, we have been working with No Peace Without Justice to produce something very comprehensive but unfortunately, time has not been in on our side but we shall endeavour and we shall try.

Commissioner John Kamara:    thank you very much.

Marcus Jones:    Thank you Professor

Commissioner John Kamara:    Thank you very much and I will like to welcome you Mr. Nylander and President of the Bar  Association.  We thank you for coming to make this presentation. I haven’t got questions as such but I am a little surprised to hear or see this statement in your submission and I will read it.  Under the recommendation, paragraph three you said, provision of legal aid.  Government should seriously consider the establishment  of a Legal aid and Assistance Scheme.  So I am surprised to see that.  I had assumed all the time that there is a national provision to help people who need legal assistance but this seems to be telling me that there is no such provision in this country.  Am I correct or wrong?

Oliver Nylander:    Well Mr. Chairman not absolutely wrong.  There is a provision for legal aid but in criminal cases like in cases for murder where the accused person have the right to be defended and the state will pay the legal fees to defend the accused persons but not in all other areas.  Like in Britain, they have the Legal Aid and Assistance Scheme whereby not only for criminal cases but in Sierra Leone, as far as my knowledge goes the government provides financial assistance for defence or accused persons who are charged with capital offences like murder for them to be tried, for them to be defended in these cases.  That is as far as my knowledge goes but it does not extend to other areas especially in civil matters.

Commissioner John Kamara:    So all this time and up to this point, people in Sierra Leone who have not got the resources to afford legal aid have had no justice in those matters.

Oliver Nylander:    Well I do not say they do not justice but they do not have recourse to the courts to redress their wrongs because they haven’t got the finance or they have got the money.  That is the problem and Mr. Commissioner, there is nowhere in the world that you have a level playing field when it comes to the matter of justice. You have to pay for justice like any other commodity.  You have to pay your lawyers.

Commissioner John Kamara:    But also, you have told us that there are provisions in some countries.

Oliver Nylander:    Yes they are like in Britain I am aware of that.

Commissioner John Kamara:    But we have got.  Well I hope your recommendation will be heeded to and sometime in the future, provision will be made to help people who cant afford legal aid in this country.

Oliver Nylander:    Indeed Mr. Commissioner.  It is my wish, I hope that we will arrive at that situation someday.

Commissioner John Kamara:    Thank you.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much Mr. Nylander for coming to the Commissioner and more so want to join my colleagues in appreciating your contribution.  I have read your very short testimony and going down in the fourth paragraph, I was reminded of , I am sorry to put this but its just a way of reminder to quote from a book I have read before “Law without Lawyers” and he is saying that at a portion of that book he is saying that “the laws are made by the rich, for the protection of the rich” and he is saying that “the legislature are the rich people assuming those who make their ways to the4 house, to be in position to help make the laws, must be people in the higher income”.  That is the argument put forward. However, in order to correlate that statement with your testimony, I have done here with me, like you said in the fourth paragraph, where you said the postponement of adjournment of cases, I heard when you said it is not entirely the responsibility of the lawyers at times.  But the complainance in this particular case, are the people, the civil populace who are not lawyers.  It is they who are complaining that there s persistent adjourn of cases which means, the fault is not coming from them, that it is the lawyers who persistently and frequently adjourn cases at time for no reason, at times for some other reason to say go and wait for me at the court, I will be there, only to find out that they don’t even show up. So this is the allegation.  I don’t know how much you contribute towards either refuting this or confirming it?

Oliver Nylander:    Well, as I said earlier, there might be some truth in these allegations because some of our colleagues take more cases than they have the capacity to cope with.  But a more of situation that I have witnessed that I have been involved in throughout my practise is failure on the part of witnesses to appear.   I will give you a classical example that occurred last week.  We were in the High Court in a murder trial, we were expecting the doctor to turn up.  Unfortunately, he could not come because he was extremely ill and we had no alternative other than to have the matter adjourn.  At the next adjourned date all efforts were made by the prosecution as well as the defence to see that transport was provided to bring the doctor from his accommodation…………………not to help him to the court and he came, he was able to deal with the autopsy, which he presented because it was murder trial and that closes his own section because if we had not got that doctor at that particular stage, the doctor flew out on Friday.  It means we would have encountered difficulty and there would have been a prolongation of that particular trial.  These are some of the problems we face, for example, we also have criminal matters like in the Magistrate Court where you have the police witnesses.  Police fail to turn up, investigators who fail to turn up, that’s not the fault of the complaint or the lawyers but the investigators who fail to come up whose matter could not be proceeded with.

Commissioner Torto:    thank you for your explanation.  It has just been stated, I think you were in the hall listening to the testimony of the CJ, that the judicial department is suffering from a very very acute staff shortage and the tendency has been for lawyers to actually move from government service into private practise and that has caused, is the major cause.  Well, the major case is conditions of service anyway, but other additional reasons are there which you know better than myself as to why actually they are leaving, going into private practise.  Can the Bar Association, pass a resolution inorder to actually forestall this kind of trend, inorder to stabilize the personnel of staffing in the judiciary and the Bar Association pass a rule to say every practising lawyer who is just coming into practise from college or from outside, most serve the government for five years before opting out.

Oliver Nylander:    Mr Commissioner, I do agree and see your anxiety being expressed but I think a resolution to that effect might be interfering the lawyer’s own human rights.  Certainly, it would interfere with them because it is your choice on completion of both your academic and professional training to enter into which field either as a practitioner or into the Bench.  Personally, I have served my own national service I did my own national service.  Immediately I left school, I worked as a clerk in 1961, at the Establishment Secretary’s Office on to the Prime Minister’s Officer, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Secretary’s Office again and I ended up at the Ministry of education.  I went on study leave, when I came back I had to work at the Law Officers Department as a State Council and I worked for four solid years.  So its up to the individual but as I said earlier, the conditions could be made more attractive, definitely it will attract younger practitioners to come unto the Bench but we need people of calibre because it is been said in certain quarters that corruption is rampant but you need not only to recruit lawyers, but lawyers with high calibre who would say not to the temptation and not yielded to the temptation of corruption.  So, all boils down to the question of making the conditions of service more attractive, then you will have them and as my Lord, the chief Justice said earlier, even the younger colleagues, leaving the law school they do not fancy coming up to the Bench.   I have gone all my way, I have spoken to them and even to older colleagues, its extremely difficult.  The CJ will confirm that we hold conference with them in private under attractive social conditions, talk to them, please come into the Bench, but they would not.  They say the conditions are not attractive and that is the position.

Commissioner Torto:    thank you Mr. Nylander.  Would you agree to the general statement that the law is actually made by the rich for the protection of the rich because legal service is only available to those who can afford and those who can afford are the rich.  Don’t you believe?  What do you say about this assertion.

Oliver Nylander:    I would not only agree with that assertion that the law, because the law is passed by parliament and not only rich people are in parliament.  We have people of different financial status are in parliament, they pass the law and the courts are there to interprete the law and they may say that the law is meant for the rich.   There are certain areas unless you have money, you could not have redress especially in civil matters, like the shipping cases, the land tenure cases but in other areas, the poor man goes to the court.  If he is offended, he goes to the Magistrate Court issuing the summons, complainant persons and he had been heard.  So I would not agree entirely that the law is meant for the rich because its is not the rich people who pass the laws, not the rich people, ordinary parliamentarians and not all parliamentarians are wealthy that one I could say.

Commissioner Torto:    thank you.  There is also a general allegation or accusation going round.  At times, I don’t know whether it is true or false or not that there is the tendency for lawyers of complainance and lawyers of accused to  team up together to fix a case.  Are you aware?  Is your organisation aware of this case?  

Oliver Nylander:     I am not, they are nor have complained that effect come to my knowledge because if that be the case, its grave professional misconduct for which you could had your wigs removed off your head and you are debarred from practising.  So I don’t think colleagues will go to that extent to risk their livelihood, risk the person of being debarred, where you would starve not only you, you and your family.  But no complains have been brought to my knowledge were lawyers team up with complaints to defeat the aims of Justice.

Commissioner Torto:    thank you then.  The very last of my questions for areas of clarification is this one bothering on this staffing issue.  You have just rightly said that it could tantamount to interfering with human rights of the lawyers who may be required to actually sign an agreement for a number of times and then opt out.  But this practise was actually, been done in the teaching field, wherein teachers were required to sign a bond and then go to teaching for about a number of years and then up till now there after.  I don’t know whether the practise is still invoked or it has actually bee…………….with time.  But since it was right, don’t you think what is right for the goose is right for the gander.  The teachers were subjected to it why shouldn’t the lawyers.

Oliver Nylander:    Well Mr. Commissioner, provided that your fees were paid by government because speaking from my own experience, when I worked as Assistant  Student Secretary in the Ministry of Education, students were bonded.  That was around 1968, 69 they were bonded because the scholarships that were given or their fees were paid by government.  But if my fees were paid by the parents, I don’t see why I should be bounded to go and serve the government.  But if government spends the resources, pay for my education, then it’s my obligation and duty to serve government for the money spent upon on.  So if the government could provide the scholarships for student to come to the Law School or to complete their studies at the University, then come unto the Law school, then we might introduce that sought of bond for students who serve the government, as it has been in other fields.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you chair.  I am sorry there is an area that is of interest to me where you really recommended the various welfare systems which is right, quite in place inorder for judges and lawyers to actually perform their best.  There has to be that kind of improvement in the conditions of service.  There’s no doubt about that.  But would you think that all by itself would solve the problem?  Are there not other issues that one would consider inorder to make the lawyers and judges more effective?  The welfare system are taking in good parts I agree with you but I think there should be more to it than this.  In terms of attitude to work, personality, other forms of motivation that these ones may not satisfy.

Oliver Nylander:    Agreed Mr. Commissioners also from within the individual that is my duty to serve on the Bench.  But from conversations and discussions held with colleagues, what has come out primary is the conditions of service, which are not attractive.  That is the main reason.

Commissioner Torto:    thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    thank you Leader of Evidence have you questions?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much Honorable Commissioner and thank you very much President of the Bar Association of Sierra Leone.  Our first observation is that the Commission would want to have a comprehensive, very comprehensive written submission, which should include certain areas, such as absolute laws.  What you perceive as absolute laws and therefore requires reforms.  You mentioned that there are absolute laws, we would want you to specifically identify them and give reasons why you think reforms are necessary, and then also on the rule of law generally and how the judiciary have faired.  We would want to have a comprehensive written submission assessing the various political regime  from independence as far as the rule of law is concerned in this country and many actually other area.  The question I would also want to ask is what is the Bar Association doing in terms of determining or ensuring qualify service delivery by lawyers to their client because, of course it could be inferred from your submission that there are incessant adjournments and all of that and as we all know the saying that justice delayed is justice denied.  In a country like Nigeria for example, the Bar Association has set up an institute of advance legal ……………..which allows lawyers to go for continuous legal education.  I am also aware in Ghana for example, the Bar Association organises periodic workshops on specific issues or to upgrade the lawyers with current issues and you know, when a facility is made available, then it is up to a particular lawyer to pay to attend that kind of programme so we would really want you to address that issue.  What is your association doing in terms of ensuring quality legal service delivery in terms of training and also in terms of several other issues.  What are you doing with your lawyers?  Thank you very much.

Oliver Nylander:    Yes.  Firstly I would say that we have the Bar cancelled, who is responsible for the overall work done, to see that quality services are rendered by solicitors to their clients and if the clients have complains, they could write to the Bar Council, who would immediately respond whatever complains they made.  As far as the Bar Association is concerned, I would say that with the introduction of the Special Court, it was observed that few legal Sierra Leone practitioners have got the international exposure.  By that I mean, few have got the opportunity of practising in International Criminal Court.  That is why in conjunction with no Peace without Justice, we solicited the help of the Humanitarian Bar Council of England and Wales and a course was organised which we have just finished on Saturday, to train barristers and solicitors out there to give them the exposure, how to make pre-trail submissions, what type of work they will face in the International Court of Justice, like the Special court and we have that course organised.  It started on the 22nd of July and ended on the 26th day of July inclusive.  You see, all comes down to the question of funding because as I stressed in my recommendation when we were at Abuja, it was stressed that we need a legal education as something continuous because we do not have a static world and if we are in need of globalization, to meet the challenges we must be ready and so we are trying with the help of other international bodies to organise training courses as we have just succeeded in organising this last one held with the No Peace Without Justice and the Bar council of England and Wales to provide at training course for would be solicitors and barristers appearing before the Special Court.  But all comes down to the question of funding which is not easy to come by these days.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much but as I also said perhaps one area you may have to consider asking the lawyers actually to pay, you know, because its form of investment for them.  If you make the facility available, then you encourage them to actually pay by way of investment to upgrade themselves.   Think you may have to also consider that kind of workshop.  Another issue we would like to have clarification and as a President of the Bar Association, which is such a powerful association, we really want to have your opinion on this issue as regards executive interference in administration of justice.  What has been your experience.  Do you think that our judges in time past and even now have asserted their independence in terms of delivering bold and impartial decisions?  Or you know, we would really want to have your opinion in terms of their independence as far as executive interference is concerned.

Oliver Nylander:    Well I will start off by answering the question as far as my own personal knowledge of something I have been involved in.  I remember in 1982 as a state council in the Law Officers Department working with my learned senior Mr. Cyril Juxon-smith.  We had this matter of Agro-commercial and NIC.  That was the case in which Agro Commercial sued the NIC for rice imported into Sierra Leone, which were damaged during transit.  There were available evidence to the fact that before these rice were put on board the boat, they were not even fit for human consumption.  There was certificate to that effect before they were insured and this matter came up.  We tendered the certificate in court, did everything that is humanly possible and it’s a young practitioner  coming from Britain.  We used to go to court, my books were in cartoons, I had the police carrying them all display of the legal knowledge.  At the end of the day we lost the matter but what really pains me, after loosing the matter when I came back, I was asked by the then solicitor General the late Pierre Boston to write an opinion whether we could appeal.  I wrote an opinion and said that there are good grounds for us to appeal against that decision.  The opinion also of Albert Medzegar Esq. Was sought and he said that this is a matter that we should appeal because the rice were not fit for human consumption before they were put on board the boat.  Who owned Agro Commercial?
It was the Late Siaka Stevens and Mohamed Jamil or Sahid Mohamed.  Mohamed Jamil threatened the NIC that if they are going to appeal, he would withdraw all his fishing boats that were insured with the NIC.  As  a result, the NIC did not appeal and that was one of the main reason why I left the Law Officers Department.  I immediately said to myself, I cannot go on with this so I went straight to the then Attorney General the Late Francis Minnah and Pierre Boston and said well I am afraid because when we lost that case in particular, I was so sure that all the facts were in our favour. I came back to my room, I cried for hours had a rap on the door.  My learned figure opened the door, he said “Oliver what are you crying for”.  He said prepare to shed more tears for cases that you are going to loose.  But that was a case it was so patent that they should not have lost that matter and when we wanted to appeal to redress what we consider today wrong judgement, we were deprived or denied that right and so poor NIC they did not appeal and when our clients do not instruct us, we cannot go on.  These are particular instance that I know of the executive interfering with the judiciary, with the Law Officers Department.  This is from my own personal knowledge.  But with regards to the executive interfering with judges, that I cannot say because none has been brought to my personal knowledge nor have I involved in a matter which judgement has been delayed in which I feel the judgement was not fair.  But let me say it comes up, if even you have the matter delayed at the High Court, you always have the right to appeal.  You go to the Court of Appeal and if you are not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of Appeal then you go to the Supreme Court.  There is always the avenue for appeal.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:        Thank you Mr. Nylander for answering all our question.  Now I wonder whether you have any questions for the commission.

Oliver Nylander:    I haven’t my Lord.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Well recommendations I suppose you have been asked to work with the judiciary, the Chief Justice and put together a more comprehensive document which will be of use to the Commission so I suppose all your recommendations will go into that document.

Oliver Nylander:    Certainly my Lord.  The only thing is that the notice was very short because I had another letter dated 21st July, which actually touched on the judiciary.  All what we were asked to talk about it the question of execution and what not.  So I shall endeavour with my members of my association to work in conjunction with the judiciary so that we produce a very comprehensive document.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you very much.  You may step down now.

Oliver Nylander:    Thank you madam chairman and members of the Commission

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THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS: THE JANUARY 6, 1999 ATTACK ON FREETOWN

DATE:
BEFORE:
Commissioner Joseph C. Humper (Presiding)
Commissioner John Kamara
Commissioner Laura Marcus-Jones
Commissioner Yasmin Sooka
Commissioner Sylvanus Torto

Leader of Evidence:

WITNESS No.: 1
WITNESS NAME: Dr Samuel J.M. Maligi ii

Commissioner Humper:    Thank you very much Dr. Malige for responding to our invitation to attend this hearing.  The usual procedures here are that you give your testimony and Commissioners from this side will ask you questions. Officials of the Commission will ask you questions afterwards. At the end of it all you too may ask the Commission questions. You may also make recommendations to the Commission.  This is how the Commission operates.  Can we now hear your testimony?

Maligi:           SUBMISSION

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for inviting me to this hearing and to start by saying that prior to the conflict, I was employed and still employed as the national Executive Director of the Sierra Leone Opportunities Industrialization Centre (SLOIC). In 1995, I was appointed Secretary of State by the NPRC in charge of local government, rural development and national security. In respect of that appointment I took a leave of absence from the Sierra Leone OIC for a year.

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, you may wish to know what SLOIC is and what it does. SLOIC is a human resource development programme that helps young men and women acquire skills so as to be gainfully employed and become productive citizens. Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, our current mission of SLOIC is to assist the government of Sierra Leone with the rehabilitation reconstruction and resettlement reintegration of ex-combatants war affected individuals, unemployed youths and school leavers. SLOIC works in the areas of technical/vocational skills training, job creation, entrepreneurial development, credit assistance, counselling, and peace building for reconciliation. Our training is free. We have training centres in Bo, Bonthe, Makeni and here in Freetown.  We also intend to establish centres in other parts of the country. The establishment of OIC centres is highly dependent on the needs of the community.  In order words the community requests our establishment in their areas.

I will come to my experiences during the conflict.  In 1991 when the conflict started SLOIC operations were going on at our various centres. In fact the Makeni Small Enterprise Development Centre was official opened in 1991. The Mattru Jong Integrated Rural and Women’s Development Centre was established in 1993.  18 months after the start of the Mattru Jong Centre, the rebels overran the town making it a no go area.  This was the beginning of anxious moment from me particular.  I worried over the lives of the trainees and staff, and also worried over the building materials that were just shipped to Mattru Jong. We were able to evacuate staff and trainess to either Bo or Bonthe. Some of them were eventually brought to Freetown by sea.  Our operation was now limited to Bo and Makeni. Freetown had the head offices.

There were at least 37 checkpoints between Freetown and Bo,  and about 30 between Freetown and Makeni.  At that time the checkpoints were mounted and manned by soldiers and personnel of the Special Security Division. In January 1995 I was appointed Secretary of State Internal Affairs and Rural Development.  During my brief period of service I recommended the formation of the Council of Chiefs at each administrative level- district, provincial and national. It was approved by the Council of state.  The idea was to have an organised group of chiefs that government could interact with and relate to.  I also travelled extensively within the country to talk to our internally displaced people. I even went to Guinea, a trip that created some problems for me.  I cannot exactly remember what I said in Gueckedu in one of our refugee camps that angered Foday Sankoh. He declared me a wanted man. Our ambassador in Guinea intercepted the radio announcements when Sankoh was communicating with his commanders.  The ambassador quickly informed Freetown.

I believe I did my best as a Secretary of State in spite of disagreements here and there. After the palace coup of January 1996 I resumed my duty at the SLOIC. In June 1996 we opened the Freetown Centre. When Johnny Paul Koroma’s May 25 1997 coup took place I wanted to stay in the country for a while. I was however advised to leave immediately.  Four days after the announcement of the coup I left for Conakry, Guinea.  While in Guinea I worked with the Forum for African Women Educationalists. We wrote a proposal to UNDP, which was approved for the opening of a school for our refugee children.  We registered over 2000 primary, secondary and tertiary students.  UNICEF helped with school materials and over 85 Sierra Leonean teachers were employed.                       While in Conakry my house at Murray Town was completely looted and most of the vehicles taken away.  Those that would not be taken out were vandalised.  I was later called from the United States that my home was burnt.  It was apparently seen on CNN news.

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, my plans for the future are to work hard and establish OIC in every district in Sierra Leone. Interest groups have been formed in a few districts.  The districts include Kailahun, Kenema, Kono and Koinadugu.  The other plan is to ensure that SLOIC provides handymen in every community in Sierra Leone.  All of these require support from the government, donor organisations and people of Sierra Leone.

Let me come to the specific issue of the January 6th attack in Freetown.  Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, ladies and gentle men, the event of January 6th 1999 is common knowledge to every one that was in Freetown.  I will therefore limit myself to events that affected me as an individual, family head, head of an organisation institution and as a responsible citizen.  At about 1:30am on January 6, I heard a heavy bang on my door like a detonation. I heard the voice of my nephew: “uncle Sam, den don cam, den don enta”. I was half naked when I got up and asked who?  The rebels he replied.  This was not quite a surprise. I made a few telephone calls to the east side of town to know if it was really true and to check on my staff and relations that were on that side of town. We continued to monitor the situation until day break.

From that Wednesday morning on January 6 it was like hell on earth for everybody. My greatest concern was for my staff members most of whom were in the east end. I had also had some relatives in the east. I was worried for my younger sister who served as a juror on the last treason trial before the even of January 6th.  By the end of that week I had over 60 people in my home.  A little over a week after the 6th of January a team of ECOMOG soldiers entered my compound and launched two rocket propel grenades into my home and sprayed my bed room windows with bullets.  Few minutes later, they banged at my door ordering us to open the door or risk been killed.  Most of my people ran to the basement of the house leaving few of us including my mother in her wheel chair.  I however braved it to the door and opened it. There were about 5 guns immediately pointed at my chest. I was pushed further into the house from the door.  They immediately ordered every one outside including my mother in her wheel chair.  It was at this point that I lost my cool and was ready to die by their guns.  I slowly moved my mother out. The ECOMOG soldiers asked all the men to prostrate with their faces on the ground.  They kicked every door open. And each time they opened a door, they will push me inside before they enter.  They searched every box and bag in every room before I was matched outside again.  While we were outside my cousin Patrick Tucker was identified as somebody they saw spying on them from our veranda. He was given a nasty slap.  They later ordered me to go with them to their base at Murray Town. It was on our way to the base, that I learnt that somebody was shooting at them from my compound. I was not even given a chance to either explain or defend myself. I was shocked to see bodies floating near the base. They told me, “don’t worry you will soon join your people’ referring to the floating bodies.  I was ordered to sit on the ground to wait for the last order from their boss who was at that moment out of the base.

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, you can imagine how I was feeling at that moment. I became very indignant. I must forever be grateful to a private soldier by the name of Joseph Peters who materialised there to save my life.  I was labelled a rebel and we all know that at that time such label simply meant death.  Joseph was prepared to lay his life for me. They argued about me in a Nigerian language so that I would not understand what was been said.  Today I sit here to talk about it. The young soldier was only demonstrating gratitude for what he believed I had done for him and colleagues in the past.  I was later released that evening and Joseph was asked to bring me home.

One important thing I forgot to mention here Mr. Chairman, was the President’s declaration of a ceasefire. All that divided us and the rebels at that time was the Congo Cross bridge.  I was so nervous that I developed diarrhoea. I must have visited the toilet for times in 30 minute knowing fully well that the rebels were occupying the greater and best part of the city. Reflecting on it today, I say thank God the President made that declaration. If the war had continued and we would have lost far more lives than we did.  Indeed the President was acting from his head while most of us were thinking from our hearts.  A few days after my ordeal in the hands of ECOMOG news came that my stepfather’s house at Kissy Mess-Mess was burnt down. Gunmen shot down him and his eldest son.  One such gunman was identified as a Mr. Kamara also known in the area as ‘Babu suk lem” .  It took a week to inform our mother about the death.  

After two weeks we exhumed their bodies for proper burial. My mother died in hospital nine days later.   May her soul rest in peace.  Another things that shocked me at the time took place at the Stadium Hostel while we were waiting for an interagency meeting.  One young lady was shot over four times for her friend’s missing baby.  After the young lady was shot four times, she still struggled to get up. ECOMOG and SSD personnel dragged her to the cemetery and sprayed her body with more bullets.  In less than 30 minutes a young man was shot dead too.  The bullet went through him and met a man who was just by me.  Both People were killed by ECOMOG.  

Upon the arrival of the two officials, we were waiting for, the Chairman of the Re-integration, Resettlement and Rehabilitation programme and the Deputy Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, I made a bitter complain to them. I asked my staff members to get out of the meeting and go home without attending that meeting.  The unfortunate case of Evil Spirit was public knowledge.  I however, did not see any of his killings, but practically every day reports were made about his madness.

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, the rebels’ invasion of  Freetown on January 6 was disastrous to say the least. It caused extensive damage to an already inadequate economic and social infrastructure. It contributed in no small measure in heightening poverty, unemployment, and destitution. This has impacted negatively on the government.  SLOIC was not spared of the negative fallouts of this milieu. Payment of SLOIC staff salaries were unduly delayed, causing massive exodus of dedicated personnel to international NGOs and other organizations.  Regardless of all the human efforts within the power of SLOIC’s management this situation has still not been alleviated up to this moment of my submission at this Commission.

In spite of the of the fact that security has stabilised there a few displaced people still occupying the SLOIC training centre in Freetown thus making the environment unattractive to donor support.  SLOIC has revived it full operations, however.  In Makeni DFID has constructed part of the OIC centre and promised to furnish it with tools and equipments.  European Union assisted the rehabilitation of the Mattru, and Bo OIC centres. The government of Sierra Leone through ministry of Education has also given rehabilitation support to the Bo centre.  Presently a German-based aid agency is currently assisting us in skills training programmes at Mattru, Bo, and Freetown.  Mr. Chairman and Commissioners ladies and gentlemen, so much has been said about the causes of this senseless war. Corruption has been given as one of the major causes.  I see it a little more than that.  I believe the main cause is that we allowed formal organizations to degenerate into informal organisations. We have created lawlessness, incompetence tribalism, discrimination and injustice.  Formal organisation is any social unity that is deliberately organised for the explicit purpose of reaching specific goals. Formal organizations operate on definite rules.  On the other hand informal organisations has no formal organisational structures. They may have leaders and followers, procedures and taboos but there are no written rules or elected officer.  Prior to 1967 Mr. Chairman, you will agree with me that our government had firm formal structures.

A loose structure approach to governance has many problems.  There are problems of bureaucrats with unlimited freedom to set their own policies and rules as long as it yielded personal profit. This was how corruption had root in our system.  I will be most deceitful to say that prior to 1967 there was no corruption in this country. There is no corruption-free society if I may add, my Chairman. It is the looseness of the system that has brought us to the point where bank customers had to bribe to withdraw money, scholarships were awarded not on merit but by affiliation and money.  Jobs were offered on the same principles.  People were made Paramount Chiefs not on merits but by might.  The youths who became frustrated and had no means of living were found on the streets. A few went to Liberia to struggle for survival.  Dissaffected and disgruntled persons lay in wait to take advantage of any opportunity to create chaos.

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners I recommend the following that Government ministries be strengthened. I further recommend that TRC be given additional responsibility as a follow up to reconciliation.  What I am trying to say here is that in addition to reconciliation there are a lot of NGOs now offering counselling services around the country.  There has to be a coordinating unit or coordinating mechanism. This I think could be added to your mandate.  A lot of people need counselling.  Thirdly, Mr. Chairman I sincerely believe that we need a complete overhaul of the civil service. I recommend again, Mr. Chairman, that our leadership be more opened and be more responsive to public opinion.  We have put ourselves in cocoons and we don’t really get to the public. We don’t talk to them and we don’t know what they want because we don’t hear them. We listen to few people who are around us and who tell us what they believe we should know.  I recommended also that we pay special attention to our youths. Let’s train our youths. Let us provide a future then.  I thank you very much.

Commissioner Humper:    Thank you very much Dr. Maligi for this presentation. The commissioners will now ask you questions. Commissioner Marcus-Jones.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    I want to thank you very much Dr. Maligi for coming to the TRC and for your submission.  I feel a bit disheartened and disturbed by some of the things you mentioned- things that really need to be corrected in our country. I wonder whether you would not agree that it is because as individuals we accept things even when they are not right.  One of the things you mentioned is your inability to pay our staff for a period of four months now because of the insensitive attitudes of some public officials.  As I said, I wonder whether these things don’t happen because we have been accepting everything so quietly. We keep quiet over burning issues for long time only ‘to burst up’ at some point. And this leads to greater conflict.

Maligi:    Thank you very much Commissioner. It may be true to say that people don’t complain but I want to state here that a few things have happened in the past that I followed personally. Let me give you a typical example. On his re-instatement after the AFRC interregnum, President Kabbah made pronouncements that people should be paid their salaries whether they had been in or out of the country. I can tell you  that up to this moment I am still owed a year’s salary.  I have complained to the highest authority in this country.  I have still not received a penny.  What do I do?  I can’t go to court. Here is another incident. When my wife and I just came from Liberia she went through an interview for a scholarship. After the interview, some members of the scholarship committee came to me saying: “oh, Sam congratulations, your wife did so well, infact we have recommended her for the scholarship”. The minister at the time did not only delete my wife’s name but replaced her name by his own daughter.

I keep saying this: we are suffering from yesterday’s drunkenness.  This is why I am strongly recommending an entire overhaul of the civil service.   We have been used to a system. There are only a few people who can stand their ground and say what is right. Most citizens are afraid.  If you are not part of the powerful group you have nothing to depend on.  People say “A nor go live pan briz”.  If they fire you today you become a loner. I honestly believe that we need to introduce a merit system.  

The civil service needs to be overhauled.  I personally did not even believe that Permanent Secretaries should be vote controllers.  They should be professional heads. The man or the woman that has worked his or her way from the bottom to the top, who knows the cracks and corners of that ministry, must have a say in the disbursement of funds.  Somebody who is coming there for two three years and is transferred to another ministry should not be given all the powers.  An engineer would say it takes twenty million Leones to do this road.  The Permanent Secretary who has no knowledge of engineering would say twenty million is too much. But at the end of the day you look at the real voucher you see the cost is forty million Leones, instead of the twenty million that was initially asked for.  This is the kind of system I am talking about.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you Dr Maligi.  The Commission will do its best to put forward your complaints and recommendations.

Commissioner Humper:    Dr. Maligi we want to thank you so much for coming here and making your presentation. Your submission entails substantive recommendations for this country.  We will treat those recommendations very seriously.  I only want to ask one question:  Why Sierra Leone? What went wrong? What needs to change? But let me get my facts straight- did I  hear you say that you held the position of Secretary of State from 1995? OIC is synonymous with Sam Maligi in this country; that I know.

Now, this is my pregnant question.  As a worthy and eminent citizen of this nation what would you objectively say was or were the difference or differences between NPRC, AFRC/RUF and the constitutionally elected governments that were overthrown.  This question recognises the fact that you worked for the NPRC, which is your inalienable right to do as a citizen.  

Maligi:    Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.  I don’t know where to start but I will try. Let me look at the differences first.  N.P.R.C was a military government.  Like you said yourself the government that was ousted out of power by the AFRC was a constitutionally elected civilian government. I cannot honestly say much about the AFRC because during their period of rule I was out of the country.  They came to me and asked me to be part of them. I refused.  A friend had however told me not to sleep in Freetown that night.  That was how I left that particular afternoon for Conakry.  I therefore really cannot say much about the AFRC rule.  I can say something about the NPRC rule. There was determination on the part of the NPRC government. But they were young people. The NPRC looked like one group but it had layers. I was part of the council of secretaries of states but there was another layer that was a little higher than the one I belonged to. That layer was the supreme council.  And I also believed that there were small pockets of power groups where the real decisions were taken.  Decisions could have even been taken without the knowledge of the head of state.

I was able to do what I thought I was brought into government to do. Once or twice I asked to be relieved of my duty. The Chairman said no.  Naturally, we had arguments here and there. The civilian government we have now is constitutionally elected. I am part of it as a Member of Parliament. It would not be very fair for me to sit here and really make comparisms between the NPRC that I served and the present civilian government. I served there in the NPRC as a minister; and in the SLPP I am a Member of Parliament. It would not be morally correct on my part to talk about political correctness.

Commissioner Humper:    Dr. Maligi, it is a question that may be answered in the broader context of good governance and corruption.

Maligi:    Mr. Chairman, in deed there was a lot of corruption in the N.P.R.C. As a government we raised it. We talked about it. Some of us even threatened to leave.  All I am saying here is that I don’t really want to get into details.  It is difficult to see a corrupt free society. This is even true with the constitutionally elected government today.  I will be mad to say that there is no corruption today.  It is something we talk about it in parliament. The system is such that it is going to take an army of counsellors to really change the attitude of the people of this country.  When we talk about corruption we limit it only to government officials.  There is corruption almost everywhere and at every level of our society. Take the women who sell in the market. Buy ten cups of rice and go home and measure it. You will hardly get up to eight cups.  Taxi drivers who are supposed to take four passengers, takes 6 passengers.  Teachers ask children to bring this and that. That is corruption.  Even office messengers sometimes take bribes to allow people to see their bosses.  They will stick their necks out to convince or persuade the boss to see you as long as you have given them something. That too is corruption.  So there is corruption everywhere Mr. Chairman.

Commissioner Sooka:    Thank you Chairperson.  I also have two questions for you Mr. Maligi.  In your recommendations you singled out three ministries that you said needed to be strengthened. I would like you to elaborate.

Maligie:    Thank you very much.  If I were in the President’s position three ministries I would really strengthen would be the ministry of defence, the ministry of health and the ministry of education.  I remember we raised an issue in parliament few weeks ago when they were talking about this dreadful disease from china – Sars – yes I asked the question what is the ministry of health doing?  We have our business people going to Hong Kong; they are screening people at the airport?  No they are not, we are waiting until it becomes an epidemic in our society.  You know we should now move from crisis management to crisis prevention.  You know that is what I am saying.  And of cause you know the mess with education today. I don’t think I need to elaborate on that.  We have a very high level of illiteracy.  We still need to honestly put a lot of money into education.  We have a lot of degree holders with no jobs.  Let us now put emphasis on skills training and vocational education in preparation for national reconstruction.  We have been paying lip service to technical and vocational training.  Let it be seen to be done .

Commissioner Sooka:    One more question. You spoke about a coordinated approach to counselling.  Can you explain that please?

Maligi:    I am aware of the fact that a lot of organisations, especially NGOs, are providing counselling service to our communities.  Even SLOIC is providing counselling. We also train counsellors.  But I am talking about getting a special unit to coordinate these various efforts. Coordinating counselling  around the country could be added, for instance, to the mandate of a body like the TRC.  That is what I am saying. It is a way of giving us common direction.  We cannot just do counselling to fulfil requirements to get money.

Commissioner Kamara:    I would like to join the others to thank you Dr. Maligie for coming here to share your thoughts with us.  I am not going to ask you questions. I just want to make observations that you may want to comment on.  You have given us a very honest review of the ills of the country.  It is a fair diagnosis of what went wrong.  But I must say that I feel little disappointed by the recommendations or the prescriptions you have given to solve those problems.  Because to me the recommendations seems more like the stereotype recommendations one hears around.  You cited specific cases of wrong doing for which complaints were made. And you say that nobody took any action to correct things.  I was therefore expecting more innovative recommendations. That is my disappointment.

Maligi:    You are very correct Mr. Commissioner. I don’t want to say it was deliberate, but I knew questions were going to be asked. It would have taken me a lot more time to really handle the recommendations the way you want them.  But I want to say to you that if you really want me to do some extra work on these recommendations for your satisfaction it could be done.  

Commissioner Kamara:    I am sure the Commission would welcome confidential submission from you. Thank you.

Chairman:    Thank you very much Dr. Maligi. I have only one question for you. And the question is simply about the treatment you received from ECOMOG.  Did you report your maltreatment by ECOMOG to any superior official at that time?  And what was the reaction.

Maligi:    Mr. Chairman, I called military headquarters and spoke to a few senior military officers.

Commissioner Torto:    I must congratulate you for what you’ve achieved personally or done for this country as brought up in your paper. You spoke about your pioneering work with the SLOIC- an institution you have been running and expanding since. I commend your efforts in that direction. I must also thank you very much for highlighting the ills of the civil service.  I only want to implore you to help the Commission with a submission of further recommendations. We particularly want to have something on civil service restructuring. Leader of Evidence, do you have anything for Dr. Maligi?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you Mr. Commissioner. I believe we have about two questions from Dr. Maligi. Dr. Malige on page two of your submission you said the current mission of the SLOIC is to assist the government of Sierra Leone with the rehabilitation, reconstruction, resettlement, and reintegration of ex-combatant, war affected individuals, unemployed youths and so on.  Do you have any specific programme for amputees as war-affected individuals?

Maligi:    Yes, we have programmes for amputees. A person who lost one leg can still do tailoring. When it’s for in-take for our assistance programmes we advertise. We identify people as  war-affected when they apply. Our counsellors also move from community to community to identify people who would need our training.  Practically, every technical training area at OIC is open to amputees.

Leader of Evidence:    As a follow-up to Commissioner Torto’s question- you said you were labelled a rebel. And definitely we know as a matter of fact that ECOMOG acted on information. Were you able to find out those who labelled you a rebel and if so have you reconciled with them or do you want to reconcile with them? Could you give the name of the person or persons to the Commission so that would find a way of reconciling you if that has not been done?

Maligi:    No, nobody specifically labelled me a rebel. When the ECOMOG troops took me to their base they said all Sierra Leoneans were rebels.  They said I was a rebel so I just sat down there.  I even gave them my passport. At that time I had a diplomatic passport. I told them who I was. They didn’t even want to listen to me.  So I just kept quiet waiting to be thrown into the water too.

Commissioner Humper:    Thank you Dr. Maligi. Do you have questions for the Commission pertaining to our work, and how you think we could improve on what is missing?
 
Maligi:    Frankly I don’t have questions.  It is only disappointing that a lot of us don’t come here.  This is a place one would expect to be jam-packed. People have to come and support the Commission and hear what people are saying. But I am greatly disappointed that the place is empty you. I however, want to congratulate you for doing a very good.

---

 
Leader of evidence:     Our next witness for this morning is Major General Tom S. Carew, Chief of Defence Staff.

WITNESS No.: 2
WITNESS NAME: Major General Tom S. Carew
 
Commissioner Humper:    We want to welcome you here as Chief of Defence Staff.  We are delighted that you agreed to come here and be part of this nation-building process called TRC.  We believe that the participation in the TRC of personalities like you will go a long way nationally and internationally to give the institution credibility. We welcome and encourage you to share with us whatever you have that will help us this country.  You are now welcome to give your presentation.

SUBMISSION
Carew:    Mr. Chairman, members of this Commission, invited guests, ladies and gentlemen.  I will try to be very brief because my submission is already with you. In deed it gives me the greatest privilege to appear before your Commission to make this submission at its public hearing. Furthermore, I like to seize this opportunity to congratulate you Mr. Chairman, your executive Secretary who is not here and gallant commissioners for organizing such a symbolical even at this auspicious time in the history pf our beloved Sierra Leone.  I shall be speaking about the January 6 1999 rebel attack on Freetown as you’ve asked me.

The day commonly known as J-6 is unforgettable in the minds of all Sierra Leoneans especially Freetonians. The horrible memories of the actual events of the fatal day will linger in the minds of Sierra Leoneans so many years to come.

Mr. Chairman in making this presentation, two weeks before January 6, intelligent reports were coming in that the AFRC/RUF rebels were planning to invade the city of Freetown. During that period, the intervention force ECOMOG was solely responsible for security of the city, and indeed the entire country.  Mr. Chairman, it was the same ECOMOG that won the single credit of flushing the AFRC junta from Freetown thereby proving the way for the restoration of the democratically elected government of the day.  At that time, the national army was dormant and the bulk of the surrendered personnel had been camped at three locations, Lungi Garrison, Benguma Barracks and the National Stadium Swimming Pool.  In my presentation or my submission to you, I mentioned certain problems that the heads of ECOMOG were having at that particular time which I will not like to mention openly.  Suffice it to say that there were some problems with ECOMOG and its leadership.  

Petty jealousy was even mentioned. It is safe to say however that because of some internal squabbles ECOMOG never made contingency plans for any attack of the nature of January 6.  For their part, the rebels took advantage of the prevailing situation on the ground. They seize the initiative and attacked the people.  The rebels started launching series of attacks on ECOMOG positions across the country.  Their main plan was to systematically attack the overstretched and thin ECOMOG deployment taking maximum advantage of knowledge of the terrain. The attack started from the Northern axis under the command of late Captain S.A.J. Musa.  Through these attacks ECOMOG troops were cut off from the rare and in many instances completely isolated. Locations like Alikalia, Kono, Magburaka, Makeni were overrun after all these attacks from the north.  

They kept on the attack until they arrived on the outskirt of Freetown.  To be more specific, the armed forces training centre at Waterloo was their first target.  At that time the ECOMOG leadership and indeed the traumatized populace did not fully trust the SLA troops.  So ECOMOG made sure all the encamped SLA personnel and arms were securely kept in barracks. So when the rebels eventually launched a surprise attack on the encamped troops at Benguma our own troops withdrew and Benguma fell easily to the rebels.

So Mr. Chairman in the mopping operations after their victory, the rebels proceeded to destroy everything they could lay hands on including expensive military equipments, stores and ordinance. The rebels broke into the armoury and took out all the light arms they could lay hands on and carried them away. They even destroyed some of these heavy weapons to prevent us making any counter attack. Without thinking of the danger involved S.A.J Musa gave instant order to his rebels to set fire to the armoury building which at that time was full of high explosives, heavy shells and dangerous bombs.  In the ensuing high explosion, several rebels who were within the danger zone were all torn to pieces.  S.A.J Musa who gave the orders for the armoury to be burnt down was himself on the spot. He died.

Hours after the explosion, the few surviving rebels managed to drag his body from the scene. They dug an unmarked grave and without any military ceremony buried him.

SAJ Musa’s death was indeed sad news to the rebels but a big blessing for government forces.  With the death of this feared and notorious commander, the rebels were demoralized and temporarily thrown into disarray with no credible commander to take over the mantle of leadership.  The junior rebels commanders tried strenuously to put the men together to plan the diabolic invasion of the city.

Now, let me talk on the attack on the city itself.  The rebels invaded the city on Wednesday 6 January 1999.  The actual invasion reached the ears of ECOMOG High Command from  ECOMOG troops at about 4.00a.m.  It was not only a big surprise but also a great shock.  The actual invasion started from the eastern part of the city in the Calaba Town general area.  The rebels disguised themselves and mingled with the huge exodus of civilians who were entering the city in waves.  The rebels also tactically made maximum use of the prevailing darkness to conceal their identity and true strength.    Before daybreak they had penetrated the centre of Freetown and had started firing from all directions. Residents in the East and centre of the city were thrown into a state of panic, confusion and pandemonium.

I have just said that even the ECOMOG Generals in the ECOMOG headquarters at Cockerill were all shocked, astonished and dumbfounded. In their attempt to capture the entire Freetown, the invading rebels proceeded to attack the West end of the city. They met by a very strong ECOMOG resistance at Congo Bridge where they suffered incredible and fatal casualties.

That was the first offensive operations of ECOMOG. I was part of it.  The ECOMOG troops under the command of one Major Musa made a surprise and deadly ambush that totally engulfed the leading elements of the rapidly advancing rebels.  All the leading vehicles and their occupants were blown to pieces in that particular encounter.  That was indeed the greatest single victory by ECOMOG against the rebels. It broke their invisibility and put a final halt to their intended advance into the West end of Freetown.

As I said earlier ladies and gentlemen, during this period, the national army was dormant. ECOMOG was solely responsible for the security of the country with the Nigerian born General Timothy Shelpidi as Force Commander.  General Abu Amadu as ECOMOG Task Force Commander. General Khobe was Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army by then. I was Colonel in charge of administration. I was placed under a Nigerian Captain to control me.  This shows exactly how dormant the SLA was.

After halting the rebels’ advances towards the West at that Congo Cross Bridge encounter, ECOMOG finally seized the initiative and embarked on decisive attack, and pursuit of retreating rebel elements.  After three days of fierce gun battle and massive bombardments, ECOMOG forces in a three-fold simultaneous attack on rebel positions cleared Brookfields, Kingtom, New England, Pademba Road area and the whole of central Freetown. ECOMOG went as far as East-end Police.  Having suffered serious casualties and setbacks, the rebels had no choice but to beat a top retreat in the face of the rapid ECOMOG assault.  The fleeing rebels started to vent in their anger on defenceless civilians. They carried out wholesale burning of government buildings, civilians’ residences, and vehicles.  They did not stop at that.  They also started acts of amputation, abduction, and mutilation. They massacred innocent civilians including women and children.

Mr. Chairman, the only casualty on our part on that particular day was the loss of one Major J.B. Arrow and one junior personnel. As a result of these two casualties, government troops temporarily halted the pursuit to evacuate the casualty and wait for fresh reinforcement.  General Khobe and myself coordinated this.  Early the next day, we received the reinforcement and we started the advance.  We were with the troops just to give them morale. Because their most feared commander, SAJ Musa was out of the scene there was little command and control on the side of the rebels.  

The retreating rebels split into two factions.  One faction returned to Makeni to rejoin their colleagues while the other element returned and established a notorious hideout at Okra Hills. The Okra Hill group called it self “West Side Boys”. It was this same gang that stubbornly held out at the base even after ECOMOG was replaced by UNAMSIL. And it was the same group that launched series of attacks on Masiaka and its environs, ambushed the Waterloo-Masiaka highway on countless times. They dug several ditches as death traps across the highway to deter the flow of vehicular traffic.  The ‘West Side Boys” met their Waterloo when they abduct seven British soldiers who were out on patrol. The British undertook operation Barras to free the soldiers, demolish the notorious base, and route the bandits. Scores of the bandits were killed. Those who were captured are still at the Pademba Road Prisons.  

The effect of the AFRC/RUF attack on Freetown on 6th January 1999 was immense.  In the East and Central parts of the city the rebels attacked defenceless civilians and committed so many acts of atrocities.  They killed and raped people. They looted property and burnt houses.  Of course Sierra Leoneans as well as the international community were witnesses to the huge scale of destruction of human and material resources that accompanied the January 6 invasion.  I need not say much on this issue.  

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, distinguish guests, ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you all for listening to me.  I will now wait for some questions.

Commissioner Humper:    Major General Tom Carew, we want to thank you very much for your time. You have done a good job to unravel the story of the January 6, 1999 invasion of Freetown.  Commissioners will now ask some questions to seek further clarifications. The Leader of Evidence may afterwards ask questions or make comments. I will now turn to my colleagues to engage our Chief of Defence Staff.

Commissioner Torto:    I thank you very much Major General Carew for this presentation.  I must also join the Chairman in thanking you for even honouring our invitation to be here.  I have so many questions for the Major General. I will try to limit my questions as much as possible to the issue under discussion. Many of my questions draw from people’s testimonies. And all I want from you is to make clarifications.

I am going to start by asking you a question about something you raised in the presentation.  The national army you said was dormant.  I don’t know why the national army was dormant. How could the whole army at that time be dormant?  Were there not loyal officers, men and women in the army who could have actually answered to the call of this country?
 
Carew:    There were actually some people.  I was one of those that surrendered to ECOMOG at Lungi, before going to Conakry. I was in Conakry until ECOMOG came and drove out the AFRC. That was when I came back and reported to General Khobe. There were some other soldiers who were called ‘the loyal troops’.  These were few soldiers and some SSD personnel who were with us.  The people however, had little trust in us because as I said earlier, the percentage of soldiers who were with the bad guys was very high.  It was going to take some time for people to have confidence and faith in us. General Khobe just camped us in barracks, and stored all the arms and ammunition so that none of us would think of doing anything bad.  Some of us who were trusted to some extent were attached to some of the military operations.  That was how it went.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you. Our army was reputed at one time to be a very strong force. The Sierra Leone army had the reputation of being a very strong and brave force in the West Coast of Africa for a long time. What gave cause for a foreigner -General Khobe to be appointed Chief of Defence Staff when there were so many brave people in the army?

Carew:    Again Mr. Commissioner, an answer to that question could be found in what I said about trust in the Sierra Leonean soldier. About 80% of our men at that time were on the other side- that is on the RUF/AFRC side.  It was very difficult for people to trust us. When Government decided to root out the guys who were in command of security in the country,  General Khobe was automatically declared as the Chief of Defence Staff of Sierra Leone.  There were honest people but you yourself would not have trusted them at that time.  Mr. Commissioner I will be talking on the armed forces and the police in my next presentation.
 
Commissioner Torto:    Thank you. There is a general feeling especially among Freetown residents, that the invasion of Freetown by the rebels was only possible with the connivance of SLA. It is said that without the SLA, the rebels could have never penetrated the city.  Can you comment on that?

Carew:    Actually, everybody has his own view.  For my part, I want to agree partly with what you said, Sir. There were about 80% of our men with the rebels. They were well-trained compared with the rebels. A person like S.A.J. Musa was a well-trained combat officer.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you. Many people who have appeared before this Commission as victims have stated that what this country is going through today was all caused by the Sierra Leone Army.  Do you agree?

Carew:    That is their view, Sir. But let me explain. In any society there are bad elements. The military had its own bad elements bent on destroying the institution. But the institution had its own good people. We could point to the loyal troops for instance. I wouldn’t want to point at myself as a good element in the military. But I want to believe that power comes from God.  Nobody should begin to fight for power.  I hold this believe because of my Christian background. I grew up in the home of the late Bishop B.A. Carew. A military man should aspire to become a General and not to become President.  That is my own belief.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you.  This is my last question for now because I know you are going to face the Commission again. The May 25, 1997 coup was staged by very low-ranking officers. They were not officers in fact. The people who staged the coup according to testimonies before this Commission were just batmen of the Junior Officers. They commanded no dignity, and no respect. They had no form of education, not to talk of any idea of running a country.  Why were the Senior Officers in the army so dormant or allowed themselves to be overrun by mere boys of theirs on May 27- where were they?

Carew:    This is a very controversial question, actually.  Sir, the rank and file far outnumber the officers. The rank and file planned this thing without the knowledge of officers. I want to believe that even though we were small in number, if we were properly prepared and had the will power to say no the coup could have been resisted. We could have stopped them. But it is not every officer that can withstand tension.  I had to leave this country because I was not willing to salute any Corporal. I fled to Guinea to seek refuge.  Before going to Guinea I was kept at Pademba Road prison.  They said I didn’t want to co-operate with them.  I was there for two and a half months.  That was why I left this country.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you Major General for coming here and giving us your testimony. I am curious to know whether the Task Force Commander was ever brought to book for the lapse in contingency plans which brought disaster to Freetown?

Carew:    Madam Commissioner, because these are military matters I have opted not to discuss them in public. The Task Force Commander was not a Sierra Leonean by then.  We have certain rules that regulate any action that is to be taken. I cannot elaborate in this open hearing.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    I just want to one comment. I hope Major General that in the training of army officers they are made to realize how destructive petty jealousies could be among senior officers.

Carew:    Actually this is true.  If I should make my recommendations maybe this is one lesson learnt. From any history, any campaign, one must learn lessons.

Commissioner Kamara:    Thank you Major General Tom Carew.  I join the other commissioners in welcoming you to this Commission. We have not exhausted all questions on the military. We still want to understand a lot of things that happened. We hope to have other opportunities for clarifications on aspects that might not have been dealt with.  Coming to your current presentation, you said a few times that Sierra Leoneans did not trust the army.  As a very senior officer you must have had an idea of what created this mistrust.  Can you tell us why the people of this country did not trust the army?

Carew:    I may not need to say much now.  In the next paper I will actually give my views on how and why discipline in the army deteriorated so much.  It was all about discipline.  If people are disciplined they will do things that the civilian populace accepts.

Commissioner Kamara:    Alright. I know that we need to get more information from the army. But I would like to know whether your statement means that the military was no longer serving the people or protecting the people it was meant to protect.

Carew:    It is my view that some soldiers were actually working in the interest of the people of this country while others went to the other side.

Commissioner Kamara:    Major General, were the people of this country receiving what they expected from the army. I want an opinion?

Carew:    Well, I don’t know what people may feel. But since this is the time for reconciliation I just want to ask the whole nation to forgive us. We know that people do not to trust us anymore because of our actions. Let us forget about the past and look forward to the new army that is now well trained. Let us look forward to a well-disciplined army that is accountable to the people of this country.

Commissioner Kamara:    It is true Major General Carew that the main concern of the Commission is to bring about reconciliation in the country. But before reconciliation there has to be something- a prerequisite. People should come out and admit any fault of theirs or displeasures they would have caused the country.

Carew:    As I said, in any society or organization, you will have people who are bent on destroying its good image.  I continue to beg for forgiveness on behalf of the army. I want to humbly ask members of this Commission to help us to talk to the people of the country.

Commissioner Kamara:    Apart from bringing about reconciliation, the Commission is also to find out the cause or causes of what happened so that we can make recommendations that will prevent its reoccurrence. And this is where you and all the other people come in. You were the characters in the stories, in those places where all these things happened.  It is people like you that should come and tell us what went wrong or created the circumstances that led to the problems that this country had.  When we get the information and analyse it along with others, we will then be able to make appropriate recommendations.

Major General Carew appears again before the Commission the following day

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Major General. You have been with us yesterday. You now know the procedure.  You will do your presentation, which will be followed by questions from us. The Leader of Evidence will thereafter ask you questions. At the end of it all you will have a chance to ask the Commission questions and make recommendations.  So may we now hear from you?

SUBMISSION
Carew:    Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, invited guests, ladies and gentlemen.  Today again, I stand before you to talk about the taking of the United Nations peacekeepers hostage, in 2000.  I was deployed in Freetown when the hostages were taken.  Many stories have been told to about this. What I intend to talk about is how we got to the hostage taking stage.  How the hostage taking impacted on us nationally and internationally.  I will however attempt to describe the peculiarity of the war years, and how those peculiarity of the war years, played out in West Africa. Then I will conclude by recommending some reforms and practices aimed at protecting UN peacekeepers in the management of ceasefire during civil wars.  

Now let me just say few things before and during the conflict. Before the war broke out in 1991, I was deployed as Adjutant of Lungi Garrison at Lungi.  When the war broke out I was posted to Mano River Bridge.  I was later posted to Potoru in the Pujehun District, and subsequently posted to Koribondo as Battalion Commander in 1993.  I became third Brigade Commander in the Southern Province in 1994. I  had just returned from Ghana, where I did my Senior Staff College Course.  The brigade was headquartered in Bo, and I was a colonel. The rebel was a strange animal to many soldiers and to the RSLAF at large. The rebels for fear of long-term identity wore the uniforms of fallen regular soldiers. That was how we became labelled as “Sorbels”. The National Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) became united.  Now let me come on to the topic itself.

There were three issues in my view,  that made the hostage incidence possible :  the problems of UN forces relieving ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, the principle of UN’s impartiality, and civil/military relations. At the time the UN decided to deploy its forces in Makeni, the force’s size was small. Its mandate was not combative, and there was no established relationship between the UN forces and the splinted regular RSLAF forces.

As it were, the international community mistook the AFRC/RUF alliance for the entire RSLAF forces.  For example, before the Kenyans headed for Makeni, a team visited the Armed Forces training centre to inform the RSLAF trainers and security personnel who took part in the liberation of Freetown after the RUF invasion on the 6th January 1999.  The Sierra Leone Army did advise that it monitored an RUF radio communication that suggested the arrest of peacekeepers as a way to improve the movement’s stake in the peace process.  The UN obviously was not in a position to heed such advise given the level of mistrust everybody had for the Sierra Leone Army.

However, even when the peacekeepers were about to be taken hostage a more robust mandate could have taken care of things.  A robust mandate could not have missed the natural element of self-defence.  Actually, my disappointment was that the hostages were released to President. Charles Taylor. It was Taylor who handed the hostages to the UN authority in Freetown.  And I must say that we thank God our colleagues resurfaced although some died. 

Nevertheless, I personally learnt the following lessons and I wish to share them with the TRC:

– UN peacekeepers must recognize partnership with the local forces in order to gain any entry point into secure and credible peace operation. And the second lesson is that peacekeepers should be trained and organized to move into peace reinforcement role. The UN should also develop a force protection party, should a situation demand it. As reforms in the RSLAF are being undertaken it must also not be lost on the international community to contribute to the reform process by preparing the RSLAF for peace support operations within the outside West Africa.  

– And to summarize, I want to say that I saw the beginning and the end of the civil war.  Mr. Chairman, I will say the rest ing answers to your questions.

Commissioner Torto:              Thank you. Commissioner Kamara?

Commissioner Kamara:    Thank you very much Chief of Defence Staff, T.S. Carew.  We are happy to receive you here again.  There is something I don’t know or perhaps misunderstood about the taking of the peacekeepers as hostage. I want you to confirm my own understanding of your presentation.  Are you saying that increasing the negotiating power of the AFRC/RUF was the reason for the hostage crisis?

Carew:    Yes, Mr. Commissioner. It is my view that this must have been one of the reasons why they took those hostages.

Commissioner Kamara:    To what extent would we blame the peacekeepers for what happened ?

Carew:    I could say that they cannot be blamed, Sir. The rebels may have been using diversionary tactics to pass on those messages to their counterparts. Some of our guys were part of those rebels, mind you.  When I came back from Guinea, for example, we went to recapture Kono. We went there with many vehicles and tanks.  A false message was sent to our location that those vehicles were needed back in Freetown.  By then we have spent about two weeks.  We had no food. We were surviving on raw mangoes.  Then I decided to go back with the vehicles to Freetown.  On our way we fell in a terrible ambush. These were some of the diversionary tactics that the rebels were using. So we cannot blame the peacekeepers at all.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you for coming again and thank you for waiting so patiently for us to call you up to podium.  Can you give proportions of the Sierra Leone army’s splinter?

Carew:    I cannot give exact figures. But as I said yesterday, at the time of the AFRC, we had about 80% of our men on the AFRC/RUF side.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Eighty percent on that side?

Carew:    Yes, it was about 80%.  Very few loyal soldiers went to surrender to ECOMOG.

Comissioner Marcus-Jones:    So you will agree that the proportion of soldiers that stayed on the Government’s side was not large enough for the UN to have established any relationship with?

Carew:    That is why I am saying that we should not blame the UN.  I have said that the percentage of soldiers on the side of the rebels was too large. Nobody could therefore trust any soldier.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Could you explain to us why you were disappointed that the hostages were released to the President of Liberia?

Carew:    It is actually known that Charles Taylor was the man who was supporting the RUF. I particularly had something against him for that.  I was therefore not pleased that those people were handed over to him.
 
Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you.

Commissioner Torto:    Chief of Defence Staff, we welcome you again and thank you for your patience.  My first question now is this:  Did the arrest and killing of some of the UN peacekeepers take place before the Lome Peace Agreement or after the Lome Peace Agreement?

Carew:    Actually, the arrest took place after the Lome Peace Accord.

Commissioner Torto:    Alright. Article 9 of the Lome Peace Agreement granted amnesty and pardon to those who were involved in the fighting. The amnesty however covered only the period between the start of the war and the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement.  It follows therefore that any crime committed after the Lome Accord is not covered by the  amnesty provisions?

Carew:    Mr. Chairman, I want to believe that we should go by what the law says.  Luckily I was part of the delegation that went to sign that peace accord.  We were there for over two months. Foday Sankoh and his people gave us a lot of problem. It was only the patience of people like the honourable Vice President that saved the situation.  

Commissioner Torto:    Would you not agree with me that it was within the context of the Lome Peace Agreement that UN sent a peacekeeping force to Sierra Leone? And had they not every right to go to everywhere in the country?

Carew:    Mr. Commissioner, I want to agree with you hundred percent.

Commissioner Torto:    My final question now, Chief of Defence Staff is this: What impact, negative or positive did the arrest and killing of some of the United Nations by our own people in this country have on the international community?
 
Carew:    Mr. Chairman, I want to say that it was a very shameful act.  Any true Sierra Leonean should be ashamed of what those people did.  This shows you the amount of lawlessness that was in the country during those days.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you sir.

Commissioner Sooka:    Thank you Major General T.S. Carew.  In paragraph two of your submission, you said that you intended to talk about how we got to the hostage taking stage.  And how the hostage taking impacted on the national and international political scenes.  In paragraph five you said that the arrest of five hundred peacekeepers was related to three issues in your view:  The problems of the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces and replacement by UN forces, the legalistic principle of impartiality, and the problem of civil/military relations in Sierra Leone at that time.  Could you explain exactly what you mean by those three points?

Carew:    Let me start with the problem of ECOMOG/UN forces  change-over.  There was a lot of confusion on the ground at the time when ECOMOG was been replaced.  Those UN who were coming in did not know the ground, so there was complete chaos in the general area. I want to believe that this was one of the reasons why those peacekeepers were captured.  Let me come to the second issue of the legalistic principle of impartiality. I think that the UN troops thought they were going to a friendly place.  So they were never prepared for combat. They didn’t have Chapter Seven mandate.  On the last issue of civil/military relations, let me start by saying that it was the first time the UN troops were on ground.  They therefore hadn’t civilian friends on the ground that could advise them on where and where not to go.  That was why in my opinion, they ended in surroundings were rebel elements could encircle and capture them.

And of course, added to all these, as I said earlier, was the fact that the peacekeepers were not prepared for any combat role.  The size of the force itself was very small.  Five hundred men is less than a battalion. The rebels in the area where the hostages were taken were more than a brigade.  

Commissioner Sooka:    You talked about UN peacekeepers not winning partnership with the local people.  Do you think this is a fair criticism of the UN’s early operations?  .

Carew:    As I was saying, yesterday, in the military you always try to learn lessons from any failure of a command.  As far I was concerned there were problems that led to the capture of the UN peacekeepers.  

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much Major General Carew. There are very minor areas that I want you to clear with me, based on your written submission.  According to the last sentence in your first paragraph, the rebels for fear of long-term identification wore the uniforms of our fallen regular soldiers. That was how our soldiers became known as sorbels.  Was that the only way our soldiers came to be known as sorbels?   Are you aware that there were connivances between the rebels and some officers of the Armed Forces?

Leader of evidence:    Commissioner, the Chief of Defence Staff will be scheduled for a close Session on the 22nd. There are a number of important issues to talk about with the Chief of Defence staff.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you.  Does the Leader of evidence have questions for the Major General?

Leader of Evidence:    Honourable Commissioner, I have no questions for the Chief of Defence Staff on the kidnap of UN peacekeepers. I have only  two requests to make to the Chief of Defence Staff.  Firstly, I want the Chief of Defence Staff to assist the Commission with opinion on the objective conditions in the country that led to the civil war. The Commission will also be very interested to receive submissions on the ‘ndogbowusu’ rebellion.  What was the role of the military in that rebellion? Who were the actors? What was the nature of the disturbances?  

Carew:    I will delegate my staff to do it; because I was a low –ranking officer at that time.

Leader of Evidence:    It is not about you as a person, Sir. It is about the Military as an institution. There must be records.

Carew:    During ‘Ndobowusu’ time?

Leader of Evidence:     1982 certainly.  There must be records of the roles that the Army has played over the years.

Carew:    If you talk of records then I must be very frank to say that  everything was destroyed.  I only want to assist the Commission. I will contact people like General Gortor to help with some records because he was the Commander of that Operation.

Leader of Evidence:    That will be wonderful.  Could you, in that case tell Gortor that we want to see him.  It may be helpful for us to interview him directly.  

My second question concerns the 1998 trials and executions.  We would like to hear from you because you were President of the Court Martial.  I would like to have a transcript of the proceedings of the Court Martial, as well as the interrogations of the officers by the army.

Carew:    Let me clarify that point again.  You have already sent a letter to me, to which I have replied. I have also spoken to your team.  It is very difficult to get the records of those trials now. Every document was handed over to the Chief of Defence Staff. The Chief of Defence Staff by then was General Khobe.  He too had to take those records to higher level.  And we know that during the intervention, nobody wanted to keep such records. People just threw them away.  Maybe an institution like SLBS has such documents. SLBS staff attended the trials on a daily basis

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much. The Commission will explore all possible means to go to SLBS, the office of the Vice President and the Attorney General to see whether we can have access to those records.  They are very important documents for the work of the Commission

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you Major General. Do you have questions for the Commission?

Carew:    I do not know how you people intend to interview some of my officers. I have been receiving letters from some of those who are out of the country. I do not know what arrangements you are going to make for them.

Commissioner Torto:    You mean serving officers, or members who have left the army?

Carew:    No, serving officers.

Leader of Evidence:    We have sent a number of letters to the Chief of Defence Staff.  Apart from Colonel Mondeh who is in Nigeria, my understanding is that all the other officers serving in the country will be invited.

Carew:    There are officers who are pursuing also pursuing courses of study outside the country.  This is my concern.  Do we wait for them?

Commissioner Torto:    How long are their courses going to last?

Carew:    Let us say they will be here towards the end of the year.  Most of them would have come.

Leader of Evidence:    Honourable Commissioners, I think it is something that the Commission needs to take up at the level of the Ministry of Defence and perhaps, the Presidency.  These are very critical witnesses that the Commission has to talk to. The Leaders of Evidence have through the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Commission written to the Military authorities that these people come and be interviewed by the Commission.

Commissioner Torto:    I see one of them has made a written submission in the person of Komba Mondeh, has Kess Mboya made any?

Leader of Evidence:    No, he has not. And he is a very critical witness for the Commission.  We did not intend to request Mondeh’s further appearance. We are going to talk to the Head of State at the time- Captain Valentine Strasser. if Valentine Strasser can testify before the Commission, then the Leaders of Evidence would not intend to present Colonel Mondeh as a witness.  K.E.S Boyah and Bangura are very significant witnesses  that the Leaders of Evidence think the Commissioners need to interview in closed session or open sessions.

Commissioner Torto:    OK.  Since this is the case we are asking that the matter be taken up with the Ministry of Defence. But regarding the submission of written testimonies to us, we want to ask you to remind K. E.S. Boyah to send in his submission.  Already one of his colleagues, Komba Mondeh has sent his from Nigeria. We think K.E.S. Boyah can do the same thing.  He has to actually send in a written submission.  Efforts to get him to appear before the Commission in person would be pursued by the Commission.

Carew:    Mr. Commissioner, in my own little way, I will try to contact him. My assistant will phone him after here.  I can ask that he spend a few days here.  The only thing we may have to do is to get his return air tickets.

Commissioner Torto:    Yes.  Just a few days.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much Chief of Defence Staff. The Commission’s intention is to help you build a very professional Army. I am sure that you will be very happy with the report of the Commission in respect of the experiences of the roles some people have played in the army.  We would therefore appreciate if you can facilitate the appearance of some of your officers before this Commission.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you. We see that you have some suggestions or recommendations in your paper. Are those all you have, or do you have any to add?

Carew:    Yes, I will try to make some additions.

    
Commissioner Torto:    Please do that in writing and let us have them.

Carew:    I may need to talk to you in-camera.

Commissioner Torto:    If you do not have anything more to add, we thank you very much for coming and appreciate your time with us.  You may step down now.

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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARNG: JANUARY 6 ATTACK ON FREETOWN

DATE:    Day 2: 15th July, 2003.

BEFORE:
Commissioner John Kamara (Presiding)
Commissioner Joseph C. Humper
Commissioner Laura Marcus-Jones
Commissioner Sylvanus Torto

Leader of Evidence:    Our witness this afternoon is Dr. Julius Spencer.
WITNESS No.: 1
WITNESS NAME: Julius S. Spencer

Commissioner  Kamara    Dr. Spencer your name is a household name in Sierra Lone. We want you to continue to help the Commission in making Sierra Leone the country we want it to be.  In different ways we have all been playing our roles.  But at a critical moment like this we want to put our thoughts and ideas together so as to help the nation and the international community in mapping out the problems in Sierra Lone.  We appreciate that you accepted our invitation, in addition to the comprehensive interview with the Commission. You are welcome and the Commission is ready to listen to you.

SUBMISSION
Spencer:    I will be brief and limit my comments to the January 6, 1999 invasion of Freetown. That is the theme I believe that I have been invited to talk on.  I will start by saying that prior to January 6 and I was Minister of Information Communication Tourism and Culture. Let me however mention that before becoming a Minister I was a private citizen. In fact I was in the United States when the coup happened in May 1997.  When the coup took place I decided that I needed to do something to help reverse it. I had terrible fears about what would happen to Sierra Leone. I offered to help establish a radio station for the government of Sierra Leone. We ran the radio for roughly nine months. I also should make this comment that I was not and still not a member of any political party.  I only once in my life joined a political party, and that was the National Democratic Party was established in 1991. I have no political ambition.
 
In December 1998 after I became Minister I moved away from military matters. Prior to my appointment, during the period I was at Lungi I was very close to ECOMOG. I knew most of the officers and operations. I was almost one of them.  I observed ECOMOG working. Late General Khobe was commander of ECOMOG Task Force. I observed the tremendous discipline with which he operated and the efficiency with which the ECOMOG operated.  So I had absolute confidence in ECOMOG abilities to provide defence for Sierra Leone. When I became Minister I moved away and concentrated on my ministerial responsibilities. It was not until late that I began to realize that things were not working the way they should.  I began to hear of things not working well with ECOMOG.  ECOMOG positions were been over run the rebels.  One day, myself,  Alie Bangura and a few others went to General Khobe to discuss with him what was going on. At that time he was no longer in charge of ECOMOG. He was Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army.  

It was there that I realized, that in the first place, ECOMOG hadn’t full troop strength. Troops that had been withdrawn had not been replaced. Many things had gone wrong. Sierra Leone soldiers had been disarmed. Some of them were re-armed and worked alongside ECOMOG. ECOMOG did not have enough supplies, vehicles, equipments etc.  ECOMOG was simply not in full strength. Myself and a few other people decided to get close to ECOMOG to have clear ideas about what was going on and how we could help.  The ECOMOG Task Force Commander was Brigadier General Abu Amadu. When we met him on a couple of occasions he asked that we air programme on radio and television to calm the civilian population and stop the large movement of people. We started doing programmes on radio and television on this issue.  But this did not seem to have the desired effect. It also became clear to us that General Khobe no longer had any working relation with ECOMOG. They were not listening to him when he advised them on what to do.  He was a slightly junior officer to both the ECOMOG Task Force Commander, and the ECOMOG General Commander. At one time I was at Wilberforce Barracks which was then the headquarters of ECOMOG. Some officers came from Makeni which had been overran to report to the Force Commander that they had been betrayed by some of the Sierra Leone soldiers who had been integrated into their ranks to defend in Makeni.  

I also remember when Masiaka was attacked and the Guinean Commander coming to the barracks terrified about what was going on. ECOMOG forces seemed powerless and always over run all over the place.  At the time I don’t think there was any formal national defence council which was in charge of security. It was obvious that the Sierra Leone Government was not really in the position to do anything because the government at that time did not have an Army of it own. General Khobe kept complaining that he had no soldiers.  Government had just started training and recruiting officers and men.  Around the January 2, a number of us went to see General Khobe to discuss the situation and asked what we needed to do. He basically said that there was nothing he could do. He told us that his advice to ECOMOG General’s on what should be done to ensure that fighting did not take place in the city was not heeded.

However, it was obvious that the rebels were advancing on Freetown. On  January 5 rebels overran Jui which had an ECOMOG base at the time.  I found it hard at that time to believe that the rebels had got that far. On the evening of January 5 I jumped in to my vehicle with my two bodyguards and a driver and to go and see things for myself.  We drove all the way Foamex where the front line was at time.  We got there to find SSD personell, ECOMOG soldiers and some Kamajors preparing for the night. They told us it was not quite safe to go any further but I insisted that  I wanted to go and see what was going on.  We drove pass and went all the way to Jui. I expected that we’ll meet an ECOMOG check point at the junction but there was none. The area was no man’s land. We drove  down the road going to the ECOMOG base. We l didn’t see nobody. We came across a few corpses along the road. After a while we saw somebody coming towards us leaping. My driver who was an SSD officer said that the person was a rebel. We turned around and came back to town. I remember going to his Excellency the President and telling him that I am just from Jui and didn’t find anybody.  He called and was told that they were there in their trenches. I did not see anybody intrenches.  So I went to bed that night. I used to monitor the police network and I had one of the handset. It must have been around midnight when reports started filtering in of movement of people into the city.  Around 2 or 3 a.m Alie Bangura called me and we discussed the matter. And I think I also talked to Abdulai Mustapha who was working with the Security people. We agreed that we needed to go on air and talk to the people to keep off the streets and stay indoors. ECOMOG was complaining that they could not do anything because there were crowds of civilians about. So we then decided to go on the air at FM 98.1 which was at the location it is now at Signal Hill. I was surprised how quickly we began to hear reports about ebels here and there. We got a call that they were at Brookfields, Goderich, and all over the place. The whole situation became very confusing.  Obviously what had happened as we discovered later was that the city was infiltrated by the rebels coming in small groups or individually and hiding weapons around.  When the attacks started they all came out and started firing and that created a lot of confusion.  I learnt that the President was no longer in Freetown. While monitoring the Police Communication Network I had heard the code that he was been taken out. And I know he barely looked out of government wharf before the place was overran.  At day-break we did not know were the President and the Vice President were. We could not even account for General Khobe, General Shelpidi who was ECOMOG Force Commander, and the Deputy Minister of Defence. Myself, Alie Bangura, Abdulai Mustapha, Sheka Mansaray who was National Security Advicer and Dr. Jonah went to Wilberforce Barrack to get a clear picture of what was going on. Wilberforce itself seemed to be under attack because there was gunfire in the area.  We were told that the President was in Lungi. Somebody came and told Dr. Jonah that the President wanted to see him at Lungi.  

So he reluctantly left for Lungi in a helicopter. Iit turned out to be a lie that the President had sent for him.  But it seems as if ECOMOG wanted us out of Wilberforce Barracks.  Because while we were there one Major pulled me aside and said; “you people are better off out here, because if this is attacked we are all going to run”.  But we decided that we had nowhere to go and that we could not just move away. We needed to do something.  We decided to continue broadcasting because it was clear at that time that ECOMOG was severely demoralized. The troops had almost lost hope and did not know what to do because the commander at that time was incompetent. I am talking about Brigadier Amadu. He was totally at a loss as to what to do.  The man could not even give order. He was just sitting in his office starring at his officers who came with situation reports.  I remember vividly one of the armour cars came back in a rush that they were out of ammunition. The Sergeant Major who was the driver jumped down and tried to rally troops around. He was telling them that the rebels were coming around Hill Cut Road and that they need to go and block that road. He needed troops.   The Force Commander was leaning a railing looking looking blanking at nowhere. I expected that he could have taken over the issuing of orders. But the man could not give any orders. He confessed to me later that he was at a loss. He said he was a conventional officer and  that kind of warfare was not something he was used. He said he felt abandoned by his Force Commander Shelpidi who had gone away with the President.

 General Khobe decided that he needed to take the President and the Vice President out because he was convinced that ECOMOG could not provide significant defence for the city and he did not want the President to be killed. General Khobe obviously informed the ECOMOG General Shelpidi, who opted to go to Lungi too. Brigadier Amadu said to be he was abandoned by his commanding officer. He was left alone to sort out the mess.  In my view leadership was one of the major problems ECOMOG faced at the time of January 6 invasion. There was a serious problem of incompetent leadership in ECOMOG. For a period of about of thirty six hours after the invasion started  the responsibility of deciding what to do lay in the hands of a few of us.  

Obviously we consulted and decided that a curfew needed to be imposed. We also decided to continue the broadcasts.

 I believe that we were in a life and death struggle. If we had not taken control in a way and tried to ensure that ECOMOG fights and that some kind of defence should be provided in a short time whilst re-enforcement was been sort the whole of the city could have been overrun.  It was that time we realized very clearly that ECOMOG did not have enough men and ammunition. On morning of January 6 at Wilberforce barracks people were calling for ammunition. We had run out of it from A.K 47, which is the basic weapon of the soldier.  We were blessed that can the rebels did not have enough confidence to advance as quickly as they had started. They could have over run the whole city. We had to, in a way bluff our strength which was why we continued broadcasting to assure the public that ECOMOG was in control and that the situation would be reversed. It was only a temporary measure to keep the morale of the ECOMOG troops; particularly those who were cut off behind enemy lines. Those whose position had been over run were also been assured by the broadcasts that they could be rescued.

Even government officials and many other ministers did not know what was going on.  They too were assured by our confidence on radio. They started coming out.  They started congregating at the Presidential Lodge were consulted on what should be done.

ECOMOG started pushing the rebels back after we had been able to get re-enforcement from Nigeria. We had to call Abuja. I know it was Alie Bangura who was able to get through to talk to the Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff and explain the situation to him. He promised to get troops to Freetown in a couple of days. I think it was a battalion or two that came. That was how we were able to stabilize the situation and move the rebels back. I think on January 8, 6 or 7 the President made contact with us. He came back after a couple of days.

It took me a while to realize what was going on. ECOMOG could send out patrols to clear the rebels wherever they were. ECOMOG would move all the way to Up Gun and come back and report that the area was cleared, only for rebels to reappear there again. What was happening as I realized much later was that the rebels did not stand and fight. They would put up very little resistance run off. so ECOMOG would send a patrol to look the area and no rebels would be seen. ECOMOG would tell us to inform the people that the area was clear. We informed the people accordingly.  I ran into an ambush at Brookfields because I wanted to go and turn on the telephone exchange there. The batteries had run low. I wanted to go and find out what was happening as Minister of Communication. Some foreign correspondents followed me. We have been told of course that the area was clear. We heard gun fire before we reached the bridge. There was a check-point at the bridge. We stopped to check what was going on. I even sent the officer-in-charge of the security detail to go back to Wilberforce Barracks to find out what was going on because we tried to communicate with the handset it could not get through. He came back and told us that it was nothing serious. He said it was just a sniper and we could go ahead.  We drove across the bridge. I was combat fatigue and carried a rifle. I was driving my own vehicle because I could not find my driver.  We got to F.S.S.G School and heard some gunfire. But since we have been told the place was clear we assumed that it must have been some ECOMOG or CDF in the area.  We turned a corner by Marine House and we saw about five men standing at the corner eating. There was food and beer on the ground. The men were carrying weapons. Some were dressed in the “Ronko” (country cloth) like what  the CDF wore. We stopped. All of us thought that they were friendly forces. My ECOMOG bodyguard told us to go there. ”It’s our own people” he said.  The lead vehicle had started moving. I started moving also and suddenly we heard gun fire. Instinctively we all jumped down and responded.

One American journalist was killed. A Canadian who got a bullet in the head survived. He wrote a book about his experience, which I have recently received.  The Canadian in his book explained that the America who was the cameraman wanted to film these guys who were at the junction. He says that was why the guys decided to fire.  So it turned out that the guys were rebels.

I don’t believe that ECOMOG was deliberately trying to mislead anybody. They probably were not aware of the fact that the rebels would run away and come back.  The situation eventually began to stabilize and more troops and ammunition coming in. We also succeeded in getting General Khobe to get directly involve in the operations.  In fact orders were given from Abuja that Khobe should take over the command. Shelpidi did not completely obey the instructions.  A sort of joint command was eventually agreed on. Khobe started leading troops out to clear the city. I was with him when State House was captured for the fourth time.  They had tried to capture it before but the rebels always came back.

Another thing that was partly responsible for ECOMOG inability to defend the city was that many of them had become slack and too friendly with the civilian population. They had girl friends even at checkpoints.  An incident that convinced me of this was the Captain who was in charge of security detail at Pademba Road Prison. We found out later that he had a girl friend whose father was one of the detainees. He was taking information to the father. And when the Prison was broken into the detainee- Christian Kargbo, the AFRC Governor of the Bank, went to the Captain’s house hide.  The house was close to 98.1. Many people came to give us information that the man there.  We decided to search the place. We took troops along. When we were at the gate, the Captain came out. He was not in uniform and I recognize him as a Nigerian Officer.

I told him that we had information that Christian Kargbo was in the house. He said he also heard that. He said he had checked and found out that it was not true. We went back. Unfortunately for them somebody who was in the house at that time got scared when see us coming and banging at the gate. He jumped the fence and tried to run away. One of the soldiers at 98.1 caught him. When we went back they told us that this man had run away from the house. We questioned and threatened him. And he confessed that Christian Kargbo was in the house. We went back and the same officer opened the gate.  I told him that the man we were looking for was inside the house. He said he was going to get his own troops to help with the search. He walked off.  We went in and Mr. Kargbo and another person who had also escaped from Pademba Road. We arrested them and took them to Wilberforce Barracks. My security guard insisted that the officer at the gate was in league with the rebels. They went and dragged him. They would have shot him if I had not been there.  I prevented them from shooting him. We took him to the Wilberforce Barracks. I believe that he was court martialed. When we reported the incident to the Senior Officers at the barracks they were extremely annoyed. He was stripped of his uniform and chained. That is just an example. ECOMOG had become friendly with everybody. They let down their guard and were not very security conscious anymore.

Finally, I think I want to make a comment on the kind of atrocities that took place in Freetown at that time.  It seems to me that the rebels began to react to the fact that they were not getting their way.  When it became obvious that they were been pushed out that was when they turned on the civilian population and started the killings, arson, amputations and so on.  I also knew that I was a target of rebel attack. A friend of mine who was cut up behind enemy lines confirmed the rebels intentions for me. I remember going to the President and telling him that I didn’t I want to continue broadcasting. The President convinced me against that decision. I agreed with him. I reduced my broadcast time however.  I did not go on air as frequently as I had been doing.  In a nutshell this is what I have to say on the invasion of Freetown and am prepared to answer questions.

Commissioner Humper:    We want to thank you very much Dr. Spencer.  I think today is going to be another important day for Sierra Leoneans.  So many things were concealed about the January 6 invasion of Freetown. As a result many of us were wallowing in ignorance.  I believe you will have another opportunity to elaborate on some issues in answers to questions from the Commissioners.

The essence of this Commission as you said is to set records straight and establish an impartial historical record of what transpired during the ten years rebel war.  My colleagues will now begin their questions. You will also have an opportunity to ask us questions and make recommendations relating to our work.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much Dr. Spencer for this testimony. I have actually read your interview. But I will ask you questions based on testimony because much of what was in the interview is not mentioned here. It may be that issues covered in the interview are not pertained to January 6 invasion.  

Let back to the point where the President was taken out of Freetown and explained ECOMOG didn’t even have enough arms, ammunition and men to hold the ground. Under what conditions was the President brought back two days later?

Spencer:    I think they probably believed that the situation had stabilized a bit and that he could be secured.  ECOMOG had successfully defended the Congo Cross bridge to confine the rebels only to central and eastern Freetown. At the Presidential Lodge, security beefed up as well.

Commissioner Torto:       Thank you.  In a film strip, “Cry Sierra Leone” I saw you in arms at   P.Z. what were you looking for.

Spencer:     That was the day that I said I was with General Khobe, when State House was captured for the fourth time. My particular mission in going to these areas was to try and turn on the telephone system that had gone dead.  We could not communicate, not only locally but internationally.  We wanted to make many international calls. We had to use a satellite phone.  So I went town to find out what the situation was. Again I had been told that all that area was clear.  I had with me two security guards.  I was driving myself.  I got to State House and met General Khobe. In fact General Amadu and some senior officers at the former Vice President’s office were there.  I joined them. Troops were deployed at State House. It was decided that the surrounding needed to be cleared. That was how I went along with them to P.Z.  At P.Z. we came under fire but the resistance was successfully cleared.  It was at that point that this boy who became a subject in the “Cry Freetown” film, Moses came out of one of the buildings. And of course everybody believed he was a rebel.  He was caught and put in the van.  He jumped down. They tried to keep him in the van but he kept jumping down. They tried to tie him up but he fought so had.  I went to talk to him, and the way he grabbed me, I thought he was high on drugs.  They decided to shoot him.  I protested. General Khobe also came and said no. He was tied up and eventually taken to Wilberforce Barracks. We tried to talk to him for several days but he couldn’t respond. He was just screaming.  We all were convinced that he was on drugs.  We even took him to the hospital. The doctor said he was on drugs. We decided to keep him there hoping that he will recover.

It was days later that I realised the fellow  was deaf and dump.  He  was absolutely terrified. That was why he was behaving that way.  But at the time nobody knew that was the case.  It was the day we discovered the boy at P.Z. that a fellow called Junior Sawaneh also was killed. An ECOMOG Major, whose name I’ve forgotten was also killed on that day. They were both shot when Khobe led some troops up to Up-Gun.  

Commissioner Torto: Thank you. My other question was going to be on the radio announcement but has actually been clarified during your explanation.  Why did they just take Dr. Jonah and leave you at that particular time when you were in so much danger at Wilberforce?

Spencer:    Well, I don’t know.  They probably felt that Dr. Jonah was much more a high profile and international figure.

Commissioner Torto: Was he more valuable?

Spencer:    I don’t know. I can’t speak for them. But I know that they called him. I was there. An officer came to him to say that the President was calling him. The President was in Lungi. But Dr. Jonah told us later that when he got to Lungi the President denied sending for him.

Commissioner Torto: Thank you.  Would you now remember the group you were talking to by Freetown Secondary School for Girls or Hannah Benka Street and Railway Line junction? Was it an ambush you fell in and met that group of people.  Do you remember their faces? Do you know any of them or do you know or whether they are in fact alive?

Spencer:    No.  In fact, I think they were all killed eventually.  There were two ECOMOG soldiers in the car with the journalist.  When the ECOMOG soldier fired into the suspicious car, gin fire was returned.  The ECOMOG soldier killed two of them on the spot.  The other three ran off. And I believe two of them went to hide in a vehicle that was packed along the road. A Rocket Propelled Grenade was fired into the vehicle.  I suspect that one of them escaped.

Commissioner Torto: Now, my second to last question.  Were you aware that some ECOMOG officials were engaged in human right violations like arbitrary killing?  Evil Spirit, an ECOMOG sergeant or major has been accused of killing people at random at Brookfields. Or was it Aberdeen Ferry Road area?  Were you aware of what he was doing? What did you do? What happened to him?

Spencer:    Well, I heard the stories.  I know of one or two persons, in fact who I believed were killed by Evil Spirit. They were accused of being rebels. We heard many stories like that.  I believe I talked to one of the senior ECOMOG officers about it.  I don’t think anything was done to Evil Spirit.  I believe he eventually went to Nigeria. But I’ve heard recently that he had died.  I don’t know if that’s true.  I don’t know if he’s still alive.  Indeed, we heard reports of extra-judicial killings. It was not just Evil Spirit. There were many, many such violations; maybe too numerous even to mention.  But I think that the catalyst for those violations was the civilian population. It was civilians who where going to ECOMOG soldiers and pointing who was or was not a rebel. They were asking ECOMOG to kill people who accused of being rebels.

I remember intervening on a number of occasions to save number people from being executed.  One instance involved a surrendered soldier who had been kept at Collegiate School compound. He left the compound one day to go and find food or do something else. He was caught and accused of being a rebel.  He kept insisting that  he was one of the surrendered soldiers. He insisted that we took him away for verification.  So I took him to Collegiate School and was able to prove that indeed he was a surrendered soldier. Everybody recognised him as soon as I took him there. There were a number of instances like that. But like I say, civilians spread this kind of thing.  There was a time, I remember, when a truck load of surrendered soldiers were brought to Wilberforce. Many people were saying: “why did they bring them here, they should have just killed them”. “What are they keeping them for”?  Many people, from all works of life, all strata of society held that kind of view. I remember arguing with a senior person in government who was saying the same thing. Some days later, this same person was very upset when the wife or girlfriend of one of his security officers was accused of being a rebel and killed. I then drew his attention to what I’d been saying some days earlier that this is the kind of thing that happens when you condone extra-judicial killings.  No matter what, we have to go through due process. But the situation was such that it became uncontrollable. And I think that because  ECOMOG felt that betrayed by Sierra Leoneans, they became a bit brutal in the way they treated people who were accused of being rebels. But invariably, it was civilians who accused people of being rebels.  ECOMOG did not have any means of saying that this person was a collaborator. It was civilians who were spurring on the ECOMOG troops to carry out the killings.

Commissioner Torto: Thank you.  However, what happened to Abu Amadu and Shellpidi later for the way they deceived this country? Look at the kind of havoc the country underwent.

Spencer:   Well, I think they’ve been retired from the army eventually. I don’t know if their retirement was particularly because of the ECOIMOG operations or for other reasons.  Soon after President Obasanjo took over, I believe they were retired.  I don’t think they are in the Nigerian Army anymore.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you Dr. Spencer for your testimony and also for the interview you had with the Commission.  I recalled that when Freetown was burning you were on the radio advising people to stay indoors. You were saying that ECOMOG was in control and they are pushing back the rebels here and there. I wonder, whether you are aware that there are at least two interpretations to what you were trying to do at the time.  I’ll start with the better of the two.  You were like Winston Churchill during the 2nd World War when the British had nothing at all, but he made his famous speech about fighting on the beaches and so on.  But at the same time, there were other people who felt hurt that you did not make them realize the situation at the time. Such people say that if they had been allowed to come out, they might have been able to save their property from being destroyed.

Spencer:    Well, first of all I’ll say that I was Minister of Information. I was the official spokesman of the government.  I was not speaking on behalf of Julius Spencer.  It was only once that I expressed my own personal view. And that was in a BBC interview. There had been this call for a ceasefire. And the President had reached some kind of agreement with Foday Sankoh that there should be a ceasefire. I was pushed by, I think, Robin White to give my own views. I said I didn’t think it would work. That was my own personal. With regards to information about what civilians needed to do, I told the public what I had been advised to tell them by the Security forces.  It was the security forces logic that for ECOMOG to  operate on the streets, civilians had to be kept out of the way.  If there are civilians on the street, and because the rebels do not wear military uniforms you cannot quite distinguish rebels and civilians. If ECOMOG saw people on the streets during an operation, they are going to consider all of them as rebels. And they are going to open fire on them.  After the initial experience of the way the rebels came into the city, that was ECOMOG’s position.  In the first few days in fact, the curfew was for 24 hours. Nobody went out.  We had to plead with ECOMOG that people needed to find food to eat.  We asked ECOMOG to reduce the curfew hours; to which they agreed. Curfew, I think was pushed up to midday.  After a while, we had to go back and say that the mid-day time was not enough time.  They shifted it to 3 o’clock.  On one particular day they called me to agitate that there were too many people on the streets. We were asked to tell people to go back home otherwise ECOMOG was going to start opening fire. At that time ECOMOG was very jittery.    So it was in the interest of the public that people were asked to stay off the streets. It was not only for their own safety, but also because being on the streets, was hampering ECOMOG operations.

Over and above that, I had no personal objective to achieve.  I was simply doing my job. And that job was to pass on to the public information that had been given to me to.  We must also bear in mind that we were in a life and death struggle. The life and death struggle for this country, not individual lives. I believe even to this day that if the rebels had succeeded in overrunning the city, this country would have been doomed.  We would not be sitting here today talking about reconciliation. We would not have had the kind of peace we have today. It is not so pleasant being in the forefront as a mouthpiece for the government in such times.

I understand the feeling of hurt of those who were caught up behind rebel lines and saw their relatives killed or their houses burnt. But to it is unreasonable to blame me for the rebels reckless behaviour. I understand if they feel hurt, if they blame me for the loss of their property of their loved ones, I understand that.  But I also believe that the picture is bigger than that.  There is a bigger picture that the individual out there could not see and cannot see even today.  But that is understandable.  I also believe that you cannot please everybody.  I know that there are people who have said to me that they believe they are alive today because they listened to what I said.  So it goes both ways.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank You.

Commissioner Humper:    Let me join the other commissioners in welcoming you to this commission.  We have heard other versions of what took place during the period you’ve spoken about. There have been criticisms, complaints and dissatisfaction about the way you handled situation.  There are people out there who feel even today, that you were deliberately misinforming people. I would like to ask one question.  Why did ECOMOG announce that areas were secure when it was not true? ECOMOG must have known that people were likely to go into those areas to carry out other economic or life saving activities.

Spencer:     Well I cannot really speak for ECOMOG. But we not forget that the situation at the time was not normal.  It may also be that ECOMOG officers and commanders themselves believed that those areas were safe. Perhaps they didn’t fully understand the tactics that the rebels were using.  When ECOMOG sent out patrol the rebels would run away. ECOMOG thought that the rebels were running away for good.  Let me also say that ECOMOG’s communication network may not have been that good. I know that they did not have enough communication equipment.  Troops in the front had problems communicating with headquarters.  We were to discover later that Headquarters sometimes didn’t even know where exactly all their troops were located.  

Commissioner Humper:    Thank you. What was the reason for the low strength of ECOMOG at the time?

Spencer:    I don’t really know.  I don’t know.  I know that troops were rotated after a few months. Troops that have served are taken back home. Newer troops are brought in.  Finance may have been the problem. I think it was costing Nigeria so much money to keep soldiers here. Nigeria may have been trying to reduce expenditure on the soldiers. That’s my own interpretation.  It’s my opinion.  

Commissioner Humper:  How did General Khobe come to take over the Sierra Leone army?

Spencer:    I believe that after ECOMOG took over Freetown in February 98, there was a need to restructure and reorganise, the Sierra Leone army. Government at the time decided that we needed somebody of proven integrity and competence to do that. And of course Nigeria had agreed to help Sierra Leone.  I believe the President asked the Nigerian President to second General Khobe to Sierra Leone so that he could manage the process of restructuring the army.  That’s how Khobe came to be Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone army.

Commissioner Humper: The poor management of the security at that time has been attributed to the fact that Khobe was junior to the other ECOMOG Commanders- Shellpidi and Amadu Do you don’t support this position?

Spencer:      No.

Commissioner Humper:     People have told us that.

Spencer:      I know. What I’m saying that the issue of rank only became a problem after Khobe had become Chief of Defence Staff. Khobe was no longer in control of ECOMOG. He could only advise. And because they saw him as a junior they may not have been willing to take his advise all the time.  I believe very strongly that if Khobe had been in control of ECOMOG at the time he would have done a much better job in defending this city. I had seen him in action. I know that he could lead his men at the front. Soldiers were willing to follow him and do whatever he wanted them to do. He was not a soldier who sits in an office.

Commissioner Humper: Thank you. Government had information indicating that the rebels were moving westwards from the provinces. At that time we still had some Sierra Leone Government soldiers. Why were steps not taken to get the Sierra Leone Army to halt the movement of the rebels?

Spencer:    I’m not sure we could say we had a Sierra Leone Army.  We had a relatively small number of troops under arms because there was not much faith in the majority of the soldiers. A large numbers of soldiers were in detention. Some soldiers were armed and sent to work alongside ECOMOG. I have said that some of them betrayed ECOMOG and went over to the other side. There was really no faith in the soldiers.  

Commissioner Humper:  Thank you very much Dr. Spencer.  

Commissioner Sooka:    Thank you Chairperson.  I have asked questions this morning about the number of troops that were actually based in Freetown just before the invasion on January 6th.    The Chief of the Defence Forces said that there were only 120 soldiers left in Freetown. He said that some of them were not even armed.  You said in your interview that several thousand soldiers were also held at Lungi at the time. Civil Defence Forces were not allowed to bring their guns into Freetown. They were not given weapons either. What was the number of the troops therefore fighting on the side of Government? How many of them were armed. And why were the Civil Defence Forces not armed?

Spencer:    I don’t know the exact number of troops. I don’t have those figures. I don’t know.  All I know is that the numbers were drastically reduced from what they were in February 1998.  I know that Freetown was being defended by something like a company of troops. It is true that Civil Defence Forces were brought from places like Bonthe to help to defend the city.  It may be that they were not given arms because arms were not available. I know that there was a shortage of weaponry. Some Civil Defence Forces however fought.  The relationship between ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces may  not have been very good but they agreed to work together.  ECOMOG did not have that much faith in the Civil Defence Forces because they did not believe they were disciplined troops. And in many cases they were not.  

Commissioner Sooka:    I think you have already commented on the killings committed by some ECOMOG troops.  Would you have any specific information on the death of Mr. Eric Lewis, who was Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Labour? A person called Evil Spirit allegedly killed him.

Spencer:    I knew Mr. Lewis very well. We grew up together in the same area.  Their family and my family are friends.  The Lewis’s house and my family’s house are adjacent. At one time in 1998 my sister told me that Eric Lewis had been accused of being a rebel collaborator. When his car was seized by ECOMOG at one point he came to seek my help. I don’t have any evidence that he collaborated with the rebels. I intervene and got his vehicle released.  Another information I got from my sister however was that there was some dispute over some land that Eric was trying to develop.  I think he was detained for a while and, released. In 1999 he was again accused of being a rebel collaborator. Evil Spirit- as he was called- wasn’t asking many questions.  I think he just took the man and shot him. Another Lewis also was killed from what I gathered.  Two of them were killed.  But it all boils down to the fact that it was the civilians who instigated things like that. We must not forget also that it was not uncommon for that people were also using the ‘rebel collaboration tag’ to settle scores with their enemies.

Commissioner Sooka:    Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Commissioner Humper: Thank you.  It is now your turn Mr. Spencer to ask questions or make recommendations relating to the Commission’s work.

Spencer:    I think I have a fair understanding of the process that you are going through. I support it. I believe very strongly that we need to fully understand what  this country has gone through to ensure that it doesn’t happen again. I am not one of those who say we should forget. We should never forget. We should always remember what we went through in this country so that we can ensure that we don’t go through it again.

Commissioner Humper: Thank you very much Dr. Spencer.  You may now step down. We have come to the end of the day and we want to thank all of you. We will adjourn to 9:30 tomorrow morning.

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS

WITNESS  20:        Police Commissioner Hudson Siazyamana Benzu
                Commissioner of Police, CIVPOL

WITNESS 21:        Major (rtd) Abu Noah

DATE:            

Our next witness is the Commissioner of Police, Police Commissioner Hudson Siazyama Benzu from the Civil Police, UNAMSIL,

Commissioner Bishop Humper:   The usual process is you give your testimony we asked you questions and the leaders of evidence will ask questions if they have any.  But we will start with the formalities.  Are you a Christian or Muslim?

Police Commissioner Hudson:    Christian.

Commissioner Bishop Humper: administered the oath to Police Commissioner Hudson with a copy of the Bible.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Please go ahead

Police Commissioner Hudson:    Thank you very much sir. I have already submitted my paper to the Commission. What I am looking at is the importance of the presence of the United Nations Civil Police in Sierra Leone and its relationship with the Sierra Leone Police. Mr. Chairman, as all of us know, a democratic government should uphold the rule of law and the human rights of its citizens. It was in this light that UNAMSIL was tasked with assisting in training the SLPP to be a force for good by providing and improving standards, operations and services delivered to peace. Citizens, this was considered important because of the years of war had obliterated proper policing and it was considered by the government that the country  needed proper policing.

To do that Mr. Chairman, the police must the free from political interference, which was hitherto the case.  But a lot of changes has taken place since the beginning of international efforts to help the Sierra Leone Police. A Sierra Leonean has taken over from an expatriate inspector General, and he is being helped in the running of the police by the Executive Management Board.
 
Mr. Chairman, respect for Human Right is integral to a good police force, and they can only do this if they are properly trained.  I am here to say that a number of training programme had been implemented and others planned. I should hasten to tell you that SLP had been looked upon as a corrupt institution, but there are number of things that could be done to address this. A priority area in this vein is the welfare of officers in terms of salaries accommodations and communication.  Mr. Chairman, your Commissioners would help me to say that SLP suffered and is being assisted by various donors, but it is also important for the gains to be consolidated by governmental action to properly look into conditions of services.
 
The last point I want to mention is about the recruitment and formation.  It is very important in any service or force that recruitment is down across the board without any consideration or interference.  What I mean is when you are recruiting we should look at qualities of officers and also of course ethnic considerations and also this goes with promotions.  The SLP has come up with a policy of equal opportunities.  You are promoted because you can fight.

And the last one I want to mention is the improvement of the Criminal Justice System.  However much the Police Service improves, if the judicial is weak we are going to have a problem. So far, a lot has been done to improve policing, but  hardly has any work been done address problems with the judicial system. Courts are almost non existent; people are arrested and end up in cells because it take times to go to court.  

Also, the prison service and conditions are poor. Prisoners keep on escaping, which in effect meant an incompletion of judicial processes. This  undermines police as the efforts are complimented or sustained in the other branches of the criminal justice system.  Your Commissioners have already been presented with copies of my presentation; what I have just said is but a summary of what is contained in those copies.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you, we will now ask you some questions. We will start with Professor John Kamara.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you for coming. I have for you one observation and question.  Many times people and perhaps even the Police themselves wonder why the Police failed to investigate crimes rapidly or why they fail to score successes in these investigations. People often say that the thing that scares the public from co-operating with the Police is that anybody who offers to serve as a witness becomes the criminal suspect. Instead of the Police making an effort to seek the criminal they now take whoever is responsible for reporting the criminal case to be the criminal.  This is what discourages people and because of that they fail to give the necessary support to the police. In your training of the new police do you include advice on how they must relate with the public and treat the public in a gentler and encouraging way.

Police Commissioner Hudson:    I take this one as a genuine question and observation that has been going on for sometime.  Actually we have devised a means to assist SLP with this kind of approach because if we don’t get support from the public then whatever we do we will not succeed.  Community policing is one way to deal with this, and also public relations and victims supports which is known here as the family supports units. We are now getting support from the community and currently SLP is running programmes that are improving its image. UNAMSIL are also running programmes wherein we invite Senior Police Officers and UNAMSIL Officers to talk to the public in phone-in. We may also need to advise the Police to put in place mechanisms for people to report events to the police without giving their names. This has been successful in other countries.  You don’t need to ask for names, just give your information on war crime and then the Police are expected to do a follow-up. Generally, the police do not consider those report crimes as criminals; but they ask questions as to how they knew about what was happening. If you come to talk about a dead person the first thing they want to know as Police is what were you doing in that area and you have to explain correctly to avoid making the police think that you were the one that killed the person.  
Commissioner Professor Kamara:    I don’t have any more questions but I would like to add this observation and comment.  Now in January 6th 1999 when the rebels entered Freetown, the Police was one institution that was targeted by the rebels and dissatisfaction with and the injustices and Human Rights violations that the Police were committing was cited as a reason. Thus I want all police officers to know that acting in the proper way and respecting the human rights of the people will in the long run help them and their families.

Police Commissioner Hudson:    Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, we recognize the importance of human rights in policing. UNAMSIL’s Human Rights Unit has been running Human Rights seminars for SLP.  As am talking to you now, Mr. Chairman we are having a second seminar in Makeni in Human Rights.  We have been to Kono, Kailahun, last week we have been around the headquarters and we will be going to Kenema.  We have been in Koindu and this is the second time we are at Makeni. So we definitely know the importance of human rights.
 
Commissioner Ms Sooka:    I have two questions; in most modern day Police Forces two of the biggest problems are corruption and the fact that Police don’t see their jobs as an opportunity to enrich themselves, I wonder what is been done in respect to training them to address this.  The other question relates gender based violence. Given the fact that gender based violence during the conflict was perhaps the largest in terms of violation, what training has the Police received in dealing with complains of rape and sexual violence in the country situation at present.  Before you answer, let me just say most of these women groups had made submission and indicated that the Police have never seen Gender based violence as a serious crime and like most women receive absolutely no co-operation from the Police.

Police Commissioner Hudson:    I will start by looking at corruption, corruption is generally called a crime of greed but corruption also should be considered in two other ways:

1. The corrupted person and also the one that is corrupting you. In condemning the Police we should look at the general citizens because these are the people who are giving money to the Police. Efforts are being made to tackle this; if you go around you will find that there are a lot of posters saying “Please Do Not Corrupt The Police.” We want to sensitize the Community; they should not succumb to Police corruption; they should report matters to senior officers. At UNAMSIL, we receive reports and we forward this reports to Sierra Leone Police.  We have officers who are with the SLP in advising on how to handle these cases. We are preparing seminars on corruption. The Traffic unit is perceived by the by the public as corrupt, but that is being addressed
2. I want to mention that the lack of courts predispose people to be corrupt. There are few courts to send , for instance traffic offenders to, so they initiate bribery and corruption to get off that which may end nowhere. This of course is no reason why the police should be corrupt, so we are working assiduously to tackle this problem on the police side.

Relating to Gender based violence we have a family support limit within SLP.  We have gender specialists within the UNAMSIL.  One is with CIVPOL and the other with Human Rights.  What has been done now is to sensitize the public steps to take in relation to the issue of gender based violence. You will agree with me that previously we never had reports coming because people kept off from calling the Police but now we get a number of reports coming not because crimes are committed more but people now have confidence in the Police that once you report action would be taken.  I think in the shortest time all this gender violence would go down.

Commissioner Ms Sooka:    I wonder if you could advice about a unit within the police where complaints could be made about police corruption because there seem to be a trend in modern police forces that you have a special unit that you can report to when police are not behaving properly.

Police Commissioner Hudson:    We have a unit like that aims at improving  professional standards. Also we have in every unit what is commonly called CDID; these are officers who are looking at the activities of fellow officers.
 
Commissioner Bishop Humper:    We want to thank you very much for coming today.  You have already given us a comprehensive document which will be very valuable to our work.  I have one main question. From your own general assessment what did you consider to have been the militating factor against the efficiency, effectiveness, motivation and commitment of our Police Force which is now dubbed a force for good?

Police Commissioner Hudson:    Mr. Chairman, I am unable to answer that question.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Now Commissioner Marcus Jones

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Can you help us in answering the question as to whether the Police is not interested in its environment because I am always puzzled by the fact that that right at the door of the Police Station one finds people piling up rubbish as high as possible and police officers go by with a blind eye. So I often wonder whether the police is not interested in its environs?

Police Commissioner Hudson:    As a police force they should be responsible and concerned. But likewise the community, they should not do things that irritate others.  I would plead that we give a bit of time for SLP to improve its standard because these are people who are coming from war conflict situation. We are all working on it. We are also sensitizing the community, for they should understand what the Police are supposed to do. Because if they don’t understand, it would pose a lot of problems for the police.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    I wonder what your opinion is about Police patrolling certain areas. To improve the image of the police may mean seeing the police being friendly and helpful, for instance giving directions to people and generally improving security in the country.

Police Commissioner Hudson:    Beat patrols should take the police to the community and this is what we are actually trying to do now.  But lack of maps is hindering us. Areas should be demarcated into small portions where police officers go and take care of. It is also important here for the police officer to know the citizens or subjects who are there and if there is a visitor coming he would know who had just come in that place. Our general information service at UNAMSIL are working on providing maps to SLP at every station and posts we have already demarcated, and we have already putting the areas of responsibility of the officers who are there.  So that has been taken care of.

Commissioner Bishop Humper: One reason put before this Commission for the rampant corrupt practices in the Police Force is the low level of salaries paid to them.  Is that a justifiable position, if not, have you done anything to address this issue?

Police Commissioner Hudson:    I want the Commissioners to know that corruption cannot be considered wholly in the terms of emolument because if people who are getting the same amount of money don’t get involved in the vices which you are involved in, then you cannot justify your corrupt acts.

We have carried out  public surveys in Freetown, Makeni, and Kabala to find out about corruption and other perceptions relating to the police and the Inspector General is integrating the findings into his strategy the tackle corruption and the other problems facing the police force.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    I wonder if you can make available to the Commission the results of the findings.  Can you please send us the report of the findings of the consumption of the Commission, please do that as soon as you can?  

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Leaders of Evidence do you have any questions for our man here?

Leaders of Evidence:    No question.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you; please remember to send us the findings of this exercise.  Do you have any questions for the Commission?

Police Commissioner Hudson:    No, I don’t have any question.  All I want to say is to thank the Commission for this opportunity to make a presentation before it.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you too, you may step down.
Leaders of evidence do we have another witness?

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Witness 21 – Rtd. Major Abu Major (rtd) Noah

May it please the Commission that the next witness is Major Abu Major (rtd) Noah (Rtd)

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    We thank you very much for responding to the invitation of the Commission, we are confident that your submission and your testimony before the Commission would help us a whole lot in looking at a few issues.  Are you a Christian or Muslim?

Major (rtd) Noah:        Muslim.

Commissioner Bishop Humper administered the oath

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Mr. Major (rtd) Noah we have received your written submission and it was very interesting. But I must appeal to you to make a presentation of it instead of reading it page by page.  It will help us and you also to save a lot of time.  So please let us hear you.

Major (rtd) Noah:        Commissioners, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen I would like to start the topic from the background knowledge that all the nations of the world made mistake at one time or the other in the past. No nation is free of that charge and I strongly believe that a developing nation in contemporary times would commit mistakes and cause many socio-cultural disasters to happen.  I will advocate that sleeping dogs be let alone.  My reason would unfold as I advance my argument but foremost in my catalog of events is the fact that things are changing fast these days, changes in attitude, relationships, indeed generally society changes.  Many trends have also traumatized our people, especially this senseless war. We should endeavor to foster the exhilaration of this trend.  But in order to address this trend we need to go back into history, to where it started.

I would say the main crux of the destructive force in the country that led to the civil war and everything that we are experiencing today was the breakdown of discipline in the army and the police. The army lost sight of their traditional role of protecting the sovereignty of the state when called upon and got involved in political activities which derailed it completely.  Politics went into the army, the politicians took it to the army and there by destroyed the norms and traditions that held the army together throughout the colonial era and the period before 1964.

The marriage between the police and the army and politics was a destabilizing factor that led to the erosion of order and discipline in these institutions.  It also led to  the castration of the officer core which was the mainstay of the army from which discipline percolated down to the rank and file.  This action of the politicians destroyed the officer corps; promotions were no longer meritorious, you have to belong to the dominant political grouping.  The wrong people were elevated, they got positions as a result of tribalism, others suffered as a result of this, some lost their lives and a good number of men were kicked out of the army thus depriving the army of the power in the officer-corps that kept it going. The Army and the Police were brought into politics in 1965/1966 when Brigadier Lansana and the Commissioner of Police were invited to a political party meeting. They became more and more interested in political activities than the administration of the army. They put officers in positions they did not merit and in the process marginalize more senior officers who were not in their political good books. The treatment of Colonel Ambrose Ganda in 1966 was a case in point. He was the most Senior Officer in the absence of Colonel Bangura who was abroad doing a course. Brigadier Lansana was to attend a meeting of the OAU Defence Commission in Ghana as battalion Colonel Ganda should act as army commander in the Brigadier’s absence. The latter however did not appoint  the colonel to this position and instead chose an officer (major) junior in rank to the colonel. This major was a British officer who was not even a combatant officer. Colonel Ganda rightly complained about this. But he was cashiered out of the army as a result and given a diplomatic post in Britain.

Politics got so deep into the army that Lieutenant Colonel Ganda and myself were branded as APC supporters. Colonel Ganda was a soft spoken gentleman, he was very respected, he was interested in a children programme titled ”Uncle Ambrose” in which he was presenting forest animals like snakes, monkeys, chameleon. He was very popular in the army and that did not go down with Lansana because popularity bothered him.  The next thing was that Colonel Ganda came from Moyamba, he was very close to Sir Albert and Madam Ella Koblo Gulama.  I think that created a state of panic in the army.

I was sent to Daru under a foreign commander with a letter that associated me with politicians. I never knew about this.  I went there to do my work. In the end the commander found out my character was at variance with what the letter said about me.  Then he produced a letter to confirm what he said to me. This letter was written by Brigadier Lansana accusing me of being a politician, of associating with politicians and that I should be sent to Pademba Road.  I asked the Commander if I could get a copy of the letter he said no, he would not go that far, that he has already done enough to show me the letter, that giving me a copy would be too much.  I dropped the issue. About six months later he recommended that I was over due for promotion and that I was wasting over there.  I was transferred to Freetown and appointed as Adjutant of the military academy.  It was while I was there that I became aware of the trend politics had taken in the army because politics was moving at a break neck speed.  Political Parties was trying to get voting. The Brigadier was busy putting together his political his war machine.  He had organized on traveling bases, group of officers and men to counter the elections that was going to come.  I didn’t know about this though I had seen the signs all over the place.  I knew something was wrong and something was going on but I was in the military academy then.  They invited me to his house and he brought the subject; he told me what he was going to do.  I listen and I thought this was a mistake.  I sat there watching all the officers who were coming in either from the West or from the East.  I mean the South or the East, I never saw a single officer from the North or the Western Area.  I became disillusioned over the whole thing.  I said it was bias and it was not going to work. So he left me briefly and all of them went into another room. By the time he came back I had left his building. I never went there again.  So this thing continued. He did not call for me again.  Then eventually all the officers and men from the Western Area and the North were disarmed, all ammunition were removed from them whilst the other segment had ammunitions. But these other officers took contingency measures and for that we were arrested and thrown into prisons on framed up charges of wanting to overthrow Sir Albert.  We believed no matter what happened the election result should decide who was to rule and we also believed, I particularly believed, that it would have been a very beautiful thing for democracy for Sierra Leone for the government to go into opposition. I believed then, I do believe it now that if Sir Albert had gone into opposition it would have been very difficult if not impossible for Siaka Stevens to become a dictator in this country.  

I believe what we face today started from that moment when politicians were not prepared to accept the result of the choice of the people. From that incident a lot of things happened. Violence was introduced into the political arena, unemployed youths from all over the country were incited unto violence for political reasons. That ugly phenomenon is still with us. After the elections these youths were abandoned, their lives were not organized, jobs were not provided for them, they were left high and dry without bearing.  So what happened, they had been disgraced, Freetown was too small to keep all of them, so they resort to sleeping in King Jimmy and they complained about it because we invited them unto politics. They established their own businesses they started selling diamba, cocaine and cheap wine. After they had bee used and abandoned they had no way to go and nothing to do but to continue in the trade that they had been introduced into, and this culminated into war. Young men and women who were starving and had no work no homes, no bearings, in short they had no life at all. Those men were ready, they could go into anything and they were easy targets for those who were recruiting for rebels. Even now you could find them in the corners, King Jimmy, go there every time and you see these people there and the most painful sight is that you have children been brought into this setting, growing up in that setting. What happened in the past is being perpetuated, the future of our lives are not organized.

There is also the Institutionalization of corruption. This was made manifest in the statement of  Siaka Stevens when he said that they are talking about Bailor Barrie and you are talking about Davidson Nicol. This means “while people are talking about money you are talking about education, are we surprised about what is happening now. Did not our political leaders engender corruption?

Then another President came on, he said education is a privilege and not an obligation. Only those who could afford it sent their children to school, and those who could not were transformed into thieves.  We see the police picking up the pick picketers everyday.

Siaka Stevens wanted to stay in power by all means and used all means.  After that, of course, we had the mushrooming of military governments. This started as a result of the action of Colonel Jumu who was then the battalion commander Politics had already been introduced into the army and it included our arrests, which we knew was going to be explosive. It precipitated the actions of Colonel Jumu when he arrested Brigadier Lansana, Siaka Stevens and the Governor General Sir Lightfoot Boston immediately. That was a noble action.  I applauded that action. But it went wrong when they formed a military government; that was the beginning of a wrath that is still eating the further of the country.  All they could have done to uphold the constitution was to have listened to the Governor General and spearheaded the constitutional replacement of a civilian government They did not have to go and put the Prime Minister in jail, put the Force Commander in jail and the leader of the opposition and other authorities in jail. That was the first mistake. Though I served as a commissioner I one of the subsequent probes, it was not my intention to be part of any mechanism that entrenched the overthrow of any government.  It is not my business but I shall never be afraid to tell those in power that they are doing wrong when they are doing wrong. That happened when Siaka Stevens created a joint Army Police structure which was wrong. The function of the Army is quite distinct from that of the Police. The police is a civil force, you don’t bring them and the army together in an operation. Let the police do their operation and where they could not handle the situation, they could of course invite the army.  But bringing the army into a civil affair or an uprising which the police should handle is abusing the army and misusing it to oppress the people. The joint police army structure, purportedly set up to combat crimes soon degenerated into an instrument for the persecution of opposition parties, as was seen I the arrest of UDP members (United Democratic Party) and the Doctor Sahid. Army commanders would start instructing people to go and arrest people and Police Officers stated grumbling about the illegality of the operation. The apprehension was all over. I did not know about it but they know that I was very close to Major Farahjoya. He was my friend so they grumbled to him that what they were doing was illegal and that they had to consult the Brigadier.  

So Farah told me. I asked him if he was sure. He said yes, I said where did you get this information from. He said from the Police, but that it was passed on to him by Amadu Kargbo. We went to Amadu Kargbo, he took us to the Police Officers and asked them about the operation. They said this thing was unconstitutional, and that our colleagues had condemned the members of the NRC for the same action. We have been pushed into something that would land us in the condemn cell like those people.  So I went to the Brigadier, I asked him if the operation was constitutional.  He said he did not know, I said ‘Brigadier you don’t know and you are risking our lives.  No, Brigadier this operation is going to stop now, I’m stopping it.  I asked him to call the commissioner of Police Mr. Jenkins Smith. We decided to meet in the morning, and that no body in the interim should go out on an operation and I went out and dismissed everybody.

The following morning at 10 0’ clock, we went to meet the Commissioner of Police. We found them in their conference hall. No senior police or army officer was absent, we were all there.  The Commander brought the subject up, the commissioner told us that the operation was illegal. This was stupid, how can we be taking part in an illegal operation similar to that for which our colleagues were in the condemn cell. We would not confront the Prime Minister with the issue;  he would say something els. So we decided to take the matter to our commander in chief, the governor general to explain to him the situation, that he could talk to the prime minister to drop the operations.  We drove up to the governor general and the Brigadier addressed the General on the issue. The Governor General was shocked. ‘What is this?’ he asked, ‘are you people arresting politicians? why did you do that? The prime minister never told me about it. The Prime Minister does things without telling me.’

We suggested to him that he tells the Prime Minister to drop the operation, and that we are not planning anything against him. The governor-general thanked  and asked us to come back at 12 0’ clock, the same day.  He said he was going to get the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to explain this matter and he wanted us to be there.
 
At 12 0’ clock we all met in the office of the governor general. Fortunately I was ten minutes late. As I was arriving I saw a group of soldiers coming up independent avenue with all sorts of weapons, singing songs of praise to the Prime Minister and the APC and condemning the Army and the Police.  I parked my car, walked out of the door, took out my revolver, lifted it up for all of them to see and told them to stop singing immediately and that everybody should go and wait for the Prime Minister at his office. As I turned around moving into the hall The Honorable S.I. Koroma and C.A. Kamara-Taylor were coming out. I told them not to worry, that everything is over as I have dispatched them. The two men thanked me and said that the guys could have caused some trouble in the place.  I laughed and said there was no way that these boys would have caused any trouble, that they would have met determined resistance from the army, and that the trouble would have turned against them. We turned around and they sandwiched me, both of them.  We moved on and S.I told me I was their man and should not join those people in there.  He told me they knew what the guys were planning and that I should not be a Party to it.  I replied that since they knew, and I did not, I should go into the meeting to find out, and that whatever I do would then be observed by the government. We entered the hall. The Governor General, the Prime Minster, Force Commander, army and police officers were all present. The force commander was saying that ws not what they agreed upon went on stage was the First Commander on the carpet that was not what we agreed on, that they they did not come to the meeting to be blamed by the Governor General, but rather to witness the Governor General advicing the Prime Minister that the operation was illegal.
 
The First Commander turned to the Police and Army officers for confirmation, but nobody stood up for him, they abandoned him.  I felt bad, mad, I really went out of my head, then moved into the centre of the hall, asked the First Commander to sit down and then turned to the Governor General and asked him whether it was not him that told us the operation was illegal and that he was going to tell the Prime Minister. He finally answered in the affirmative after I repeatedly posed the question to him. ‘Why then,’ I asked, ‘was he blaming the Force Commander’ He finally told the Prime Minister what we agreed upon and the matter was resolved.

What I am trying to show here is that the caliber of the officers in the army at the time were not the same, and that there were others who would have done what I did to put things aright while at the same time maintaining respect for the authority. But we did not want them to use us the way they wanted.  Some allowed it and saw it at an opportunity to fly to the top of the officer corps. We saw the result of this later when you have private soldiers shooting up to Lieutenants and lieutenant to Colonel and Brigadier General. What sort of nonsense is that?  This was the trauma we went through when the civilians layed lots of politics with the military, and soldiers sat down and allowed the destruction of this beautiful institution with impunity.

Siaka Stevens institutionalized corruption because he wanted to keep his power at all cost.  Everybody could do whatever he wanted to do as long as it did not touch Siaka Stevens’ power. But even if he was dreaming and you were some cause of some misfortune to him in the dream, if you are not careful, you wold see yourself the next day before a kangaroo court, found guilty and hanged.
 
You look at the judiciary and wonder how members of such a respectable institution that should upkeep the constitution and protect our rights and liberty would allow themselves to be used by people like Siaka Stevens. For instance while Brigadier Bangura and others were being tried, parliament passed a law that affected these people there and then and they were eventually hanged. The judiciary allowed all this to happen right under their noses.  Go even now to Pademba Road and see how people are still on remand for more than two years. Soon the place is an incubator of criminals, people come out of as hardened criminals. Lawyers have too many case loads and there are lots of delays in delivering justice. People are not getting justice, which as we all know is integral to our constitution.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    I feel that your presentations both verbal and written are so interesting and very educating and resourceful to this Commission. I have some questions for you. So we were wondering whether you could zero-in and round up so we would have time to ask you questions.

Major (rtd) Noah:        Mr. Commissioner you know I spent 10 years 8 months in jail wrongfully because Siaka Stevens would have brought Guinean soldiers here without informing us. We stopped the coup, but there was some misinformation about Sierra Leone being at war with Guinea, and Guinean soldiers invited by Siaka Stevens were all over the place taking shots at the soldiers and that created tensions in the barracks.  So we said we should have a meeting with the prime minister and his ministers. The meeting took place in the town hall. Again I was late. When I arrived, my first shock was to see a Guinean Lieutenant with guns piled on the ground which obviously he had taken from my colleague officers and soldiers who had gone to the meeting. He told me to surrender my gun. I said, ‘what! you come all the way from Guinea to this country to ask for my gun in my country. I am the constitutional soldier here. What right has he. I pushed him, moved two steps above him, turned round and said to him I am going to that hall with my gun, that the only way you can stop me is to shoot me. He didn’t move so I entered the hall and when I got there I found all our officers in there surrounded by Guinean soldiers who were carrying arms, giving the impression that they had quelled the coup. I got angry. Tom Caulker was chosen to address the Prime Minister. He was talking but I looked around at the faces of these Guinean Soldiers and their conquering stance I got extremely angry and  walked up to Tom Caulker and told him to sit down. I turned to the Prime Minister and said if these funny people dared fight again in this country again we will deal with them so well that they would not forget us in a hurry. I asked that the Guinean leave the hall. The prime minister told them to do that. But I also added that if any one of them should fire a single shot in the country, we would interpret that as a declaration of war and we shall attack them. Then I told the Prime Minister that we were fed up with the bloodshed in the country and that we have killed and killed but there seemed to be no end to the killings.

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THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS

TAPE CODE:    TAPE 23 W 23

DATE OF HEARING/INTERVIEW:    DAY 3 WEEK 2  – 23/07/2003

NAMES OF WITNESS:            BRIMA ACHA KAMARA
                        INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

NAMES OF COMMISSIONER:        COMMISSIONER MRS SOOKA
                        COMMISSIONER BISHOP HUMPER
        COMMISSIONER JUSTICE
       MARCUS-JONES

TRANSCRIBER:                MARY-ROSE A.T. GANDA

SECRETARY:                MARIAMA J. BAH


Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    We have received your submission.  I would ask that you not read the whole submission but address us on the issues that are raised in your submission please.

Acha:    Mr. Chairman, members of the TRC, on behalf of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) let me thank you very much for inviting us to give out our own view of what went wrong during the eleven (11) years civil war.  My presentation will take the form of giving the historical account of the SLP, the problems encountered during the war, and the way forward.  I sit here as a proud and honoured representative of our noble institution to present our views to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  These views are based on victims and perpetrators.  We were both perpetrators and victims during the war.  My presentation is a clear manifestation that we in the SLP honestly believe in the principles of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  First, I will start with the legal status of the SLP.  The 1991 constitution of Sierra Leone, section 1551 act number six (6) of 1991, stipulates what the functions of the police are and its relationship to the state.  It is directly under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its main duties are the protection of life and property and keeping the peace.  The first day after independence, when the police act of 1964 was enacted, successive governments used the police to restrain the army from politics and to stifle opposition.  When Siaka Stevens became Prime Minister in 1967, and the plans to un-sit him failed, he began to rely more on the police than the military to protect him under-take his state functions.  Recently, a para-military wing was formed in the police, and gradually, it became an instrument of tyranny and suppression.  This was the start of the drift from its traditional peace keeping constitutional rule to that of a fighting force and a subsequent failure to protect the people from the excesses of the state.  This fighting force was used to suppress all segments of society; including members of the opposition party, the army, youths, and others who were perceived as threats to the Stevens administration.  Successive government continued to use the police force to suppress opposition in all its forms.  However, there did not appear to be any visible beneficiaries.  Neither did the political nor the police leadership care for the men and women under their command.  The police leadership was corrupt and self-serving.  They cared only for themselves and used their position to amass as much personal wealth as they could.  This was clearly to the detriment of the junior personnel who were deliberately kept in abject poverty. In as much they were being used against political opponents, these aggressors had their own agendas to acquire wealth through corrupt and unjust means. The same was also the case with many of those with grievances against the state. They would, to gain recognition and support, advance the grievances as the motivating factor.  We all know that, the cause of the rebel war in Sierra Leone varies across individuals and organisation.  You may say that, at the start of the conflict the grievance explanation seemed convincing but as the war progressed, it became apparent that the self became greater than the good of the state.  It became clear that as a result of personal greed and the thirst for economic and political power.  As I said earlier, the SLP as an institution suffered as a victim as well as a perpetrator.  Several factors were responsible for this dual role, and if I may, I will attempt to catalogue some of them so that we’ll get a very clear view of where we were, where we are and where we want to be in the future.  However, the most important factor is that we want to put where we were behind us, and concentrate on our future as an institution that is committed to protecting human life and property.

The Politicization of the police: the deployment of the SLP continued as it distracted from its constitutional duties.  The police spent less and less time protecting the individuals in society.  The rule of law that says that, ‘No one is above the law’ and that all men will be treated equally regardless of their status, was blatantly ignored.  People were arrested and locked up for taking alluvial diamonds found on apparently common land but the corrupt practices carried on in high government circles, the diversion of millions of dollars away from the state and into private bank accounts, no one was ever arrested for these.  The checks and balances surrounding the doctrine of separation of powers – those who have the power to make the legislation are constitutionally kept separate from the upholders of those legislations – were ignored.  The Inspector General of Police whose constitutional powers revolved around protecting the lives of the individual was key to that process.  But, ironically, he was brought into that process, into the political arena.  He was given a seat in the cabinet and invited to contribute to the debates in parliament.  If ever there was a time when the IGP wanted to raise a voice against the excesses of the government, once inside the parliamentary machine, he was silenced.  Like promotions, postings had become so politicized that they were done either at state house or Parliament, in many cases, without any reference to the IGP, SLP and indeed the police council.  

I now go on the transformation of the Police into an instrument of Tyranny.  The traditional role of the SLP is to keep the peace.  However, previous governments succeeded in transforming it into an instrument of tyranny.  Politicians and people in high places used police personnel when they wanted to plant or manufacture evidence on people whom they saw as threats.  This was no secret.  People were tortured at the Criminal Investigation Department and forced to falsely admit their involvement in cases of treason, murder, or any high profile case.  Armed policemen were used to terrorize the people and regularly used to raid their homes and harass the youths.  In fact, they would terrorize anyone who was perceived as being a threat to the administration.  The special branch was solely used to spy on political opponents of the government.  At times, it would appear that only personnel who were loyal to the party were posted to the Special Branch.  They reported directly to the powers that be, rather than to the head of the force.  In fact, some members of the force certainly contributed to the early demise of some former Inspector Generals of Police.  There is no doubt that they have good skills but the intrusive nature of their inquiries was channeled towards what the politicians wanted rather than what the citizens needed.  

The general public, victims, relatives and the youths themselves did not take kindly to this.  When the opportunity came through a rebel war, we saw the army, armed civilians, masquerading as members of the Civil Defense Force and some unarmed civilians attacking, maiming burning and killing police personnel and destroying buildings, vehicles, and other forms of police equipments.  

I will now talk about recruitment and promotion malpractices.  It is crystal clear that any well meaning organization has an objective recruitment policy that is aimed at bringing in good quality people who would support and improve the organization.  However as a result of the politicization of the force to engender the affiliation of political patronage of the police to its party politics,  most of the new recruits were deliberately targeted because they were not competent. Many wee illiterate and within a very short time, effective service delivery of SLP was to a large extend diminished.  Others were targeted because they had reputation for being able to cause people to comply with the wishes of the political masters.  These political thugs were thought to be useful assets and they were sent to the police for recruitment.  This simply means that we were infiltrated.  The same applied to promotions.  Traditionally, promotion was merit based and the selection process was used to fill vacancies with those officers who had earned the respect of their senior officers.  However, it all changed.  It was from amongst this incompetent bunch that personnel were taken and promoted to higher ranks.  This happened through nepotism, cronyism and often, as a reward for dubious favors.  These officers – both junior and senior – moved up the ladder not because of their ability but because they had their various godfathers.  They were prepared to serve their godfathers instead of the communities.  Invariably, they were not working in the interest of safety and security of the state.  Owing to the inhuman ways in which many of the police conducted themselves in maintaining the status quo the public no longer trusted their local police.  They had no confidence in anyone in the SLP to protect them.  Additionally, within the police, there were many competent, hardworking officers who were kept down.  Well, they too began to harbor a sense of grievance.  One strategy they embarked upon was to informally join the rebels by passing on vital information to ensure the success of the rebels with the sole intention of catapulting these godfathers out of positions of influence.  

I’ll go into another area: POSTINGS AND TRANSFERS:  Postings and transfer of police traditionally, are done by senior police officers who allegedly have the expertise and competence to objectively assess the suitability of the police officer to perform a task in a given situation.  But what happened in the police force was that people were put as square pegs in round holes.  What would regularly happen was that top politicians gave names to senior police officers with instruction that they should be posted or transferred to specific areas of interest like Kono, traffic, etc.

UNLAWFUL DISMISSALS:  many police officers were unlawfully dismissed on trumped up charges and that is the difference between the leadership then and the leadership of today.  These dismissals culminated in the final unlawful dismissal of thirteen (13) very senior police officers by the NPRC.  Almost the entire leadership of the force was wiped out.  Others were imprisoned and tortured.  Most of them again joined the militias and caused mayhem during the rebel war.  Another is EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS:  in 1992, as the war progressed, the army decided to cease power.  Some Senior Police Officers, police drivers and laborers who were on drinking spree at Lumpa, Waterloo were arrested and falsely accused of treason.  They were later summarily executed.  Some other officers were brutally murdered by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), another warring faction, an act that caused despair to many police officers and their relatives.  This fanned the flames of enmity with the families of the massacred officers, which in turn led to them to helping the rebels.  The circumstances under which the police officers were killed, clearly indicated that the enemy forces ignored the conventional rules of engagement in conflict.  Our records revealed that throughout the war, a total of two hundred and ninety-three (293) police personnel were killed.  Forty-two (42) wounded and thirty-seven (37) missing in action.  Making a grand total of three hundred and seventy-two (372).  This, to me, is an astronomical number.  This is of considerable operational and economic cost to the organization.  The first victim of both the Koindu and Zimmi attacks were police officers.  The Civil Defense Forces in Bo and Kenema killed close to fifty (50) police officers and during the reign of the AFRC close to two hindered (200) police personnel were killed.  The killings of these unarmed police officers can be linked to the killing of unarmed civilians.  Police officers are citizens in uniform, thus, it is tantamount to gross violation of international humanitarian law.  I think, the perpetrators must take full responsibility for the sake of peaceful co-existence.  

THE POLITICS OF RICE:  It was during this period that we saw some of our most senior men receiving over five hundred (500) bags of rice per month, whilst the junior ranks received (1) bag.  This was regardless of the size of the family they supported.  According to spectators at the time, it was heart rendering to see that at times even this one bag was taken from some of the most junior officers by the same senior officers who would have received his or her five-hundred (500) bags of rice.  Most surprisingly, the end result was the start of a grudge against those in authority and a big rift set in between the junior and the senior officers.  It was reported that shortly after this, some of these aggrieved officers began to support the rebels and many soiled their ranks.

PUBLIC ORDER ACTIVITIES AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  The police are constitutionally bound to keep the peace and be legally responsible.  The legitimacy of their actions does not extend into suppressing dissenting views.  However, the police did use this power to control governmental opposition and those who had held dissenting opinions.  Processions and demonstrations held by opposition parties, students or pressure groups for which the police had no political backing would always be turned down.  The effect of this public denial was that the groups chose to go under-ground.  If they could not vent out their grievances in the open, they resorted to private clandestine methods.  We could not effectively put in place any intelligence network to monitor these underground networks.  Any spontaneous outburst were put down heavy handedly. Subsequently, most of these aggrieved people joined the ranks of the rebels and then targeted the police.  Others, as a result of the tyrannical attitude of the police and treatment they received from the police, store up anger waiting for the right moment to retaliate.  Some were tortured and forced to admit wrong doings and many of the innocent were sent to prison.  When the rebels released them from the prison, they were seen as their saviors and they immediately wrecked havoc on the police and anything that gave them cause to remember what the police had done to them.     

THE HALLMARK OF THE REBELLION:  the rebellion was marred by destruction, terror and violence, the likes never seen or perpetrated anywhere before.  The atrocities have been well documented elsewhere and those surrounding the amputation and brandings witnessed in Freetown were simply a replica of what was happening in the rural areas.  With the above scenarios, the organization was wildly viewed as a citadel of corruption, an instrument of tyranny, an obstacle to the socio economic progress of Sierra Leone.  Before the war, the police was confronted with problems of all sorts ranging from the shortage of logistics to welfare issues of personnel.  The war brought along its own problem.  It hindered effective service delivery, increased the crime rate and any movement of personnel and logistics was a complete nightmare.  We became targets for the various warring faction and policing was limited to only government-controlled areas.  We were also faced with the enormous challenge of maintaining a balance between containing the enemy forces and performing our traditional roles.  As I said before we were not spared.  Although I am really trying to explain the role of the police during the war, and we know that many saw us as perpetrators, we need to tell you that we also suffered as victims.  Today, we are short of manpower to effectively police the country and we are now running a non-stop recruitment drive.  This is one of the effects of the war that we are now facing.  Nevertheless, notwithstanding the catalogue of the areas I’ve already listed, many police officers were either killed or declared missing in action at the forefront.  Some of our personnel officially joined the ranks of the army and were killed in active service whiles defending their motherland.  Others were trained by ECOJMOG peacekeepers at Lungi to help remove the AFRC from power.  In fact, it is a common knowledge that without the OSD having a defensive position along the Congo Cross Bridge the rebels would have over-run the whole city.  In the process, some were killed in battle, others brutally murdered by the various factions.  Their only alleged crime was that they were police officers.  To really portray the depth of hatred against the police personnel, mere pictures or uniform of police personnel were considered legitimate targets.  To illustrate a point, it is known that whenever the RUF rebels entered any town their first task was to locate the police station and structures and target the personnel.  Both will be burnt and killed respectively.  The damage to structures and equipments is so enormous that it is difficult to attach realistic cost.  Just as they saw us as legitimate targets, so too did they target the SLP infrastructure.

Our encounter with the armed factions through investigations and intelligence from other sources indicated that the RUF in particular, was getting support form certain rogue states.  Collaboration from within the country was also a worrying problem for the Sierra Leone Police.  The internal collaboration became more apparent when the RUF joined forces with some elements of the national army.  Now, what is the way forward?  The guns have now fallen silent and we pray to the almighty God that the situation shall remain like that for some time to come.  The question now is, how do we maintain this new found peace and what do we do in the years to come to ensure that such a horrible nightmare does not befall this nation?  The war brought untold sufferings to the people of this country creating in the process, deep seated resentment that can be a real obstacle to peaceful co-existence.  

I believe one way is through the TRC and the restorative justice system.  Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa observed that an offence injures a relationship.  But restorative justice, he said, can restore that injured relationship.  As an organization, we could not agree with him more on this.  We pray that the Sierra Leone TRC be another success story.  However, to achieve this goal, the perpetrators must muster the courage to confess their misdeeds and beg for forgiveness.  The victims too, for the sake of peace, should forgive. Even psychologists have contended that forgiveness is good for one’s health.  Such bold and courageous actions can surely provide a free state for peace co-existence.  At this juncture, please allow me to rest as I fell free.  Free in the sense that, as perpetrators of the war and a repressive arm of the government during the pre-war years, the general public, including the various combatants, saw the police as an enemy.  This battered image alienated the police from the community.  As an organization we confess and apologize for our misdeeds to the public at large.  Today, we are policing through mutual cooperation.  That is, local unit policing.  The populace has once more accepted their police – the cooperation and the appreciation is enormous, otherwise, we would not have been sitting here today.  I repeat, I feel free because today, before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, we have officially vented out our feelings, our position, the mistrust and misgiving throughout this ten (10) years civil war.  I hope all will appreciate, forgive us and we all will turn a new page so that we push Mother Sierra Leone forward.  To ensure that we provide an efficient and effective service to the community, we are appealing to the government and the people of Sierra Leone, and to some extent, to the international Community to do their best to improve our conditions of service.  I have already outlined the functions of the police and its primary peacekeeping role.  The constable is the lowest rank of the service.  But it is at that junior rank that the majority of the service delivery is carried out.  It is the constable that has the power to arrest for a multitude of criminal offences.  It is the constable who is patrolling the streets at night.  Yet the pay and conditions of service for a person with so much power is a bit small.  The salary that the constable takes home each month is the equivalent of a sack of rice and a sack of onions with a little left over to buy some loaves of bread.  To us, as an organization, we see it as tantamount to an abuse their human rights.  

The police is being challenged by local needs policing, and because of that, recently, we have established, throughout the country, local policing partnership.  The government policing charter and our police emission statement came about as a result of the Inspector General of Police asking His Excellency, the President about the style of policing he wanted for the Sierra Leoneans.  That document is a government’s decision for policing in Sierra Leone.  And the mission statement tells the public how we, the SLP, will deliver that style of policing.  The local Policing Partnership boxes are the medium where we ask the communities what their concerns are and to help us tackle crime in the neighborhood.  The civil society is our focus, and in that vain; we are establishing local partnership bonds nationally.  It is part of our strong commitment to provide a service to the individuals who live in diverse range of communities throughout Sierra Leone.  We know that to become an efficient service the police has to be free from corruption; not only corruption, but also political interference.  We are now going through a period of time when the community is visibly showing that their trust in the police service is returning to how it used to be.  However, there is a negative side to what I have just said and I want to be realistic.  I believe we all agree in the type of police service we need to feel safe in our beds.  But we can not expect the police to deliver a professional service on a less than professional wage.  If you ask members of our complaints, discipline and internal investigation department, what is the number one reason why police officers take bribes on the streets, they will tell you it is to feed the family or pay for their school-going expenses.  The majority of our men and women live in poverty.  Go to Kingtom or Ross Road barracks and see for yourselves.  There is overcrowding.  Temporal structures are springing all over the barracks.  There are not enough barracks for our new recruits, the ones we need to replace those who we have lost in the war, our men and women are sleeping rough.  Some are sleeping on the floors of friends’ houses.  Others are paying exorbitant rents for one room.  Our terms and conditions of serving include a rent allowance; it is Le1,000.00 per month, a bottle of coke costs more.  What we need now as part of our own TRC is adequate recompense for the professional job we do.  Good housing conditions and appropriate allowances in view of accommodation.  Our welfare scheme is limited.  We would like to expand it to include some form of maintenance to support the families of our personnel who were killed or are missing in action.  Micro-finance opportunities will also be used for the police’ wives and their children; to help support their families.  We also need adequate logistics including transportation and communication to help us bear the burden with the community.  At times, those in remote areas feel vulnerable; more so, along the Liberian border.  Above all, what we will like to see is the dearest minimum so that we can begin to put the past behind us and ever sleep in peace and harmony.  The period of the rebel war needs to be relegated to history books for our descendants to read and understand just exactly what went on in Sierra Leone and why the police suffered the way they did.  In order to build the new Sierra Leone, which will be a land of prosperity, adhering to formal democratic practices and the rule of law, it is appropriate that those who are responsible for igniting the machinery of justice should have their terms and conditions of service improved.  We in the Sierra Leone Police, on our part, have forgiven all those who traumatized us.  Those who killed and maimed, maimed our colleagues, brutalized their families, raped our wives and daughters, burnt our houses and police stations during those turbulent years.  We do, however, hope that none of this will ever occur.  It is an organization, which with all intents and purposes continues to be a force for good.  We hope for everlasting peace in the land that we love, Sierra Leone, Thank you.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    Thank you very much for that.  It’s usual for us to ask you questions.  I’m going to ask my colleagues if they have questions for you.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Inpector General Kamara, I want to use this opportunity on behalf of my colleagues to congratulate you on your elevation to that enviable office, a very tasking office of Inspector General of Police.

Acha:    Thank you Sir.

Chairman:    We are most fortunate in that even before your elevation you had manifested great interest in the TRC and had worked with us and designated somebody to work with us.  We want to say here that we very much appreciate the contribution that this institution had been making and continue to make towards the accomplishment of the mandate of the commission.  I have great temptation to talk too much, but I will not.  I will leave most of what is in the presentation to be addressed by my colleagues.  We have called you as a symbolic representation of that institution to address a few pertinent questions that are very crucial for the work of the commission.  We have some resume, a synopsis of these issues but I want to read them, probably for you to take note of them, and my colleagues will be dealing with these issues within this context.  The questions the commission continues to grapple with includes among others: 1, why Sierra Leone? 2, what went wrong? 3, what needs to change? 4. who must effect the change? 5, who are the beneficiaries of this change?  This is what I foremost in the mind of the Commission, in everything we have been doing,  I now want, as my colleagues engage you for clarifications want you to know that we are clearly aggrieved as a commission that in order to deal with the antecedent of the war, we start from the year, 1961.  So, you have helped us to an extent. But for clarification we would like to view the police in the context of the following periodization.:
1960 to 1961.
1964 – 1967
1967-1970
1971 – 1985
1985 – 1992
1992 – 1996
1996 – 1997
1998 – 2000
the year 2000 to present

The commissioners will not be quoting these dates but it is within this context, this boarder context that your paper, as we see, is presented and we all are familiar with the history of this country.  That’s why I have tried to analyze it in my own way so you have this at the back of your mind.  Indeed you have rightly quoted that the 1991 constitution, and in that constitution, section 161-25-1 Act no. 6 states, “among the duties of the police force, is the protection of life and property and keeping the peace.  And this is what I think also the commissioner believe in.  Because, as the questions come, we have to put them in context.  In the universal declaration of human rights, 1948 December 10, stipulates among other things that every human being has the right to belong to a group, to an association, to free expression of views and you constitutionally have the right to vote and be voted for.

Within this broader context, the one simple question, I.G. that does not require much labouring over is, as a police force, as citizens of this nation, regardless of your own group affiliation, what is required of you in the discharge of your responsibilities in accordance with the constitution?

Acha:    Thank you very much Sir.  I see a tripartite relationship in this whole scenario. There is the government that employs us to give certain services, you have the public at the other end who will be receiving these services and you have the police.  And the police organisation has contracted individuals, us to do  specific tasks in order for us to meet our own obligation. I believe both the public and the government have their own dual role to assist the police and if the government or the people do not do their own bargain, I don’t believe the police force will be in that position to effectively deliver quality service.  As an organisation, in accordance with their constitution, we really have to make sure that there is peace in this country.  There are times, as an organisation, we ask too much from the public and the government.  Then we do not ask ourselves, what are we doing? So, in order to answer the questions, it behoves us, really, to deliver the service that the constitution stipulates.  But this is predicated on other issues.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    As a commission, we have the responsibility of establishing an impartial historical record and in our work, if we get somebody, a witness, coming to either name names or institutions in regard to Thematic Hearings or public hearings, we have the responsibility of cross-checking.  So, yesterday, you might have listened to the radio or you will listen later, one of our witnesses here maintained that the Dombolo (meaning trouble) that befell this nation was largely the responsibility of the army and police.  What do you say about that?

Acha:    I absolutely do not agree with that; with his statement.  The police lives within a sub system, a larger system, and mind you, if the political atmosphere is not conducive, we cannot do anything.  And it is because of the present president; because of the vision he’s got for the police, that is why, in fact, we are making great improvements.  So let’s start from the political situation in the country.  Under the one party state, there were many honest police officers but because the political powers were corrupt, it affected all sections of the community.  If you look at the two systems, now because we have somebody as president, a leader who has a vision, who knows the problem, that’s why in his government policing charter, he says “this is how I want the police to perform; to tackle corruption, involve the community, this is exactly, as an institution, what we are doing.  If we had been in a military state, this improvement in the force would not have come.  So let us look at the bigger picture instead of blaming individuals.  We were politicized.  We were corrupted form above and if you don’t heed them, either you will be dismissed or your family will suffer.  

As an organization, we have so many forces impacting on us; political, economic, social,  so we behave according to those forces.  So in order for us to cut off this vicious circle of politicization we need to work, really, as a unit and stop the mutual blaming game.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you, I.G. my second to last question is a pro-position so I want to present it to you.  Is it a tenable proposition that institutionalized corruption, the get rich quick syndrome for personal aggrandizement, the prostitution of the constitution, apathy, call it indifference to the cry of the poor masses contributed in no small measure to the political and socio-economic demise of this nation during the period under review?

Acha:    I agree with you sir

Chairman:    One other important question is that, it has been asserted in many circles that tribalism, sectionalism and nepotism were considered requisite qualification, and not the formal qualification itself for the recruitment of the police force.  If you so subscribe to this view, what effect does this have on the effective and efficient functioning of this institution?

Acha:    In my presentation, I touched on it and it’s quite true that all of this affected the quality of personnel we had in the SLP. And up till this day, we still have some of them who have been catapulted – given senior ranks, without really performing their present role.  And because of it, if you go through the government policing charter, the president has said that all of our policies will be based on equal opportunities.  So we’ve got an equal opportunities department and our recruitment promotion nowadays is very much transparent.  So much that we have not been getting policemen grumbling nor going through the press to challenge the decisions we have made.  It’s a very transparent decision; it’s no longer a one man’s show.  At the top of it, we have the executive management board comprising police headquarters, staff, departmental (and regional commissioners). It is in this board, really that major decisions are taken and not as it used when a dictator would take all the decisions. We don’t have a dictatorship in the police force. It is very transparent and even the constitution says that no one should be discriminated against because of his or her own tribe or the region he comes from.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    I.G. the presiding chair will be asking you to do us some favour.  On page ten (10) of your submission, you have some comprehensive submission as a form of recommendation and the commission will be very much interested in helping us to say what concrete substantive achievable recommendations we would receive from your institution in order to make it a real force for good.

Commissioner Justice Marcus- Jones:    I would like to thank the I.G. for his submission and for his presentation here this morning and I would like also to associate with the chairman in congratulating the I.G.  I am sure he is going to get the support of the force.  For one thing, the support we see here this morning, I don’t think people have ever seen such support for any presenter to the TRC so, I think the future is bright for you, IG.
    
I want to extend sympathy to the police force for the loss they suffered during the ten (10) years conflict.  Whilst we did our hearings, we listened to many accounts of violations against the relatives of members of the force.  We even have on our staff, a member whose father was killed just because he had been a policeman at one time or another.  So, we do appreciate your suffering and we sympathize with you as a commission.

This is not actually a  question. It appears, from what we’ve been told here, in this commission that, and we know that we have perpetrators and the victims in this conflict and, we’ve found out that some victims were changed into perpetrators.  For example, people who were abducted were trained, taught to use guns to loot, and they eventually, themselves became perpetrators.  But I would think, from all we’ve heard that maybe the police force started off by being perpetrators and ended up being victims.  And it appears also that the army and the police who were supposed to be protecting civilians and the state were not performing that duty and that if their duty had been performed properly, things would not have gone the way they did during the conflict. Do you have any questions or recommendations

Acha:        

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SERVICE DELIVERY

(i) The Constitutional provisions governing the SLP should be strictly adhered to by government if the Force is to be professionally administered.
(ii) Improvements in the conditions of service/increase in salaries and allowances of SLP personnel.
(iii) To improve accommodation facilities for the entire membership of the SLP. In lieu of accommodation, an allowance proportionate to the inflationary trend should be awarded from the current rate of Le1,000.00 to at least Le50,000.00 per month
(iv) The families of those killed in action during the war should be compensated as
was done in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.
(v) Micro -Credit schemes should be extended to police wives.
Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones: We want to thank you for your presentation and recommendations. They have been noted. Thank you IG you may step down  
 

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Leader of evidence:    Our next witness for this morning is Maj. Gen. T. S. Carew, Chief of Defence Staff.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    The full name of the witness and religious affiliation.

Carew:    Major General Tom S. Carew.  I am a Christian.

    Oath was taken by Maj. Gen. Carew.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    We want to welcome you here as CDS.  We are delighted to have you as part of this nation building process we call TRC.  So we encourage you to share with us whatever you want to share with us that will help us in this task.  You are now welcome to give your presentation.

Carew:    Mr. Chairman, members of this Commission, invited guests, ladies and gentlemen.  I will try to be very brief because my submission is already with you. It gives me the greatest privilege to appear before your Commission especially for the first time to make this submission at the public hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  Furthermore, I like to seize this opportunity to congratulate you Mr. Chairman, your executive Secretary who is not here and gallant commissioners for organizing these hearings at this auspicious time in the history of our beloved Sierra Leone.  The topic which I will be speaking about is the January 6 1999 rebel attack on Freetown which you wish me to give a talk on.

As you all know this day was very fundamental to the people of Sierra Leone and is commonly known as J-6 .  It is an unforgettable date in the minds of all Sierra Leoneans especially Freetonians.  The horrible memories of the actual events of the fatal day will linger in the minds of Sierra Leoneans for many years to come.  Mr. Chairman in making this presentation, I will do it in a purely military style.  I will give the aim, then the scope and then I will give a brief conclusion.  Now the aim of my presentation is to give the sad event of the 6 January 1999 rebel attack on Freetown and its effects.  In giving the scope, I will use the following:-

I will briefly talk on the event before the attack, then the attack itself, then the effects of the attack.  

So let me start with the events before the attack.  Two weeks before the actual day of January 6, intelligence reports were coming in that the AFRC/RUF rebels were planning to invade the city of Freetown.  During that period, the intervention force ECOMOG was solely responsible for security of the city, and indeed the entire country.  Mr. Chairman, it was the same ECOMOG that won the single credit of flushing the AFRC junta from Freetown thereby paving the way for the restoration of the democratically elected government of the day.  By that time, the national army was dormant and the bulk of the surrendered personnel had been camped at three locations and these are Lungi Garrison, Benguma Barracks and the National Stadium Swimming Pool.  In my presentation or my submission to you, I mentioned certain problems that the heads were having at that particular time which I will not like to mention openly but there was some problem with ECOMOG and their leadership.  Well this strained relationship is attributed to petty jealousy. In essence we never made or they never made contingency plan for any attack of such nature.  The rebels took advantage of the prevailing situation; they seize the initiative and thereby decided to attack the people.  They started launching series of attacks on ECOMOG positions across the country.  Their plan was to rapidly and systematically attack the city, attack any position from the north.  Their main plan was to systematically attack the overstretched and thin ECOMOG deployment taking maximum advantage of the terrain. They were under the command of late Capt. S.A.J. Musa. Locations like Alikalia, Kono, Magburaka, Makeni were overrun after all these attacks from the north.    They kept on the attack until they arrived on the outskirt of Freetown that is, the Waterloo general area.  To be more specific, the armed forces training centre at Waterloo was their first target.  At that time the ECOMOG leadership and indeed the traumatized populace did not fully trust the SLA troops to be very frank.  So ECOMOG made sure all the encamped SLA personnel arms were securely kept in the barracks angle. So when the rebels eventually launched a surprise attack on the encamped troops at Benguma our own troops withdrew and Benguma fell easily to the rebels.  So Mr. Chairman in the following mopping operations after their short-lived victory, the rebels proceeded to destroy everything they could lay hands on including the expensive military equipments, stores and ordinance. These rebels broke into the armory and took out all the light arms they could lay hands on and carried them away and even destroyed some of these heavy weapons so that in case we wanted to make a counter attack, it will not be possible for us.  Without thinking of the danger involved SAJ Musa gave instant order to his rebels to set fire to the armory building which at that time was full of high explosives, heavy shells and dangerous bombs.  In the ensuing high explosion, several rebels who were within the danger zone were all torn to pieces.  SAJ Musa who gave the orders for the armory to be burnt down and who was himself on the spot also met his tragic and painful end.  Mr. His entire skull was scattered.  That was the demise of the man who had caused so much havoc and catastrophe on his fellow citizen and who was aiming to become the President of this country.  Of course that was indee divine providence and divine justice.  Hours after the explosion, the few surviving rebels managed to drag his body from the scene along with the other casualties and they were put in an unmarred grave without any ceremony or military honour. SAJ Musa’s death was indeed sad news to the rebels but a big blessing for government forces.  With the death of this feared and notorious commander, the rebels were demoralized and temporarily thrown into terrain with no credible commander to take over the mantle of leadership.  The junior rebels’ commanders tried strenuously to put the men together to plan the diabolic invasion of the city.  

Now let me talk on the attack on the city itself.  The rebels invaded the city on Wednesday 6 January 1999.  The actual invasion reached the ears of ECOMOG high command from forward ECOMOG troops at about 4.00a.m.  It was not only a big surprise but also a great shock for the unsuspecting ECOMOG troops who took the rebel invading forces for civilians.  The actual invasion started from the Eastern part of the city in the Calaba Town general area.  The rebels disguised themselves and mingled with the huge exodus of civilians who were entering the city in waves as displaced persons.  The rebels also tactically made maximum use of the prevailing darkness to conceal their identity and true strength.    Before daybreak they had penetrated the centre of Freetown and had started firing from all directions in the East and centre of the city to throw residents into a state of panic, confusion and pandemonium.  In no time the rebels had taken over these areas. Okay as I just say, even the ECOMOG Generals in the ECOMOG headquarters at Cockeril were all shocked, astonished and dumbfounded when this ugly incident took place.  

In their attempt to dominate the entire Freetown, the invading rebels proceeded to extend the attack to the West end of the city but were met by a very strong ECOMOG resistance at Congo Bridge where they suffered incredible and fatal casualties.
   
That was the first offensive operations of ECOMOG which I was part to halt the invading rebels.  The ECOMOG troops under the command of one Major Musa made a surprise deadly ambush that totally engulfed the leading elements of the rapidly advancing rebels.  All the leading vehicles and their occupants were blown to pieces in that particular encounter.  And indeed this greatest single victory by ECOMOG against the rebels broke their invisibility and put a final halt to their rapid advance from the East end of Freetown.  As I said earlier ladies and gentlemen, during all of this period, the national army was dormant; ECOMOG was solely responsible for the security of the country with the Nigerian born General Timothy Shelpidi as Force Commander.  General Abu Amadu as Ecomog Task Force Commander and then General Khobe as our Chief of Defense Staff.  To drive home this point, I will just give a simple example.  I was Colonel in charge of Administration; I was placed under a Captain to control me.  So this shows exactly how dormant the SLA was.   At that Congo Bridge encounter, after having halted the rebels’ advances towards the west at Congo Bridge, Ecomog finally seized the initiative and embark on decisive attacking, pursuing the retreating rebel elements.  After three days of fierce gun battle and massive bombardments, ECONOG forces in a three fold simultaneous attack on the rebel positions cleared the rebels from Brookfields, Kingtom, New England, Pademba Road area and the whole of the central Freetown up to Eastern police end.  Having suffered serious casualties and setbacks, the rebels had no choice but to beat a top retreat in the face of the rapid ECOMOG assault.  These fleeing rebels started to vent in their anger on defenseless civilians and carrying out wholesale burning of government buildings and civilian residences and vehicles.  They did not stop there.  They also started acts of amputating, mutilating and massacring innocent civilians including women and children.  Of course, Mr. Chairman, sorry to say that the only casualty on our part on that particular day was the loss of one Major J.B.  Arrow and one Junior Personnel who was with us.  As a result of these two casualties, government troops temporarily halted the pursuit to evacuate the casualty and wait for fresh reinforcement.  General Khobe and myself coordinated this.  Early the next day, we received the reinforcement and we started the advance.  As I said we started the advance the next day.  At that time to be very frank, there was little command and control on the side of the rebels because their most feared commander, SAJ Musa was out of the scene.  Again when the rebels realized that they had lost the initiative and could no longer halt the momentum and rapid advance of government troops towards the east in our bid to clear the entire city of rebel element, they decided to intensity their usual acts of atrocity, abduction and taking away of beautiful women and children.  Thus after suffering serious defeat at the hands of ECOMOG with maximum casualty, the retreating rebels split into two factions.  One faction returned to Makeni to rejoin their colleagues while the other element returned and established a notorious hideout place at Okra Hills.  Of course this group called themselves The West Side Boys, it was this same gang that stubbornly held out at the base even after the transition from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL and it was the same group that launched series of attacks on Masiaka and its environs, ambushed the Waterloo-Masiaka Highway on countless occasions and dug several ditches as death traps across the tarred highway. They were in this type of operation until when they finally went out of the way by abducting the British who were out there on patrol. They tried to persuade them to leave these people but they refused.  So we finally used force which was the language they could understand.  So the British organized an operation known as operation Barass. This operation actually dealt with these people, they demolished their notorious base and routed these bandits, they exterminated the stubborn ones and off course captured the rest and they are still at the Pademba Road Prisons.  

Now let me talk a bit about the effects of all this. The effect of the AFRC/RUF attack on Freetown on 6th January 1999 was immense.  In the East and Central of the city itself the rebels attack defenseless civilians and committed so many acts, atrocities.  They raped people they burnt houses and did so many other bad things.  Of course Sierra Leoneans as well as the international community were witnesses to the huge scale destruction of human and material resources that accompany the January 6 invasion.  Of course we all know how serious people suffered.  So I need not say much on this issue.  Again following their crushing defeat and pursuit from the capital, the rebels resorted to the wanton destruction of lives and property before they fled the city.  Government buildings and other state facilities were all not spared.  Seven churches were burnt down.  They went to the extent of even destroying the National Stadium, Kissy mental Home, schools, churches of course as I said earlier were all destroyed.  So many people suffered, even transport owners, motorists, they burnt all their vehicles.  So they have no more hope of getting any more income.  

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, for the past few minutes I have been discussing about January 6 rebel attack on the city of Freetown.  I  first stated that the lack of unity and cooperation which I don’t like to mention was the major cause, for had there been that co-operation we would have made contingency plan to counter these people but this was not there.  Mr. Chairman, I also mentioned about the way in which SAJ Musa met his death.  To me this time it was not a call of the Special Court but a call made by the divine God Almighty for him to go and face God’s court for all that he has done in this country.  Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you all for listening to me.  I will now wait for some questions.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Major General Tom Carew, we want to thank you very much for your expertise in unraveling the January 6 1999 invasion of Freetown.  We now as a Commission wil ask some questions for clarification, after which we ask the leader of evidence for some questions or clarification as well So I would now turn to my colleagues to engage our CDS.

Commissioner Torto:    I thank you very much Maj. Gen. Carew for this presentation.  I must also join the Chairman in thanking you for even honouring our invitation to be here.  I have so many questions for the Maj. Gen, but because of the systematic way of presenting it as required, I will limit or try to limit as much as possible my questions. I must tell you that my questions come out the hearings, people’s testimonies, and all I want from you is to really clarify the issues. I am going to start by asking you about things said in the presentation.  You said during all what was happening in the army, and so on, the national army was dormant.  I don’t know why the national army was dormant, was the whole army at that time dormant?  Were there not loyal officers, men and women in the army who could have actually stood to answer to the call of this country when the country needed them most, not a single one?

Carew:    Well actually there were some people.  I was one of those that surrendered to ECOMOG at Lungi. Then I went to Conakry. I was there until ECOMOG came and drove out the people and I came back, reported myself to General Khobe and there were some other people whom we called the loyal troops, few soldiers and some SSD Personnel who were with us.  They were all there but the people did not trust us because as I said earlier, the percentage of those who were those bad guys was so much that the civilians never trusted us anymore.  It would have taken some time for them to have that confidence and faith in us. So when we came and reported ourselves, what General Khobe did was just to keep us in the barracks, camped us, get all the arms and ammunition stored so that none of us will think of doing anything bad anymore.  So we were just there.  For some of us whom they believed to some extent they attached us to some of their operations.  That was how it went.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you, the next question; our army has been reported to be a very strong force; the Sierra Leone Army has the reputation of being a very strong and brave force in the West Coast of Africa for a long time and it actually enjoyed that respect in the sub region.  What gave the cause for a foreigner, General Khobe to be appointed Chief of Defense Staff when there were so many brave people in the army?

Carew:    Trust was not so much placed on us anymore because as I said earlier, about 80% of our men at that time were on the other side, that is, on the RUF/AFRC side.  It was very difficult for people to trust us. So when General Khobe came and they decided  to root out these guys, they were in command of security in the country and whosoever was in command of the security must be the Commander according to our own principle.  So General Khobe was automatically declared as the Chief of Defense Staff of Sierra Leone.  There were honest people but, I mean, you yourself will not trust people at that time.  So to clear that doubt we will just leave it like that.  Mr. Commissioner I will be talking on that in my next presentation, the armed forces and the police.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you.  There is a general feeling, especially among the Freetonians, so to speak, and even throughout the country that the invasion of Freetown was possible only because of the rebels conniving with the SLA, that without the SLA, the rebels could have never penetrated the city.  Can you comment on that?

Carew:    Well actually everybody has his own view.  For my part.  I want to agree partly with what you are saying Sir, because by then if our people, as I said about 80%, who were well trained I mean they have all these tactical knowledge in them as compared to the rebels, may be if they had not gone to these people surely they would not have penetrated the city. People like SAJ Musa.  He was a well trained combatant Officer, If he had not gone to them, maybe these people would not have been able to penetrate or bye pass over positions.

Comm. Torto:    Thank you, my penultimate question is most people who have appeared before this Commission have stated that all what this country is going through today was all caused by the Sierra Leone Army.  Do you agree?

Carew:    That is your own view Sir, but if I should explain, I mean, in any society you must have few bad elements that will try to spoil an institution. But among these people, there must be some good ones. I mean like the loyal troops. I believe because from my Christian background, I was brought up by the late Bishop B.A. Carew, I want to believe that power comes from God and that nobody should begin to fight for power.  If you should get it, you will get it and to be a military man, you are not aspiring to become President but aspire to become a General.  That is my own belief.

Comm. Torto:    Thank you.  The very last question for now because I know you are going to be coming again is that the recent coups in this country were staged by very very low officers, not officers, in fact, other ranks.  Privates in the army according to testimonies before this Commission. Just your batmen, batmen of the Junior Officers, people who commanded no dignity, no respect, no form of education, not to talk of having any intelligence or any idea of running a country.  Why were the Senior Officers in the army so dormant or allowed themselves to be overrun by mere boys,  where were they?

Carew:    Well actually, this is a very controversial question.  Sir, if you look at the ratio of officers to the other ranks, they far outnumber us.  So when you look closely it is not that those guys would have been able to overcome us but they were more numerous and when they planned this thing, some officers did not know about it. Because I believe that even though we were small in number, if we were properly prepared and had that will power to say no we would have resisted them, we would have done it, but not all of us could withstand this tension.  I particularly had to leave this country because I would not salute any Corporal and I fled to Guinea to seek refuge.  I was placed in Pademba Road.  They said I did not want to co-operate with them.  I was there for two and a half months.  That was why I left this country.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Justice Marcus- Jones:    Thank you Major General for coming here and for giving us your testimony.  I am curious to know whether the task force commander was ever brought to book for the lapses in contingency planning which brought a disaster to Freetown?

Carew:    Yes Madam Commissioner, actually this was why I said I do not want to say it in public because these are military matters, and also that the task commander was not a Sierra Leonean.  We have certain rules that do regulate any action that to be taken  that I think it is not prudent to discuss in public.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    I hope, Major General, that in the training at the army officers they are made to realize how destructive petty jealousies could be along Senior Officers.

Carew:    Well actually this is true.  If I should make my recommendations maybe this is one lesson.  We call them lessons learnt.  From any history, any campaign, you have these lessons. You have to at least summarize lessons learnt, how best you can avoid some of the mistakes that you have made.  So I put them under lessons learnt and then I will make some recommendations.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Thank you Major General Tom Carew.  I join the other Commissioners in welcoming you to this Commission and we hope that even if we do not exhaust all questions on the military, we will have other opportunities on aspects that might not have been dealt with.  Coming to your current presentation, you did say that, and you have repeated it a few times that Sierra Leoneans do not trust the army.  As a very senior officer even then, you must have had an idea of what created this mistrust.  Can you tell us why the people of this country did not trust the army?

Carew:    Well actually I need not say much now.  As I said, in the next paper, I will actually give the reasons why I think the discipline in the army deteriorated so much.  It all depends on discipline.  If people are disciplined they will do things that the civilian populace that is now paying them  appreciate. They are using salaries to contribute.  I mean to say  our salaries, I mean they will do things to let the people realize that after all we are not masters, but we are servants of the people and then all these things will not arise

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Alright, I know that we need to get more information from the army but this I would like to know whether your statement means that the military was no longer serving the people or protecting the people it was meant to protect.

Carew:    Actually that might be your view, but my view particularly was that some were actually working in the interest of the people of this country while others, you know, went on the other side. They were thinking that getting power by the barrel of the gun was the best way to serve which is not correct at all.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    So Major General, on the average were the people of this country receiving on the average as much as they were expecting from the army?

Carew:    Well I don’t know what they may feel but I want to believe that since this is the time for reconciliation I would act just like I mentioned in one of my papers that I will ask the whole nation to forgive us because we know people have actually made people not to trust us anymore. I mean staging coups, this will not allow people to trust you anymore. We are asking the people to forgive us, forget about the past and look forward to the new army which is now well trained, well disciplined and accountable to the people of this country.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes, Major General Carew, it is true that the main concern of the Commission is to bring about reconciliation in the country but before reconciliation, there has to be something, a prerequisite, and that is people should come out and admit any faults, atrocities or displeasure they would have caused that made people not to trust them, so are you saying by that statement that you accept now as head of the army, on behalf of the army, that there was a period, the period we are discussing now when the military was not serving the people of this country and were thus not trusted by the people of the country?

Carew:    Yes exactly.  You know as I said in any society or any organization, you must have people who are bent on destroying the good image of that institution.  So I will not argue on that point.  Just like you rightly say, I will just beg, you know, I mean members of this Commission to help us to talk to the people of the country and that is why anytime members of your staff go to my headquarters, I will always welcome them and try to tell my junior officers to make sure we assist them because we know this is the only forum whereby we can come and vent out our views and actually ask for forgiveness which I will now do.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Alright but we have a duty that goes beyond that.  Apart from bringing about reconciliation, we are also to find out the cause or causes of what happened here so that we can make recommendations that will prevent the reoccurrence of what happened and this is where you and all the other people come in because you are the ones who were the actors in those theatres, those places where all these things happened.  You are the ones to come and tell us what was it that went wrong, that created the circumstances that led to the problems that this country had.  When we get that information and analyze it along with others, we will then be able to make appropriate recommendations.  Otherwise if you just say we are sorry and are over with it, we will not be able to come out with recommendations that will be worthwhile.  So this is why I am asking for instances. My other question is what was it in the army that, even if it is only 5% of the military, that created this dissatisfaction within the army that led to the army behaving the way it did?

Carew:    Okay, these are all in my next paper but I will just summarize them, I would say some of these things, you can put them under the following: training, there was no good enough training for people. Training brings in so many things like discipline and from discipline you have so many other things that you derive from that.  You see you will now know how to teach your fellow soldiers.  You now know how to take care of him even your subordinate. We do what we call military history when we do our officers courses.  In these courses you may be reading about ten Generals and you will actually study them properly; then you take three to know actually what the qualities of these men were?  Why were they liked by their subordinates?  Why was he having victory upon victory?  This was how we study and I took that of Field Marshal Montgomery.  He was a man who was always with his men.  He feared God in the first place.  So whatever it is, he was always thinking that there is somebody behind watching at him.

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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
THEMATIC AND INSTITUONAL HEARINGS

TAPE 6 – W 5 CONTINUED
TOM CAREW – CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF – SIERRA LEONE ARMY
DAY 2 – 15/7/03
TRANSCRIBER:    KIPTIYU B. SESAY
SECRETARY:    MARIAMA J. BAH


Commissioner Bishop Humper:    There are a lot of questions that we need answers to, but I will only ask one question. What would you say to the opinion that the west side boys were all members of the Sierra Leone Army and not just rebels?

Carew:    In my presentation Sir, I told you that about the other side, that is the RUF/SLA/AFRC.  So most of these people who went to West Side base were those die hearted AFRC element that did not want to hear anything about peace, those were the guys out there causing all sorts of problems.  In fact they attacked the British people and we really organized operation Barass which taught them a lesson.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Are you saying that among the West Side Boys you had RUF and SLA?.

Carew:    The point I am trying to make here is that there was a split when they went out of Freetown; the RUF went one way the SLA went another way. The SLA were the ones who formed the group at Okra Hill and all those that went to Makeni were all RUF. But they had a common linkage with their RUF counterparts in Makeni.  That was how they were working.

Commissioner Bishop Humper: Thank you.  Major General before I come to my question I want us to get one clarification probably that would help us in relation to the last question.  My understanding is that those who stayed here, the West Side boys, and some of those who went there put together a good number of old allegiance to Johnny Paul Koroma.  

Carew:    Your are correct Sir

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    because if you don’t do that then we would lose the trend, and tract of what Is happening. The old allegiance to Johnny Paul Koroma.

Carew:    You are correct Sir.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much Sir. Now let me come to your experience before I come to this January 6 invasion, did I hear you say that with your experience as a colonel, when the ECOMOG people came you were put under a junior officer?

Carew:    Yes Sir.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    You had intelligence information about the pending invasion two weeks before the time. Are you saying that no mechanism was put in place to follow up on that information received?

Carew:    Well to be very frank chairman the whole operational issue was left in the hands of the ECOMOG.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Yes, you have answered my questioned.  CDS do you have anything just in summary because you are well guarded and am also going to be well guarded in asking my question.  Do you have any inclination of there been some sort of conflict between the commanders of ECOMOG and the then CDS of the country who was not a Sierra Leonean.  In other words, did you have any inclination of the conflict between Shellpidi and others and General Khobe who was then CDS?

Carew:    That was what I put in the nutshell that there was some problems.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    In other words it is the general assumption that this general over commanding ECOMOG consider the CDS his junior; so why should he come to command me a more senior officer. Would be right to say that but for the conflict between these officers it might have been practically impossible for RUF to invade the city.

Carew:    Mr. Commissioner that was why I said I had wanted it to be in a closed hearing. It would be out of place to say things along those lines in an public. But if I could give my own view I would say maybe if there was cooperation from all commands maybe we would have had strong plans to forestall the invasion.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    The final question is the one that all Sierra Leoneans should answer. But you are sitting here, so you are going to answer on behalf of all Sierra Leoneans.  Sierra Leone was considered the darkest city in the world.  Did I hear you say that one of the reasons why the rebels easily invaded the city was because of the darkness in which we lived in the city?

Carew:    Well you are correct because during the junta days there was complete confusion in the country, no good administration, no good light, all those things people were  expecting.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    There are a good number of questions I will keep for tomorrow because they probably belong to tomorrow; we don’t want to bring them up now. But the January 6 invasion as you said left an indelible mark on the minds of people in this country and constituted another dark chapter in the history of our country.  So when we are dealing with it everybody is listening keenly to see what went wrong and whether things changed for better or worse at  Benguma when SAJ Musa could no longer arrive in the city, that is now history.  We would only hope that all of us, in our respected positions,. will learn from history.  I would now ask the leaders of evidence if he has any question or any input at this point.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    Thank you Chairperson my first question is about Brigadier General Khobe. I was told that before he became  Chief of Defense Staff he was the one actually in charge of the ECOMOG troops.  Is that correct?

Carew:    Yes

LEO:    Who took the decision to replace him by a Nigerian personnel and why was this decision taken.

Carew:    Well I think a request was made along the line that since this man had done so well and there was no trusted Sierra Leonean at that time that we must have somebody like him whom the people of Sierra Leone had trust in to the armed forces of this country until such time when we have settled down and a Sierra Leonean appointed to that position.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    Was it a decision taken by ECOMOG or the Sierra Leonean government?

Carew:    I cannot actually pin point now who took te decision.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    Do you think that the decision to remove General Khobe from the ECOMOG forces contributed to what you described as petty jealousy for supremacy or was it also because there was a different treatment of ECOMOG COMPARED TO THE SLA soldiers. I mean there were more benefits for ECOMOG

Carew:    I want to believe that any true Sierra Leonean would question the appointment of General Khobe to lead the army at that time because at that time he represented hopes for peace in the country.

Leader of Evidence:    Is it correct that the number of ECOMOG troops had been reduced just before the invasion or sometime before the invasion?

Carew:    Yes it is true that they had started cutting down the numbers because of logistics. But actually we were having very good number of them.  Even at that time.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    So how many ECOMOG troops were in Freetown at that time and how many SLA were left in Freetown just before the invasion.

Carew:    Actually I cannot give the figures now because in military operations it is only the commander that will know the exact number of troops that are under his command.  At that time I was attached maybe because of my loyalty to Brigadier Gove to take care of logistics but even at that I had little to do because the Nigerians were actually running defense affairs.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    So can you find this information for the commission can you communicate this with us?

Carew:    I cannot promise the Commission because most of these documents were with the Nigerians and they took it with them when they left. And I have nobody I can ask. if I should have such information it is only people like me because I was with General Khobe.  But when he died, they took all the documents from the office. It was not until after 2 months or so before they called me and they said I should be acting as CDF.
 
LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    Can you find the information on the SLA

Carew:    That one I can do because we were very few, not more than a company, that is roughly about one hundred and twenty. We were not more than a company really; those that surrendered to the government.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    Can you tell us about the relationship and the collaboration between SLA and CDF just before the invasion and during the invasion?

Carew:    All I know is that when I came back from Guinea, ECOMOG had driven out this junta element.  As I said the loyal troops were very few and I know that we had some government forces which included the CDF.  They were assisting, yes.  But they were not taking part in any operation, to my knowledge, here in Freetown. Most of them were up in the provinces because ECOMOG was solely responsible for the security of this city.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    My last question is about the West Side boys; how come you had to wait for the abduction of some British Soldiers and for the British to come and Free them in order to chase the West side boys or take over their base?  Why didn’t the ECOMOG or later the UNAMSIL and the SLA do that?

Carew:    At that particular point in time the British were here to train us. They were training the Sierra Leone Armed Forces because the government decided that we want an army of reconciliation whereby we would bring all this factions that were fighting together in a national army.  So when the British came they advised, in fact they brought this idea; so they started training the army and during that time they were on patrol in that particular area okra Hill base.  They were surrounded by these guys and abducted. They tried to negotiate with them for about a week or two, but they refused.
 
LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    But why were the West Side Boys particularly strong, or had they heavy arms made them so invincible?

Carew:    For me I know the British would have flushed them out but they would have had many casualties.  So they did not want that and wanted to use diplomacy doing it But that was not a language they could understand; so the British used force. We were at BTC; no time was given for the striking hour. It was only given to people like myself and other important people.  It was early that morning at four that we actually showed them that they were no force to reckon with any national troop or any government.

LEADER OF EVIDENCE:    Thank you very much

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Now CDS you now have a chance to ask questions or to make recommendations.

Carew:    But actually with regards to such a topic I don’t think I have questions.  I would just try to maybe put down on paper some of the lessons learned.  I will send them to you.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much CDS. We again want to reiterate that you are one of the great personalities in this society that we will depend on to accomplish our mandate to deal with the question of what went wrong, why we had this ten year senseless war? It would require all of us who had been helping, working in this country to come up with their own ideas so that we will put all of these together and educate ourselves.  We want to thank you for coming ad we see on our schedule your appearance again. We feel that unless we have this dramatic hearing we will not be able to arrive at definitive decisions on what happened on specific events that took place in this country.  Thank you again for the time you took in explaining and clarifying some points.  So we hope we will meet again here in due course to continue the same process. We now ask you to stand down.  Our thanks and appreciation.

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Commissioner Torto:    May we have your names please in full?

Carew:        General Tom Sebana Carew.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you.  You were with us yesterday. You now know the procedure.  You will be making a presentation and we would ask you questions, followed by the leader of evidence and if you have questions and recommendations at the end, you will have opportunity to offer them to us.  So may we now hear from you?

Carew:    Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, invited guests, ladies and gentlemen.  Today again, I stand before you to respond to the task, assigned to me with reference to the taking of the United Nations Peace keepers hostage in Sierra Leone, in 2000.  Actually I was deployed in Freetown when the hostages were taken.  Many stories have been told to inform the pensive world, what I intend to talk about is how we got to the hostage taking stage.  How the hostage taking impacted on us nationally and internationally.  

I will also attempt to describe the peculiarity of the war years, and how these peculiarity of the war years played out in West Africa and beyond.  Then I will conclude by recommending some reforms and practices aimed at protecting UN peacekeepers in the management of cease fire during civil wars  Now let me just say few things prior to the conflict, and during the conflict itself.

Before the war broke out in 1991, I was deployed as adjutant of Lungi Garrison at Lungi.  At the outset of the war, I got posted to Mano River Bridge.  I was later posted to Potoru in the Pujehun District, and then I was subsequently posted to Koribondo as battalion commander in 1993.  I became third brigade Commander in the Southern Province in 1994; that was just after I returned from Ghana, after doing my Senior Staff College Course.  By then the brigade was headquartered in Bo, and my rank was colonel.  The rebel was a strange animal to many soldiers and to the RSLAF at large.  However in a very short space of time, my troop became used to the situation and stood firm to face the enemy which was by then the Revolutionary United Front.  Then the rebels started wearing the uniforms of fallen regular soldiers and we became labeled as SOBELS; just as what one of the Commissioners was saying.  Also that time, the National Provincial Ruling Council known as NPRC and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) became united.  And in fact got on to what we call a marriage.  The AFRC interregnum again blemished the Army because of the lack of that mark of destination and identity between the RUF and a portion of RSLAF that went into marriage with these people.  In future like I have always done, I will implore our soldiers, sailors, aircraft men, to do their constitutional duties and only perform all other task when our civilian masters pass instructions within the provision of the 1991 constitution of Sierra Leone.  

Now let me come on to the topic itself.

THE ARREST OF ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED UN PEACEKEEPERS

    Three were issues were important here:
 
– The change over problems between the UN forces and ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone.

– Another one is the logistic principles of impartiality on the
Side of the UN and Civil/Military relationship problems in Sierra Leone at that particular time.  At the time the UN decided to deploy its forces in Makeni, which is one hundred and forty (140) kilometers away from their Freetown headquarters, the force size was small, the mandate was not combative, and there was no established relationship between the UN forces and the splinted regular RSLAF forces.

– And also because of lack of trust. As it were, the International Community mistook the AFRC/RUF alliance for the entire RSLAF forces.  Now for example, before the Kenyans headed for Makeni, a team visited the Armed Forces training centre to inform the RSLAF trainers and Security personnel who had joined the Nigerians to liberate Freetown after the RUF invasion on the 6th January 1999.  The SLA did advise on the that the AFRC and also that a monitored RUF radio signal suggested the arrest of some peacekeepers in an effort to improve on their stake in the peace process.  Sierra Leoneans felt this in their flesh; I am sure even UN personnel felt the same  way.  However, that situation forced the UN to improve on their mandate. Actually, my disappointment was that the hostages were only released to the President of Liberia – Mr. Charles Taylor, who handed the former hostages to the UN authority in Freetown.  And I must say that we thank God our colleagues resurfaced although some died, at the initial stage of the hostage taking, that is what it takes to manage uncertainty.  Nevertheless. I personally learnt the following lessons and I wish to share them with the TRC; and these are:

– UN peacekeepers must enter into the partnership with the local forces in order to gain any entry point into secure and credible peace operation.  And the second lesson is that peacekeepers should be trained and organized to transform into a peace reinforcement role, by developing a force protection party. But such a force should be enhanced by the International Community, especially in areas such as peace support operations.  And to summarize, I want to say that I saw the beginning and the end of the civil war.  So I believe in Restructuring with the aim of inducing the military to work within the ambit of the laws – national and international.  As for the hostage taking of the peacekeepers – a hundred and fifty kilometer (150km) -away from the UN headquarters. There was lack of fit between the ECOMOG exit strategy in 1999 and the UN’s take over tactics in 2000.  Mr. Chairman, this is not going to be a very long topic.  I will leave the rest for questioning.

Commissioner. Torto:    Thank you, Commissioner Kamara.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes, thank you very much Chief of Defence Staff, T.S. Carew.  We are happy to receive you again today, for the second time in two days.  This hostage taking of the peacekeepers.  I don’t know, maybe I misunderstood you so I want you to confirm my own understanding of your presentation.  Are you saying that the reason for it was only to enhance or increase the negotiating power of the AFRC/RUF?

Carew:    Yes Mr. Commissioner, I want to say that this is my own view, that it must have been one of the reasons why they took them hostage.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Alright.  Then I refer you to – because I want clarification on a statement you made –  paragraph six (6) of page two (2) where  it’s stated and I quote “before the Kenyans headed for Makeni, a team visited the Armed Forces training centre to inform the RSLAF trainers and security personnel who had joined Nigerians to liberate Freetown..” What was it? What was the objective and outcome?

Carew:     Mr. Commissioner you see, when moving troops the very first thing as a military commander, you must do is actually to get enough information on the routes you are taking. So what I/m saying is that peacekeepers should work hand in glove with the local forces.  So when these people were about to go, from my latest information at that time, was that they went to AFTC and they were informed that they have monitored some messages that they want to kidnap some of these people.  Well I want to believe because of lack of trust, and  I will not blame them really, but because of trust and maybe just as you were saying, people do not trust most of our soldiers at that time, some of them could manufacture information and just pass them across and to say ‘ah we received this from the  rebels’.  So maybe that was the reason, so they never gave heed to it.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    And therefore one can conclude that the blame for what happened rests squarely with the peacekeepers.

Carew:    Not at all.  I will say that Sir.  What I’m saying is that, they should not be blamed; because maybe these were just diversionary tactic by the rebels to pass on those messages to their counterparts; because some of these guys were part of those rebels – mind you.  So maybe, this was just a notice for example, when I came back from Guinea, when we went to actually recapture Kono, we went there with so many vehicles so many tanks.  What they did was that they sent a false message to our location, telling us that they need those vehicles back.  By then we have spent about two weeks.  We have no food; we were just depending on raw mangoes and all those things.  So there was nobody to come back.  Then I decided ‘Ok today, I’ll go back with these vehicles to Freetown.  On our way we fell in a terrible ambush, half a mile ambush. That was where I got this scar.  So this was the diversionary tactics that the rebels were using.  So we cannot blame them at all.

Commissioner Professor Kamara:    Yes but Carew General is it no true, ast most people say, that all is not fair in battle?  These people, of course, have a right also to deceive the enemy.  So if they send false messages and you fall in the trap that they set for you, well, that is to their own benefit; but what you have told us in this case was that, the peacekeepers were warned by the Sierra Leone army that we have got this message, whether true or false it meant that the peacekeepers should have taken some measures to make sure that if the message were true, they would also deal with it; but I don’t think they did; And because they did not, it shows that they took responsibility for their action at that  time.

Carew:    Mr. Commissioner, you know, at a time when situations are stable, we can say we blame them; but at that particular point in time, you have so many diversionary tactics used by rebels.  So it was very difficult for you to say those people were at fault.  So let us leave it at that.

Commissioner Justice Marcus-Jones:    Thank you for coming again and thank you for waiting so patiently for us call you up to podium.  Now, what was the proportion – in what proportion was the RSLAF splintered?

Carew:    Actually, I cannot be exact now; but just like I was saying yesterday as at the time of the AFRC days, we have about roughly eighty percentage (80%) on the other side.  That is on the AFRC/RUF side.

Comm. Jones:    Eighty percent on that side?

Carew:    Initially I cannot tell the percentage; but up to the time of the AFRC, when the AFRC took over, it was about 80%.  Very few people – loyal soldiers that went to surrender to ECOMOG.

Com. Jones:    So you will agree that the proportion which stayed regular was not high enough for the UN to have established any relationship with?

Carew:    That was why I was saying that we should not blame the UN.  Just like you were exactly saying, the percentage was too large.  So the people did not trust us anymore.

Comm. Jones:    Could you explain to us in what particular areas you disappointment lay that the hostages were released to the President of Liberia?

Carew:    Actually from the information we have received, Charles Taylor was actually the man who was supporting the RUF.  So I particularly was having something against him.  So for these people to be handed over to him, just confirm what I had against him, that he was the main man supporting these people against this country.

Commissioner Marcus-Jones:    Thank you.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    CDS, we welcome you again for being so patient.  The other day I asked many questions for clarification today. Did the arrest and killing of some of the UN peacekeepers take place before the Lome Peace Agreement or after the Lome Peace Agreement?

Carew:    Actually the arrest took place after the Lome Peace Accord.

Chairman:    Alright, the Lome Peace Agreement Article 9 stipulates that those who were involved – the warring factions were granted amnesty and pardon – up to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement, that’s on 7th July, 1999.  Thereafter it follows that any crime committed after that was not within the purview of that amnesty, is that the case?

Carew:    Mr. Chairman, I want to believe that we should go by what the law says.  Luckily I was part of the delegation that went to sign that peace accord.  We were there for over two months; these people were giving us a lot of problem.  There will come a day, they will go to court, Foday Sankoh will say ok I have said these things, today I don’t say it anymore.  It was only people like the Honourable Vice President who was so patient; because had it been for us, we would have just left the place.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    OK before I ask my third question.  The sub-question that follows immediately therefore CDS, is that, would you agree with me that it was within the context of the Lome Peace Agreement that UN sent the Peacekeeping force to Sierra Leone and that they had every right to go to every area of this country as a result.

Carew:    Mr. Commissioner., I want to agree with you (100%) hundred percent.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    My final question now CDS is this: What impact, negative or positive did the arrest and killing of some of the United Nations by our own people in this country have on the International Community and particularly, those, whose lives were lost in the pursuit of ensuring peaceful Sierra Leone?

Carew:    Mr.; Commissioner Bishop Humper I want to say, this was a very shameful act.  Any true  Sierra Leonean should be ashamed of the way these people acted.  This shows you the amount of lawlessness that was going on during those days.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you sir.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    Thank you General T.S. Carew.  In paragraph two (2) of your submission, you said that you intended to talk about how we got to the hostage taking stage.  And how the hostage taking impacted on national and international political scenes.  In paragraph five (5) you said that the arrest of about five hundred peacekeepers was related to three issues in your view.  The problems of the relieving of ECOMOG with UN forces, and then you talked about the second probably being the legalistic principle of impartiality, and thirdly civil/military relation problem in Sierra Leone at that time.  What if you could explain exactly what you mean by those three points?

Carew:    O.K. let me start with the problem of changing over.  You know at that time when ECOMOG was been replaced, there was a lot of confusion on the ground.  The UN people coming in, do not know the ground, so there was complete chaos in the general area.  So I want to believe that this is one of the reasons why these people were able to capture those people.  Otherwise, they would not have been able.  Then coming on to the second point – the logistic principle of impartiality.  I think the UN troops thought that they were going to a friendly place.  So they never went in that combatant role, with more logistics taking up tanks. So in case of any problem, they change the combative posture or or chapter seven (7) so to say.  They were not given that mandate so they went out there ill-prepared for any scuffle with these people.  Otherwise, if those people were properly armed, went in their combat role, well ready for battle the rebels would dare not attack them. Coming down to the last one, civil military relationship problem, I want to believe that was the first time the UN troop was on ground.  So they would not have had friends on the ground – like talking to civilians, who will actually direct them to say ‘don’t go that way and so on and so forth.  So they went there, they did not know anything about the ground and it was easy for the rebel to encircle and capture them. But I know if they had had that civil relationship properly in place, people would have advised them that – don’t go to let’s say Town X on the right side of the town, this is an area that is being occupied by rebels and so on and so forth.  And of course, added to all these as I said earlier, they were not thinking that they were going for any combat role.  The size of the force itself was very small.  Talking of the five hundred (500) it was less than a battalion and those people were more than a brigade in that particular region.  So I think these would create some disturbances for these people, and according to our ratio, we do fight one to three (1:3).  So let us say if we have about a brigade in that place, we should at least carry a division there because we have two brigades in one division.  So that is how we do carry out our operational planning.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:     So could one conclude from your testimony that in your sort of expert opinion the capture could probably be attributed to a combination of not doing the proper sort of intelligence survey, and not being prepared and also combination of distrust and in the lack of trust in the information supplied by the army?.

Carew:    Well maybe that might be possible but I don’t want to agree with the first one; because, UNAMSIL have facilities for better information gathering.  So I don’t want to believe in the first one, but maybe the second one, because of the diversionary tactics which the rebels used.  They will not believe our men there, so that just feel that these people were telling lies and that they can go in that small number, because they were not expecting that they were going to face any fight.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    But we know from your testimony, you talked about the fact that the group was too small and in a sense you seemed to suggest that they were unprepared for what was going to happen.  That is why I’m asking if in your opinion, you think they were not properly prepared and perhaps were not being briefed about what they would encounter?

Carew:    Well actually, I want to believe that these people felt that they were not going to meet any resistance; because they were here to help us keep the peace.  So they were not expecting anything like that.  That to their surprise, those people, of course, you know them, they are not disciplined, they don’t regard any law; they can sign papers today and say ‘ah we don’t agree with this agreement’ so they can do anything.  It was just too unfortunate for them.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    Just two last questions,   In point eleven (11) you talked about the fact that the hostage taking took place a hundred and forty kilometers(140) away from UN headquarters.  Then you also said that there was a lack of fit  between ECOMOG exit strategy and the UN’s take over so, could you sort of explain that?

Carew:    Well, you know, Makeni which is a town in the Northern Province is about a hundred and forty (140) kilometers away from Freetown.  So I am just talking of the town itself. I’m just giving you the distance from Freetown to Makeni, just to let you picture the distance from the headquarter by then.  UNAMSIL’s headquarters which is in Freetown; and the way they captured those people,  just for you to see the distance between the two towns.

Sooka:    Yes but my second question really is about what you mean when you said that there was a a lack of fit between the exit strategy and the UN’s take over.  That is in the last paragraph of your statement.

Carew:    No, I’m not talking of ECOMOG, its not there.

Sooka:    It’s the last sentence actually in you’re ……..?

Carew:    The last sentence, But there is nothing like that here. It’s eleven, you said paragraph eleven?

Sooka:    Yes paragraph eleven you said there was, as for the hostage taking of the peacekeepers a hundred and forty kilometers away from UN headquarters and there was a lack of fit between the ECOMOG exit strategy in 1999 of the UN’s take over tactics in 2000; and I am asking you to clarify what you mean by that.

Carew:    This is what I am saying.  I am just trying to actually give you the distances between Freetown and Makeni and also the tactics of these rebels as compared to that of ECOMOG who were just getting out of the scene, it’s some sort of summary.  ECOMOG was planning live the theatre and these other people were trying to take over from them. It was during that period that this confusion took place, and maybe the sooner they left, they know for sure that these people have no knowledge about the locality.  So they used that opportunity to go and capture these people.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    This was even in your recommendations and you said I personally learnt the following lessons.  The UN did not do things properly and you said that UN peacekeepers  should win the confidence of  the local forces  in order to gain any entry point into the secured, credible peace operations.   Now, perhaps, I think what we are all trying to get at is, you seem to be fairly critical about the way in which they managed this particular operations.

Carew:    You know, this is just like what I was saying yesterday, that in the Military you always try to study some lessons from any failure of a command.  So to me, there were some problems with this operation. And as a result what lessons can we learn to make sure that other peacekeepers are not just taken hostage like that.  So this is one of the suggestions I am making.  That when we have new troops they should actually try to get more information about the terrain, they should try to get more information from those people who were occupying the ground; and then must try to get the best information as possible, so that when they get there they will not find any difficulty.   This is just my personal view.

Commissiner Mrs Sooka:    So it seems you go back to the question really of forces being prepared in a sense?

Carew:    You see, when dealing with rebels like those in Sierra Leone, these people who really do not have any aim, it is actually good.  My advice to any peacekeeping troop is to be well prepared because they can do anything.

Commissioner Mrs Sooka:    Thank you.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you very much Brigadier Carew.  I am sorry to reduce your rank, but I am not so much aware of your rankings even though I am seeing buttons and – so you have to forgive me.  I just have very minor areas that I want you to clear with me, based on your written submission.  You are saying that, according to the very first paragraph, last sentence, ‘the rebels for fear of long term identity, wore the uniforms of our fallen regular soldiers, and we became sobels”.  Was it only on that day that you became sobels?  Were you?  Secondly as a part of this question – are you aware that there were connivances among your officers, between the rebels and some officers of the Armed Forces?

Leader of Evidence:    Commissioner, the Chief of Defence Staff will be scheduled for a close Session on the 22nd because we think it is important that a number of issue be interrogated with the CDs, so perhaps for today we may end the questioning

Commissioner Torto:    OK.  So I can hold on to that, thank you.  For now we take this for the reason.  The last part is stated and has something to do with the function or the office of the General of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces if you look at it in paragraph ten (10) ‘To summarize I saw the beginning and the end of the civil war.’  The restructure with the aim of inducting the military to work within the ambit of the laws, national  and international. Now, who should do this restructuring since it is coming from you?  It is an appeal you are making to us since you are now the CDS, who should now do this restructuring.

Carew:    This is just a general introductory paragraph I am giving.  What I am saying is that the restructuring is going to be done by a team.  That is the IMATT team, and some of us Sierra Leoneans.  So it is just something that I am putting in passing.  That we should consider when doing this restructuring, so that we can think of all these things.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you.  Leader of evidence you have questions for the General.

Leader of Evidence:    Honourable Commissioner, I have no questions for the CDS on the kidnap of UN peacekeepers, but I have two requests to make of the Chief of Defence Staff.  The first is to assist the Commission in terms of the testimony that come through about the objective conditions within the country that led to the onset of the civil war, the commission will be very interested to receive further submissions from you Sir, on the ‘ndobousu’ rebellion.  What was the role of the military in that rebellion, who were the actors, what was the nature of the disturbance?  I think that will be a critical contribution that the Commission would be expecting from military in writing.

Carew:    I will delegate my staff to do it; because, as I am now talking here, I was not the Commander at that time, and I was a very low officer – I mean lower in rank at that time.

Leader of Evidence:    It is not about your person Sir, it is about the Military as an institution and so there certainly must be records.

Carew:    During ‘Ndobowusu’ time?

Leader of Evidence:     1982 certainly.  There must be records of the roles that Army has played over the years, who were the Commanding Officers; their experiences and what they have done in different places.  So certainly, your officer will need to look  into your records.

Carew:    No actually, if you talk of records, to be very frank, when the people came in they destroyed everything.  I will only try to do it because I want to assist the Commission.  Maybe I will contact people like General Gortor to help us with some of these things because he was the Commander of that Operation.

Leader of Evidence:    That would be wonderful.  In which case Sir, could you ask him, tell him that we want to see him.  It might be more helpful for us to interview him than for him to put something in writing.  So I will discuss with you after the session so that I can – we can write a formal letter requesting for him specifically.

Carew:    OK.

Leader of Evidence:    Second one Sir, is in respect to the hearings two days ago, which dealt with the 1998 trials and executions.  Even though you were not invited as a witness, because we were not having you very much on our list but the Commission would be very much interested in receiving further documentation from you Sir.  You were President if the Court Martial Board.  So I would like to have a transcript of the proceedings of the Court Martial, as well as the interrogations of the officers by the army.

Carew:    Let me clarify that point again.  You have already sent to me, and I have already replied to your letter and I have spoken to your team.  It is very difficult to get those records now, because let us say for example, after the proceedings, what you do is, you go and handover everything to the CDS and by then he was General Khobe.  He in turn will have to take it to a higher level.  So during the intervention, these guys, when they were coming, nobody dared to keep these records, people just threw them away.  Maybe it is only people like SLBS and these other people that would be having these things; because they were attending these trials on a daily basis. But to say you get it from our own archives now, it is not possible.

Leader of Evidence:    Well thank you very much, the Commission will explore all possible means to go to SLBS, the office of the Vice President and the Attorney General to see whether we can have access to those records.  They are very important documents for the work of the Commission.  Thank you very much CDS.  That is all Commissioners.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank your Carew General you have questions for us, for the Commission?

Carew:    I do not know how you people intend to interview some of my officers, because everyday, I have been receiving letters but some of them are out of the country.  So I do not know what arrangements you will make for them

Commissioner Torto:    You mean serving officers, or members who were with the military?

Carew:    No, serving officers.

Leader of Evidence:    Mr. Commissioner we have sent to the CDS a number of letters, apart from Colonel Mondeh, who is in Nigeria, my understanding is that all the other officers would be invited, serving within the country and one of them has actually come forward.

Carew:    Well what he is out of the country, he is attending a course.

Leader of Evidence:    Really when will the course end Sir?

Carew:    He has about a year more.

Leader of Evidence:    I think he is a very important witness; he is actually on the list of invitees from the army and the expectation of the Commission is that, since the military has a duty to cooperate with the Commission, then it would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence Sir, to produce those officers, particularly the gentleman you just mentioned.  He is a very critical witness for the Commission.

Carew:    Like you sent another signal for Bangura?

Leader of Evidence:    That is right Sir,

Carew:    Bangura is also on a course outside of the country.  So this is my concern now.  Whether maybe you will just wait for them; but again you have some time limitation.

Commissioner Torto:    How long are they taking in the course?

Carew:    Let us say towards the end of the year.  Most of them would have come.   

Leader of Evidence:    Colonel K. Squire is on a course for one year and ……….

Carew:    ….. But he is doing his war college.  He is completing in July, then he will be doing another year, to complete his Masters.

Leader of Evidence:    Honourable Commissioners, I think it is something that the Commission needs to take up at the level of the Ministry of Defence and if need be the Presidency.  These are very critical witnesses.

Commissioner Torto:    I see one of them has made a written submission in the person of Komba Mondeh, has Kess Mboya made any?

Ozonnia:    No he has not and he is a very critical witness for the Commission.  In the context of Mondeh, we did not request his further appearance because, first is that the Head of State during that era- Captain Valentine Strasser, we want to bring him, and so if Valentine Strasser can testify before the Commission, then the Leaders of Evidence would not intend to present Colonel Mondeh as a witness, but for K. Squire and Bangura, these are very significant witnesses,  that the Leaders of Evidence think the Commissioners need to interview either in closed session or possible open sessions as well.

Commissioner Torto:    OK.  Since this is the case we will take the matter up as you have said through the Ministry of Defence. With regards the submission of a written testimony to us, we want to ask you to remind Kess Mboya to send us his submission.  Already one of his colleagues sent in his submission from Nigeria – the person is Komba Mondeh.  We think Kess Mboya can do the same thing.  He has to actually send in a written submission.  The other efforts to get him bodily, before the Commission would be pursued by the Commission.

Carew:    Yes Mr. Commissioner, in my own little way, since I have actually promised to go all out to make sure that this Commission succeeds, I will try to contact him, and my M.A. will phone him after here.  Then I will request that he spends just about few days.  The only thing maybe we will have to get the tickets for him to come and explain and then go back.

Commissioner Torto:    Yes.  Just a few days and then he can take off a few days and then return

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much CDS the Commission’s intention is to help you Sir to build a very professional Army. So some of those who have some way, answers to provide to the work of the Commission, are so critical and I am sure that you will be very happy with the report of the Commission in respect of their experience and the roles that they have played.  So we would appreciate if you can facilitate their return

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you.  We see you have some suggestions or recommendations in your paper, are those all you have, or do you have any to add?

Carew:    For the peace keepers.

Torto:    On the papers you have presented even this last one – those I believe they are your recommendations, right?

Carew:    Yes, I will try to make some addition.

Commissioner Torto:    Please do that in writing and let us have them.

Carew:    The only thing – ok.  I will talk to you in camera.

Commissioner Torto:    Thank you. iIf you do not have anything more to add, we thank you very much for coming and appreciate your time with us.  You may step down now.

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International Human Rights Law Group
MAKING RIGHTS REAL FOR 25 YEARS

SUBMISSION AND PUBLIC TESTIMONY AT THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION BY THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP.
Freetown, YWCA New Hall Brookfields, 28 July 2003.

Theme: ‘The Judiciary, the Legal Profession and the Rule of law”.

l. Introduction and Overview of the situation.
The recent years of conflict have exacerbated the deplorable state of the justice sector in Sierra Leone, which was (and is still) in a very poor state of affairs. Through the Sierra Leone history, there has been a gradual decline in the independence and impartiality of the justice sector as well as in the quality of resources.

Inside and outside the country, some think that abuses in the justice system, impunity and the state’s failure to protect citizen’s rights were among the causes of the war.

Sierra Leone is one of the most impoverished countries in the world, and the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans lack awareness of both the substance of their constitutional and human rights, and the available means by which they can seek redress if such rights are violated.

Moreover, most Sierra Leoneans lack the means to surmount the formal legal systems’ daunting barriers to justice. Legal services are expensive, and almost all legal professionals are situated in Freetown. Access to justice is characterized by expense, delays, geographical remoteness and cultural distance. The system is not equipped, either in terms of physical infrastructure, or personnel to meet the needs of the poor and marginalized, and in particular women and youth.

While not formally part of the judiciary, both private legal practitioners and state counsel play a daily role in its functions. The Law Officers Department has responsibility for prosecuting and defending on behalf of the state, but its ability to perform this function is extremely constrained. The full complement of legal officers was 38 in the national office in Freetown alone, but at the time of research there were only 10 officers in Freetown and one, serving simultaneously as a customary law officer and state counsel, in the provinces. The deficiency was primarily due to poor remuneration, which made it impossible to attract even new graduates to government service. Although the Law Officers Department is empowered to prosecute cases on behalf of the state at any court level (save the local courts), in practice it had to hire private practitioners on contract for serious cases in the superior courts. It relied largely on the police to prosecute criminal cases at the magistrates’ courts level.

Private practitioners, whose situation is not consistently as dire as that of their counterparts in government service or on the Bench, have also suffered from Sierra Leone’s general economic collapse. Barristers lost their best source of income when almost all formal, large-scale commercial activity dried up by the latter half of the 1990s. Legal practice in Sierra Leone is to a large extent the domain of sole practitioners. Less than 10 per cent of barristers work in a firm. The result of a legal profession increasingly starved of revenue has been a sharp drop in pro bono legal assistance that barristers were once able to give in addition to their paid work.
The Sierra Leone Bar Association (SLBA) is nevertheless an active body with a fully constituted executive, a human rights committee and an impressive record of service to the legal community. It has campaigned on a number of legal issues, some of which advocate for basic civil rights within the justice system rather than for the narrowly defined “interests” of private practitioners as a group of professionals. The SLBA has, for example, protested the use of police prosecutors in place of independent professional state prosecutors in the magistrates’ courts, even though it might be more advantageous for defense barristers to face prosecutors with less specialist legal training than themselves.

The erosion of the machinery of justice is just one of the factors contributing to an altogether more fundamental problem: the general cultural erosion of the notion of criminal accountability and the rule of law. Sierra Leoneans’ expectations of justice have been woefully low due to their accrued experience of failed court systems, powerful local militias and a weak police force. There are few parts of Sierra Leone where official courts, supported by policing and facilities for detention, have existed over the past ten years. Even before the civil war, under-capacity, corruption and arbitrariness had hobbled the authority of the courts. However, with the onset of chronic insecurity in 1991, a host of improvised justice systems emerged to compete with or replace the state’s judiciary, just as vigilantism in the form of civil defense militias (CDF) filled the vacuum created by the retreating official Sierra Leone Army (SLA).  As a result, the authority of the courts has been seriously eroded.

Outside Freetown and the provincial capitals of Bo and Kenema, the police Criminal Investigation Department freely admitted that at that time the local cells of the CDF supplied the sole guarantee of order and possibility for redress in criminal and civil matters. These local bodies were loosely organized but well armed and drew from a largely illiterate rural population. They dispensed an unpredictable brand of summary justice in what the police and members of the Bench refer to as `bush courts’. They were completely beyond the reach of official structures, and therefore of any means of appeal or standards of fair trial and predictable punishment. The CDF militias in some cases did and in some case did not co-operate with traditional authorities – Paramount Chiefs and Councils of Elders – and the local customary law courts, but it is widely reported that both Chiefs and local court Chairmen were powerless to challenge the power of militias. The savage violence meted out by the rebels to civilians is well documented, and has nothing to do with justice, regardless of the claims made by the RUF to this effect. There may be a form of traditional justice administered at the village level by the local courts, but these authorities have been powerless to resist or punish the abuses of the RUF over the past decade.

2. Modest contribution of the International Human Rights Law Group.
The International Human Rights Law Group has a longstanding interest in promoting and protecting human rights in Sierra Leone.  In June 1999, when Law Group Executive Director Gay McDougall visited Sierra Leone with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the National Forum for Human Rights, an umbrella organization composed of nearly thirty human rights organizations, requested that the Law Group establish a program of support for human rights NGOs in Sierra Leone. During the next year, the Law Group remained involved in Sierra Leone through serving as an expert consultant to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, while maintaining close relationships with Sierra Leonean activists and human rights groups.

In 2001, the International Human Rights Law Group opened its office in Freetown to respond consistently to the needs of the local NGOs. Examples of our work to date include:

• Building the confidence and capacity of the local human rights community, allowing them to participate more effectively in deliberations over the political, security and human rights situation in the country. For example, the Law Group’s support provided local NGOs with the capacity to participate constructively in national discussions concerning the relationship between the TRC and Special Court in December 2001.
• Helping set the agenda for prioritizing reforms of the justice sector in Sierra Leone by organizing an important rule of law consultative conference in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Bar Association. The proceedings from the conference form the foundation of involvement by the World Bank and the British Department for International Development in this sector.
• The Law Group provided technical support to the National Forum for Human Rights (NFHR), and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), in the production of the organization’s first annual human rights report. This was the first comprehensive human rights report prepared by a Sierra Leonean organization in the post-conflict period. Through activities such as this, the Law Group has helped place the NFHR at the forefront of the human rights struggle as the most vibrant human rights coalition in Sierra Leone.
• Facilitating the participation of four local activists in the 57th and 58th Sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The participants joined an annual Law Group training program on human rights reporting and advocacy at the UN Commission, which is the preeminent UN human rights forum. By bringing this knowledge and experience back to Sierra Leone, these activists have strengthened the capacity of the local human rights community to include UN human rights language in their engagements with government, thereby improving their skills and general confidence in presenting human rights arguments to Sierra Leonean government officials.
• The Law Group was instrumental in the formation of the Women’s Task Force in Sierra Leone.  The Women’s Task Force consults regularly with the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to create an enabling environment that will encourage the participation of women at all levels in these two transitional justice mechanisms in Sierra Leone. The Women’s Task Force also pushed for the creation of a special unit to investigate gender-specific war crimes during the country’s decade long civil war.
• Driving and facilitating the formation of the NGO Steering Committee on the TRC that coordinated and organized the sensitization efforts on the TRC to ensure quality, synergy and maximum coverage of the country with funding from the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights in Geneva.
• The Law Group, in collaboration with the NFHR, established the initial infrastructure for a Human Rights Resource Center at the Law Group’s offices in Freetown. The Resource Center is currently equipped with a television, videocassette recorder and two computers with Internet access. With the addition of research materials, the Resource Center will become an invaluable asset to the human rights community in Freetown. The Resource Center also serves as a training center, where workshops are conducted and NGO activists meet on an informal basis. This has become an increasingly important space for NGO activities given the paucity of infrastructure within the NGO community in Sierra Leone.
• Advancing discussions around the concept of women’s equality in inheritance rights. The Law Group has initiated a training program for two lawyers who will provide advice and information on inheritance issues to returning refugees and internally displaced persons especially in Kono, Kailahun and Koinadugu.
• For these two years 2003-2004, the International Human Rights Law Group will focus on two key areas of mobilizing civil society on anti-corruption issues and access to justice.
• Mobilizing Civil Society on Anti-Corruption Issues: In mobilizing Sierra Leonean NGOs and grassroots communities, especially in Kono, Kailahun and Koinadugu, to effectively combat corruption at all levels, the Law Group will continue to provide formal training in advocacy, coalition building and grassroots mobilization, as well as informal mentoring support to build up strong networks of stakeholders to make the parliament and the government accountable. In particular the initial focus will be on various forms of advocacy, in conjunction with Freetown based networks, to force the government of Sierra Leone to take action on the cases presented for prosecution by the Anti-Corruption Commission that are yet to be prosecuted. In addition, the Law Group will introduce training on Grassroots Budget Tracking in the three geographical areas that will enable NGOs and CBOs to link budgetary figures for specific community development projects in their areas with actual disbursement of the funds to ensure accountability at both the national and local levels. Furthermore, working in conjunction with the Freetown NGOs and CBOs in Kono, Kailahun and Koinadugu, the Law Group will help civil society draft bills and mobilize their constituencies on anti-corruption legislation.
• Access to Justice: To reduce tension between returnees, refugees, “remainees” and demobilized soldiers, and to encourage mechanisms of alternative dispute settlement and mediation, the Law Group will launch a program of access to justice that trains and works with credible CBOs in the three geographical areas to provide Community Liaison Officers who can act as mediators and settle disputes. This program will also work with the Court Barrays in these areas.

Finally, the Law Group would like to reflect with its partners the best ways the Special Court, which is unique in the international criminal practice, could benefit the Sierra Leone judiciary before it completes its work. It would be very unfortunate to see the domestic justice system continue to function inefficiently after Sierra Leone has accommodated an international court for more than three years.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commissioners, the Law Group is pleased to make the following recommendations:

1. Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen, the Law Group learnt with dismay that there is an unbelievable inadequacy of personnel to deliver justice to the people of Sierra Leone, especially the indigent. One of the factors that might be responsible for this is the deplorable salaries and conditions of service. To salvage this ugly situation, we strongly urge the Government to:

• Consider improving the conditions of service and salaries that could be very instrumental in improving the delivery of justice because we believe that functionaries of the judiciary are hugely demoralized because of their low salaries. Although it may not be the solution to the perceived corruption, an increase, we believe must be part of any serious law reform effort. Thus far, we are informed that eighty-six (86) Justices of the Peace have begun work but these usually retired honourable citizens engaged in providing valuable support to their communities need enough legal education and training to be able to fulfill their difficult mission. To this end, UNDP and the Sierra Leone Bar Association and other NGOs could be encouraged to conduct regular workshops to continuously train JPs on the legal issues they are facing. Moreover, the daily sitting fee of Le 3,000 (plus Le 2,000) travel reimbursement is meager and needs to be revisited.
• Consider putting in place a grant system for law students in order to make it obligatory for them to serve the government before proceeding with private practice.
• However, for this to be achieved there has to be the political will on the part of government and an additional indication or willingness on the part of functionaries to accept change; and for members of the donor community, human rights and civil society groups to give them the required support.

2. THE DEATH PENALTY: Mr. Chairman distinguished Commissioners, the Law Group believes that it is becoming increasingly accepted international practice to abolish the death penalty. Sierra Leone should consider the option of outlawing the death penalty for all crimes and thus establish itself at the forefront of international human rights law. It is likely that there will be enough support in the Sierra Leone legal community to lobby on a concerted basis for the abolition of the death penalty. This would be consistent with other ongoing human rights and reconciliation efforts currently occurring in the country and would signal the country’s commitment to the value of life. Moreover, the imposition of the death penalty in a country with inadequate legal representation and widespread illiteracy is especially hazardous and unfair. Many impoverished defendants have no resources to appeal against their sentences.

Thus, from a standpoint of judicial fairness, it would be prudent to repeal the death penalty. A campaign for such could be orchestrated through the Sierra Leone Bar Association and domestic and international human rights groups. These groups could form a committee to study the death penalty and lobby parliament and the executive to consider making changes to the current law.

3. HUMAN RIGHTS: The Lome Peace Agreement makes provision for an independent National Human Rights Commission which has to date not been established. It is our hope that such an institution could be set up to monitor human rights developments in the country. Furthermore, we advocate the introduction of human rights in school curricula to make them knowledgeable and aware of human rights. This would obviously require the Bar Association, NGOs and related agencies conducting workshops and providing them with educational materials. Personnel of the courts as well as the lawyers deserve and need to be adequately trained in human rights and other updated international standards of undertaking their duties so that minimum standards are maintained.

4. CORRUPTION:
Internal Leadership and a Code of Conduct:
Corruption presents a monumental problem to fair and equal justice in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that will take care of this problem. As mentioned, one part of the alleviation of corruption lies in increased salaries for judicial personnel.

Nonetheless, more important than any financial disincentive will be principled leadership from within. Therefore, it is imperative that the judiciary be subjected to a binding code of conduct. The Chief Justice of the Sierra Leone Bar Association should draft a code of conduct that sets out clear principles. Thus, the fight against corruption must start from the top – as the saying goes it should be leadership by example.

Corruption Legislation: Parallel to a push for internal corruption measures, parliament must pass and implement much tougher anti-corruption laws. The current provisions are simply inadequate and rarely enforced.

5. Law Reform:  The existence of obsolete and archaic laws in the Sierra Leone judicial system continue to render the system retarded and unwilling to adapt to the changes of our times. The preservation of draconian customary laws compounds the problem of discrimination against women and children, thereby paying lip-service to several international covenants/instruments especially the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed and ratified by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Law Group therefore strongly urges the Government through the Law Reform Commission and encourages the Law Reform Initiative recently launched by some legal practitioners to continue the nationwide consultations on an acceptable level of harmonization of these laws for them to reflect the views and interests of Sierra Leoneans irrespective of their sex and regions of origin.

Bearing in mind the dramatic increase in the occurrence of sexual and gender based violence throughout the country, the open manner in which the courts prosecute such cases and the consequent stigmatization suffered by the victims as well as the exorbitant amounts requested by medical practitioners to examine victims, the Law Group urges the Government to:

• ensure that SGBV cases are heard in camera so that prosecuting witnesses are well protected and that the victims are protected from public eye.
• ensure that minimal charges are requested from victims of sexual violence
• criminalise the refusal of persons to provide evidence for cases of sexual and gender based violence crimes.
• include child trafficking and the use of other objects in rape as offences in the laws of Sierra Leone

We also strongly encourage non-governmental organisations that have women and child protection as part of their mandate to collaborate with government agencies to ensure that the public is made aware of these crimes and the negative impact that these acts could have on the lives of the victims.

6. The Legal Profession Development and Education:  Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, the recent history of Sierra Leone demands that today’s and tomorrow’s generation of lawyers are educated in the area of human rights and international humanitarian law to assist the country in its arduous rebuilding process. This could be made less onerous if proposals are made for the incorporation of these courses into the curriculum. Simultaneously, adequate funding needs to be sought to entice additional professors or lecturers to cover these areas of law.

A Diversified Legal Expertise: Coupled with this, the Sierra Leone Bar Association needs to take responsibility for specialised law training. The Bar could form committees of interested members focusing on various topics. Substantive support would be possible through international organisations in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the Bar Association should attempt to initiate partnerships with international bar associations. These partnerships could lead to mutual exchanges and further assistance to the Sierra Leone legal system.

International Legal Expertise: The currently assembled international legal talent should be tapped for the benefit of Sierra Leone’s Judiciary. Workshops in international humanitarian law and human rights law could be conducted by numerous international practitioners and institutions in the country (e.g. the Special Court, UNDP, and DFID).  These workshops for lawyers, judges, magistrates and JPs could be jointly organised by the Sierra Leone Bar Association on a regular basis.

7. Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, it is also the conviction of the International Human Rights Law Group that the combination of the offices of Minister of Justice and that of Attorney General should be separate to ensure independence and practical separation of powers. We would therefore encourage the Government to consider separating these two offices as an important ingredient in the process of democratisation.

I thank you very much for your attention and look forward to your continued cooperation with the Commission.

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THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS

REPRESENTATIVE OF LAW GROUP – MR. JOE H. PEMAGBI
ALISON SMITH – COUNTRY DIRECTOR – NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE.

Marcus Jones:    Name in Full

Witness:    Joe Hindoveh Pemagbi representing The Human Right Law Group

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Are you a Christian or a Muslim.  Please take the Bible and say after me.

Mr. Pemagbi:    Thank you very much

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    And we are all ears to follow your submission so you may carry on.

Mr. Pemagbi:    SUBMISSION

Commissioner Marcus Jones:     Mr. Pemagbi I will now ask the Commissioners to ask you questions beginning with Commissioner Torto.    

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you very much Mr. Pegmagbi for this academic presentation of the issue.  I have read it, grasped some areas, listened to your interpretation of it but I am still confused about some of the issues you have actually reiterated. People had mentioned those before this Commission and some of them are issues that continue actually to occupy our thinking.  One of them is the abolition of the death penalty in as much as the whole world is following the trend according to your testimony, and therefore Sierra Leone should follow suit.  I would like to know what should happen to compulsory killers.  People have an addiction to killing and when they are brought to you, you will imprison them for life.  Agreed, but there are aspects of the penal code of conduct that actually empower prisoners to release convicts while putting up good behaviour.  In other words, they are released on account of good behaviour in detention after some years and it is the same people who go back into the society.  What will happen to such an individual who has had the kind of impulse to kill with the prevalence of that if death penalty were to be abolished?  How would you handle a situation like that?

Mr. Pemagbi:    Yes, thank you very much Commissioner Torto.  The criminal procedure act of 1965 makes provision for lots of discretion on the part of our magistrates and our judges in this country.  We know there are consequences for releasing people that are in the habit of murdering.   We have several instances of convicted murderers in this country but the Law Group is not mere making a recommendation for the abolition of the death penalty because other countries are doing it.  One if we look at where we are from for the past 10 – 12 years we have had several executions and as part of the curse of the war a lot of people have mentioned this death penalties.  We have had series of unpleasant executions in this country.  No execution is pleasant though but we have had series of those and that has sadly been the case and that has been mentioned as one of the causes of the war.  Secondly, as I said we know the dire course of religious people.  The prisons department has an obligation to the people of this country first to ensure that the people are reformed and not only kept in prison.  So the issue of sending people to jail for a couple of months or days still goes back to the judiciary in implementing very stiff sanctions for murderers.  I think that is where I will stop for now.     And that the courts should ensure that we have stiff sanctions for murderers and that we would ensure that our prisons are safe and fortified enough for jail breakers.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    I hear you.  My question really was alluding to criminals who may have an impulse to kill: not executions because of political reasons, that’s not what I am really concerned about.

Mr. Pemagbi:    I think I made an attempt to look at that particular question that in as much as we have people that have made murder a profession the duty of our prisons is to ensure that people are reformed.  The duty of our judiciary is to ensure that we have stiffer bails for people that have committed murder and not only send them for a month or two we should ensure that we have stiffer sanctions for people that have committed such offences that is my due.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Okay.  That brings me directly to the next question I was going to ask, which you have bordered on.  The Prisons Director was here sometime ago and I asked him questions as to what the conditions were in terms of trials and the dispensation of judgment.  Definitely I would like you to throw light on this a little bit.

Mr. Pemagbi:    Commissioner Torto, I think I touched on the point of correction, to be very specific on the issue of developing the code of conduct for the judiciary.  I said that it is imperative for the judiciary be subjected to a binding code of conduct.  The chief justice and the Sierra Leone Bar Association should draft a code of conduct that sort of clears issues, principles of practice.  Obviously these codes will only be worthwhile if they are enforced by the Bar Association and the judiciary.  That is one recommendation that I clearly mentioned in my submission Sir.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you very much Mr. Pegmagbi.  I don’t have further questions for you.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Thank you very much Madam Chairman, Commissioner Sylvanus Torto.  I would like to welcome you.  Thank you for coming to make this presentation to us.  Let me say I have no question on the paper itself but I have some comments to make.  I am impressed by the comprehensiveness of the document.  The only thing of course it covers areas which have already been covered by other people of course there is a good reason for that I know but my comment here is that like many of the other witnesses, the recommendations have not been specific.  They are more general than specific in most of the cases and this is where I would like to ask that perhaps in collaboration with many people like the bar association and other NGOs that are interested in human rights and the injustices that were meted out to women, you can work with them to come up with more specific recommendations.  Let me call specifically on three areas.  That law reforms on the inheritance as it refers to women.  I think we need more specific recommendations to what the laws should be and also I would like to ask in that respect why you refer to having some interest in Kono, Kailahun and Koinadugu.  Why do you not mention the other districts?  I would like you to give us more specific legal reform on corruption.  You said there should be tougher laws of what kind; I mean how tough should these laws be?  How tough should they be in terms of people’s access to justice?  I also thought I should turn to the area of reconciliation directly.  I will read from page 5.  To reduce tensions between returnees, refugees, “remainees” and demobilised soldiers and to encourage mechanisms of alternatives to the settlement of disputes and other mediation efforts.  The law group will launch a programme of access to justice and train the workers to work with credible CBOs in the three geographical areas.  You will launch a program of access to justice that is to people who have suffered injustices in these three areas.  The areas you mean those three districts or in the three provinces.

Mr. Pemagbi:    Can I go on?

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Yes.

Mr. Pemagbi:    First I will start with the inheritance right.  The Law Group has been doing some work on women’s inheritance rights.  It’s part of our overall programmes from head office.  Each field office has the mandate to look at women’s rights, to be specific we have women’s inheritance rights.  That is what we are looking at.  Last year we sent magistrate Claudia Taylor and another female activist to attend our annual inheritance program in Ghana and this is an annual programme wherein we bring female lawyers in Africa together to discuss women’s rights.  You will agree with me that Africa is a large continent where we have very little regard for our women.  So we bring women together form over 25 countries to discuss the issues that cut across and how we can move the process of allowing women to inherit properties especially form their deceased spouses, husbands.  We have been working and we are still working with the Ministry of Social Welfare Gender and Children’s affairs on the issue of women’s rights.  In the next four weeks we would be looking at recruiting a gender person to be in charge of General affairs specifically as part of our effort to look at women’s inheritance rights.  And I personally have attended and presented a paper at three workshops looking at women’s rights with more specificity on the women’s inheritance rights in Sierra Leone.  You asked why the three Ks: Kono, Kenema and Kailahun Districts.  Madam Chair, Commissioners, you may agree with me that these three districts were largely devastated during the conflict.  For even prior to the conflict these places were almost ignored by our government.  So these are the areas we want to start looking at for now as a start.  We must start somewhere and we also depend on the amount of resources available in order to attempt to cover the entire country.  So we need to begin with these three districts because first, they were largely devastated and two, even prior to the war these areas were largely neglected.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:   So they are going to be limited to those three?

Mr. Pegmagbi:  Yes for now.  For a start we will be limited to those three districts.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:  Yes.

Mr. Pegmagbi:  We also talked about the Anti-Corruption Commission.  For now the process calls for the present Anti Corruption Commission to submit its reports to the attorney general’s office.  And it is largely discretional for the Minister of Justice and Attorney General to prosecute cases which we don’t really favour.   As an organisation that’s why we are recommending that it becomes mandatory for the Minister of Justice and Attorney General’s office to prosecute all cases brought before them.  To make things easier for the Anti Corruption Commission it would be better for them to have their own prosecutors and probably judges as well.

They should have their own judges to prosecute such matters because there is always a tendency for the government in power to wield influence over institutions they have set up.  That is why we are recommending that we have tougher laws and that is why we will be embarking on advocacy to ensure that we have such tough laws in the interest of the Anti-Corruption Commission in this country.  That is why we are all going through civil society groups to join so that it doesn’t become a one man show: it becomes the business of the entire civil society of Sierra Leone.  You also talked about how you will want to reduce tension between refugees and “remainees” as well as ex-combatants, am I right?

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Yes Sir.

Mr. Pegmagbi:  Very often you have witnessed some kind of animosity between people that stayed behind during the conflict and those coming back.  By the time people leave their places of sojourn or their towns or villages to come back some of their farms, their pieces of land, have possibly been cultivated by those that remained.  There is also the possibility for refugees to benefit from donations from WFP and other donor agencies or other Commissions like NaCSA.  That we have now so you would expect that animosity to exist between those that stayed behind and those that are coming in because the economic situations of these two parties are not quite different.  I have personally had such encounters before while working with refugees as well as displaced persons.  You can imagine people living in remote villages with hardly enough to eat then you bring in refugees say from Liberia give them supplies of two coups of bulgur, cooking oil or whatever you may have and you leave the host population behind, going without.  So you will always have that animosity.  There is always a cold war that exists between these two parties, that is why we are looking at such communities.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:   Finally am I correct in thinking that according to your sentence on the top of page 5 that you are going to be providing model laws or bills in aid of these law reforms, you are, therefore, recommending something?   Because you say here “working in conjunction with Freetown NGOs and CBOs in Kono, Kailahun and Koinadugu the Law group will help civil society draft bills and mobilise their constituencies on Anti-Corruption or on all the law reforms you anticipate.

Mr. Pemagbi:    Well as I stated earlier on in my presentation we have women’s rights as a priority and we are also closely looking at Anti-corruption and access to justice.  That’s the starting point now.  That is what we can do with the available resources at this point in time.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:  Thank you.            

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you.  Em… Chairman?

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    I join my colleagues in thanking you for the comprehensive documents, the presentation you have put together almost all the recommendation that people have put together for our consideration and that is very helpful.  Without taking the other documents we can take your documents because they all are recalling recommendations, which means in the country many people are thinking the same way.  I only have one question to pose with regard to your work, the work of the international human rights law group.  And the question borders on how independent you are against this background.  My personal understanding is that I should be aware there is the international human right law.  International criminal law and international humanitarian law all of these put together I think this is the basis on which you are working as a group.  There is in our context the Sierra Leone constitution, which in some ways limits the activities of the “international human rights law group”.  What is out there may not be applicable here.  What do you think are some of the constraints you think you face and what further recommendations in terms of reform law would you want to propose in disentangling you from carrying out your responsibilities only because there is a national law and there is an international law.

Mr. Pemagbi:    International human rights law group is just the name of an organisation Sir.  We know there is the international human rights law, humanitarian law and the rest.  And we know there is a constitution of Sierra Leone that consists of our laws.  Definitely we expect that with the scarcity of human resources within the judiciary we as a nation are finding it difficult to go through Law reforms.  We must be very appreciative.  On behalf of my organisation let me state here that we are here to complement the efforts of the government of Sierra Leone to revitalise the Law Reform Commission. We do hope to be working closely with all of these institutions: the Law Reform Initiative, the Law Reform Commission.  I was invited to the workshop they organised two weeks ago.   The mere fact that I was invited is a sign of collaboration between my organisation and other partners, so it is a process.  I don’t see any animosity or any rift developing between my organisation or any other groups while the international law group is just a non-governmental with our head office in D.C. Washington of the United States.  We’ve got branches in several other countries.  Five of those are in Africa: one in Sierra Leone, the other in Nigeria, Congo we have two officers there , one in Morocco and the fifth one is in Burundi so to just another non Governmental Organisation just to help in resolving human rifts all over the world.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you.

Mr. Pegmagbi:  Maybe if I may just add to that you talked about the problems I which we encounter because of the scarcity of our limited resources.  At this point in time we work in collaboration with other offices of the law group.  We will also be bringing a colleague from our Nigeria office to help us sort some of these challenges that we are experiencing.  He would be here in September to help work with the law reform commission and other agencies.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   Leader of Evidence, any question?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much Commissioner, I don’t have a question but from the submission it is obvious that they are doing a grand research with respect to women’s issues, particularly on inheritance and sexual violations.  Since this has become obvious, we would really want to request that they send us a written submission basically on women.   We would send invitations to them to that effect with the guidelines on the specific issues they will have to address based on the work they have done and the experience they have had on the ground so far.  Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Mr. Pemagbi:    We will be pleased to do that Madam Chair.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Mr. Pemagbi we’ve included the recommendations contained in your submission so I think all I am left with is to ask whether you have any questions for the Commission.

Mr. Pemagbi:    None at the moment if we do have some questions later, we will submit them to the Commission.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   Alright I know you are always in and out of the office.  We will be pleased to entertain your questions at any time.  Thank you very much for coming and you may step down now.

Leader of Evidence is this your last witness for the morning?

Leader of Evidence:    Yes, Honourable Commissioners, we will have to adjourn and come back later after lunch to continue the proceedings.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   Thank you so much ladies and gentlemen we are breaking off now and we will be back at 3: O’clock to continue.  We hope we will see all of you.

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Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen and welcome to our afternoon session.  Leader of Evidence is your witness here?

Leader of Evidence:    Yes Madam Commissioner, the witness is here.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Please call her.

Leader of Evidence:    Madam Commissioner our first witness for this afternoon is the Country Director for No Peace Without Justice Ms. Allison Smith.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   Your name in full.

Allison:    My name is Allison Smith.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   Any objection to your taking the oath?

Allison:    If it pleases the Commission I will prefer to affirm.

    The Oath is taken.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   I don’t know whether you have been following our hearings here or on the radio.

Allison:    Some.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   But there is nothing for you to fell worried about.  Just give your testimony, feel relaxed.   After you’ve finished the Commissioners here will ask you some questions.  The leader of evidence will do the same, that is if they have questions and then if you have any questions on the procedure and processes of the Commission you will ask your questions and at the end if you have any recommendations you would like us to include in our report you are free to make them.  So thank you so much for coming and the floor is yours.

Allison:    Thank you Honourable Chairman, Honourable commissioners, ladies and gentlemen.  I first have to thank you for giving me the opportunity to come and speak before you today on behalf of my organisation No Peace Without Justice on issues relating to the rule of law in Sierra Leone.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    The TRC is grateful for your testimony but it is regretted that the Commissioners haven’t your submission in front of them and I will ask them to ask you questions if they have questions to ask and we will start with the chairman.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:  I want on behalf of the Commission to thank you for the presentation.   I am sure sooner or later we will get copies of the document.  You started off and that for me was very important and crucial for the Commission to take very seriously into consideration.  I heard you mention violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law committed by all factions without exception.  That is very critical and we take that very seriously to continue to explore what went wrong in this country.  So many people and some others join in saying that peace and justice are two sides of the same coin.  The question that comes to mind from the angle of the Commission (probably you may not respond to that question) is what is justice and in the context of Sierra Leone, in what sense and at what stage would you use this word that will capture the minds of both victims and perpetrators.  When you talk about dispensation of justice, how do we intend to capture these two concepts?

Allison:    Thank you for that question.   Before I answer it I would like to apologise to the Commission for not having their written submission available yet as I mentioned.  We are gathering information from around the country and we only just finished the exercise.  I am sorry that the information to inform our written submission as well as the conflict mapping report are not available.   So I do apologise and I will have the written submission to you as soon as possible.  The question of what is meant by justice, I believe, is encapsulated in what I discussed about the rule of law that there are rules that apply to everybody.  Justice is seen in application of those rules to individuals.  International criminal law to be allowed to this kind of individual responsibility and they find security by such applications and not by abstract entity.  It is difficult to talk about state community as one individual.  So it is all individuals living under the law and justice is making sure that the rule of law applies to the individuals and that they answer for what they have done in contravention of the rules.  The question of when justice should apply is a difficult one to answer.  Justice can be dispensed by military forces themselves during the conflict.  In fact it is their responsibility to ensure that their forces adhere to the laws of war.  In terms of this the greatest responsibility is a matter of practical ability.  And I should also say that through international criminal justice mechanisms such as the special court and the international criminal court, should question the key leaders.  As I mentioned before I think the most liable culprits are the leaders and this is partly because it’s the leaders who decide how war is going to be fought and they plan out a system of how they are going to conduct warfare. At that point they decide whether or not it would be conducted by going through the laws of war or by violating the laws of war including things such as the attacking of civilians, hospitals, undefended tenants, and etcetera.  And so they are the people who should take responsibility and they should be held criminally responsible for violating the laws of war and their people.  People further down the chain of command do not matter much.  Well I think there should be some form of accountability.  The international criminal process of law is not necessarily the most appropriate one for them.  That is what I was leading to when I spoke about an integrated system of accountability and because there should be accountability in some form.  And I think the TRC provides a form of accountability for people who perhaps fall within the top levels and the people who are not there as well. The international criminal justice mechanism also covers the child perpetrators so that answers the question.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    One other question I would like for your clarification or consideration here is that the general impression people get when they hear about no Peace Without Justice is that you are leading more towards a legal position.   That is the general impression that people get and so that leads me to this question for your consideration.  It may not be for you but in the mandate of the two institutions: the Special Court and the TRC.  For the Special Court it is from November 30, 1996 to the present, to put it broadly.  And the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s mandate is from 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Accord 1999.  The fact of the matter (and this is factual) is that I want to see where Peace and Justice or No Peace Without Justice is coming into play. I have no doubt on my mind that the groups involved in that time line of the Special Court’s mandate from 1996 – present are no different from the same group involved from 1991 to present.  Now how do you see the implication in dealing with the whole scenario?  You are faced with two institutions which appear to be dealing with two issues.  As the time line indicates it appears that there are two different entities in the eyes of the outsider but to the Sierra Leonean they both involve the same people, what is your view on that?

Allison:    On the temporal address the theme of the Special Court and to be completely candid I think it should have been set from 1991 as in the case of the commission of the TRC because international law begins to apply the moment a conflict begins.  So from the moment the first battle took place in 1991 humanitarian law began to apply so that in my personal opinion the Special Court should have had jurisdiction from 1991 but it didn’t happen that way.  I think the Special Court will have to look at what happened before 1996 to get an understanding of what happened after 1996 and to what extent.  I think the two institutions are looking at the same things from the time perspective and they are looking at different people and also the Special Court is to try the people that bear the greatest responsibilities; the top level people and the TRC has a much greater ability and opportunity and I think has been going at reaching out more people across the whole country.  But I think as I said a minute ago you could have the TRC and the Special Court but as an integrated system of accountability, which is not just criminal justice but is coming to terms with what has happened.  I think for Sierra Leoneans for every case coming out of the conflict that extends its time bounds, the period of the conflict should not begin or end arbitrarily at a point either way.  I’m sorry, I don’t know whether that answers your question.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:      Thank you very much.   Has Professor anything to say?

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:  Thank you very much Madam Chair, and let me say welcome and thank you to Allison for coming to make this presentation.  Well we always welcome submissions like this that add to the variety of materials and a broader perspective to the way we are going to look at our mandate.  The challenges are huge and complex particularly regarding the subject which you are dealing with.  Peace Without Justice has many challenges which we need to look at from different perspectives, not only from the context in which the problem we are examining occurred or was carried out but from the context of the broader world perspective.  I think that is the global picture of justice for some of us as we have gone out meeting people and talking to them asking their opinion about what should be done to satisfy them.  Because of what they have suffered, they seem to be presenting different clues as to what justice is not.   It is not an invariable or homogenous, or it cannot be seen from only one point of view, it is relative.  What one person may consider as satisfying whatever will meet his or her justice criteria will be different from the opinion of her people.  So that is why we feel that your presentation, I hope we get it submitted to us at some future date, will give us an opportunity to study the matter very carefully.  But from what I have said already I hope you understand that we hold the view that justice is relative.  I mean there is no one single justice just like truth.   I don’t want to go on to develop that and give examples even of recent times where we have seen it demonstrated by people whom we have the greatest respect for.  For me I haven’t got any question to ask on your submission but I have interest in it from the point of view of giving another perspective to justice.  We are seeking to discover the meaning and the how of dealing with that aspect of it in our minds.  This is why I am thanking you so much for that submission.  I look forward to receiving the document, which I hope will come.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:     Commissioner Torto

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you very much Chairman, I want to join the other commissioners in thanking Allison for this presentation.  I am asking that you please let us access the written version of your statement in order that some of us will read it in detail and be able to react to it in a more forceful way.  So I will encourage you to please let us have copies in time for us to read and then follow.  But besides that I just have one area of concern that I would like you to help us out with as an organisation.  We have heard various aspects of justice like Professor Kamara has just told you especially in the African setting.  Some people are pleased with a mere apology.  If you just stoop down for them to touch you on your back they are satisfied and the feeling of hurt is gone for good.  They don’t want to go beyond that.  Others want to retaliate and for them that is what satisfies.  Others will take you to some elderly person to complain so that the matter is adjudicated and then whoever is right or wrong is declared and that approach for some provides satisfaction.  We in the commission are looking at it from all those angles. Therefore we want to we thank you very much for your contribution.  It gives us other areas that I want you to help us out with.  I mean either from the point of view of your organisation or you yourself we want you to help us actually reason out or add to our reasoning or correct the wrong reasoning we may have on the issue.   And this is it, between the TRC and the Special Court which one of these institutions in your opinion or in the opinion of No Justice Without Peace would provide the fairest and the most just situation to victims enacting from the last conflict.

Allison:    I think that that’s a very good question.  That is also relative.  I think that as you are saying, some people see justice as one thing and to give justice is a totally different thing.   So I am trying to say which institution is fairer or better for victims.   I think that each institution is necessary for victims.  But I think it’s necessary in different ways.  The Special Court only has jurisdiction for those who bear the greatest responsibilities.  It has a limited mandate in a sense and it also has a time-limited mandate.  It only has three years to do it’s work and because of the nature of criminal justice it is reaching the international criminal justice system.   It is seen as a conflict in many ways as in international system and very few victims relatively speaking will actually participate directly in the work of the court.  So very few people will actually get to tell their story to the court and I think that is very strange.  The TRC has for victims what the Special Court perhaps doesn’t have.  Perhaps it is meant to have but nevertheless it doesn’t.  By that same token I think the leaders could plan that war be conducted in that way, attacking civilians and burning their houses.  I think the first thing for victims is that the person perpetrating violence is prosecuted and in that way you can reach the culprits.  I think a very large number of victims are at the top of the chain of command and because orders have been given down, down, and down the violence spreads to all of the victims in the country.  But it is a very different process and as I said I think some processes are necessary as well as others.  TRC has its own constraints and so I think that the Community based forms of accountability or justice, forms of reconciliation are probably also necessary in order to fully overcome what has happened, especially for speaking to the victims’ needs.  I don’t know if that answers your question.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you chairman.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:     Leader of Evidence have you any questions?

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you Madam Chair.  Actually I don’t have any question for the witness.  All I have is a request because very soon we will be embarking on what I want to say is this question of reform.  We all know that some of our laws are absolute and if the constitution needs some amendments then you include that in your submission when compiling your report.   We want you to look at the legal areas; those areas that you think need reform so that at the end of the day the judiciary will be able to function well and so they will dispense justice accordingly.  Please pay special attention to the substantive laws and even the constitution where you think the reforms are necessary so that when you make your submission on them we will look at them and incorporate them in our report if necessary.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:  I wonder if you have any questions for the Commission about our work, our process, and procedures.

Allison:    Well at this stage now I don’t have any questions but I do appreciate the opportunity given to us.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    I know we are going to receive your recommendation when you do send us your submission but I also know that you have some recommendations here with you and I think it will be rounding up your views for the public if you just give us an idea of your recommendations now.

Allison:    Thank you very much and thank you for the permission to submit our written recommendation after making the oral submission.  We will certainly address those areas that you mentioned in our written submission.  I do have some preliminary recommendations from our organisation that I will read now.  We will as I said give a preliminary submission in the following:
    First, that the Special Court will follow the principal fundamentals of the rule of law in all aspects of its operations.  Second, that the International Community continues to support accountability efforts in Sierra Leone in particular and those should include the agreement or cooperation with the Special Court.   Regarding the necessary financial support both for the TRC and for the Special Court, we recommend that the international community extends its support to efforts in rebuilding the judiciary in Sierra Leone, particularly in line with Sierra Leone’s international obligations.  That the Government of Sierra Leone and others work to ensure that security forces are trained and are au fait with all other aspects of humanitarian and international human rights law and also that the government of Sierra Leone and others work to make sure that information on international and human rights law is disseminated in an appropriate manner to the general public.  We would respectfully ask that the TRC acknowledges the importance of instituting the rule of law in the Sierra Leone society as one of the key elements for attaining sustainable peace and reconciliation and as such to highlight the world of past impunity and corruption of the rule of law that applied in and sustaining the 10 years conflict.   Finally we would again recommend respectfully that the TRC recognises that the hearings to international humanitarian law are not only an obligation of the government but they are central to the interest of peace and reconciliation of the nation.  Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:  Thank you very much for coming.  You may step down.

Allison:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:  Can we have the next witness?

Leader of Evidence:    Madam Commissioner, I am sorry that is the last witness for the day.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:  Thank you ladies and gentlemen.  We have come to the end of our day’s hearings and so we are going to adjourn now until tomorrow morning at 9:30 and please come again and bring some friends with you so that this hall will be crowded.  Thank you.

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Leader of Evidence:     May I ask that we all stand for the Commissioners?

THEMATIC HEARING: MR FRANCIS GABIDDON OMBUDSMAN OF SIERRA LEONE

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    We welcome you to this session Mr. Gabbidon.  Your name is a household name in Sierra Leone and in many ways you have contributed to bringing us where we are at this particular point in time.  It is but natural that you continue the process.  We are at the River Jordan and we want to cross that river together, and so we put or hearts and minds together and carve out a destiny for our nation.  We are here as you might have received from the office for issues pertaining to the judiciary.  Your presence or absence in that office and what your experiences had been vis-à-vis the ten-year civil conflict will be our present focus.  How you see the judiciary functioning in the past, now and in the future and everything that has to do with this process that will bring a new Sierra Leone.  This is essentially why you have come and we’ve enjoyed your cooperation – your help in getting the TRC not to get materials from outside but people who themselves are architects as it were, for the carving out of their condition.  You know the process I may not tell you; you helped to carve the instrument and we know that whatever you say here could be said in good faith and we accept it in good faith, and digested in good faith.  We thank you for coming.  I will now give you the opportunity to make your presentation.    

Gabbidon:    Thank you very much Bishop Humper – let me first of all say how pleased and privileged I am to be here.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    I’m sorry Mr. Gabbidon, we left a little bit of process that you needed to go through and that is the taking of the oath.

    SUBMISSION

Gabbidon:    Distinguish Chairman, and fellow Commissioners, let me firstly say how humble and privileged I am to appear before you this morning, to testify at this all important Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  I honestly don’t think a better group of people could have been appointed than you here to sit on a panel like this where the integrity, probity and reputation of the Commissioner is so important and I can assure you that, those of us who are in the position to help, cooperate and assist this Commission will do so and I personally will do so to help you succeed; because your success is our success, not just for now but for posterity.  You see Chairman, you are right to say that, in my own humble way I played some part in seeing this TRC established, because, after the Lome Peace Accord the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights decided to do some sensitisation on the Lome Peace Accord and to explain to the people of this country – our brothers and sisters, what this accord is all about.  Why it was signed, why it was necessary for us to see it work.  If we recall, at that time, we were all bitter, we were all angry, because of what had taken place in our country over years.  Many lives were lost; thousands of people injured; maimed; houses destroyed and professor Pemagbi, who is now the Ambassador of UN approached me to help, to explain to the people of this country in simple language the Lome Peace Accord, and in my own humble way for over a year, I tried to explain to people, the terms and conditions of the Lome Peace Accord, the meaning of these terms and why the government had to sign that accord because some people think it was a bad agreement.  It could be, but at that time the government had no choice but to sign that agreement.  Even up to yesterday, I was reading a book called “Deliver us from Evil” which is written by an American; and he said he quite sympathises with the government of Sierra Leone to have signed that agreement; because, there is no doubt that the ex-combatants would never have left the bush or would have signed the Peace Accord if some of those terms were not inserted in that agreement.  As somebody said its probably difficult to make peace than to wage war; but I believe that the government was right in signing that agreement and we can now see the benefits of that; because we’ve done a wonderful job despite what we say amongst ourselves – there’s been disarmament, demobilisation and integration and if we can consolidate and build on this, I’m sure we have a future,.  Mr. Commissioner, I’ll like to talk on a few things concerning judicial governance and my office; but do permit me to digress a few minutes because there are one or two things I’ll like to talk about, to fit into this picture.

    Firstly, I think one of the biggest mistakes we ever made in this country was when the one-party system was introduced.  It was a disaster for Sierra Leone.  Sierra Leone should never have established a one-party state, because we had inherited a system from the British in which we had the Judiciary, the legislature and the executive, and that system with all its faults worked.  It worked well.  Sierra Leone was peaceful; had a good level of education, business economy that was picking up and I believe, we made a big mistake when I say we, I say all of us.  It’s not time now to point fingers because we accepted it as it then was but it was a disaster when we look back.  The reason for saying so is that the one-party state did not benefit the people of this country.  It only benefited one man and a few of his coat-tails and as such most the institutions collapsed – the judiciary collapsed, the executive collapsed and the legislature was virtually a rubber stamp; and because these institutions collapsed because there was virtually no opposition, no accountability – it means that the consequences of the collapse of these institutions was that the people of this country had nowhere to complain to; nowhere to air the grievances and nowhere for people to know how we felt.  Even a few of the newspapers that tried to challenge or to criticise were dealt with harshly.  So that’s the first point I’ll like to emphasise that never again should this country go back to that type of system – never – it should never go back to that type of system.  All they did was to create a lot of disaster for this country.  We did not benefit anything even though some people felt that, it helped to unify us and bring stability. Even if it did, it was a stability that was short-lived because eventually what we refer to as sitting down was a powder keg that exploded.  So that stability that some people argue was as a result of the one-party, was a fragile stability.  Because what in fact it was holding was a powder keg and the powder keg exploded which we saw in rebel war and all the disturbances that we had.  So that was a big mistake.

    I think the second mistake we made in my insight was the holding of the OAU Conference.  Sierra Leone was a small country and even though the African countries were rotating the hosting of the OAU there was nothing wrong with us telling our brother African countries that we were not in the position to host it.  If we recall Addis Ababa was fixed.  Ethiopia was the permanent site for hosting OAU countries just as we have New York for UN conferences and only those countries that are rich and can afford it could do so outside of New York or Addis Ababa, but we decided to host the OAU in 1980 and that again was for the benefit of the vanity of one person and it meant that we squandered all the resources and reserves of this country.  A hundred million dollars in 1980 which was the total reserves Sierra Leone had were used to host the OAU.  It might have helped our image and to some extent the infrastructure but the long-term consequences were economic and social disaster for which we are still paying the price.  The OAU of 1980 was an economic disaster just as the one-party establishment was a political disaster.  So these were two events, that shaped the destiny of this country adversely; because of these institutions – the executive, the judiciary and the legislature.  It meant as I said, more or less us creating a situation where the state did not function or even if it functioned, it did not function well and efficiently.  There was no accountability to the people of Sierra Leone.  People did what they wanted in these institutions.  The Army in particular was self-accounting – they were not accountable to the people of this country.  Armies all over the world are accountable to the civilian government.  In our case the Army was accountable to itself.  The amount of resources and money spent on the Sierra Leone army during that period was unbelievable; and most of it went into the private pockets of senior army officers who used it to build houses, purchase cars and other amenities that suited them, rather than develop and strengthen the army that we had, that was so famous many years ago when it was part of the contingent that went to the Congo during the peace keeping operations; it went to Burma and distinguished itself in the first world war and in the second world war in Cameroon.  So also, apart from state institutions, the beginning of the disintegration of the army started during that period; during that one-party period when the army was not accountable to the people of Sierra Leone.  They were accountable to themselves, nobody however knew the state of the army; they did what they liked and we are paying the price and thank God for the British and other countries that have come today to help us to restructure and develop our army.  So these were fundamental mistakes that were made, but let me say, immediately that much as I’m criticising the government then, we also, that is we the people of the country must accept some of the blame; because we did not challenge the government then, as have been done in Ghana and Nigeria.  The middle class – we the middle class, the professionals and intellectuals – failed the people of this country because in Ghana and Nigeria when similar circumstances arose, we saw that the Ghanaian middle class or Nigerian middle class and intellectual and professionals looked to the streets, went to the courts, were prepared to go to prison, and were prepared to die.  But regrettably, we, and as I say we I include MYSELF, WE ALL Sierra Leoneans we were cowards because people felt that the existence of the SSD then, was (the SSD now is a different SSD) was used to intimidate and tyrannise the people of this country.  The SSD have played a role over the last few years but then it was the instrument of tyranny in this country.  It was used to cow opposition leaders; it was used to cow the press, the citizens, students and people who try to protest.  Never again should we have an arm of the police that is an instrument of tyranny.  The SSD as is doing now, and I praise them now, has transformed itself to be part of the police for good.  But at that time, it played an infamous role and some of the big disasters were perpetrated by them – the killing of people, maiming and to some extent even armed robbery.  There were instances when in fact in those days some of the SSD personnel then were involved in armed robbery – it is a fact and people know it but everybody kept silent because of the fact that we were scared that, they could seek their revenge.  So the collapse of the army, the collapse of the police forces were as a result of that unlawful marriage.  The police then was heavily politicised.  The introduction of the army and the police into politics was another disaster.  The army and the police and the Civil Service should be neutral and impartial at all times.  They should support the government of the day.  They should be loyal to the government but they should not be politicised.  Inspector Generals of Police then were appointed on tribal grounds rather than merit or experience or ability.  Promotions in both the army and the police were based on tribe, rather than merit, ability and experience.  So were the seeds of disaster sown and we are now paying the price.  I knew, I predicted this, I told my wife many years ago that we were sitting on a powder keg.  Sir, it did not come to me as a surprise when Sierra Leone exploded.  It was bound to explode.  What I was not sure about was the way and manner in which it would explode.  Any true Sierra Leonean would not say that the ways and means this country was governed was not a tinder-box for explosion; but I did not believe that Sierra Leonean will cut each other’s hands.  I did not believe that we would dismember women.  I felt and believed that there would be a protest, that people would revolt to change the country into better society; but talking to some of the RUF; and I talk to quite a few of them up to today; some of them have admitted that, this was not what they envisaged at first.  In the end instead of helping us to change the country, they inflicted harm and murder on the very people they said they were protecting.  So the collapse of the state institutions, the army, the police, the civil service was politicised.  These are things that we should never do again.  The civil service, the police and the army should be based on merit and ability.  We must not allow tribalism to go into these institutions; because the moment you introduce tribalism in these institutions, it is the country that suffers.  Even though those who take the decisions think they’re doing something good, they also end up paying the price.  When you have a bad leader, the country pays the price.  So even those who think they were doing their tribesmen a favour, in trying to put their own men there, did not realise that they were doing all of us a disfavour because after some time, the edifice was going to collapse and we all paid the price.  So that is why one has to commend this government for now going on criteria such as merit, ability, and experience.  When you look at your commission, Mr. Chairman, you could see merit, ability, integrity and experience.  It is quite possible that a couple of years ago, if a similar institution was elected it could not have had the integrity and reputation of people like you.  It could have been based on tribal or other grounds.  That is why I say if we now see institutions work and work well it’s because of the absence of these negative factors.  

    Mr. Chairman, the point I’ll also like to bring in which, just digressing when I come to my main point is that, we also have a reputation for being very friendly, hospitable and warm; which is good.  Sierra Leoneans are basically warm, hospitable, and friendly but this is more with outsiders.  We tend to love outsiders more than ourselves.  Why?  We open our hands to outsiders – fine; but why don’t we also concentrate that love and unity for each other.  We need to love and unite more.  This has also been a problem in place.  We are at each other’s throat too many times.  There is nothing wrong with competition.  We should compete amongst each other.  There is nothing wrong with trying to be able to strive for success.  But we see the unity at now the level we want it.  In other words we should try to love ourselves more and to love our country more.  That’s why people like me have come into public life, to play our own part.  Instead of sitting in an office, I could be making millions of Leones.  I used to; but I decided with age and time that we should put back into society what we’ve gained and to help our society build itself again or we could have gone out of this country and taken any international jobs but that is not the answer, we have to build our country.  The Sierra Leoneans who run out of this country build somebody else’s country.  They do not build Sierra Leone and foreigners are not going to build this country for us.  We have to build this country.  Now the point I want to make here is that, not only us driving the lack of unity which we are trying to now cultivate and the patriotism which we are also trying to cultivate.  We have opened this country too much to foreigners and we are suffering for it as well today.  The way this country is opening up to outsiders is too much.  We won’t see this in other countries; and this is why we also have a problem; because we do not necessarily attract good people into this country.  We have a lot of people in this country that have no business here, in the economy, in business, living in the best houses, driving the best cars, and to that extent, a lot of Sierra Leoneans feel alienated; because they are not enjoying the best of their country.  You do not see this in any other West African country.  Whether you go to Guinea, even Liberia with all its problems, Gambia, Nigeria, Ghana, the inhabitants of those countries, enjoy the wealth of their country.  To some extent, apart from a few you have made it, the majority of Sierra Leoneans need to be empowered economically.  That does not mean that Sierra Leoneans don’t have to work hard to achieve that economic success; because to some extent, some people criticise us to say we are lazy.  I do not believe we are lazy, I thing if the Sierra Leonean is well motivated financially and otherwise, he will work hard although we still have some people who don’t want to work; they prefer to go around the streets begging and loafing.  Now Mr. Chairman, the Judiciary and my office which I want to link up are my main theme.
    
    The Judiciary and My Office

    The Judiciary and my office have to be strengthened and taken seriously.  If democracy has to succeed, if democracy has to survive in this country, the bed-work is the judiciary.  The bed-work of democracy when you look at the United States of America, Great Britain and other developed democratic countries, the judiciary is seen as a premium asset.  If you do not develop or strengthen your judiciary, all the other institutions will collapse, because at the end of the day, it is the judiciary that has to make the necessary pronouncements on the rule of law, on the constitution of the country, on whether our laws are valid, on what happens to people who flaunt the law.  So the judiciary has to be empowered and I must say that over the years, it’s only now we are seeing a judiciary being empowered.  Although I must give credit to the late Francis Minnah, and I want to say it on record politics aside, he was the only Attorney-General of this country that took the judiciary seriously.  Talk to any senior lawyer, they will tell you that.  In terms of conditions of service, in terms of the way he empowered judges, salaries, pensions, the incentives to work, the late Francis Minnah politics aside, took the judiciary seriously; and for this, I would go on record and a lot of those who don’t have the guts to say it would admit it in private that he did take his judiciary seriously in that judges were happy to work at that time, and some of the benefits we are enjoying today are as a result of the initiative he took?  As I say, I’m here to talk about his tenure as attorney General and some of the things he did are there on record.  So I must give credit to the late Francis Minah; may his soul rest in peace for the fact that, politics aside, he did a job to help the judiciary.

    Some Of The Ways The Judiciary Has Gone Wrong Over The Years And Which We Must Try To Put Right

    From 1973 up to today, there is no system of law reporting in Sierra Leone.  A judiciary cannot function without a proper system of law reporting.  Unlike the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, we do not have a system of law reporting and I believe this government is now trying to put the mechanism in place.  Without law reports, the judicial is meaningless.  It’s law report that we have to look to, find what the law is and what the law has said; but now all we have is unreported cases and I was briefing the Special Court judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers on Saturday and I told them, they have to make do with the fact that what we have is an unreported system and they just have to accommodate themselves to it until such time that we have law reporting.

    The other problem we have is that the laws of this country have been static.  They’ve not been reformed.  Thank God we now have distinguished juries – Doctor Peter Tucker who has been appointed to help the Law Reform Commission – you must commend this government for that and that Commission has an able secretary Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff and this is a good team.  Because these are solid lawyers and with the help of some of us – I now intend to help them – we should go back on track to revise and review our laws.  Most of our laws as my learned judge here will tell you are outdated.  They do not meet the present conditions of this country.  Laws have to be dynamic, they cannot be static.  They have to move with the times.  Regrettably, since 1960, when we had the major law reform in this country, law reform over the years has been peace mill. Rather than comprehensive, and now I think the government is trying to have a comprehensive system of law reform.  So, law reform and law reporting must also be given serious consideration, and I believe they are now being given that, because there is a Law Reform Committee that now works at state house under Dr. Peter Tucker and Yasmin Jusu Sheriff and the law reporting has not started, but I have the feeling that, I believe DFID wants to help us set it up.  These are the tools of the trade; it’s like a Doctor without a stethoscope.  A Judge without his law report cannot make the necessary diagnosis – a doctor needs his stethoscope in order to examine to find out what is wrong.  The lawyer, the judge, needs his books; needs his law reports also as there have been an absence of law libraries in this country.  It’s basic but it’s a fact.  You cannot have a legal system without good libraries.  We must take these simple things seriously.  You might just see a library and think – this is a place where I go and borrow books.  No.  It goes beyond that.  It is your books you use to write your judgments and your rulings.  Your law library is important.  So we need law libraries we need to have books.  The University law library is virtually non est.  The best law library we now have in this country is the Law School library; which is very good, and I believe the Law Officers Library is now going to be empowered; or is being empowered by DFID.  So these institutions work, when you have the necessary ingredients.  You must have law reporting, you must have law reform, to update your laws, you must have libraries to have your books.  Also, the conditions of service and terms of conditions of service and terms of conditions of the judiciary have not helped; our judges, magistrates and law officers are paid pittance and if you pay them pittance you will have pittance judgments and pittance rulings.  Judges and lawyers all over the world are paid well.  The reason for this is one, when you pay them well, they can take their work seriously and then they will resist corruption so that if you find them corrupt you come down heavily on them.  Judges are paid well, in England the moment you become a judge, they are knighted automatically.  This is to enhance your status, so that probably what you lose in practice, you make up in in-made prestige and a reasonable amount.  We are not saying they should be paid astronomical salaries, no.  But pay them a decent wage so that if you find any evidence of corruption; you can come down on them heavily.  As for any of us for that matter, who work in the public scrutiny; logistics, transport, infrastructure are in short supply. But let me not lay too much emphasis on those, because I think other people have spoken about these areas, and we all now accept that the judiciary has to be transformed, it has to be restructured and we have to have personnel.  This is another problem.  We’ve not been able to recruit some of the best personnel from the BAR into the judiciary bench.  People complain about the judiciary but we the lawyers must take some of the blame; because we have refused to go to the bench.  It is small salary, small conditions so those who have taken the risk of sacrifice like our learned Commissioner here must be commended, because it shows that it was not just money that drove them into office, but there were other attributes.  But at the same time, that should not be an excuse for judges, lawyers or those who work in the government service not paid well vis-à-vis the private sector to undermine their integrity the way we often hear these days.  If you have two colleagues who went to lets say the Prince of Wales School – one becomes a lawyer, one works at the brewery – the one who works at the law officers department would be paid lets say two hundred thousand Leones a month.  The one who works at the brewery probably gets seven eight hundred thousand.  You see that disparity and probably even when they were at school, the one who became the lawyer was more brilliant.  What happens – the one who is in the law officers becomes frustrated – yes he is disillusioned.  The one at the brewery is well looked after.  Probably it’s unfair to compare both of them but that is what you see.  In that probably the one at the Brewery will work there for twenty years because he’s paid well, is well looked after, he takes his job seriously; but then if you pay somebody two hundred thousand Leones after six years in law school he starts to say why the hell did I bother to read law.  I could have been doing something else.  So that is why we say, we’re not demanding or asking that the legal system is paid astronomical amounts but let them be given a living and descent wage which will keep them and their families going.  I think one of the things I’ll like to suggest to this Commission is that we should now stop the system of appointing judges from the magistrate bench.  We’ve been lucky in the past to have the likes of the late Mrs. Justice Awunor Renner and we have Justice Marcus Jones here who are the few whom we can commend.  But let me say here openly that a number of magistrates, who were promoted to the bench, had no business there.  They were promoted because that is the system; but their legal knowledge was not all that commendable.  They did not have any practice at the Bar; and so, much as they were made judges, their contribution to judicial improvement or advancement here was very minimal.  I’m not saying that it is only people who are appointed from the BAR who do well; but that has proved a better system, because we do have judges who are appointed from the Administrator General’s office like the Late Justice Parson Davies and D.M. Williams.  We have those who have been appointed from the Law officers – Justice Adorph, Aladi, and a few others but the bulk of our judges, should be appointed from the BAR.  But of course it’s a vicious circle because, somebody would answer me and say, well, Mr. Gabbidon where are you going to get these people from, because your colleagues refuse to go and take these jobs and that is why we say, make them attractive, make them good, the lawyers will come.  Just as the World Bank has been able to recruit recently, four lawyers from private practice to help the law officers department, and the money they’re paying them is not fantastic in terms of an astronomic earning but it was descent enough to attract four good lawyers from the private BAR now joining the government: the persons of Mr. Barbar, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Sesay and Mr. Thompson.  So, that is the clue.  Give people a nice descent wage which is reasonable, they will work for the government.  I believe that the government can introduce a system where you have what we call part-time recorders;  where people in private practice or some of us who do not practice any longer could do part-time work for the judiciary.  They do it in other countries.  You sit part-time as recorders, to help the government clear backlog, to help with complex cases.  Because of our experience we could develop a system of part-time recorders because we cannot afford full-time recorders.  Some part-time recorders can be made to work in the provinces while others could be made to work in town.  These are ways and means to improve the judicial system in this country; and these part-time recorders would be made up of lawyers in private practice who are prepared to sit at the magisterial or high court or whatever bench to have the system.  The other problem we’ve had is that an important office like the Master and registrar has also not attracted very good people. Now Masters and Registrars all over the world, in the British Common Law system, perform very vital role in the Judiciary.  They are the ones who run the Administrative set ups and to some extent play an important judicial role; but because of poor wages and salaries, we’ve not been able to attract solid people there; but let me pay my credit to the Late William Johnson who became a judge, who was a very good Master and Registrar, Mrs. Showers, now Justice Tola Thomson, but we need to attract people there not just for Freetown; Bo, Kenema, Makeni to have their own registrars.  So what we have is a system where we just have one or two in Freetown, and the provinces have no registrars.  We should have registrars all over the country at the judiciary.  So these are areas where even if it’s outside help – let us go for it. But if you want to have a judiciary functioning, these are the weak areas that have to be strengthened.

    Now, the other failure of us; when I say so, I include myself.  I don’t try to point fingers just at people, I point fingers but also we collectively must accept some of the blame, because the judiciary did not challenge the establishment of the one-party system under Siaka Stevens; but we challenged it under Albert Margai; and Albert Margai resisted and abandoned it.  But we failed to challenge it under Siaka Stevens.  Probably because Albert Margai was a lawyer I don’t know or a democrat.  But when Desmond Luke, T.S. Johnson, Jalayakin and others went to court; the late Kutubu Kaisamba; L.E.M Gerald, they said no we don’t want it, the late Sir Albert resisted, but when it came to the one-party of Siaka Stevens, the judiciary did not do anything.  So we have to take the blame for that.  Why didn’t we the lawyers challenge, why didn’t we go to court, even if the court had ruled against us?  So we have to accept that.   Some of the reasons why this country collapsed at that time was what I might call fear; cowardice amongst us professionals people who say well, I’m not going to risk my life, I don’t want to die; but you must have martyrs if a country has to progress.  No country develops or progresses without people dying.  Look at the amount of people dying in Iraqi whether it is Iraqi’s or Americans for different reasons.  So the failure of the Sierra Leoneans has to do with their reluctance to go to jail.  We don’t like to go to prison, nobody wants to go to prison, but Ghanaians, Nigerians, Gambians, do go to prison for a course.  So we’ve had a problem.  Who wants to bell the cat?  Nobody wants to bell the cat.  We have too many armchair critics in this country.  People who don’t even want to come here and speak the minds.  They sit in their houses criticise, go to newspapers, write a lot of balderdash but you ask them to come up and talk and really go on record they will not do it; they say – I don’t want to go to jail, I don’t want to be victimised; but no country will develop in a culture of silence, but if you criticise, it must be constructive, it must be reasonable and you must put forward an alternative solution.  It is not just to criticise, the criticism, must be constructive.  It must be reasonable and you have to come forward if necessary with an alternative solution.  So even when people criticise us now, within a short period of time, people don’t realize the miracle that has happened over the last few years; in that very few countries, who have been through a ten year rebel war, have turned around within the period of two years to this extent.  To the extent that I have an article, which I’ll put at your disposal, written by a Professor of Politics at Florida University.  I’ve never met him.  I got it when I went to England last year.  It’s a twenty page article by a man who came here; and the, article is entitled, “The Country that came back from the dead” that was the heading: the country that came back from the dead. And he argued vigorously that Sierra Leone unlike other countries like Somalia or any other of these failed states has been able to come back from that collapse, from that failed state syndrome and we are back on the road to recovery.  He said the country that came back from the dead.  And this can only be a credit to all of us.  Even though we have to thank UNAMSAL, IMATT, ECOMOG our Nigerian brothers and sisters, but the will to survive the resilience of the Sierra Leonean, the faith in God, or God put us to the situation where we are back again; to the extent that some people come here after so many years abroad and say – “but where is the country that was at war I don’t see anything”.  Some of my friends came over Christmas, they said “but I can’t see what you are talking about” – I said but that is because you were not here a couple of years ago.  So if they can come and see, this green mess of Sierra Leone and not the fire that was engulf in this country, let us congratulate ourselves.  Mr. Chairman, I am of the view that the establishment of the office of Ombudsman has been an important one.  Not because I occupy this position.  This is a position that should have been established a long time ago and I was telling why or how the absence of it contributed to some extent to what we went through in the sixties (60’s) a lot of African countries decided to establish this office.  It came from Scandinavia, down to Europe then to Africa.  The first African country to establish it was Tanzania in 1962 under Julius Nyerere.  The good thing about the office—is that it acts as a safety valve.  The office, of the Ombudsman is a safety valve between the government and the people.  In previous years, people had nowhere to go and complain.  Absolutely nowhere!  If they went to the courts they probably won’t get justice because the stronger man succeeded or the man with the money succeeded.  The poor, the weak, the vulnerable had no chance of redressing their grievance from the courts; if he went to parliament to complain to his MP, his MP had no time for him.  For him, if he went to see one who was a Minister, he was simply told “I’m busy”, and of course he had very little access to the Executive.  People had nowhere to turn to for addressing some of these grievances, some of these disputes and these feelings of misadministration were boiling up and some people; some people I believe turned to arms, resorted to arms when they felt all else had failed.  Whether it was the right thing for them to do is a matter for history to decide.  That is not for me to decide; but when people felt that all sources of democratic channels had failed them with nowhere to complain, and nobody to listen to them, they decided to resort to arms.  What was wrong was the way and manner I believe the arms were used against their own brothers and sisters.  Nobody would deny that Sierra Leone was not tinder–box waiting to explode.  So the Ombudsman’s office acts as a safety valve; because, now, people have somewhere to complain.  They have somebody to go and talk to. We don’t send them away. We try to help them either by linking them to other institutions like the police or the Anti-Corruption Commission or the National Commission for democracy and human rights or ICRC etcetera or we send them to LOWCAA.

We do a lot of aid work at Brookfields.  These young men have been doing a lot of good work. We are ashamed we the senior lawyers because  it was these young lawyers that set up the first legal aid system and today they are flourishing.  If you interviewed those who went to the bush they will tell you “I had a land case for twelve months Mr. Gabbidon I was not having justice.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:  Thank you very much Mr. Gabbidon for coming here; we already have before us what you called the trio yesterday: we heard the Chief Justice whom you already heard and then the president of the Bar Association.

As it is our practice at this Commission we would ask you questions for clarification and after that we’ll ask you for your own input and then the leader of evidence will ask you his own questions.   So I’ll now call on my colleague to ask you questions.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:   Mr. Gabbidon I want to join the chairman in thanking you for accepting our invitation to share with us your experience I can say I have been a living witness to most of what you have said in your introduction.  I would want you to clarify a few areas that you have raised in your statement. They are the area of national mistake you mentioned that has cost the country immensely.  Another was the introduction of the following: the army chief of staff did not only become a member of parliament but also a minister of state.

The inspector general of police was both MP and minister of state.  The civil service became a member of the central committee of the ruling party; and chiefs as well as traditional rulers became indoctrinated into politics above all the Attorney General became a minister of state and sat in cabinet. And you as a lawyer would know what that means more than me.

Gabbidon:        Commissioner Torto, thank you.  Well what you said is correct. Those who should have stood up should have been us lawyers because we have a fundamental duty to challenge government when the freedom of the people was violated, because the establishment of a one party state contravenes the constitution because there should have been freedom of association.   

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THEMATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS
Chief Justice Dr Abdulai B Timbo  

Leader of Evidence:      Hon. Commissioner, our witnesses for today’s hearings are present.   We have here as our first witness the Hon Justice Dr Abdulai B Timbo the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:     Please give us your name in full.

Hon Timbo:       Babajeh Timbo.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:   Are you a Christian or A Muslim?

 Hon Timbo:      I am a Muslim.

                          THE OATH WAS ADMINISTERED

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Chief Justice we are glad to have you here this morning and I am sure you have been following our proceedings on the radio and maybe on the television; so you are aware of what we do here and you have nothing to worry about. We are not going to use your testimony against you in any way nor are we going to persecute you; so please feel confident and relax. The normal procedure is that you give your testimony.    And then the Commissioners asked you questions if they have any and then the Leader of Evidence will also ask you questions and after all our questions if you have any questions and recommendations  for the Commission you can ask / say them.

I believe I noticed recommendations in your submission but if you have any other you may like to give, you may do so at the end.  The floor is yours.

Hon. Timbo:     Thank you very much Madam.  The topic of my evidence is the Judiciary, the legal Profession and the Rule of law within the Special Court and issues of Amnesty, and dignity; and the constitution of Sierra Leone.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:  We want to thank you very much CJ for your testimony which you’ve given this morning so that every one should be clear by now the difficulties and the problems facing the judiciary.  It is one thing to criticise and to blame and it is quite another thing to support financially and otherwise and to solve the problems in front of the judiciary. I will allow the Commissioners to ask Questions.

Commissioner Bishop Humper: We want to register our thanks to you not only for making your submission but also for coming here.   This will go a long way in helping us as a Commission. You have responded to many things and that constrains us in asking further questions. I will come to a few questions that border on the work of the Commission.  We had peace keepers that came from the United Nations or ECOWAS.   Those peace keepers were charged with responsibilities to keep the peace when they were called upon to come here. To what extent can they be prosecuted for committing crimes during the charge of their responsibilities? Let’s say UNAMSIL, ECOWAS, or other groups who came here and in the course of their duty happened to have committed crimes.    In what context do you understand that?

Hon. Timbo:  Before the peace keepers themselves came to Sierra Leone they were given instructions and guide lines with respect to what they should do and not do.  I feel and I believe and I submit that if they go outside those regulations and directives they should be properly prosecuted.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:  My second question borders on our work with regard to the difficulties we find ourselves in as a Commission. My question is would somebody be prosecuted for committing crime after the 7 of July 1999 (when the Lome Peace Agreement was signed).  Let’s say on 8th July a person who committed a crime on 7th July is granted amnesty and pardon.  Is such a person coverable if he commits a crime after that date and is he subject to persecution?

Hon. Timbo:   Well as you have already mentioned, that I think is the situation. The people were worried about people committing offences after that period and there is provision for that.  The special court act for persecutions after July 1999 I believe can be properly investigated and invoked, and a person can be prosecuted thereby in my opinion.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:   Chief Justice could you please help us again to have some insight into the non legal and legal concept of impeditive justice.  The TRC is dealing with the understanding of the non legal but the Special Court is dealing with the Legal.  There appears to be a tension between these two institutions.  Will you help us to get some insight into the workings between the two?

Hon. Timbo:     From the beginning it was stated that not every body will be prosecuted under the special court provisions.   Therefore it follows that those who committed offences that fall outside the ambit of the Special Court should  be investigated thoroughly by the TRC. Because as we have been doing people have been coming forward but down-playing their own participation in the rebel war and I believe as we have made it clear to them you are not collecting the evidence to submit to the Special Court  so I don’t see any difficulty in that as such. However I still think it a boosting that they should be investigated even if there is no prosecution.  They can come plain with it as it has been happening to make apologies.  It has been done with people confessing their roles and pleading forgiveness.   We are all part of Sierra Leone; we want peace and want to be able to go to bed with both eyes closed and I think the TRC is doing a wonderful job.   I am speaking for the judiciary and I commend you for your work.
    
Commissioner Bishop Humper:    This is the last question I am asking you not in your capacity as Chief Justice but as an individual and as a citizen of this country. In your opinion, how far has the interference or non interference of the executive branch of government into the professional work of the judiciary hampered or undermined justice in the period under review.

Hon Timbo:    I have difficulty to speak as a private person because I have been a judge for the past 17 years so I should be able to say what I have noticed on the bench rather as a private person. I don’t believe or remember any one moment when the executive has interfered with me or any body I have known of.  On the question of non interference I hope I am correct to say that I blame the government for not seeing to it that we have proper financial provisions for the bench and the judiciary in general.  The Minister of finance should know our problems.  They should come and assist us realizing that without an upright and functional judiciary little will be achieved in terms of good governance. The public or the ordinary person will want to know that if he or she has a problem with somebody else he has a place to go to and they will get justice.  That is why I believe it’s of utmost importance that the judiciary is given a face lift.  I even went to England recently to do the interview for the judges for the Anti Corruption Commission and I did emphasise that without a functioning judiciary, there’s hardly anything that can function properly in our Republic.  It is the same thing I am saying here that members of this Commission should do everything to see that the judiciary functions properly.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:              Thank you Chief Justice.
 
Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:      I will like to join Madam Commissioner and the Chairman of the Commission in thanking the Chief Justice.   In your submission you are saying you are asking for self accounting.  What is the implication or what effect will this have on what people are complaining about the access to justice, the affordability of justice and you know those things that will make justice affordable to the ordinary person

Hon Timbo:   The first thing is this; we have established a system by which there are courts presided over in every district headquarter town and some other sub stations.  For example we have courts in Makeni, Kamakwei, Kabala, Kambia, Mashaka and many other places.  We are having problems in getting magistrates who supervise or in getting JP’s to go to these areas.  We don’t have money to give them fuel for their vehicles. They may go and make claims afterwards but where will the money come from?  It will be much easier for us to make our own arrangements for them so that they will be able to move from point A – B faster than one would expect.  And when we talk about access to justice it means we should go nearer to the people who need justice so that one need not move down to Freetown before realising.  When an electric bulb gets blown up you can’t get money to replace it, they say buy it and claim the money later.   But where is the money going to come from?  These are the sorts of things we are going through.  The master is here, Mrs Showers knows it because she has gone through it over the years.  If we had this self accounting system before and it worked, why can’t we have it again to be able to run our courts efficiently?   We have recently received motor cycles.  I appealed to the Chinese Ambassador and he gave us 4, and DFID gave us 14.  Problems that arose immediately we got these things had to do with finance.    They had not been budgeted for so we had difficulty using them.   They had not been licensed and just as there was no money for fuelling them.  So I had then stocked in the court building for nearly 2 months  and had to appeal to the Chief Executive Secretary of the Road Transport Corporation to remove the vehicles on terms and that we would pay later, so many of them Mr Commissioner.  I now give you a most recent example when I tried to establish the high court in Port Loko.  Because of the scarcity of personnel and the fact that there is only one judge who moves from point A – B, I had to come in myself.  I wanted money to travel but the accountant asked me to wait in the office so that she could go and look for money.  She spent nearly the whole day without success and she was afraid to come back to me to say my lord, I am sorry there is no money.   So I had to spend my own money.   Fortunately I was able to get money from somewhere and I went to Port Loko.  Until now I have not been reimbursed.  If we have a self-accounting system, we will be able to generate funds in the judiciary and we will also be able to take care of these minor things. Then again the UNDP said they were going to make a case for us to the government but first we were expected to generate funds and to take care of the funds we received on a daily basis, like fines and other impositions.  What I did was that 2 weeks ago, as soon as I came from England, I took steel boxes to the police stations and asked the clerks to put their takings for the day; and I kept them under lock and key.  We thought we should produce something so that our case would be easy to handle.  These are the ways in which I am trying to bring in some help so that we can take care of our immediate needs.  Without these it is virtually impossible to get people to do things.  I put pressure on my staff and even embarrassed them while they in turn embarrassed me because we want to move forward and take justice to the people. But in all of these you need money and it is for these reasons that we are suggesting that we come back to where we were before. And I am appealing to this Commission to help us get back this self accounting system.  The judiciary has to move forward we are willing to do so but please help us.
 
Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much.  What I am proposing here is you have asked us to help you towards this self-acquiring self-accounting system.  But we cannot do that until we have received all the information that will guide us in making an informed contribution or recommendation towards that because one of the considerations as far as I am concerned, will be that whatever system is adopted, is not going to be worst than what exists now that the people of this country, the public will be able to afford justice, that is legal services to give them justice. If you have a system which makes it impossible for the ordinary man to afford legal services, then it is of no good use.  I am sure you will agree with me, it will be of no good to anybody.

Hon Timbo:    I quite agree with you Mr. Commissioner but I am sure whilst we are here, my master would assist, then we can submit something by the time you rise, I am sure you will have something to hold onto.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much.

Timbo:    Am I right my master?  Mr. Showers

Mr. Showers:       Yes indeed.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Our staff will get in touch with you on that.  The other question I want to ask has to do with the question we often meet as we go out to talk to people relating to this amnesty and the Special Court.  Now there are people, who are described as having to bear the greatest responsibility for the war, who go into the Special Court.  But there are other people, who do not fall within that category.  Well, one may perhaps understand that the punishment or the effort to punish those who bear the greatest responsibility is a way of having accountability for everybody who took part in the rebel war.  Indeed those who bear the greatest responsibility were responsible for the atrocities committed by others under them down the line.  But other people have been asking the question, why is it that after the amnesty, these same people are selected for punishment?   For instance, a person who has killed another person’s relative is as culpable as a person who led the rebel war.  So they feel that those people too, should be punished and there is the other completion as the chairman asked earlier.  Those people who committed crimes after the 7th of July 1999 are all these people covered by the amnesty?  Can these people take action against them if they want to in spite of the amnesty?

Hon. Timbo:    Well for a start, the Special Court is made for people who have committed the greatest atrocities, down the line silent in between.  You are the TRC, your function is to try to bring out all these things into the open and try to reconcile as much as you can with the people.  Thereafter, if people feel they are not satisfied, I believe they should be free to go to court, and then the court will be able to interpret the amnesty provisions of Lome.  That should be left with the court and that should be left to people who are not satisfied after all your effort.  That’s how I think I should put it at this level.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    There is a subsidiary to that and this goes on page 4 of your submission and I read the appropriate section.  It says the court will therefore be entitled to impose custodial sentences additionally; the Special Court will have the power to order forfeiture of any convicted person’s property, proceeds and assets which were considered to be acquired unlawfully.  Now we have also been approached by people who had acquired property of others, they are now and those are properties which they hold while they deprive the victim and impoverish, and can’t afford them at this stage.  But these people have not everybody is saying they have amnesty.  I will give you an example.  In Binkolo, one man went and took another man’s building materials, put up a building and now lives in it and there was this man who was deprived, he cannot now afford to put up a building and every time he passes by and sees this man living in a comfortable house, you know, something moves within him.  So he asked the question, can’t this man pay for the materials or give me that building which he now possesses which should have belonged to me because these people are not going to be put in court because they do not bear, the greatest responsibility?

Hon. Timbo:    I believe, the amnesty should be limited to criminal activities.  I cannot see, during the rebel war, somebody takes my car away and in peacetime, I see him going up and down with that car, I do not do something to repossess that car.  That is the civil aspect, I do agree with those people who pose those questions that there should be remedy somehow and that’s why I am saying if you try the civil court, it will be a matter for the court, to determine whether that is covered by the amnesty.  Some of these cases should be tested in the court there you will find the answers.  I would not like to say so sitting down here.   As a Chief Justice or as a judge when the matter comes before me, it may be said, this was what you said at the TRC, so I would not go beyond what I think I have already said if you will excuse me please.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Thank you very much.

Hon. Timbo:    Thank you.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Before I ask Commissioner Torto, I just want to say what has occurred to me that these people who would want to bring these cases, would not be able to afford test cases.  They are the type of people who would not be able to afford test cases.

Hon. Timbo:    Well, that is why the Commission is there.  At the Commission people can make their own recommendations, it if is as a system of legal aid somehow, then they can pursue their rights and test the cases.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Commissioner Torto?

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you very much chairman.  Chief Justice, I must first of all join my colleagues in thanking you for your appearance before the Commission and sharing your experiences with us on this very very important matter.  I have a few areas that I really want you to help me out with in terms of clarifying them.  I will start with very short ones that deal with personnel.  It is disheartening to hear you and also read from the paper how much your department is suffering from shortage of personnel that has hindered your effective performance so seriously.  My question in that regard is, has the establishment of the law school not helped the situation in terms of alleviating staff shortages at the judiciary.

Hon. Timbo:    Well, as I mentioned, not even the young are interested in the judiciary.  Last week, when the law school met, Council for Legal Education, I as chairman, we were going to recommend that in fact students should be bonded like in the past so they will be able to serve the country.   I cannot get as I say even those who are 2 or 3 years.  They can be magistrates but they refuse to come and it is very disheartening.  There was a time when I even called some of them in my chambers but I saw nobody.   “My Lord, I will give you an answer,” but the next minute I heard they were somewhere else.  Two of them went to the Law office, they took a consultancy and little did I know that they had in fact applied to go to the Law office and they were with me for about 45 minutes.  I have done that continuously and it appears the Law School doesn’t seem to be in a position to help us.  The answer to this would be improved conditions.  UNDP is working on that but even the suggestion they want to put before government, I have been testing people to see their reaction; people are still not satisfied.  The figures UNDP is even suggesting are too small.  Even before government accepts them, they say it’s too small so why wouldn’t it be.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you.  My next question has to do with Corporal Foday Sankoh.  Many a time he stated during interviews, testimonies and explanations and even statements that one reason he took up arms to actually fight against the government of this country, was the injustice meted out on him.  That he was falsely accused, falsely prosecuted, falsely charged and falsely imprisoned and that was one reason he thought the best way he said he could remedy the situation was to change the system by force.  Chief Justice, do you think there are possibilities of such actions in the judiciary department that people could be falsely accused, falsely charged, falsely prosecuted and falsely imprisoned.

Hon. Timbo:    Well with the greatest respect to you, I do not agree such cases are many, if any.  The question of falsely charges and falsely imprisonment, there are so many loopholes, so many gaps.  Corporal Foday Sankoh never told us what the offence was, he never told us he tried to appeal, he went to the highest court in the land, he never told us that.  So we have to take it with a pinch of salt.  As events showed later, it was more than just locking up Corporal Foday Sankoh.  We all know, Corporal Foday Sankoh had his own ambitions, it was just a question of having been locked up unnecessarily in his own words.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you.  I also want to make reference to a testimony before this Commission.   I don’t want to call names because it’s going to portray a different situation for witnesses who have testified and categorically described the proportion of inmates at the Pademba Road Prisons; saying that the greater percentage is made up largely of people awaiting trial, who are actually serving remand.  Some people have been in that kind of situation for 2 or 3 years, still awaiting trial.  He has cited a lot of reasons for this one that lawyers gain by adjourning cases, and that presiding magistrate’s attitude of not treating cases with the utmost urgency they deserve.  In addition there is a lot of professional malpractice going on in the judicial system.  Lawyers prolong cases by asking for adjournments repeatedly and as a result of that, there are lots of cases pending judgment, and that has raised the prison population to a very high level with most inmates on row as remand prisoners.

Hon. Timbo:    As I have already mentioned, we have this serious shortage of staff, and of course there are so many cases with a volume beyond our handling and the question of sending people on remand makes it worse.  You might have heard recent complaints against us that the courts often release prisoners only for them to go again and commit worse offences.   What do you suggest we do?  We need to send cases of aggravated robberies to prison and refuse them bail.  We have to refuse them bail so they will be there.  The answer to the question of cases dragging in court is that we do not have enough magistrates or judges.  Since I became Chief Justice, I introduced court sittings on Saturdays just to see if we can go faster.  They are still doing that.  Now, there is also a fast track system, which is being experimented by my office and DFID.  Well, with the JPs again, the JPs are helping very greatly in Freetown here and in the provinces so that we can reduce the backdrop of cases and the cases for those awaiting trial.  But we are caught in between as to whether we should release these people on bail, or send them in.   If we send them in can we cope with the volume of cases?  I must say here and I believe that is the truth.  Something has to be done about personnel.  Our female Commissioner on the other side did so much work for us but then we lost her to the TRC.  Her cases had to pass through other judges; it meant they had to be tried all over again.  I wish she had some time to go and complete some of those cases.  I don’t know whether she can but that is the situation.  We are desperately looking for judges and I believe if the conditions are improved, the senior members of the bar will come and assist us.  That’s why I think we should put the emphasis for you to use your good offices to see that we have personnel.

Commissioner Bishop Humper:    Yes sir.  He also mentioned the unnecessary adjournment of cases by lawyers.  That those cases are prolonged unnecessarily and the buyers gain by that.  I don’t know what he means by that but this is the allegation.  So I don’t know whether there is any excuse for that.

Hon Timbo:    I don’t know how they gain by that but I am told by magistrates and judges, don’t adjourn cases beyond two weeks.  That is a rule, a guideline I have given them and they have been keeping to it but the lawyers have so many cases.  They come to court and find that at times they have ten or perhaps fifteen cases per day.  They have to be in all these courts, if they don’t do it the witnesses or the accused persons will say the magistrate has been bribed or the magistrate had an interest that was why he is refused to adjourn.  So here again, we are caught between justice and the demands of the system.  We have tried to improve on all these things although we have to have basic ingredients that are magistrates and judges.  The intention in fact, is to have one magistrate in every district, rather than go by what we have now.  For example we have Magistrate Shyllon covering Bombali, Koinadugu, Tonkolili and Kono Districts.  He goes to each of these places three days in a month.  When he is not there it is the JP’s.  The reasons we put the JP’s there is to make sure that if somebody is charged with an offence, within 72 hours, the law says you should appear in court so the JP’s will be there, so we are making this improvement.  Most of these are not being highlighted.  It is the other things, the negative side that comes up most of the time.  This is unfortunate but it is not to say that we will stop the progress of the court.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you.  For how many weeks can a case be adjourned?

Hon. Timbo:    Pardon?

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    A case can be adjourned up to 2 weeks.  How many times of two, two weeks can it go on?

Hon. Timbo:    Before now it used to be one month, 2 months, 3 months at a time.   Definitely, there is a limit.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    So you can adjourn for two weeks?

Hon. Timbo:    No, we will not take it up to a year; not even six months, everything else being normal.  If we have enough magistrates, we have enough judges, a case will not last more than 3 months.  That is my target but we need the step.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    My last question sir.  It’s the area of the office of the CJ.  The swearing in of Johnny Paul Koroma has been criticised by journalists in editorials sometimes.  Some say it was wrong of him to have done so, others say it was right.  I want to know whether in such circumstances it is right for a Chief Justice to swear in a junta leader, thereby legitimising his position as Head of State with all the facilities and privileges of that post.  Is it right?

Hon. Timbo:    Legally, I would say it is not right but it is left with the individual chief Justice to make his own decision.  Recently when we went to interview the anti-corruption judges, the one from Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands did not have to abandon the thing because you have so many associations there because they did not think it was right.  It was not a properly constitution government, so they refused.  That is why I say it’s left with the individual judge but legally, I do not think it is right.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Even if the Chief Justice is held under gunpoint to administer an oath of office for President?

Hon. Timbo:    That is another matter altogether with respect.  If I am held at gunpoint with words such as “put your pen there or you die”, it will still depend on the particular person administering the oath.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    But still it legitimises the oath take not so?

Hon. Timbo:    No but you will want to know the circumstances under which he did it.  If he did it under duress, that is you live or die, and yet an opportunity arises for him to retreat or to do something else but fails to do it, that becomes another matter for consideration.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Above all, I thank you very much for this paper.  You have raised the problems and actually offered solutions to them in your recommendations.  So I think this paper is going to be of immense help to a lot of us in the Commission.  I thank you very much.

Hon. Timbo:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you very much.  Leader of Evidence have you any questions?

Leader of Evidence:      Thank you very much Honorable Commissioner, we have a few questions to ask please.   Honorable Chief Justice, first and foremost, I will like to request that subsequently, our research unit would clarify certain issues with you by putting it in writing and when we do, kindly oblige us with such request.

Hon. Timbo:    Pardon?

Leader of Evidence:      We will ask you to clarify certain issues by sending to you a written request and when we do, please oblige us with that request.  But now, I would like you to address the Commission on how the judiciary is complying particularly with a certain constitutional provision.  That is section 120 sub section 16 which reads, with your permission under this constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of the evidence and final addresses or arguments of appeal and punish all parties to the cause of matter, determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision on the date of the delivery there of.  Honorable Chief Justice, could you please address us, whether or not the judges are complying with this particular constitutional provision, that is, by delivering written decisions or judgments within three months of conclusion of evidence.

Hon. Timbo:    Thank you very much for that interesting question but if you look at other provisions of the constitution, all other things should be equal.  I have outlined the number of judges we must have, I have also stated the number you have in post, so that by itself makes it impossible to comply with that provision.  I tell you when I was in England very recently I read in the Commonwealth bulletin an article written by an eminent lawyer from Nigeria.  He said their own constitution was the only constitution that had that provision.  For a start, I believe it was wrong because we have it also.  Then, he went on further to say if you do not comply with that provision does it nullify the proceedings or any subsequent judgment?  He said yes, the other argument that he should not if it does not resolve in a miscarriage of justice, you can still accept it.  But the third thing he said was that everything being equal, if you have all the judges, you have all the staff, all the other things you will need to comply with that provision, it will be wrong to exceed that three months period.  I wish we got to that place whilst I am still Chief Justice; I will make sure that that provision has been complied with.  That is why my emphasis is on the cost of recruiting judges to be able to turn out cases faster than we have at the moment.   But surely we cannot blame the judges all the way, the lawyers all the way, we have these limitations and that is the limitation I am asking this Commission to address very seriously,

Leader of Evidence:        Thank you very much Honorable chief Justice.  From everything you have addressed particularly the problems, the judiciary is confronted, would you please therefore confirm my opinion if I do say that justice is not accessible to the ordinary person of Sierra Leone and for that matter, the rule of law is really hampered?

Hon. Timbo:    With this qualification, justice is not accessible to the people of Sierra Leone as how we would want to see it.

Leader of Evidence:    Ok thank you very much.  My last question please do you think that in deciding on transitional justice mechanism that is accountability mechanisms in dealing with the atrocities committed, Sierra Leone really needed to have the 2 models, operating concurrently, that is the Special Court and the TRC?  We would please want to have your view on that.

Hon. Timbo:    Yes I think that is perfectly correct and that is why you have these institutions.  The fact that we will not be able to prosecute everybody that was involved in the war meant something had to be done to bring those people to say something like an apology or compensation to the victim.  Then for those who bear the greatest responsibility, you have the Special Court.  I think the two institutions have rightly been chosen.

Leader of Evidence:     Thank you Madam Commissioner, no more question from us.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you Chief Justice I would like to thank you for the frank way in which you have answered all our questions and for the time you have spent here with us, this morning.  Now I wonder whether you have any question for us.

Hon. Timbo:    Well I suppose the questions I have to ask I would have asked and the questions I have already highlighted in my submission except perhaps if you say any further appeal to make to the Commission.  In that case I will only repeat the appeal I have already made.  The question of personnel is a problem for me.  I am determined to see that there is a change in the judicial system; I am determined to see that people have access to justice because justice is affordable.  But we need the personnel, without them, it is not possible to perform the way I would want to perform.  I thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you, you may step down now.

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Thematic & Institutional Hearings President Bar Association Sierra Leone – Mr.
Oliver O. Nylander

Leader of Evidence:      Honourable Commissioners, our next witness is Mr. Oliver O. Nylander, the President of the Bar Association of Sierra Leone, making submissions on behalf of the Association.

Nylander:    Oliver Ogunade Nylander.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Are you a Christian or a Muslim.

Nylander:    Christian.

The oath is administered

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    We welcome you Mr. Nylander for the second time to the TRC and you watched the Chief Justice give his testimony and it is a very fortuitous thing that you are coming right after him.  So, we continue our education about the judiciary this morning, we take another aspect of it and that is the lawyers?

Nylander:    Yes Madam chair because going by my instruction from the letter, it only says that we write to confirm that the date for your appearance at the public hearing of the Commission, the subject judiciary will be on Monday 26th July.  So I shall be looking at the judiciary.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    From your own perspective?

Nylander:    From the perspective of the legal practitioners.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Alright thank you very much.  You may begin.

Nylander:    Madam Chair, Commissioners, as President of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, I will have a look at the judiciary from the practitioners point of view.  The judiciary is one of the three arms of government; others being the executive and the legislature. Successive governments have over the years neglected and failed to pay due attention to the needs and problems of the judiciary.  As a result, there had been a sharp decline in the quality of justice dispensed by courts which has resulted in the rule of law being eroded and the public losing confidence in the judiciary.  It is our opinion that the most pressing problem facing the judiciary is the lack of personnel and trained personnel to man the courts.  There has been an acute shortage of magistrates on the lower bench and judges of the superior court of judicature that is the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  My own valuable Chief Justice Dr. Abdulai Timbo, can confirm this as he has on several occasions made public pronouncements of this fact.  The last being at the annual conference of the Sierra Leone Bar Association held at the British council on 2nd July 2003.  In view of this shortage of Judges and Magistrates, there is a heavy workload of cases on the few Judges and Magistrates available.  It is not uncommon for at least 20 cases to be a day for hearing before a High Court Judge, especially civil matters and also about 30 criminal cases to be listed for daily hearing before a magistrate, particularly the Magistrate Court No.1.  This might be a contributing factor to the long delays in trial of cases thus making litigation very expensive.  Hence there is the issue of numerous adjournments.  It has been alleged that lawyers take on too many cases for which they have not got the capacity to handle.  This necessitates or gives rise to requests of frequent adjournments of cases.  There might be some truth in such allegation from some of our colleagues but most times, adjournments have been requested because the parties or litigants and their witnesses have failed to appear on the day for the trial.  In such situations the lawyer will have no alternative other than to apply for an adjournment.  Therefore lawyers are not entirely responsible for the numerous adjournments of cases.  There is also the burning issue of shortage of materials like stationery.  At times Council will request that notices be sent out to both absent parties and their solicitors.  This request might be granted by the judge, then comes the next adjourned date.  Parties and their solicitors might fail to appear.  The reason being failure by the Registrar to send out notices as requested and this will be due to the fact that printed notice forms were not available.  Then the lack or need for continuous legal training for both legal and para-legal supporting staff of the judiciary, like the Registrar, Court Clerks and Bailiffs is also lacking.  Then I have proceeded to make recommendations as we see the plight of practitioners.  May I proceed?

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    You say you have something lacking in what we have here?   Alright carry on.

Nylander:    The government must improve the conditions of service for judges and magistrates so as to attract the right calibre of people to the bench.  Firstly, the salary should be made more attractive, the supply of electricity to the residence of judges and magistrates should be made a priority so that they could be made readily available for prompt delivery.  The medical allowances given to judges and magistrates should be increased as well as the allocation of vehicles to all judges so as to enable them to arrive in court promptly for court sittings.  Next we look at the provision of legal aid.  Government should seriously consider the establishment of a legal Aid and Assistance scheme, which will enable indigent litigants who could not afford the high cost of litigation to access justice and not to be deprived of their rights to seek redress in court for wrongs done to them because they are impecunious.  Already a group of lawyers known as LAWCLA has established a form of assistance to indigent litigants.  The Bar Association has also been running a few clinics at the Bar Association Secretariat whereby, free legal advice is given to persons who cannot solicit the service of a lawyer because of the high cost involved in litigation.  

The reforming of our laws especially absolute ones:

In this area, I must commend the government of Sierra Leone, who have recently activated the Law Reforming Commission, who will be holding a seminar on the commercial use of land in Sierra Leone from 30th – 31st July 2003.  Its first major activity is to examine the reform of the law relating to the commercial use of land in Sierra Leone.  Another problem has been the absence of reported Sierra Leone law cases and this has hampered the work of the judges, since the last reporting of Sierra Leone on law cases was in 1973.  My association with funding from DIFID, has embarked upon the publication of Sierra Leone law reports covering a 10 year period from 1990 – 2000, of cases presided in the court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  On completion of the first phase, my association will embark on reporting cases presided by the High court for the period 1973 to date.  Recently, some members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association came together to form a local non-governmental association known as the Legal Reform Initiatives.  They are committed to support legal reforms in Sierra Leone and to provide a bridge between the national and international ongoing justice efforts.  We believe that the legal community must be at the forefront of promoting justice and impartial rule of law and to participate in difficult vital and important projects of improving the country’s judicial system.  The government should also seriously consider the provision of continuous legal training for both judges and magistrates and the para legal staff of the judiciary.  I was privileged together with the Honorable chief Justice Dr. Abdulai Timbo, the learned Attorney General, Mr. Eke Halloway to have attended the all-African conference of law, Justice and Development held in Abuja Nigeria sometime in February this year.  At that conference, the need for continuous legal training for judges, magistrates and barristers was stressed, if we in Africa are to leave the challenges and opportunities offered by globalisation.   Thanks to the UNDP who conducted sometime in March 2003 a course for Justice of the Peace, clerks and Bailiffs of the judiciary.  Within a very short time, we the legal practitioners have started seeing the benefits of such legal training especially among Justices of the Peace, who preside over our cases, over cases in the Magistrate Court as they now have the law stored in their bosom.  We the members of the legal profession are sure that now that we have the President, the Vice President, who are both lawyers by profession that the need of the judiciary will continue to be looked into.  That is my recommendation.  The Bar normally involves legal practitioners, the lawyers who are practitioners from the Sierra Leone Bar Association and the judiciary comprises of the Bench that is judges of the Superior Court of judicature, the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court and the Lower Bench, the magistrates, so there are two distinct situations two distinct offices.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Alright my next question which follows this and with recommendations coming from the Bar Association or the judiciary have a multiplying effect on the effectiveness of these two bodies.

Nylander:    Yes because we have frequent consultations as for example, the President of the Sierra Leone Bar Association is a member of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission.  Likewise, we also have both formal and informal meetings with the Honorable Chief Justice so at least we could put across the views of our clients and also what we see as impediments in the way forward as far as just administration of justice is concerned.  We are always given the opportunity to put forward our ideas and I must commend my Lord the Honorable Chief Justice as always willing to listen to our views although at times he does not agree entirely with us but he gives us the opportunity to be heard.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:   Thank you Mr. President.  My plea with you, if this is workable, is for you to work with the judiciary; having listened to the Chief Justice’ presentation here, then to get us a comprehensive recommendation that will be of interest both to the judiciary and the Bar Association.  Because the Commission has this as one of its very important areas of concern in this country and your first hand comments in this presentation summarises everything for me as far as I am concerned and the subsequent recommendations that should follow.   Probably you will be working in conjunction with the Law Reform Commission or other arms to get a workshop, to get a real comprehensive document for the Commission’s consideration.  That is my plea with you.

Nylander:    Mr. Commissioner, I whole-heartedly agree.  As a matter of fact, we have been working with No Peace Without Justice to produce something very comprehensive but unfortunately, time has not been on our side but we shall endeavour to do something.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you Professor.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Thank you very much and I will like to welcome you Mr. Nylander, President of the Bar Association.  We thank you for coming to make this presentation. I haven’t got questions as such but I am a little surprised to hear or see this statement in your submission and I will read it.  Under the recommendation, paragraph three you said, provision of legal aid.  Government should seriously consider the establishment of a Legal aid and Assistance Scheme.  So I am surprised to see that.  I had assumed all the time that there is a national provision to help people who need legal assistance but this seems to be telling me that there is no such provision in this country.  Am I correct or wrong?

Nylander:    Well Mr. Chairman not absolutely wrong.  There is a provision for legal aid.   In criminal cases like in cases for murder where the accused persons have the right to be defended, the state will pay the legal fees to defend the accused persons but not in all other areas.  Like in Britain, they have the Legal Aid and Assistance Scheme which is not only for criminal cases but in Sierra Leone, as far as my knowledge goes the government provides financial assistance for defence or accused persons who are charged with capital offences like murder for them to be tried or defended in these cases.  That is as far as my knowledge goes but it does not extend this to other areas especially in civil matters.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    So all this time and up to this point, people in Sierra Leone who have not got the resources to afford legal aid have had no justice in those matters.

Nylander:    Well I will not say that they have no justice but they do not have recourse to the courts to redress their wrongs because they haven’t got the finance.  That is the problem and Mr. Commissioner, there is nowhere in the world that you have a level playing field when it comes to the matter of justice. You have to pay for justice like any other commodity.  You have to pay your lawyers.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    But also, you have told us that there are provisions in some countries.

Nylander:    Yes, there are like in Britain I am aware of that.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    But we have got.  Well I hope your recommendation will be heeded and sometime in the future, provision will be made to help people who can’t afford legal aid in this country.

Nylander:    Indeed Mr. Commissioner, it is my wish, I hope that we will arrive at that situation someday.

Commissioner Prof. Kamara:    Thank you.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you very much Mr. Nylander for coming to the Commission and more so I want to join my colleagues in appreciating your contribution.  I have read your very short testimony and going down in the fourth paragraph, I was reminded of, I am sorry to put this but its just a way of reminder to quote from a book I have read before “Law without Lawyers” and at a portion of that book he is saying that “the laws are made by the rich, for the protection of the rich” and he is saying that “the legislature are the rich people assuming those who make their ways to the house, to be in position to help make the laws, must be people in the higher income”.  That is the argument put forward. However, in order to correlate that statement with your testimony, I have down here with me, like you said in the fourth paragraph, where you said the adjournment of cases is not entirely the responsibility of the lawyers at times.  But the compliance in this particular case are the people, the civil populace who are not lawyers.  It is they who are complaining that there is persistent adjournment of cases which means, the fault is not coming from them, that it is the lawyers who persistently and frequently adjourn cases at time for no reason, at times for some other reason to say go and wait for me at the court, I will be there, only to find out that they don’t even show up. So this is the allegation.  I don’t know how much you contribute towards either refuting this or confirming it?

Nylander:    Well, as I said earlier, there might be some truth in these allegations because some of our colleagues take more cases than they have the capacity to cope with.  But in more of what I have witnessed or have been involved in throughout my practice there is failure on the part of witnesses to appear.   I will give you a classical example that occurred last week.  We were in the High Court in a murder trial; we were expecting the doctor to turn up.  Unfortunately, he could not come because he was extremely ill and we had no alternative other than to have the matter adjourned.  At the next adjourned date all efforts were made by the prosecution as well as the defence to see that transport was provided to bring the doctor from his accommodation just to help him to the court and he came.   He was able to deal with the autopsy, which he presented because it was a murder trial and that closed his own section because if we had not got that doctor at that particular stage, the doctor flew out on Friday.  It means we would have encountered difficulty and there would have been a prolongation of that particular trial.  These are some of the problems we face.  For example, we also have criminal matters like in the Magistrate Court where you have the police witnesses.  Police fail to turn up.   It is not the fault of the complainant or the lawyers when investigators fail to turn up.   That’s not the fault of the complainant or the lawyers but the investigators who fail to come up, whose matter could not be proceeded with.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you for your explanation.  It has just been stated, I think you were in the hall listening to the testimony of the Chief Justice, that the judicial department is suffering from a very very acute staff shortage and the tendency has been for lawyers to actually move from government service into private practice and that has been the major cause.  Well, the major reason has to do with conditions of service anyway, but other additional reasons are there which you know better than me as to why actually they are leaving or going into private practice.  Can the Bar Association pass a resolution in order to actually forestall this kind of trend?  In order to stabilize the personnel of staffing in the judiciary, can the Bar Association pass a rule to say every practising lawyer who is just coming into practice from college or from outside, must serve the government for five years before opting out.

Nylander:    Mr. Commissioner, I do agree and see your anxiety being expressed but I think a resolution to that effect might be interfering with the lawyer’s own human rights.  Certainly, it would interfere with them because it is your choice on completion of both your academic and professional training to enter into which field either as a practitioner or into the Bench.  Personally, I have served my own national service I did my own national service.  Immediately I left school, I worked as a clerk in 1961, at the Establishment Secretary’s Office on to the Prime Minister’s Officer, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Secretary’s Office again and I ended up at the Ministry of education.  I went on study leave, when I came back I had to work at the Law Officers Department as a State Council and I worked for four solid years.  So it’s up to the individual but as I said earlier, the conditions could be made more attractive, definitely it will attract younger practitioners to come unto the Bench but we need people of calibre because it is being said in certain quarters that corruption is rampant but you need not only to recruit lawyers, but lawyers with high calibre who would say no to the temptation and not yield to the temptation of corruption.  So, all boils down to the question of making the conditions of service more attractive, then you will have them and as my Lord, the chief Justice said earlier, even the younger colleagues, leaving the law school do not fancy coming up to the Bench.   I have gone all my way, I have spoken to them and even to older colleagues, and it’s extremely difficult.  The Chief Justice will confirm that we hold conference with them in private under attractive social conditions, talk to them, please come into the Bench, but they would not.  They say the conditions are not attractive and that is the position.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you Mr. Nylander.  Would you agree to the general statement that the law is actually made by the rich for the protection of the rich because legal service is only available to those who can afford and those who can afford are the rich?  What do you say about this assertion?

Nylander:    I would not agree with that assertion that the law, because it  is passed by parliament is for the rich when not only rich people are in parliament.  We have people of different financial status in parliament who pass the law and the courts are there to interpret the law but people may say that the law is meant for the rich.   There are certain areas unless you have money, you could not have redress especially in civil matters, like the shipping cases, the land tenure cases but in other areas, the poor man goes to the court.  If he is offended, he goes to the Magistrate Court issuing the summons, complainant persons and he had been heard.  So I would not agree entirely that the law is meant for the rich because it is not the rich people who pass the laws, not the rich people; ordinary parliamentarians and not all parliamentarians are wealthy that one I could say.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    thank you.  There is also a general allegation or accusation going round.  At times, I don’t know whether it is true or false or is there a tendency for lawyers of complainant and lawyers of the accused to  team up together to fix a case?  Are you aware?  Is your organisation aware of this case?  

Nylander:     I am not, that complaint has not come to my knowledge because if that be the case, it will be considered a grave professional misconduct for which one could have his wigs removed and they are debarred from practising.  So I don’t think colleagues will go to that extent to risk their livelihood, risk the person of being debarred, where you would starve along with your family.  But no complaints have been brought to my knowledge where lawyers team up with their opponents to defeat the aims of Justice.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you then.  The very last of my questions for areas of clarification is this one bordering on this staffing issue.  You have just rightly said that it could tantamount to interfering with human rights of the lawyers who may be required to actually sign an agreement for a number of times and then opt out.  But this practice was actually, been done in the teaching field, wherein teachers were required to sign a bond and then go to teaching for a number of years and then up till now there after.  I don’t know whether the practice is still invoked.  But since it was right, don’t you think what is right for the goose is right for the gander.  The teachers were subjected to it why shouldn’t the lawyers.

Nylander:    Well Mr. Commissioner, provided that your fees were paid by government because speaking from my own experience, when I worked as Assistant  Student Secretary in the Ministry of Education, students were bonded.  That was around 1968/69. They were bonded because the scholarships that were given or their fees were paid by government.  But if my fees were paid by my parents, I don’t see why I should be bonded to go and serve the government.  But if government spends its resources, pays for my education, then it’s my obligation and duty to serve government for the money spent on me.  So if the government could provide the scholarships for students to come to the Law School or to complete their studies at the University, then come into the Law school, then we might introduce that sought of bond for students to serve the government, as it has been in other fields.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you Chair.  I am sorry there is an area that is of interest to me where you really recommended the various welfare systems which is right, quite in place in order for judges and lawyers to actually perform their best.  There has to be that kind of improvement in the conditions of service.  There’s no doubt about that.  But would you think that all by itself would solve the problem?  Are there not other issues that one would consider in order to make the lawyers and judges more effective?  The welfare systems are taken in good parts I agree with you but I think there should be more to it than this.  In terms of attitude to work, personality, and other forms of motivation these ones may not satisfy.

Nylander:    Agreed Mr. Commissioner.  Also from within the individual that is my duty to serve on the Bench.  But from conversations and discussions held with colleagues, what has come out primarily is the conditions of service, which are not attractive.  That is the main reason.

Commissioner Sylvanus Torto:    Thank you very much.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you. Leader of Evidence, have you any question?

Leader of Evidence:      Thank you very much Honorable Commissioner and thank you very much President of the Bar Association of Sierra Leone.  Our first observation is that the Commission would want to have a comprehensive, very comprehensive written submission, which should include certain areas, such as absolute laws.  What you perceive as absolute laws obviously requiring reforms.  You mentioned that there are absolute laws, we would want you to specifically identify them and give reasons why you think reforms are necessary, and then also on the rule of law generally and how the judiciary have faired.  We would want to have a comprehensive written submission assessing the various political regimes  from independence as far as the rule of law is concerned in this country and many other areas.  The question I would also want to ask is what the Bar Association is doing in terms of determining or ensuring quality service delivery by lawyers to their clients because, of course it could be inferred from your submission that there are incessant adjournments.  And as we all know the saying goes that justice delayed is justice denied.  In a country like Nigeria for example, the Bar Association has set up an institute for advanced legal learning which allows lawyers to go for continuous legal education.  I am also aware that in Ghana for example, the Bar Association organises periodic workshops on specific issues or to upgrade the lawyers with current issues and you know, when a facility is made available, then it is up to a particular lawyer to pay to attend that kind of programme so we would really want you to address that issue.  What is your Association doing in terms of ensuring quality legal service delivery in terms of training and also in terms of several other issues?  What are you doing with your lawyers?  Thank you very much.

Nylander:    Yes.  Firstly I would say that we have the Bar Council, who is responsible for the overall work done, to see that quality services are rendered by solicitors to their clients and if the clients have complains, they could write to the Bar Council, who would immediately respond to whatever complaints that are made.  As far as the Bar Association is concerned, I would say that with the introduction of the Special Court, it was observed that few legal Sierra Leone practitioners have got the international exposure.  By that I mean, few have got the opportunity of practising in International Criminal Court.  That is why in conjunction with no Peace without Justice, we solicited the help of the Humanitarian Bar Council of England and Wales and a course was organised which we have just finished on Saturday, to train barristers and solicitors out there to give them the exposure, how to make pre-trial submissions, what type of work they will face in the International Court of Justice, like the Special court and we have that course organised.  It started on 22nd July and ended on 26th July inclusive.  You see, all comes down to the question of funding because as I stressed in my recommendation when we were at Abuja, it was stressed that we need a legal education as something continuous because we do not have a static world and if we are in need of globalization, to meet the challenges we must be ready and so we are trying with the help of other international bodies to organise training courses as we have just succeeded in organising this last one held with the No Peace Without Justice and the Bar Council of England and Wales to provide a training course for would-be solicitors and barristers appearing before the Special Court.  But all comes down to the question of funding which is not easy to come by these days.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you very much but as I also said perhaps one area you may have to consider is asking the lawyers actually to pay, because it’s a form of investment for them.  If you make the facility available, then you encourage them to actually pay by way of investment to upgrade themselves.   I think you may have to also consider that kind of workshop.  Another issue we would like to have clarification on and as a President of the Bar Association, which is such a powerful Association, we really want to have your opinion on this issue as regards executive interference in the administration of justice.  What has been your experience?  Do you think that our judges in time past and even now have asserted their independence in terms of delivering bold and impartial decisions?  We would really want to have your opinion in terms of their independence as far as executive interference is concerned.

Nylander:    Well I will start off by answering the question as far as my own personal knowledge of something I have been involved in.  I remember in 1982 as a state council in the Law Officers Department working with my learned senior Mr. Cyril Juxon-smith.  We had this matter of Agro-commercial and NIC.  That was the case in which Agro Commercial sued the NIC for rice imported into Sierra Leone, which were damaged during transit.  There was available evidence to the fact that before this rice was put on board the boat, it was not even fit for human consumption.  There was certificate to that effect before they were insured and this matter came up.  We tendered the certificate in court, and did everything that was humanly possible and I was a young practitioner coming from Britain.  We used to go to court, my books were in cartoons, I had the police carrying them all to display my legal knowledge.  At the end of the day we lost the matter but what really pains me, after loosing the matter when I came back, I was asked by the then solicitor General the late Pierre Boston to write an opinion whether we could appeal.  I wrote an opinion and said that there are good grounds for us to appeal against that decision.  The opinion also of Albert Medzegar Esq.   Was sought and he said that this was a matter that we should appeal because the rice was not fit for human consumption before it was put on board the boat.  Who owned Agro Commercial?
It was the Late Siaka Stevens and Mohamed Jamil or Sahid Mohamed.  Mohamed Jamil threatened the NIC that if they are going to appeal, he would withdraw all his fishing boats that were insured with the NIC.  As a result, the NIC did not appeal and that was one of the main reasons why I left the Law Officers Department.  I immediately said to myself, I cannot go on with this so I went straight to the then Attorney General the Late Francis Minnah and Pierre Boston and said well I am afraid because when we lost that case in particular, I was so sure that all the facts were in our favour. I came back to my room, I cried for hours had a rap on the door.  My learned figure opened the door, he said “Oliver what are you crying for”.  He said prepare to shed more tears for cases that you are going to loose.  But that was a case it was so patent that they should not have lost that matter and when we wanted to appeal to redress what we consider today wrong judgment, we were deprived or denied that right and so poor NIC they did not appeal and when our clients do not instruct us, we cannot go on.  These are particular instance that I know of the executive interfering with the judiciary, with the Law Officers Department.  This is from my own personal experience.  But with regard to the executive interfering with judges, that I cannot say because none has been brought to my personal knowledge nor have I been involved in a matter where judgment has been delayed in which I feel the judgment was not fair.  But let me say it comes up, even if you have the matter delayed at the High Court, you always have the right to appeal.  You go to the Court of Appeal and if you are not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of Appeal then you go to the Supreme Court.  There is always an avenue for appeal.

Leader of Evidence:    Thank you Mr. Nylander for answering all our questions.  Now I wonder
whether you have any questions for the Commission.

Nylander:    I haven’t my Lord.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Well with respect to recommendations I suppose you have been asked to work with the judiciary, the Chief Justice and put together a more comprehensive document which will be of use to the Commission so I suppose all your recommendations will go into that document.

Nylander:    Certainly my Lord.  The only thing is that the notice was too short because I had another letter dated 21st July, which actually touched on the judiciary.  All what we were asked to talk about was the question of execution and what not.  So I shall endeavour with members of my association to work in conjunction with the judiciary so that we produce a very comprehensive document.

Commissioner Marcus Jones:    Thank you very much.  You may step down now.

Nylander:    Thank you Madam Chairman and members of the Commission.

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THE JUDICIARY, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE RULE OF LAW (INCLUDING THE SPECIAL COURT AND ISSUES OF AMNESTY AND IMPUNITY)
BY GEORGE BANDA THOMAS
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Constitutions of the majority of modern states have as one of its fundamental principles the “”Rule of Law”. This is simply the concept that the government itself, including the president and ministers, the members of the judiciary and the parliamentarians are subject to and must abide by the laws of the state. Central to this issue is the thought that all men are equal in the eyes of the law and must abide by the laws of the state. The rule of law is one of the central guiding principles of the modern state and for any nation to be accepted in the comity of nations this idea should be the bedrock and foundation of its laws.

In the absence of the rule of law, there is tyranny and dictatorship. Paradoxically where the rule of law is present in any state and working effectively, citizens will see the laws passed by government as promoting the good of all in a reasonably equal manner and therefore feel an obligation to obey them. They will not see the laws as merely restraints imposed on them by the privileged ruling class, but as a means of establishing a system of rules and regulations where the weak and the strong, the rich and the poor, the affluent and the under privileged can coexist. The members of the government must themselves see that they are subject to the law of the land.
Certain criteria must be present for the effective operation of the rule of law. One of these is the existence of a democratic state, where the government of the day is elected by the majority of the people of that state. It is this government that is entrusted with the sacred task of enacting laws for the benefit of the general good of the people. These are laws that will apply generally to all persons in the state irrespective of race, colour, religion or sex. It is submitted that there can be no true democracy in the absence of the rule of law. These two concepts of democracy and the rule of law have a symbiotic relationship. The citizens may be more likely to obey the laws passed by persons that they themselves have chosen from amongst them.

The Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991 makes sufficient provision for the protection of all persons in Sierra Leone.  Chapter 3 of the Constitution from sections 15 through 29 contains provisions protecting the fundamental human rights of the all persons residing in this country. Whilst guaranteeing these freedoms, the constitution ensures that in the enjoyment of these rights and privileges the rights of others are not impaired. The constitution secures the right to due process of law, the protection of life, freedom of conscience, association, etcetera which are the ingredients that make for equality of all persons within this country. It is submitted that the fundamental rights of all citizens and persons within Sierra Leone are adequately secured by the constitution. Incidentally our Ruling Party’s Constitution states as one of the aims and objectives of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party and I quote “”To promote the rule of law, fundamental human rights, genuine social justice, constitutional rule, and other democratic values, institutions and practices in Sierra Leone as essential prerequisites of good governance.”

Although the National Constitution does not contain any explicit provision which states that the Government, the President and his Ministers, the Parliamentarians and the Members of the Judiciary, are expected to abide by the law, it is submitted that this is implied. One has only to study the oaths of offices of these various officials as prescribed under second and third schedule of that document to see that all officials are expected to preserve, support, uphold, maintain and defend the same constitution and to do right to all manner of people within the sovereign territory of this country. In fact all of them may be removed from office for violation of the constitution. Section 51 of the constitution for instance provides for the removal from office of the President in the event of violation of the constitution or any gross misconduct.
The Anti-Corruption Act No. 1 of 2000 is a very good example of one instance in which the highest officials of this country have been explicitly subjected to criminal prosecution in the same manner as other more ordinary officers of the state. To date a Minister of State and a Judge of the High Court have been charged and prosecuted under this act. It is also true to say that our criminal code by and large is applicable to and enforceable against government executives as well as parliamentarians. In the recent past a senior Parliamentarian of our Ruling Party was prosecuted for Assault and an opposition MP has been facing a criminal charge.

Some of the factors that are directly relevant for the effective operation of the rule of law in any state are a high rate of literacy and observance of due process by all members of the legal profession responsible for the implementation of the law. The legal profession has a pivotal role to play for the effective implementation of the rule of law, especially in light of the high level of illiteracy in this country. I should at this juncture note that government and various non-governmental organisations have been of great assistance in the education of the masses of their rights as secured by the law. Numerous programs over the radio and television have assisted in educating the citizens of this country of their rights under law. Ministers, Parliamentarians, Lawyers Policemen and other public officers have all been over the wires explaining to the public their right on various matters ranging from traffic matters, bail, the rights of women and children, etc.

The existence of an accessible and affordable judicial system is also of invaluable assistance to the operation of the rule of law. The legal system must be accessible and affordable by all, from the man in the city to the man in the village in the provinces. The rebel war had the effect of disrupting and indeed completely destroying the system of administration of the law and justice in all of Sierra Leone except Freetown. Even in Freetown the system of administration of the law was greatly impaired by the rebel war. However progress has been made in the reconstruction of the courts infrastructure in Freetown and in the provinces by the government. Part of the reconstruction of the judiciary should involve the engagement of competent Lawyers to serve as Judges and Magistrates. Although government has made numerous approaches to the most qualified practitioners unfortunately most of them have not accepted the offers. The issue of legal aid for the poor is also relevant to having an accessible system of justice.

Let me say that government is committed to continuing to create an enabling environment for the operation and promotion of the Rule of Law. Given our violent and destructive past as a nation, we are faced with increasing challenges. Firstly there is the need to reconstruct legal and judicial frameworks having gone through so much destruction. Secondly there is the need to weigh the demand for immediate justice against the need for comprehensive legal and judicial reforms.

Thirdly, there is a shortage of qualified and capable Lawyers, Judges and other legal personnel.

Fourthly, we know of the total collapse of the institution and destruction of judicial infrastructure. In an attempt to adequately address these concerns government has embarked on several programmes and projects.

1. It has established a law reform commission
2. There is now a functioning elected and independent legislative. Government and its partners are now giving Parliament the required support to build its capacity for law making and carrying out its oversight functions.
3. In an effort to deal with transitional justice issues, there are the TRC and The special Court. Our aim has been to allow the country to move forward within a system that fosters national peace and reconciliation.
4. With regard to the Ministry of Justice, Judiciary, Police and Prisons, Government policy has been geared towards rebuilding their facilities and restructuring and building or enhancing the capacities of these institutions.  In sum let me emphasise that the Rule of Law is not a rule. It is not a law rather it is an expression that signifies a concept. The following are a number of broad principles underlying the concept of the rule of law:

(i) The right of every nation to representative and responsible government including the protection of civil liberties;
(ii) The need for proper control of delegated legislation and the provision of adequate remedies for the protection of the individual’s rights
(iii) The strengthening of the independence of the judiciary as well as the ensuring of an organised and autonomous legal profession.   I pause here to say that in this jurisdiction there exists a much organised and hopefully autonomous legal profession.
(iv) The right of an accused person to a fair hearing before an impartial and independent tribunal constituted by law; the adoption of the presumption of innocence, and the right of an appeal as part of the criminal procedure of every country and the avoidance of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishments.

There is no doubt as to the immense assistance of the Judiciary and the legal profession to the application and promotion of the rule of law in this country.  It is my considered view that in order to enhance their role, there is need for a code of ethics for both the Bar and Bench. The Legal Practitioners Act No. 15 of 2000 is a step in this direction regarding the provision of a code of ethics for the Bar. Section 4 (2) (d) of that act empowers the general legal council to prescribe the standard of professional conduct and code of etiquette for legal practitioners. Unfortunately the council has still not drawn up this document. There is need for the Judicial and Legal Service Commission to make similar rules.

Similarly, there is an urgent need for Judges and Magistrates to adopt a code of conduct for judicial officers. There is a need for judicial officers to actively participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing and observing high standards of conduct so that the integrity and respect for the independence of the judiciary is preserved. I would further submit that an independent, strong, and respected and respectable Judiciary is indispensable for the impartial administration of Justice in a democratic state such as ours.

It must also be emphasised that the bench must hear and determine cases as expeditiously as possible. Judgments must be delivered not later than three months after the conclusion of the evidence and the address by counsel as stipulated by the constitution. There must be adherence to due process by all officials of the Court involved in the administration of justice.  An important issue here is that of bail. There is a need for the provision of practice directions to be given to guide the bench and the prosecution on this matter. Incarceration of accused persons on trial for invariably lengthy period of trial has the effect of defeating the presumption of innocence and denying justice.

In closing I should say that development of the rule of law in any state is a process. This government has taken numerous steps in the right direction and I am sure it will continue to do more to develop the culture of a state where all men are subject to the law of the land. The legal profession has a most important role to play both in fostering the culture of the rule of law and in the nursing and guardianship of meaningful democracy in this country. Judges must be vigilant to ensure that due process of law is observed by the executive and the other organs of state responsible for implementing the law. The Judiciary must jealously guard and protect the rights of the citizens as established by law.

THE SPECIAL COURT AND ISSUES OF AMNESTY AND IMPUNITY
The Lome peace Agreement was signed on the 7th July 1999 and it was later enacted in Sierra Leone as the Lome Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act.

Article ix provided for an “absolute and Free Pardon for Corporal Foday Sankoh and for an amnesty for all other combatants in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations, since March 1991 up to the signing of the Agreement”.

It may be necessary to consider Amnesty provision in relation to the constitution of Sierra Leone and The Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002, To enable the Commission to appreciate the background facts that led to an amnesty provision and later an enactment for a Special Court I would refer to a portion of President Kabba’s speech to the Royal Commonwealth society on 24th July 2003.

“A major problem we have had to contend with in our efforts to sustain lasting peace and development in our country is impunity. We can all recall how the Government had to agree to the granting of a near-blanket amnesty to the RUF and renegade elements of our army, as well as their leaderships, in order to bring the war to an end. The people of Sierra Leone were unanimously against this amnesty but eventually accepted it as the price of peace.

Concern continued to be expressed, however, about granting amnesty to people who had committed some of the most heinous crimes known to man. It was felt that peace could not be sustained without justice and that all human rights violations should be investigated; and redress provided for the victims. We are pleased to report that the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN have been able to set up both a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court to address this issue.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is gradually promoting healing and Reconciliation by providing a conducive climate for constructive exchanges between victims and perpetrators so that the victims can regain their human dignity and perpetrators given the opportunity to repent. The Special Court, on the other hand, is set up to bring to book those who bear the greatest responsibility for the atrocities committed during the war. Both institutions are progressing well. We are convinced that they will achieve their objectives of addressing impunity, responding to the needs of the victims of the war and preventing a repetition of the violation of human rights that occurred during the war”.

Let me stress that even after the execution of the Lome Agreement and its Amnesty provision the atrocities continued unabated. This was in marked contrast to the situation in the country following the setting up of the Special Court
– Namely an end to atrocities and impunity

Transitional justice is and has been a troubling human rights issue. The question that is most commonly asked is how should States emerging from periods of serious human rights violations frame the relationship among truth, justice, and reconciliation? Some jurists pose the issue as a difficult balance between punishment and reconciliation while others see truth or, alternatively, justice, as a precondition for reconciliation.   Human rights advocates generally have adopted the latter position, without clearly defining under what conditions and through what methods justice should be achieved.

The paths chosen by states are now viewed as issues of international concern, rather than solely domestic matters. In the last ten years, there has been a wave of change, prompted both by the end of the cold war, and by recognition that failure to come to terms with past cycles of violation may lead to future violations. International human rights groups now routinely demand and assess accountability for past violations, and anti-impunity measures are no longer simply a question of national choice. It is therefore not surprising that The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations attached to the Lome Peace Agreement the following caveat:

“The United Nations interprets that the amnesty and pardon in Article 9 of this agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international law.”

Article 10 of the statute of the Special court provides that:

“An Amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court………… shall not be a bar to prosecution.”

In my view this article to some extent addresses the issue of Amnesty granted under the Lome Agreement. Additionally also it may be argued that the Amnesty provisions must be considered in the light of the constitutional provision which guarantee the rights to life liberty and judicial protection.

Let me end by saying that it is the hope and prayer of our Party the SLPP and the government and people of Sierra Leone that justice be done to all. As a Lawyer and Legal Adviser to our Party it is my considered view that minimum international standards guaranteeing fair trial for Accused persons are provided for in the Special Court Act.

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SPEECHES AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CEREMONY

Representative of chief of Defense staff- Brig. Nelson Williams:
The chairman committee of management, his Excellencies, honorables, representatives from various groups and societies, NGOs, colleague officers of the republic of sierra Leone armed forces, distinguished ladies and gentlemen. I want to thank you for your presence and the curtsey of your attention. I stand here to deputize the chief of defense staff who is unavoidably absent due to some exigencies of duty, he’s gone to Bo. Let me start by describe the fug of war to you all, war fighting is a complex and dirty contest; the players don’t know the rules of the game. Those rules are not found in any past lessons, this means that every war is unique. Uncertainties and confusion is anybody’s weapon. The RSLAF used these weapons against friends and foes alike, we have a message, do let us compare a pitch, dark, where even the bravest the bravest leader or follower cannot rationally explain the fear surrounding his advances or retreats. Sierra Leoneans employ their children to do among other people security duties by day and night and under shine and in rain. Those soldiers committed atrocities, yet we need them, for they are our children, we need them because they are Sierra Leoneans, we need for they deserve a share in the history of Sierra Leone, we are even here to plead for some of them posumusly, may their souls rest in peace. Nevertheless, the RSLAF were expected to defend Sierra Leone and its people with sense and not senselessness, with decency and not bloody hands, with timeliness and not undue delay, with necessary transparency and not unnecessary myth and with ample respect for humanity of all categories, especially women, children and the helpless. How the RSLAF did did it? We have told those stories bits and expressed deep and profound regret which I will repeat to sanctify this land marking ceremony. Today, as we gathered here to rededicate a land future we are not only looking at this ceremony as a first leg in process in two unstirred land future. We see this ceremony as the pathway on the military land map, to reconciling Sierra Leoneans, Sierra Leoneans including the Sierra Leone armed forces must come out here to accept the God almighty message in the Lord’s Prayer which says “and forgive us our trespasses – debt as we forgive our trespassers – debtors. As the republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces went out to fight, a lot of atrocities and crimes against humanity were committed against sierra Leoneans, does this make sense? The answer confronts us, beleaguering our hearts, besieging our hearts, importuning our wheels, and it is intimating engaging, let us try to transform cruelty with kindness, insult with forbearance and patience and justice with magnanimity and hatred with love. It is only with the presence of God that one can reconcile with such a situation that does not appear on one’s wish list. Let me reiterate in aid of emphases that I say again let me reiterate in aid of emphases that we beseech you to forgive the RSLAF. Forgive your fallen and living children, forgiveness starts with reconciling with God, yourself before reconciling with your fellow human being. It is only the prince of peace who can give us true peace. Forgiveness and reconciliation, Jesus Christ our lord and savior who died on the cross for the propitiation of our sins and forgiveness, when he said Father forgive them for they know not what they do. Therefore let us all ask God almighty for lasting forgiveness which is the first instrument in the preservation of the national reconciliation that Sierra Leoneans need. Let us march forward with determination, commitment, fortitude and indomitable courage with no turning back and mindset for this fellowship of purpose. To the international community, we have to thankful for creating the enabling and conducive environment for sierra Leoneans to be seen as their own peacemakers, but what we are largely thankful about is the replacement of that ugly picture with on that has carved the same Sierra Leone as a peace model in the west African sub-region and the world at large. History has forgiven all carriers of arms ever since man took war as an extension of politics. Military men are not architects of war, bur they are looked upon as necessary part of the solution. This is the stage where we must ask our masters to lay premium on second generation training in areas such as civil military relations, the rights of children in the broad concept of international humanitarian for the good of our society. Sierra Leone expects every man to this duty. Let me recall the immortal words of Pueblos Cyrus, which states that a small debt produces a debtor, a large one, an enemy. The RSLAF owes this nation a large debt; let us result to pay up with interest, not only by giving democracy a chance, but also by standing in the vanguard of peace protection, the consolidation of democracy will continue to be a major preoccupation, this is our sacred duty and we cannot afford to fail again. But let us a little further by saying that if all Sierra Leoneans should live the immortal words of President Kennedy when he said “ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country” and go ahead in our respective ways to do our best and offer unqualified service and total commitment to building this nation, then, all the glory and achievements we admire in other developed democracies will surely be here too. May the good lord continue to give us all strength to be at which will benefit the majority of our people. Finally, I want to conclude on this note we cannot make peace, reconcile our pains without recalls to adopting the practice of forgiveness for ever and ever. As Sierra Leoneans, there is so much in us that unites us than divides us. We must recognize this fact, and learn to live with each other. I stand here today on behalf of the RSLAF to promise that the ESLAF has taken a human face. You labeled the police as a force for good, we want you to label the RSLAF as a force for good peace and peace to all I thank you all

Representative of the inspector general of police:
Chairman of the TRC, other commissioners, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, and fellow Sierra Leoneans. I stand here on behalf of the inspector general of police and the entire membership of the Sierra Leone police force to give a valedictory speech at the closing ceremony of the public hearings of the TRC. As we all are aware, when the country chose the path of peace as enshrined in the Lome peace accord the concept of peace without a victor was enshrined and the TRC was made provision for and I am happy on behalf of my colleague officers to be part of this ceremony today marking the end of the public hearings. The country has gone through a turbulent past and the work you have done can be likened to a surgeon’s job. When he conducts a surgical operation in other to ensure that the healing of the person who has been troubled by illness begins. Through the various statements that you have received and through the various testimonies that have been presented before you, you now have a clear picture in your mind as to what the causes of the war were. And we do hope that at the end of your work; you will come out with the recommendations that will ensure that the decade long civil war does not arise anymore. We on our part, during our presentation, we did make mention of the fact that as police officers who are involved in the process of delivering justice, serve both as perpetrators and victims of the decade long civil conflict and I’m here again this afternoon to reiterate the point and to emphasize the point that we are also prepared to reconcile with all sectors of the society to ensure that lasting peace remains in sierra Leone. During your work, you were able to carry out an environmental scanning looking at the political, economic, social, cultural and legal considerations so that the firm foundation for lasting peace could be laid in our country Sierra Leone. This marks the end of an era and it also marks a new beginning in the sense that henceforth there will be national reconciliation, there will be national cohesion and there will be national integration. We will henceforth continue to inculcate ideas of delivering a just society doing the right things and doing things right so that no sector of the community and the society at large can feel marginalized to the point that they would have utter disregard for aw and order. We do also hope that there will be reform in governance as part of the healing process, so that we all will contribute in one way or the other in making sure that the seeds of discord are never sown in our society anymore and we also hope that at the end of this exercise all Sierra Leoneans will have a new vision, a vision that will take the country forward, a vision that put the country first instead of personal interest, so that the notions of hatred and ill will be things of the past. I also wish on behalf of the members of the Sierra Leone police force whom we have accepted interalia to have been both perpetrators and victims to express remorse for all the wrong doings which we and our personnel did both before and during the war and to genuinely apologies for all such wrong doing with a promise that such will never be repeated in the course of our history. As we strike to be a force for good, we do hope that all people within Sierra Leone and even beyond who have paid so dearly a price for our past mistakes will continue to help us  so we will forge ahead and be part of the framework to establish a new S/L,, a S/L which all of us will be proud of , a S/L which our children will be proud of, a S/L to which people from all over the world can come and feel safe, can come and work and can come and enjoy themselves. Once more, I wish to thank the commissioner, the chairman and all those who have participated in one way or another in making your job a success and who have contributed in diverse ways up to this point we are now celebrating the end your public hearings. I wish and pray that all of us will be united for a common destiny, one that will make our country what it is supposed to be, an envy of all nations. I thank you very much and I hope that total forgiveness will be rendered to us so that our country can rise from the ruins of war to one of an enviable country as compared to other countries in the world, I thank you very much for your attention.

Representative of the APC:
Honorable commissioners of the TRC, chairman of the SLPP, representatives of other parties, all protocols observed. My name is Dauda Sulaiman Kamara Member of Parliament for Kambia district. I stand here on behalf of my leader Mr Ernest Bai Koroma, who called me this morning to say he was a little ill disposed and could not be here to this very important occasion. He requested that I must come in here to take part and I am very very glad to be here. My party, the APC took seriously from the beginning the setting up of a TRC. We defined it right at the beginning as an important outfit of reconciling this nation. As a result, we have followed them in their work from Freetown here to the provinces from districts, submitting our own statements in support of their work we are very glad to have done so in the name of our party and in the name of this country. We believe that the most important engagement which we as a people (Sierra Leoneans) are in today is about peace and the TRC and the TRC in the quite recesses of their offices will produce for us a report which we hope shall be a great symbol of peace for this nation. The match we have just completed from Victoria Park through the streets of Freetown step by step and I could see how people turned out to see us, to look at us. Some of them clapping in joy, others looking at us may be in quite amazement and in appreciation of the steps we are taking, symbolic steps towards peace to this field, the national stadium. It is our wish as a party that the symbol of this field shall contain all Sierra Leoneans within a field of peace where we shall see no more war, where we shall accept that we are one and the same people, where we shall understand that the laws we make to regroup into political parties are intended to make us in a better democracy where we shall begin to understand that political parties and their members should not be feared, but should be welcomed because they are our creation. I want to thank the members of the TRC at this point and to wish that when they shall have retired after today to their officers, Allah will be with them, to guide them so that they will be wiser to produce for this nation something that we shall cherish. Soon, we shall be proceeding to the bridge, only dedication for peace and I hope that, that dedication shall be taken by all of us as a nation and indeed and indeed a millstone in our desire to bring peace to this country. I want to thank all other parties here that have come in to share in this occasion and indeed all of us that have traveled from the hills of Kabala right down to the river areas of Pujehun and Bonthe, from Kailahun through Bo, Makeni, all of us have come in here to take part in this match – a great symbol of our desire for unity, I want once again on behalf of the APC to thank you and to say that we as a party, our submissions to this TRC which are meant to contribute to a building process of peace , we shall live by them and I believe that if all other parties do, Sierra Leone shall be a country of peace and  a happy nation, thank you very much.

Representative of RUFP – Mr. Kposowa:
Sierra Leoneans, members of the diplomatic Core, our mothers and fathers, representatives of various organizations, fellow citizens, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am here to speak what the Sierra Leoneans think I should speak, and it is indeed the right time and the venue for us to speak the reality after so many sufferings of the TRC. I am here this morning with a very bad swollen heart and dismay over the chaotic activities of the revolutionary united front and all the parties that participated. We were convinced at the beginning of the war that we were fighting a war that would end peacefully, but it ended in a form of comet tragedy. This was due to the incursions of some of the other unscrupulous elements that joined the RUF with principles of war, including the former members of the AFRC and the lates. Despites this, through the help of the almighty God, and those without them this chapter cannot be completed I would want to say we have derived that nobody will win the war but the force of reconciliation and the help of his execellency Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabba. We also welcome the following; we have to remember Ambassador Oluyemi Adenijie, the fomer SRSG and now the foreign minister of the great hero of Africa, the federal republic of Nigeria, he is now the foreign minister, we also remember Lt. Gen. Opande- the force commander of UNAMSIL, we also remember the international community, Mr Kelvin Lewis who has repetitively given the correct report of the events, also Fofanah Lansana. We also remember Rev. J.C. Humper, the TRC and staff, Dr. Francis Kaikai of the NCDDR and staff, the women organizations, special tribute to Professor Amara Kamara of the TRC, lawyer Marcus Jones, Mr. Torto and the resy. With all these I have named, the charter can not be completed if we talk about reconciliation; I therefore give them a very big bravo. After winning no war, we have only derived at a position of stop the irrelevant war for better of Africa and S/L. after all the causes of the war known to have been for corruption, nepotism, sectionalism and lack of good governance in S/L for the past decade, we have monitored the affairs of the government since their induction in office. From that time, we have seen symptoms of transparency, productions of corruptive manpower to the public, minor nepotisms and minor tribalism. Fellow citizen, we are at this condolent mood asking and crying to all fathers, all mothers of S/L, all representatives of organizations and the entire Sierra Leonean populace that we are Sierra Leoneans, we should therefore reconcile at this time with another roof under the TRC as hard working staff and the commissioners including the evidence table. We should remember that reconciliation is the only way is the only problem to be at the peak of each and every one of us. Again Sierra Leoneans, we are pleading  through your Excellency’s office to the president his Excellency Dr Ahmed Tejan kabba, to start his formula of executive reconciliation by considering the lome peace accord and make those that are suffering now should  be reconciled and be freed from pademba. I am with the notion that our second in command Solomon Ekuma Berewa will also bear with me that this was stipulated in the former accord. We the members of the RUFP do not agree with the special court of course that our president his Excellency has no power over the special court. He has a supreme power over the special court, he is the supreme power of S/L and there is no supreme that is beyond the supreme court of S/L. it is therefore upon this venture that we as Sierra Leoneans are pleading again to H.E Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabba to have the full right to declare a state of clemency to even those that are presently in jail, that are being indicted by the special court. Echoing the statement of H E Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabba yesterday I quote no justification in the war, yet I have concluded in forming the TRC. What ever devices that are being used by either the APC or the SLPP as quoted by some politicians should now be pit far aback and we should start to talk about development, unity and progress. Even after the elections that were conducted in previous years should be forgotten now, the only one that should be regarded now is the one that was formed during the 2002, all of the others should be put far aback, let us no longer condone autographies, biographies because Sierra Leoneans have agreed upon final victory that we should be reconciling now. Both my brothers and sisters and the African continent, Dr Tejan Kabbah, our president has done so many even when we were in the bush, he was still coming to us to talk on peace, both at international and in the bush. We should put hands up together; we should now put hands under H E so that we can also be in peace as how Maj. Gen. Issa sesay did to the president. Finally ladies and gentlemen, with all the destruction and atrocities committed by the RUF and whosoever fought the war, those attitudes were all mankind, manmade ventures and therefore at this time in the name of the lord almighty lord, I raise my hands to say to sierra Leoneans that all of us are the same, whatsoever might have been injected into us to have caused atrocities, to have formed whatsoever, to have raped, to have done whatsoever chaos activities that the war might have done, I am saying that you should have pardon on us. We are your children. We are sorry! We are sorry that the episode that we have formed was not really from the brains of some us. So at this time, we are all craetedly captured and we have come at this stage to say pardon, we are therefore pleading for mercy and reconciliation. May God bless us all, may god bless the continent, may God bless Africa, I thank you.

Representative of the SLPP – Dr Sama Banya:
One country! One people! One nation! Mr. Chairman and members of the TRC, fellow Sierra Leoneans, ladies and gentlemen, I stand here before you this morning representing the oldest and largest political party in the country whose leader is present the president Alhaji Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabba. We must continue to thank the almighty God for his continuing grace and mercy and especially a day like this. For over ten years, we went through pain, hardship and suffering, during which we participated in or witnessed or experienced strange things. Yes! Things that we never imagined will happen in this country – which is generally known for its peace, friendliness and generosity, but slowly and painfully even helplessly we saw our country sliding towards total destruction. We may in those preceding years had eluded our selves that we will be insinuated from what was happening, e thought it will affect others but certainly not ourselves but indeed and to our shame and remise we all in our different ways contributed either by commission, omission or by playing indifference. God’s words tell us that the first to repentance is to admit wrong doing and then to ask for forgiveness. I represent a party that ruled this country in the years immediately after independence; we may have made our own mistakes. Perhaps we should have stood up to be counted, instead acquiescing or capitulating. In the last so many months since the beginning of May, we’ve had strange stories of man’s inhumanity to man, of human suffering, of wanton destruction. We thank god for the inspiration he has given us to acknowledge and confess our wrong doings. More importantly, for giving us the grace to forgive those who wronged us. We thank him for those who have counseled us, that is the members of the TRC and those who enabled us to forgive each other publicly. It may be difficult to forget, but time, the healer of pain and suffering will help to soften our hearts as we continue to embrace each other in brotherly love..This has been the message of our leader President Ahmed Tejan kabba to the people of this country where ever he has been. May God’s almighty grace protect us from a future re-occurrence. Once again, on behalf of our leader, deputy leader and all and all members of the Sierra Leone’s People Party, I congratulate all of us on our achievements; I thank you for your attention.

Representative of PLP – Dr Kandeh:
PLP!……. Shall we just stand for a minute silence to remember those who died as a result of the war irrespective of what faction they belong to. Members of the TRC, representative of the SLPP party, representative of the All People’s Congress, members of the diplomatic core, traditional rulers, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, not forgetting of course representatives of the army and the police. On behalf of the peace and liberation party, I greet you all, I want to start my statement by congratulating not the TRC as you would expect but the international community mainly UNAMSIL, the British and American governments, member states of ECOWAS, other countries in Europe and Asia, international NGOs for their tremendous material, financial and moral efforts in putting an end to the war which has brought untold misery to our beloved country. To the people of our country, I want to congratulate them for their understsnding and courage after all we have gone through. The culminating of all these efforts you will agree is that we are meeting here today. I now want to congratulate the TRC for giving me the opportunity to make a statement on behalf of our party in this epoch making event in the history of our country. I feel greatly honored. I further want to congratulate all the officials of this very important commission for taking up this acqulian task of getting people to come and say the truth and ask for forgiveness as perpetrators and to forgive as victims of the war in our country where you will agree people hardly accept the truth, where saying the truth brings hatred and contempt, where people take decision on tribal, regional, blood relations, religious and other sentiments. Mr. Chairman, in the invitation addressed to our party, you requested our party to tender an apology to the people of S/L for all action, inactions if I should quote or omission that our party may have in any way contributed to the war. it is no hidden secrete that our party was formed prior to the presidential elections of 2002 and 2003 and thus have not contributed to the war as political party. As a party that is concerned to bring lasting peace and liberation to our country irrespective of tribe region, nepotism, cronyism, religious character we do sympathize with everybody of our beloved country as we are fully convinced  that hardly will you find anybody  who have not suffered from the war directly or indirectly. If it is not our relatives, it is our friends or neighbours or tribesmen or somebody from the same region or whom we know fro another region. The reality is that some people especially in the provinces felt the war as far back as 1991 when the war started, others during the intervention of 1998 and others during the 1999 invasion of the city. Now it is no hidden secrete that all the warring factions committed atrocities. As a party of national character, we feel deep sympathy for our country and what we all went through. Our party is a rational nationalist party that recognizes the fact that the world is a global village; hence we should have a very good relationship with the international community not to the extent wherein we Sierra Leoneans look like strangers in our mother land as is presently the case. Consequently, we feel deep sorrow for our country and people that with all our wealth, we continue to be strangers irrespective of the hazards that we have gone through as a result of decade long war. we are still not above those vices of corrupt character that led us to the war. Decisions are taken not devoid of aforementioned sentiments, misuse of entrusted power for private or group benefit that started during the early days after independence continues till present day. Corruption continues in areas of public procurement, rezoning of land, revenue collection, government opportunities and local government, kick – back on government contracts and frauds of all kinds, official practice, extortion by threatening to surcharge tax payers or importers unless bribes are paid in which case low assessment of goods pass form importation without payment of any duty at all, ghosts are created to pad payrolls, fictitious institutions exist which are entitled to state funds, even the state which committed itself to financing our educational institutions have not been doing so on time. The non payment of lecturers and teachers on time and not providing the necessary conditions of service to enhance the effectiveness of their profession is a case in point. Consequently, these institutions show miracles of commercial inventiveness by extorting money form students and pupils which are a burden on the parents. Mr. Chairman, to put it in a nutshell, institutions of national integrity such as the executive, the legislative, legislature, judiciary, the media, the public servant and even watchdog agencies like civil society, public account committee, auditor general, ombudsman, police, anti corruption etc are handicapped as regards inspecting their case rules and practices. Mr. Chairman, a complete analysis of the aforementioned institutions of national integrity and their corresponding case rules and practices will fall beyond the time limit of this statement. Permit me to recommend that if we to minimize corruption which started in the 13th century BC and can’t be eliminated, apart from adhering to the standards of public life which are selfness, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and good leadership, it is inevitable that in our country decisions and actions reflects the earlier mentioned sentiments the sufficient awareness of Morals and national character must be paramount. When S/L and not tribe, region or blood relationship will be the social psychology and consciousness of our people. In achieving this, a lot depend on the group of leaders, not a leader I want to emphasize. They must moral and national patriotic character in the true sense of the word for the people to emulate them we must have an ideology of moral and national character. Once we have these, we will not think of plundering the country’s wealth to the detriment of our people and country, we will not allow other people to look like masters in our country and we as strangers, we will not think of fighting each other, we will see ourselves as Sierra Leoneans and not Mende, Temne, Limba, Loko, Creole, Kono etc. we must build the political will of our people, which is not simply the will of politicians, we should be looking at leaders from all works of life, professional groups, the private sector, trade unions, religious institutions, and the civil groups and see how these can be energized with moral patriotic awareness in fighting corruption and building morale integrity. Permit me to say Mr. Chairman that when moral and rationalistic awareness penetrates the conscience of our people, the above mentioned standards will manifest itself in practice. Even the international community which have done so much and is still doing more will be pleased to see their efforts bearing good fruits. To conclude, I want to inform my fellow countrymen that most developed countries that we see today made great strides in their political, economic and social lives after they attained this form of consciousness and that the peace and Liberation Party will always contribute and cooperate in the rebuilding of our nation, is determined to ensure that this hard won peace after ten years of senseless war caused by all the vices attributed to corruption will always be maintained. We will never support any action to destabilize our beloved country and bring suffering to our people and will always support democratic change of government through the ballot box. On behalf of the party, I thank you all may God bless and protect us all.

• Posted in: Appendices
• Tags: Appendices, Appendix 3, Appendix 3 Part 3, Transcripts

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