Mohammed Kroma Esq.
A Constitutional Time Bomb: The 2026 National Security and Central Intelligence Bill and the Case for a Better Law
By Mohammed Kroma Esq.
*A former Legal Practitioner who assisted final-year students with Methods of Political Research at the Department of Political Science, Fourah Bay College (FBC).*
PART ONE: THE ANALYSIS
I. A Bill That Should Not Pass As It Stands
There are moments in the legislative history of a nation when a single Bill reveals everything about the political culture that produced it.
The 2026 National Security and Central Intelligence Bill is one such moment for Sierra Leone.
On its face, it is a modernisation effort — an attempt to give this country a structured intelligence architecture fit for the challenges of the twenty-first century. That ambition is legitimate. Sierra Leone’s security needs are real. The threats — from organised crime, from cross-border instability, from the digital dimensions of modern conflict — are not imaginary. A functional, professional intelligence service is not a luxury. It is a necessity. But necessity does not suspend the Constitution. And this Bill, as drafted, does not merely push against constitutional boundaries — it
demolishes several of them.
My purpose in writing is not to oppose intelligence reform. My purpose is to demand that when this country builds its intelligence architecture, it builds one that strengthens the Republic rather than one that places it in the hands of a few individuals — above
accountability, above the courts, and above the law.
II. What the Bill Actually Does — Stripped of Its Language
Let us be precise, because precision is what the law demands.
The Bill creates, in effect, five constitutional violations:
1. A Parallel Cabinet: Section 53(2) of the 1991 Constitution is unambiguous: there shall be no duplicate Cabinet. The Bill creates an executive coordinating body for the intelligence service that
replicates — and in some readings supersedes — the National Security Council. This is not a technicality. A parallel cabinet is a parallel government. It is unconstitutional on its face.
2. An Unlawful Paramilitary Unit: The State Protection Service would operate as an armed presidential guard outside the command structure of the Defence Council. Sections 165(2) of the Armed Forces Act and
167 of the Defence Council Act vest all armed command authority in the Defence Council. A paramilitary unit answerable only to the intelligence service director — or directly to the President — is not a security measure. It is a private army dressed in legal language.
3. Warrantless Invasion of Privacy: The Director-General may demand personal information from any institution without judicial authorisation. This violates the constitutional right to privacy in terms so plain that a first-year law student could identify the conflict. The right to demand private information without oversight is the right to surveil without accountability. In any democracy worthy of the name, that right does not exist.
4. Blanket Criminal Immunity: Operatives acting during ‘approved operations’ are immunised from criminal liability. Officials acting in ‘ good faith’ cannot be sued. These are not narrow protections for
legitimate covert action — they are blanket shields that place an entire agency beyond the reach of the courts. No republic that believes in the rule of law can tolerate a class of public officials who are structurally immune from legal consequence.
5. Vague Penal Provisions: A ten-year prison term for undefined contraventions’ of the Bill is a due process violation waiting to happen. A criminal provision must be clear enough that a reasonable citizen can understand what conduct it prohibits. Vagueness in
criminal law is not a drafting oversight — it is an instrument of arbitrary power.
III. Why This Matters Beyond the Law Courts
I want to speak now not only as a lawyer but as a citizen who has watched what happens to countries when their security apparatus is placed beyond oversight. An intelligence service without judicial oversight does not become more effective. It becomes more dangerous — to the state itself. Unchecked intelligence services have been the instrument of every authoritarian consolidation in African history. They begin as security
measures. They end as tools of political survival for whoever sits at the top.
Sierra Leone fought a brutal civil war. We have lived through coups, through instability, through the particular terror of armed men with no accountability. We should be the last country in this sub-region to
build, voluntarily, a paramilitary unit outside lawful command — and call it progress.
Beyond the constitutional text, there is a practical reality: a Bill that the Supreme Court strikes down is worse than no Bill at all. It creates a legal vacuum in our security architecture at precisely the moment when a functioning structure is needed. If this Bill passes as
drafted, it will face constitutional challenge — and it will lose. The result will be institutional chaos. We can do better. We must do better. And — as the comparative record shows — we already know how.
IV. How Others Have Done It Right
The argument that democratic intelligence oversight is impractical or uniquely difficult in the African context is contradicted by the evidence on the continent itself. Three models are worth examining closely.
South Africa: The RICA Model and Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight South Africa emerged from apartheid with an intelligence apparatus
that had been weaponised against its own people for decades. The challenge of transformation was not merely structural — it was cultural. The solution was deliberate and multi-layered.
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) established a strict judicial authorisation requirement for all communications surveillance. No intelligence official may intercept private
communications without a warrant from a designated judge. The application must demonstrate necessity and proportionality — vague assertions of ‘national security’ are insufficient.
Parliament established a Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence with access to classified briefings, the power to summon intelligence officials, and a mandate to report publicly on the accountability of the services. An independent Inspector-General of Intelligence, appointed by the President on the advice of a parliamentary committee, conducts ongoing oversight and may investigate complaints from members of the public.
The result: when the system failed under State Capture, it was precisely these oversight mechanisms that exposed the failure and enabled the response. The oversight architecture did not prevent corruption, but it created the conditions under which corruption could
be seen, named, and ultimately confronted. That is what accountability looks like in practice.
Ghana: The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) Ghana’s intelligence reform is one of the most instructive case studies on the continent. It did not happen overnight — it was the product of incremental, deliberate institution-building across
multiple administrations and two peaceful transfers of power.
Act 1030 establishes the National Intelligence Bureau and related agencies under a framework that mandates: civilian leadership and command; parliamentary oversight through a dedicated security committee with real authority; judicial warrants for surveillance
operations; and a prohibition on paramilitary functions — intelligence personnel are expressly barred from carrying out law enforcement or military operations independently.
The critical design principle is what analysts have called the ‘referee architecture’: the intelligence services are structurally separated from both the military command and the political executive, with Parliament acting as the independent referee that holds both accountable.
The result has been an intelligence service that Ghanaians — across party lines — broadly trust to serve the state rather than the incumbent. Security sector integrity and democratic resilience are not separate achievements. They are the same achievement.
Botswana: Judicial Oversight as a Primary Check
Botswana’s Directorate of Intelligence and Security operates under a framework where judicial oversight is the primary accountability mechanism. Warrant applications for surveillance must be made to a
designated judge of the High Court, who is empowered to refuse, to impose conditions, and to review ongoing operations.
The Botswana model is particularly instructive for Sierra Leone because it demonstrates that judicial oversight does not impede operational effectiveness — it strengthens it. By requiring intelligence agencies to articulate specific, evidence-based justifications for surveillance, the warrant process forces a discipline of analysis that makes operations more targeted and more
legally defensible.
Botswana has maintained political stability and democratic continuity in a sub-region that has known significant instability. Intelligence services that are accountable to the courts are not weaker than those
that are not. They are more legitimate — and legitimacy, in security work as in democratic governance, is not a soft value. It is a strategic asset.
V. The Choice Before Parliament
Sierra Leone’s Parliament has a clear choice. It can pass this Bill as drafted — and hand to the Supreme Court, to opposition lawyers, and to civil society advocates a constitutional case that will unravel the
entire intelligence architecture the moment it is challenged. That serves no one. Not the government, not the security services, and certainly not the people.
Or it can do what Ghana did, what South Africa did, what Botswana did: take the legitimate goal of intelligence modernisation seriously enough to build it properly. To pass a Bill that will last. A Bill
that intelligence professionals can work under with clarity. A Bill that citizens can accept because it respects their rights. A Bill that the courts will uphold because it respects the Constitution.
I am not asking Parliament to be weak on security. I am asking it tobe serious about it. To that end, Part Two of this publication sets out a Drafting Instruction addressed to Parliament and to the office responsible for legislative drafting. It is not a Bill — that is the work of trained legislative drafters. It is a set of precise policy parameters and constitutional principles that any alternative Bill must reflect if it is to achieve both the security objectives the country requires and the constitutional standards it is bound to uphold.
PART TWO: A DRAFTING INSTRUCTION FOR AN ALTERNATIVE BILL
Prefatory Note
What follows is not a Bill. A Bill is a formal legislative instrument requiring the hand of a trained parliamentary drafter — with its long title, enacting clause, arrangement of sections, marginal notes, and
all the technical requirements of the laws of Sierra Leone. That work belongs to the Attorney-General’s office or such other drafting authority as Parliament may designate.
What follows is a Drafting Instruction — a structured set of policy parameters, constitutional principles, and specific provisions that any alternative to the 2026 National Security and Central Intelligence Bill must contain in order to be constitutional, effective, and
enduring. It is addressed to Parliament, to the Law Officers of the Crown, and to all persons with a role in giving this country the intelligence legislation it deserves.
DRAFTING INSTRUCTION: NATIONAL SECURITY AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BILL (REVISED)
Instruction 1 — Name and Purpose
The revised Bill shall be titled the National Security and Central Intelligence Bill. Its stated purpose shall be to establish a constitutional, civilian, and accountable national intelligence service; to repeal and replace the existing framework; and to ensure that all intelligence activity is conducted in strict compliance with
the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991.
Instruction 2 — Supremacy of the Constitution
The Bill shall contain an explicit supremacy clause: no provision of the Bill may be construed to authorise any act inconsistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under Chapter III of the
1991 Constitution. Where any provision of the Bill conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution prevails.
Instruction 3 — Civilian Character of the Service
The Service shall be established as a civilian intelligence agency. The Bill shall expressly prohibit the Service from exercising powers of arrest, detention, or armed enforcement except where acting under the direct lawful authority of the Sierra Leone Police or the Sierra
Leone Armed Forces in their respective constitutional capacities. No member of the Service shall bear arms in the performance of intelligence functions without specific judicial authorisation.
Instruction 4 — Abolition of the Parallel Cabinet Structure . The Bill shall contain no provision establishing a parallel executive body, war cabinet, or alternative national security coordination
structure. All policy coordination functions shall vest exclusively in the National Security Council as constituted under Section 56 of the 1991 Constitution. The drafter shall review every provision of the
current Bill that creates or implies a coordination structure and remove or redirect it to the NSC.
Instruction 5 — State Protection Unit: Reform, Not Abolition
The State Protection Unit (SPU) may be retained in the revised Bill, but only subject to the following mandatory conditions: (a) the SPUnshall be an unarmed civilian unit; (b) armed protective functions shall remain the exclusive responsibility of the Sierra Leone Police
and, where necessary, the Armed Forces under the Defence Council; (c) the SPU shall be under the command of the Director-General of the Service, who is accountable to the NSC; (d) no provision shall place
the SPU under the independent command of any individual including the President; and (e) the Bill shall expressly state that nothing in the SPU provisions creates a paramilitary unit.
jInstruction 6 — Director-General: Appointment, Tenure, and Removal
The Director-General shall be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the NSC, subject to confirmation by a two-thirds majority of
Parliament. This requirement of parliamentary confirmation is non-negotiable and reflects the practice in Ghana and South Africa. The Director-General shall serve a single non-renewable term of five
years. Single-term limits are essential to institutional independence
— they insulate the Director-General from the pressure of seeking reappointment from the incumbent government. Removal shall require the report of a tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice and shall be reported to Parliament within seven days. The
President shall have no power of summary dismissal.
Instruction 7 — Judicial Warrant Requirement for Surveillance
This is the single most important structural reform the revised Bill must make. Every act of communications interception, electronic surveillance, or demand for private information from any institution shall require a warrant issued by a designated Surveillance Judge of
the High Court. The warrant application must state: the specific target; the specific intelligence objective; the grounds for believing the target presents a genuine threat to national security; the methods proposed; the
duration sought (not to exceed ninety days); and the safeguards for irrelevant material collected incidentally.
The Surveillance Judge shall apply the tests of necessity,bproportionality, and legality before issuing any warrant. These are not administrative formalities — they are constitutional requirements derived directly from Section 22 of the 1991 Constitution. Emergency interception may be authorised orally, but must be followed by a written application within forty-eight hours. If the written application is refused, all material collected during the emergency period shall be destroyed immediately.
Instruction 8 — Parliamentary Oversight Committee
The Bill shall establish a Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence comprising members of Parliament appointed by the Speaker, reflecting the party balance in Parliament. The Committee
shall have the following non-negotiable powers: to review the annual report of the Director-General; to examine the Service’s budget; to summon the Director-General; to receive public complaints; and to report annually to the full Parliament. Classified information may be provided to the Committee in closed session. Members shall be subject to security clearance.
Disclosure of classified information by a Committee member shall be a criminal offence with a stated penalty.
Instruction 9 — Inspector-General of Intelligence
The Bill shall establish an independent Inspector-General of Intelligence appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Parliamentary Oversight Committee — not on the sole discretion of the President. The Inspector-General shall have unrestricted access to all records, facilities, and personnel of the Service; shall conduct inspections at least twice annually; shall investigate public complaints; and shall report findings to the Parliamentary Oversight Committee and, where criminal conduct is disclosed, to the Attorney-General.
Instruction 10 — Abolition of Blanket Criminal Immunity The revised Bill shall contain no provision granting blanket criminal immunity to Service officers or officials. A narrow good-faith defence may be available in civil proceedings for acts done within the scope of a lawful warrant or directive, but this shall not extend to: murder; torture; sexual offences; or any act constituting a grave breach of international human rights law. The Attorney-General shall not enter a nolle prosequi in any prosecution of a Service officer
without first reporting the grounds to the Parliamentary Oversight Committee.
Instruction 11 — Clarity of Penal Provisions
Every criminal offence created by the revised Bill shall be defined with sufficient particularity that a reasonable citizen can understand what conduct is prohibited. No provision shall impose criminal liability for vague ‘contraventions’ of the Bill. The drafter shall
review every penal provision in the current Bill and either: state the conduct prohibited with precision; or remove the provision entirely.
The ten-year sentence in Section 53(3) of the current Bill shall not be replicated unless attached to a clearly defined, proportionate offence.
Instruction 12 — Transitional Provisions
The revised Bill shall provide for an orderly transition from the
existing intelligence architecture. All current personnel shall be
subject to vetting by a Transition Board convened under the NSC within
twelve months of commencement.
All personal data currently held by any intelligence function of government shall be audited by the Inspector-General within six months of commencement, and any data held without lawful authority shall be destroyed.
All pending surveillance operations at the time of commencement shall be reviewed by the Surveillance Judge within thirty days. Operations inconsistent with the revised Bill shall cease immediately.
A Final Word
This Drafting Instruction is offered in the spirit in which it is written: as a contribution to a conversation that Sierra Leone must have — openly, urgently, and without the comfort of postponement . Intelligence capacity and constitutional integrity are not in
competition. The countries that have built the most effective, most trusted intelligence services — on this continent and beyond — are precisely the countries that subjected those services to the rule of law. That is not a coincidence. It is a lesson.
I call on Parliament to treat this Bill as an opportunity, not aformality. I call on the legal profession — practitioners, academics, civil society advocates — to engage with this instruction and improve
upon it. And I call on the government to demonstrate, through how it handles this legislation, that its commitment to democratic governance is not merely rhetorical.
Sierra Leone has survived too much to build, voluntarily, a structurethat undermines what it has paid so dearly to preserve.
Mohammed Kroma Esq.
*A former Legal Practitioner who assisted final-year students with nMethods of Political Research at the Department of Political Science,
Fourah Bay College (FBC).*
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