Sierra Leone Must Choose Accountability Over Ambiguity: A Comprehensive Case for First-Past-the-Post

By Zach Dainkeh Esq.

29th July, 2026

The proposed Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2025 represents the most consequential reshaping of our democracy since the landmark 1991 Constitution. While many provisions deserve genuine praise, particularly those depoliticising electoral appointments through Search and Nomination Committees, strengthening gender representation with the 30% quota, and imposing transition period restrictions on lame-duck presidential powers, one proposed change threatens to sever the sacred bond between citizens and their representatives.

The amendment to Section 74, replacing our constituency-based First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system with Proportional Representation (PR), demands the most searching scrutiny Sierra Leone’s Parliament has ever undertaken. This is not a technical adjustment to electoral administration. It is a fundamental redefinition of what political representation means in our republic and how democracy functions in our communities.

Understanding What Is at Stake

The current constitutional framework establishes that Members of Parliament “shall be elected through a system of proportional representation” under the proposed amendment. This single sentence, buried in Section 74, would fundamentally transform every aspect of our political life, from how candidates emerge, to how campaigns are conducted, to how constituents hold their representatives accountable, to how communities develop through the electoral process.

Under the proposed district-based PR model in Section 38, each district would return Members of Parliament from party lists rather than from specific constituencies. Voters would cast ballots for parties rather than individuals. Seats would be allocated based on the proportion of votes each party receives across the district, with candidates selected from predetermined lists ranked by party leadership. This is not speculation about how PR might function, it is precisely what the amendment mandates. The consequences would be immediate, profound, and largely irreversible.

The Painful Lessons of Sierra Leone’s PR Experience

Sierra Leone has already tested proportional representation and the results were deeply troubling. The PR system was implemented immediately after the civil war under special circumstances of insecurity, displacement, and the inability to establish functional constituency boundaries across conflict-affected areas. It was always understood as an emergency measure, a temporary accommodation to extraordinary circumstances rather than a permanent democratic framework.

The experience of that PR Parliament exposed the profound disconnection between MPs and their supposed constituents. Members of Parliament who had never been directly elected by any specific community found themselves representing areas where no one had voted for them personally. They had run on party lists, been allocated seats based on party performance, and then been assigned to regions and communities with whom they had no prior relationship, no campaign history, and no personal connection.

The contrast with MPs who had previously run, won, and served under the First-Past-the-Post system could not have been starker. Those FPTP MPs had knocked on doors in their communities. They had attended funerals, weddings, and community meetings. They had funded local development projects, supported youth initiatives, and built personal relationships with their constituents. They had earned their mandates through direct engagement with the people they would represent.

The PR MPs, in contrast, arrived in their allocated communities as virtual strangers. They had not campaigned in those areas. They had not made promises to those voters. They had not built relationships with local leaders, traditional authorities, or community organisations. The community had not directly voted for them and had no sense of ownership over their representation. This created an immediate and persistent disconnect that undermined the very purpose of parliamentary representation.

What became self-evident during this period was the laid-back attitude of MPs who were new to the PR system. Having been allocated to an area after being elected through the party list system, they came to a community with no direct voting for the elected MP. There was no electoral mandate from that community, no accountability to those constituents, and no personal investment in that area’s development. The natural energy and commitment that FPTP MPs brought to their constituencies was entirely absent. These PR MPs could not point to any voter in their allocated area who had actually voted for them personally. They could not say, “These people chose me to represent them.” They were, in effect, representatives without a constituency, serving areas that had never elected them.

This is not ancient history, it is living memory. Many Sierra Leoneans remember the PR era with frustration and disappointment. Communities felt abandoned by MPs who had no real connection to them and no real accountability to their needs. Development stalled. Constituency services collapsed. The vibrant community engagement that characterises FPTP elections was entirely absent. When the opportunity arose to return to constituency-based representation, there was widespread relief and support.

Proponents of PR now argue that we should maintain a system that exhibited past and present controversy. They claim that this time will be different, that the circumstances have changed, that new safeguards will prevent the problems of the past. But the fundamental structural flaw remains: PR severs the direct connection between voters and their representatives, replacing it with a system where party leaders in Freetown determine who represents which communities. This was a disaster before, and it would be a disaster again.

The burden of proof lies with those who advocate returning to a failed and flawed system. What has changed that would make PR work this time? How would the problems of disconnection, lack of accountability, and community neglect be addressed? These questions remain unanswered because there are no answers, the fundamental problems of PR are inherent to the system itself.

The Case for First-Past-the-Post: Accountability Through Direct Connection

1. The Sacred Bond Between Representative and Constituent

Under FPTP, each citizen knows precisely who represents them in Parliament. The Member of Parliament for Constituency 123 in Freetown, Constituency 67 in Karene, Constituency 42 in Kenema, or Constituency 15 in Makeni, these are not abstract concepts but living relationships. Every citizen in that constituency can identify their MP, visit their office, attend their town hall meetings, and demand answers to specific concerns.

If an MP fails to deliver on promises, ignores pressing local needs, or abuses their office for personal gain, voters hold that individual directly accountable at the ballot box is assured. This one-to-one relationship creates a sense of ownership and responsibility that PR simply cannot replicate. It transforms representation from a passive observation into an active partnership between communities and their chosen leaders.

In Sierra Leone where literacy rates remain developing, where political awareness varies greatly across regions, and where trust in institutions has been historically fragile, this clarity is essential for building and maintaining confidence in the electoral process. Citizens need to understand how their vote translates into representation. FPTP offers exactly that: mark your choice for a single candidate; the counting is straightforward; the result is immediately clear; the accountability is direct and personal.

2. Constituency-Based Representation Strengthens Local Governance

The district-based PR model fundamentally changes how Parliamentary seats are allocated. Instead of constituencies where candidates must make their case directly to voters, candidates are selected from party lists determined by party executives. This creates a profound and dangerous disconnection: MPs become answerable to party leadership who determine their position on the list, not to the communities they purport to represent.

The Sierra Leone Labour Congress has rightly warned that PR would “deny citizens the opportunity to scrutinize individual candidates on their merits and would limit accountability, as MPs would be beholden to their party leadership rather than a specific constituency.” This is not theoretical concern, it is the observable reality of PR systems across the world, from South Africa to Israel to the Netherlands, where voters routinely express frustration at the inability to hold individual representatives accountable.

Under FPTP, each constituency has a specific geographic location and identity. Citizens know exactly where to go with their distress and concerns. They can run to their MP’s constituency office, attend local meetings, and demand action. This accountability is impossible under PR, where representation is diffuse, responsibility is unclear, and MPs can hide behind party leadership when constituents seek answers.

The Competitive Energy That Builds Communities and Develops Leadership

Perhaps the most compelling and overlooked argument for FPTP lies in the vibrant, transformative process it generates long before any ballot is cast or any vote is counted. When multiple aspirants compete for a party’s parliamentary symbol in a constituency, the resulting energy is nothing short of remarkable. These contests produce an organic, nationwide movement that PR can never replicate, a movement that builds communities, develops leaders, and delivers tangible development even before the election occurs. Consider what unfolds in every constituency during FPTP primaries across Sierra Leone. Aspirants from diverse backgrounds, legal professionals, traditional leaders, educators, youth advocates, women’s organisers, business owners, and community development practitioners, descend upon their communities with genuine enthusiasm and determination. Their connections to local groups, extended families, community organisations, and grassroots networks generate unbelievable energy and collective participation that transforms entire communities.

This is not merely political campaigning in the narrow sense. It is a sustained period of intensive community engagement, development activity, and social mobilisation that benefits everyone involved. The aspirants’ acts of generosity become legendary within their communities. They fund community infrastructure projects, support local schools with materials and scholarships, sponsor youth sports leagues, provide economic assistance to vulnerable families, organise health outreach programmes, and initiate countless development activities that would otherwise never occur. This creates an environment where aspirants truly come to know their communities, their deepest needs, their highest aspirations, their daily struggles, their unique character. Conversely, communities come to know these aspirants intimately, assessing their character, capability, integrity, and genuine commitment to service. This mutual knowledge and understanding is invaluable for democratic governance. It ensures that when voters eventually choose their representative, they do so based on personal knowledge and direct experience rather than party propaganda or media messaging.

Crucially, even when there is a single winner at the conclusion of the primaries, this process produces enduring benefits that extend far beyond the election itself. New leaders emerge from these contests—individuals who may have lost the party symbol but have gained invaluable experience, built extensive networks, earned community respect, and demonstrated their unwavering commitment to community service. These leaders remain active in local development, community organising, youth support programmes, and social welfare initiatives, even without the official party endorsement. The winner, meanwhile, gains more than a political mandate. They develop working relationships with their contemporary political leaders, learning to collaborate across differences in finding solutions for their communities. The competitive zest of the primaries forges bonds between aspirants who recognise each other’s enormous potential and contributions, creating a corps of community champions ready to serve in whatever capacity they can. This network of engaged, experienced, and committed community leaders is one of Sierra Leone’s greatest democratic assets—and PR would destroy it utterly.

Many aspirants will engage in local development projects, community organizing, and youth support including social and economic support to the community regardless of the primary outcome. The process itself generates development, builds social capital, and strengthens the fabric of our communities. These are not incidental benefits—they are central to how democracy functions in the Sierra Leonean context, where community bonds and personal relationships remain the foundation of social and political life. Under a PR system, this competitive energy of constituency primaries is doomed. There would be no constituency-level contests for party symbols. There would be no aspirants crisscrossing their communities, funding development projects, and building relationships with voters. There would be no community mobilisation, no local development initiatives, no emergence of new leaders. Instead, party executives in Freetown would determine the list, and that list would be final. The vibrant democratic energy that currently enriches our communities during election cycles would simply evaporate—replaced by sterile, top-down, headquarters-driven selection processes that ordinary citizens have no role in and no connection to.

Hence the reason why it is best to allow the competitive advantage of first past the post that allows the best candidate that connects with each constituency to win and have a specific location that holds him or her accountable and the constituency have a representative that they can always run to and report their distress and concerns. This is not just a technical preference—it is a fundamental commitment to democratic participation, community development, and accountable governance.

The Flawed Case for Proportional Representation

1. The “Inclusivity” Argument Examined

Proponents argue that PR promotes inclusivity and fairer representation for smaller parties and minority groups. This is theoretically attractive but practically problematic for Sierra Leone. Our political landscape is already deeply regional and ethnically complex. PR could entrench these divisions by rewarding parties that mobilise specific identity groups rather than encouraging broad-based national coalitions that transcend regional and ethnic boundaries. Moreover, Tripartite Recommendation No. 78 explicitly called for “a nationally inclusive dialogue before the adoption of a permanent electoral system.” Yet this has not occurred. No broad-based national consultation has determined whether Sierra Leone should adopt PR, retain FPTP, or pursue a hybrid model. Proceeding without this consensus-building risks deepening political divisions rather than strengthening democratic representation.

2. The “Stability” Argument Examined

Some argue that PR reduces electoral violence by minimising winner-takes-all outcomes. But this argument has been deployed selectively and without supporting evidence. The original constitutional amendment allowing PR in Section 38A was introduced during the civil war when establishing constituencies across conflict zones was impossible. That emergency justification no longer exists. Constituencies are now clearly established across the country, and Sierra Leone has held three successive successful general elections using the constitutionally prescribed constituency system. The APC has rightly noted that “we are not in a crisis, and constituency boundaries are well laid out. Any attempt to permanently replace FPTP with PR is unconstitutional and will be resisted.”

Furthermore, there is no evidence that FPTP causes electoral violence in Sierra Leone. The violence we have experienced has been driven by other factors, including perceptions of electoral manipulation, lack of trust in institutions, and political competition over resources, which PR would not address. Indeed, PR could introduce new sources of instability, including fragmented parliaments with weak mandates, coalition governments prone to collapse, and disgruntled candidates who lost their position on party lists through opaque internal processes.

3. The “Cost Reduction” Argument Examined

The government claims PR reduces costs by eliminating constituency-level contests and reducing the number of candidates. Yet the Bill simultaneously creates an entirely new tier of complexity, staggered terms for electoral commissioners, complex run-off provisions for presidential elections, and expanded judicial oversight of electoral disputes that will likely increase overall costs. Moreover, the costs of FPTP are not merely financial. They include the “costs” of democratic engagement, the community development, the leadership emergence, the civic education, the social mobilisation that PR would eliminate. These are not costs to be minimised but benefits to be maximised. A democracy that saves money by eliminating democratic participation has misunderstood the very nature of democratic governance.

The real motivation appears to be something else entirely. As one political analyst noted, “The proposed PR system is designed to weaken constituency-based representation and strengthen party leadership’s control over parliamentary candidates. This is not about improving democracy, it is about concentrating power.”

The Democratic Primacy of Constituency-Based Representation

The competitive advantage of FPTP lies in its ability to select the best candidate that genuinely connects with each constituency. The primaries process is not merely a selection mechanism; it is a vital democratic exercise that unleashes community energy, fosters local development, identifies emerging leaders, and strengthens the social fabric of our nation. PR would doom this competitive energy, replacing vibrant community engagement with sterile party-list selection, a process conducted in party headquarters rather than in the villages and towns where democracy actually lives.

The PR model would mean that the aspirant who loses their party’s symbol would have no alternative path to contest the constituency. Their development contributions would cease. The community organising would evaporate. The relationships built through struggle would dissolve. This is not progress, it is impoverishment of our democratic culture, a deliberate dismantling of the community development ecosystem that has grown around our electoral process.

Consider the broader implications: Under PR, Members of Parliament would have no specific constituency to serve, no local office to maintain, no community meetings to attend, no local development projects to champion. They would be distant figures, selected by party leaders, accountable only to party executives, with no direct connection to the people they supposedly represent. This would fundamentally alter the relationship between citizens and their government, weakening the accountability that is essential for democratic governance.

The Crisis of Democratic Consent

The current PR debate has already exposed a troubling democratic deficit that should give every parliamentarian pause. Afrobarometer surveys show that only one in four Sierra Leoneans have heard of the electoral system review, with awareness especially low among women (16%), rural residents (20%), and citizens in the North (13%). How can we justify such a fundamental change when public awareness and understanding are so extraordinarily low?

This is not merely a technical concern, it is a fundamental challenge to democratic legitimacy. An electoral system change that is not understood and supported by the people it will govern lacks the moral authority that democratic reforms require. The PR provisions, if passed, would represent a top-down imposition by political elites rather than a bottom-up expression of popular will. This is the opposite of democratic reform, it is democratic erosion.

The Institute for Legal Research and Advocacy for Justice has warned that the Bill “creates uncertainty and opens the door to potential manipulation during implementation” by leaving critical elements, mode of election, nomination procedures, the conduct of PR elections to a future Act of Parliament. This is a recipe for partisan imposition rather than democratic consensus. The specifics of how PR would work, the formula for seat allocation, the construction of party lists, the threshold for representation, the process for filling vacancies, would all be determined by whoever holds power when the enabling legislation is drafted. This is an invitation to political manipulation that no serious democratic reform should contemplate.

The Constitutional and Legal Issues

Beyond the democratic and developmental arguments against PR, there are serious constitutional and legal concerns that Parliament must address.

First, the proposed amendment represents a fundamental change to the constitutional framework that has governed Sierra Leone since the return to democratic governance in the 1990s. Such changes require not just parliamentary majority but genuine national consensus. The absence of the latter undermines the legitimacy of the former.

Second, the PR provisions in Sections 38 and 74 are interdependent with other amendments in the Bill, creating a complex web of constitutional provisions that have not been carefully examined together. The transition provisions, the qualifications for MPs, the presidential election provisions, and the gender quota provisions all interact with the PR proposal in ways that have not been fully explored or debated.

Third, the Bill leaves critical elements of the PR system unspecified, to be determined by future legislation. This creates constitutional uncertainty and invites political manipulation. A constitutional amendment should be clear and complete, not an invitation to future partisan battles over implementation details.

Fourth, the PR proposal conflicts with other provisions in the same Bill that strengthen constituency-based representation. The amendments that require the President to have 20% support in two-thirds of districts, for example, explicitly recognise the importance of geographic distribution in democratic representation. Yet the PR provisions would eliminate the constituency-based representation that gives geographic distribution its meaning.

Strengthening FPTP: A Better Path Forward

Rather than abandoning FPTP for an untested and unpopular PR system, Parliament should strengthen the constituency-based system through complementary reforms that address legitimate concerns without abandoning fundamental strengths:

First, enhance campaign finance transparency to reduce the influence of money in constituency contests. Clear disclosure requirements and contribution limits would level the playing field and reduce the perception that only wealthy candidates can compete effectively.

Second, strengthen anti-defection provisions to prevent MPs from changing parties once elected. This would address the legitimate concern that FPTP can sometimes reward individual opportunism rather than party loyalty.

Third, increase resources for constituency offices to ensure that MPs can effectively serve their constituents. Properly staffed and funded constituency offices would enhance the accountability that is FPTP’s greatest strength.

Fourth, strengthen the gender quota provisions within the FPTP framework. Women’s representation can be advanced through candidate nomination requirements, such as requiring parties to nominate women in a certain percentage of constituencies, without abandoning constituency-based accountability.

Fifth, provide for recall mechanisms that allow constituents to remove underperforming MPs between elections. This would strengthen accountability and give voters ongoing power over their representatives.

Sixth, invest in civic education to ensure that citizens understand their rights and responsibilities under the electoral system. A more informed citizenry is the best safeguard against political manipulation and the strongest foundation for democratic governance.

These reforms would strengthen FPTP while addressing legitimate concerns about the current system. They would enhance democratic accountability, promote gender equity, reduce the influence of money in politics, and deepen civic engagement, all without abandoning the constituency-based representation that remains the bedrock of Sierra Leonean democracy.

The International Experience

The international experience with electoral system reform offers important lessons for Sierra Leone. Countries that have moved from FPTP to PR have often experienced unintended consequences that undermined the objectives of reform.

South Africa’s PR system, for example, has produced highly fragmented politics, weak accountability, and intense internal party struggles over list positions that have sometimes resulted in violence. The system has also produced a parliament that is distant from communities, with MPs having no specific constituency to serve and no direct accountability to voters.

The Netherlands’ PR system has produced such extreme fragmentation that coalition formation often takes months, during which time governments operate in caretaker mode. This instability has led to repeated calls for reform, though the entrenched interests of minor parties have prevented change.

Israel’s PR system is perhaps the most extreme case, with a single national list producing parliaments with dozens of parties, frequent government collapse, and extreme difficulty in addressing national challenges. Israeli political scientists have spent decades documenting the dysfunction that PR produces.

Conversely, countries with FPTP such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States have strengths in constituency-based accountability, clear voter choice, and stable governance. While these systems have their own challenges, they have proven more stable and accountable than PR systems in many contexts.

The African experience is particularly instructive. Countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya have maintained FPTP systems and experienced relatively stable democratic development. Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 was built on FPTP, and the system has produced regular, credible elections and peaceful transfers of power. Ghana’s FPTP system has been widely praised for its stability and accountability, with voters confidently turning out to elect specific representatives. These are the systems we should be looking to, not distant European models with different political cultures and historical contexts.

The Challenge to Our Democratic Future

Sierra Leone’s democratic journey has been hard-won. We emerged from a devastating civil war that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and destroyed the fabric of our nation. We held multiple credible elections, each building trust in the democratic process. We established a Constitution that, while imperfect, provides a foundation for governance that has served us well for over three decades.

The 2025 amendments offer genuine improvements in many areas, search committees for electoral commissioners, transition period restrictions on presidential powers, gender quotas for political representation, constitutional neutrality for security forces, all represent progress that should be welcomed and supported. But the shift to Proportional Representation is a step backward. It would weaken the direct accountability that citizens deserve and have come to expect. It would empower party elites at the expense of local communities. It would be imposed without the national consensus that democratic reform requires. It would eliminate the community development, leadership emergence, and democratic engagement that FPTP produces. It would sever the sacred bond between representatives and the people they serve.

The burden falls on proponents of change to show that PR serves the republic rather than the electoral calculations of any single party. That case has not been made. The evidence from international experience, the documented lack of public awareness, the absence of national dialogue, and the profound negative consequences for local governance all argue against this change.

Recommendations

Based on this comprehensive analysis, we recommend the following:

First, Parliament should reject the PR provisions in Sections 38 and 74 of the proposed amendments. The constituency-based FPTP system has served Sierra Leone well since the return to democratic governance and should be retained.

Second, the government should honour Tripartite Recommendation 78 by convening genuine national dialogue before any electoral system change. This must involve political parties, civil society organisations, electoral experts, women’s groups, youth organisations, traditional leaders, and the general public, not just parliamentary debate.

Third, the 30% gender quota should be retained and strengthened within the FPTP framework. Women’s representation can be advanced through candidate nomination requirements, such as requiring parties to nominate women in at least 30% of constituencies without abandoning constituency-based accountability. This is the best way to advance gender equity while preserving democratic accountability.

Fourth, Parliament should strengthen FPTP through complementary reforms, enhanced campaign finance transparency, stricter anti-defection provisions, increased resources for constituency offices, and robust recall mechanisms that address legitimate concerns about FPTP system without abandoning its fundamental strengths. These reforms would enhance accountability, promote fairness, and deepen democratic engagement.

Fifth, substantial civic education investment should precede any electoral system change. Citizens must understand the options, the implications, and the trade-offs involved in electoral system design. A change imposed on an uninformed populace lacks democratic legitimacy.

Sixth, the government should produce comprehensive comparative analysis of different electoral systems, including FPTP, various PR models, and hybrid systems, examining their implications for Sierra Leone’s specific context. This analysis should be publicly available and form the basis for national dialogue.

Seventh, a constitutional referendum should be considered for any fundamental electoral system change. Given the constitutional significance of this decision and the lack of public awareness, a referendum would provide democratic legitimacy and ensure that any change reflects the will of the Sierra Leonean people.

Conclusion

Democracy is not just about holding elections, it is about ensuring those elections are fair, credible, reflective of the people’s will, and conducive to accountable governance. For Sierra Leone, the First-Past-the-Post system offers the best chance of achieving that goal. It is simple enough to be understood by all citizens regardless of literacy level. It is strong enough to hold leaders directly accountable to their constituents. It is transparent enough to restore faith in the democratic process. More than that, it generates the community energy, development contributions, and leadership development that enrich our nation long before any votes are counted.

Sierra Leone has already witnessed the failure of PR. The immediate post-war experience exposed the profound disconnection between MPs allocated to areas where no one had directly voted for them, and their constituents who had never chosen them. The laid-back attitude of PR MPs who came to communities with no electoral mandate from those communities was self-evident. They lacked the energy, commitment, and accountability that FPTP MPs brought to their constituencies. This is not a theoretical concern, it is proven reality.

The PR proposal, if adopted, would repeat these failures. It would replace constituency accountability with party-list selection, community engagement with bureaucratic decision-making, local development with distant governance, and emerging leadership with entrenched elites. It would doom the competitive energy of constituency primaries that currently generates so much community benefit. It would sever the sacred bond between representatives and the people they serve and it kills the energy and tradition of re-election to replace MP’s who resigned, passed away or constitutionally removed.

The people of Sierra Leone deserve better than a system that has already failed them. They deserve a system that empowers them, that holds representatives accountable, that strengthens their communities, that develops their leaders, and that builds the democratic culture that our nation needs. FPTP is that system. It is not perfect, no electoral system is, but it is the best system for our context, our history, and our democratic aspirations. It is the system that Sierra Leoneans knows best, preferred and understand better. It is the system that produces accountable representatives. It is the system that builds strong communities. It is the system that motivates MP’s to regularly engage and visit their constituents, It is the system that develops future leaders.

We call on every Member of Parliament to put the interests of their constituents above partisan advantage, to listen to the voices of their communities rather than party leaders, and to reject the PR provisions that would undermine the very foundation of democratic representation in Sierra Leone.

The future of our democracy depends on the choices we make today. Let us choose wisely. Let us choose accountability over ambiguity. Let us choose First-Past-the-Post.

To be continued….