Keynote: “The Current International Situation and the Role of the United Nations Security Council : By Ambassador Michael Imran Kanu

July 31, 2023 Publisher and Chief Executive Officer KABS KANU Uncategorized 0

Presentation

By

H.E. Dr. Michael Imran Kanu

Ambassador and Permanent Representative (Designate)

Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations

Keynote: “The Current International Situation and the Role of the United Nations Security Council”

At the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) During the Workshop on Security Council Affairs Organized by the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China

Beijing, 21 July 2023

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  1. Thank you, Moderator, Zhang Jian (Assistant to the President and Director of the Institute of Europe) for giving me the floor.

Yang Mingjie, President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),

Excellencies,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

  1. It is a distinguished honour to speak and share perspectives on “The Current International Situation and the Role of the United Nations Security Council” as part of the workshop on Security Council Affairs organized by the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
  2. I thank the Department and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) for the invitation to deliver this keynote address.
  3. My address will be based on the following outline: I will first recall the important mandate and achievements of the United Nations Security Council to situate it in a general framework, and then I will proceed to describe the current international situation as connected to the work of the UN Security Council, and finally use as a case study the priorities of Sierra Leone, a recently elected non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2024-2025 term, to examine the role of the Council in the contemporary times. As this is an academic setting, the presentation reflects my personal views on the topic.
  4. Excellencies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to start with things that you know already about the UN Security Council, but significant to set the context. As you may know, the UN Security Council remains the global body charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Its establishment was certainly a radical act 75 years ago. For the first time, nations gave up an element of their sovereignty to be bound by decisions of the Security Council, and also conferred on the Council global authority for the use of force.
  5. Historically, the Council has indeed achieved much, including establishing two international criminal tribunals, expanding the use of sanctions, and setting up over 70 peace operations that have saved many lives. However, the Security Council has also failed repeatedly to prevent or mitigate conflict, aggression, and genocide.
  6. It is with this background that we move to the current international context. In relation to the mandate of the UNSC, it is to be noted that the UN General Assembly has recently, on 30th June 2023, considered in its annual debate the 2022 Security Council report (document A/77/2).
  7. Generally, commentators have voiced concerns over the work of Council and its dynamics and have concluded that this is a challenging time to be in Council.
  8. The report notes that during the reporting period, the Security Council adopted 54 resolutions and 7 presidential statements (compared with 24 in 2021) and issued 67 statements to the press. 36 resolutions, or 66%, were adopted unanimously. On 4 occasions, the casting of a veto by one or more Council members prevented the adoption of a resolution: two on Ukraine; one on Non-Proliferation/ Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and one on the Syrian Arab Republic.
  9. In fact, on 11 July 2023, just 10 days ago, the Security Council rejected 2 draft resolutions aimed at renewing cross-border humanitarian operations in Syria’s north-west. The Council failed to reauthorize the cross-border mechanism for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Syria and was unable to reach consensus on either of two resolutions that would have kept open the critical lifeline to millions of people following the expiration of its mandate on 10 July.[1]

[1] The first draft ‏— submitted by Brazil and Switzerland — would have extended use of the Bab al-Hawa crossing for another nine months but was rejected owing to the veto cast by the Russian Federation in a vote that had otherwise garnered 13 votes in favour, with 1 abstention (China).  Use of the veto triggers the convening of a formal General Assembly meeting on the situation within 10 working days.  (For background, see Press Release GA/12417.) The Russian Federation’s competing draft, which provided for a six-month extension, was defeated by a vote of 3 against (France, United Kingdom, United States) to 2 in favour (China, Russian Federation), with 10 abstentions (Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates).

[1] The first draft ‏— submitted by Brazil and Switzerland — would have extended use of the Bab al-Hawa crossing for another nine months but was rejected owing to the veto cast by the Russian Federation in a vote that had otherwise garnered 13 votes in favour, with 1 abstention (China).  Use of the veto triggers the convening of a formal General Assembly meeting on the situation within 10 working days.  (For background, see Press Release GA/12417.) The Russian Federation’s competing draft, which provided for a six-month

  1. Going back to the 2022 report, the Security Council considered a total of 49 items, including two new items,[1] and we might as well add Sudan to the list in 2023. The Council noted that it “maintained its attention on the humanitarian consequences of the conflicts of which it is seized and their impact on civilians and children, as well as on the role of women in preventing and resolving conflict”. However, we already see a failing as it is related to the two draft resolutions on Syria.
  2. The Council also held discussions and exchanged views on a range of emerging issues, including technology and security, the nexus between conflict and food insecurity and mental health and psychosocial support of United Nations peace operations personnel.

[1] Note by Secretary-General: The General Assembly took note of the “Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations” (document A/77/300), that presents a list of matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security, considered by the Security Council. Items, which the Council has ceased to deal since the notification of the Assembly at its seventy-sixth session (document A/76/300) have been deleted.  The respective deletions are recorded in document S/2022/10/Add.10*.

extension, was defeated by a vote of 3 against (France, United Kingdom, United States) to 2 in favour (China, Russian Federation), with 10 abstentions (Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates).

[1] Note by Secretary-General: The General Assembly took note of the “Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations” (document A/77/300), that presents a list of matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security, considered by the Security Council. Items, which the Council has ceased to deal since the notification of the Assembly at its seventy-sixth session (document A/76/300) have been deleted.  The respective deletions are recorded in document S/2022/10/Add.10*.

  1. The sanctions regimes remained an important tool for the Council. 10 sanctions regimes were renewed in 2022, and a new one was established for Haiti.
  2. The Council adopted decisions regarding 9 peacekeeping operations and eight special political missions in 2022. At the end of the year, peacekeepers were deployed across 12 missions in support of the Council’s mandates.

You may recall, however, that the Security Council on 30 June, about a month ago, unanimously approved the complete withdrawal in the next six months of UN peacekeeping forces in Mali – the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).[1] The resolution was a direct response by the Council to Mali’s request for MINUSMA’s prompt withdrawal. The withdrawal

[1] The Security Council decided today to terminate the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) as of 30 June 2023, ceasing its operations, transferring its tasks and withdrawing its personnel by 31 December 2023. Unanimously adopting resolution 2690 (2023) (to be issued as document S/RES/2690(2023)) and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council called on the Malian transitional Government to cooperate fully with the United Nations during MINUSMA’s drawdown, withdrawal and liquidation.  Such liquidation shall begin on 1 January 2024.  It also requested that Government to fully respect the status-of-forces agreement until the departure of MINUSMA’s final element from Mali.

The Security Council decided today to terminate the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) as of 30 June 2023, ceasing its operations, transferring its tasks and withdrawing its personnel by 31 December 2023. Unanimously adopting resolution 2690 (2023) (to be issued as document S/RES/2690(2023)) and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council called on the Malian transitional Government to cooperate fully with the United Nations during MINUSMA’s drawdown, withdrawal and liquidation.  Such liquidation shall begin on 1 January 2024.  It also requested that Government to fully respect the status-of-forces agreement until the departure of MINUSMA’s final element from Mali.

  1. may cause economic and humanitarian gap. It is therefore hoped that the efforts of the regional body ECOWAS to restore peace and security to Mali will be successful.
  2. Now in the UN General Assembly debate on the 2022 Security Council report, E. Csaba Kőrösi (Hungary), President of the General Assembly, asserted that the 15-nation organ serves as the bedrock of the collective efforts to maintain peace. However, the Council’s ability to re-establish peace is being put to the test.  He stressed “We must ask ourselves:  Where are we succeeding?  Where are we failing?”
  3. Following on this, in projecting the Council’s dynamics for 2024, a think tank, Security Council Report, has noted that the ongoing tensions among permanent members of the UN Security Council are expected to persist and are likely to shape Council dynamics in 2024. It noted that “while several issues for example, DPRK non-proliferation, Israel/Palestine, Syria, and Myanmar—remain divisive, the war in Ukraine has heightened tensions among members over the past 15 months.[1] The situation of Ukraine is likely to continue to loom large on the Council’s agenda in 2024”.
  4. In noting the mandate of the Security Council and how its work has grown more complex in both scope and process, can the Council still be effective? Council’s effectiveness requires committed member States and the continued adaptation of its practices. Its rules may have evolved, and new practices may also have been introduced, often in politically creative ways to contribute to a culture where better decisions are taken, more consultatively. This should be the role of the Council in the current international situation.
  5. Is this possible? Well, I intend to examine the role of the Security Council using the priorities of Sierra Leone as to framework to a possible answer.

[1] Russia continues to justify its invasion, which it refers to as a “special military operation”, while several Council members—including Albania, Ecuador, France, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, the UK, and the US— condemn Russia for what they consider to be an act of aggression.

Russia continues to justify its invasion, which it refers to as a “special military operation”, while several Council members—including Albania, Ecuador, France, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, the UK, and the US— condemn Russia for what they consider to be an act of aggression.

  1. On the priorities which Sierra Leone seeks to pursue at the Security Council, it is to be said that a seat in the non-Permanent category of the Council, gives Sierra Leone the perfect opportunity to effectively share its success and achievements as a country that successfully transitioned from war to peace. Sierra Leone ran under the theme: Partnership, Multilateralism and Representative Approach to Sustained Global Peace and Security, and this signifies the importance to build partnerships, effectively use the multilateral system and representation to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.
  2. Sierra Leone’s vision for a sustained global peace and security is inspired by 7 priorities, rooted in its firm commitment to international cooperation based on a multilateral rules-based order and a reformed Security Council that provides for equitable representation across all regions of the world.
  3. The primary aim as captured in its vision is Partnership and Representation to Maintain Peace and Security. This is based on the full acknowledgment of the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security and the belief that the intervention of Security Council in conflict prevention and in conflict situations should be decisive and timely.
  4. This, for example, ought to be the case in Sudan in the continued military clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and where the Council can apply its myriad of tools including calling on the parties to immediately cease hostilities, facilitate humanitarian access and establish a permanent ceasefire arrangement and to resume the process towards reaching a lasting, inclusive, and democratic political settlement in Sudan, including reference to Council’s Chapter VIII powers on effectively using regional arrangements.
  5. This vision of Partnership and Representation to Maintain Peace and Security is inextricably intertwined with the priorities of enhancing peacemaking and peacekeeping. The efficacy of using the instruments of peacemaking and peacekeeping in maintaining international peace and security through preventive diplomacy is best illustrated in the context of Sierra Leone’s experience in ending its civil war some two decades ago. Sierra Leone, a former host country and as a troop contributor, is therefore in a position to use that experience in collectively working to effectively strengthen the Council’s peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
  6. As at March 2023, Sierra Leone had 56 personnel in UN peace operations, mainly in UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), that is soon to close, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).
  7. Despite the MINUSMA termination, peacekeeping will still be a key issue for the Council in the new composition. Among the new non-permanent members, Republic of Korea ranks as the biggest troop contributor to UN peace operations and the largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget.
  8. Algeria and Sierra Leone are keen proponents of greater cooperation between the UN and AU on peace and security issues. African members have been trying to advance the discussion in the Council on the financing of AU-led peace support operations. Ghana, an outgoing member of the Council, has led these efforts, and may present a draft framework resolution. If negotiations on this issue are not finalized this year, they can be expected to continue in 2024.[1]

[1] “The financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) has been an issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in particular, since 2007. In this time, the Security Council’s discussion of this issue has evolved, with Council members increasingly recognising the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent, particularly through the deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs). Nonetheless, despite advances in recent years, the AU’s Achilles heel remains the lack of adequate resources to support and sustain these operations.

To address this challenge, the AU has since 2007 been seeking UN-assessed contributions for adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding for AUPSOs. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have tried, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion of the financing of AUPSOs through UN-assessed contributions, and the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements recognizing the need to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing for AUPSOs.

In 2018, the A3 proposed a draft resolution which sought a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The draft text placed in blue in December 2018 garnered the support of most Council members but was never put to a vote because of one permanent member’s strong opposition. In August 2019, as South Africa tried to advance the issue, the AUPSC called on the A3 to suspend their efforts pending the AU’s development of a common position on some of the contentious issues raised during the 2018 negotiations. The AU endorsed a common position in February 2023.

There has been renewed momentum in the Security Council regarding the discussion of financing AUPSOs since mid-2022. Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform.

The Council asked that the Secretary-General’s April 2023 report include “recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources”. It is likely to stimulate further discussion and can be expected to encourage the A3 to resume negotiating a substantive Council outcome on the financing issue later in 2023.   

In this research report, Security Council Report offers insights into how the Council has dealt with the financing issue by examining past Council meetings and outcomes. It will also reflect on recent efforts to revive the discussion in the Council—in a changed geopolitical context to that of 2018—examine the prospects for progress in this regard and analyse potential Council dynamics on the financing issue in 2023 before offering some concluding observations.”

[1] “The financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) has been an issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in particular, since 2007. In this time, the Security Council’s discussion of this issue has evolved, with Council members increasingly recognising the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent, particularly through the deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs). Nonetheless, despite advances in recent years, the AU’s Achilles heel remains the lack of adequate resources to support and sustain these operations.

To address this challenge, the AU has since 2007 been seeking UN-assessed contributions for adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding for AUPSOs. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have tried, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion of the financing of AUPSOs through UN-assessed contributions, and the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements recognizing the need to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing for AUPSOs. In 2018, the A3 proposed a draft resolution which sought a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The draft text placed in blue in December 2018 garnered the support of most Council members but was never put to a vote because of one permanent.

  1. In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General has said: “I wish to reiterate that the decision to take forward sustainable financing and expand the scope of mission support for African Union peace support operations is political. On several occasions, I have emphasized the need for a new generation of peace enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by regional forces, with guaranteed, predictable funding. The African Union is an obvious partner in that regard.” Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council, S/2023/303 dated 1 May 2023 para 43.member’s strong opposition. In August 2019, as South Africa tried to advance the issue, the AUPSC called on the A3 to suspend their efforts pending the AU’s development of a common position on some of the contentious issues raised during the 2018 negotiations. The AU endorsed a common position in February 2023.There has been renewed momentum in the Security Council regarding the discussion of financing AUPSOs since mid-2022. Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform.The Council asked that the Secretary-General’s April 2023 report include “recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources”. It is likely to stimulate further discussion and can be expected to encourage the A3 to resume negotiating a substantive Council outcome on the financing issue later in 2023.   

    In this research report, Security Council Report offers insights into how the Council has dealt with the financing issue by examining past Council meetings and outcomes. It will also reflect on recent efforts to revive the discussion in the Council—in a changed geopolitical context to that of 2018—examine the prospects for progress in this regard and analyse potential Council dynamics on the financing issue in 2023 before offering some concluding observations.”

    [1] Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council, S/2023/303 dated 1 May 2023 para 43.

  2. A third priority for Sierra Leone during its tenure in the Security Council is to ensure that the UN is effectively able to Maintain Peace, safeguard Human Rights and pursue a culture of Accountability. Human rights protection and promotion is a significant aspect of the work of the Security Council. Human rights protection and promotion builds confidence in democratic governance as well as bridge societal divides by strengthening a sense of common values and shared humanity, and at the same time, promote peaceful resolution of conflicts grounded in respect for the rights and dignity of all.
  3. Sierra Leone’s membership in the Security Council will provide an appropriate opportunity to support the work to break the culture of impunity through engagement and action to foster a culture of accountability. Sierra Leone brings rich experience in threading that fine line in navigating the peace and justice nexus.

 

  1. The UNSC is lauded for having established the International Criminal Tribunals as part of its successes. However, it is not envisaged that the Security Council may agree on any similar tribunals at the moment. Part of the reason include the provision in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the Security Council to refer and defer cases to the ICC in articles 13 (b) and 16 respectively of the Rome Statute. How the Council employs those powers will have far reaching implications for the current international peace and security situation.[1]

Let me now turn to an important point of ownership and the adage “nothing about us, without us”. Sierra Leone recognizes the merit in the global call for the full and equal ownership, meaningful participation and representation of women and youth at all levels in peace processes and security engagements. It is important to note that the new Elected 5 of the E-10 have underscored the significance of

[1] On 15 November 2013, Security Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ Trial Fails to Win Adoption, with 7 Voting in Favour, 8 Abstaining: An almost evenly divided Security Council, lacking the requisite nine affirmative votes, today failed to adopt a resolution seeking a one-year delay in International Criminal Court proceedings against the President and Deputy President of Kenya. Seven Council members voted in favour of the text (Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Togo), none voted against, and 8 abstained (Argentina, Australia, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United States).  The draft was, therefore, not adopted. Had it passed, the Council would have requested the International Criminal Court, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to defer the investigation and prosecution of President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto for 12 months, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which established the Court.  By other terms, the Council would have decided that Member States would take no action inconsistent with their international obligations.

On 15 November 2013, Security Council Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ Trial Fails to Win Adoption, with 7 Voting in Favour, 8 Abstaining: An almost evenly divided Security Council, lacking the requisite nine affirmative votes, today failed to adopt a resolution seeking a one-year delay in International Criminal Court proceedings against the President and Deputy President of Kenya. Seven Council members voted in favour of the text (Azerbaijan, China, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Togo), none voted against, and 8 abstained (Argentina, Australia, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United States).  The draft was, therefore, not adopted. Had it passed, the Council would have requested the International Criminal Court, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to defer the investigation and prosecution of President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto for 12 months, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which established the Court.  By other terms, the Council would have decided that Member States would take no action inconsistent with their international obligations.

  1. the women, peace, and security agenda during our campaigns.
  2. At the Security Council, Sierra Leone for instance has prioritized the broader role of women and youth in the pursuit of global peace and security. This will be expressed in terms of advocacy for the ownership and active involvement of women and youth in peace processes, peace mediation and in peacekeeping operations. Sierra Leone will therefore particularly focus on conflicted-related sexual violence and its post-conflict impact on State-building.
  3. Turning now to the persistent and new threat to global peace and security, that is, acts of terrorism and resurging violent extremism and Climate Change. These threats could only be met with increasing synergy on intelligence sharing and capacity enhancement in counterterrorism efforts among UN Member States. Today, the question of terrorism and Climate Change has become a persistent existential threat to all regions of the world, and as such, the response must be universal, collaborative, and coordinated.
  4. Sierra Leone in the Security Council will robustly support the need for strong partnership and concerted effort to suppress all aspects of international terrorism and will add the necessary impetus to the Security Council to consider the nexus between climate change and climate security with the “urgency of now”. As we know there are two sides to the debate on climate change as a threat to global peace and security, but the ask for Council is to respond appropriately to “climate risk and security”.
  5. On our next priority, Sierra Leone will prioritize the proper regulation of international trade in conventional arms as part of the global framework for arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. With relevant experience in the efficacy of regulation which reduces threat of armed conflict, Sierra Leone will spotlight and continue to build support for the work to eradicate small arms which fuel armed conflicts and crime.
  6. Finally, it would be remiss on our part if reforming the Security Council was not an integral priority in our bid for a non-Permanent seat in the Council. Based on the provisions on the amendment of the UN Charter, the reform of the Security Council requires the concurrence of all five permanent members of the Council, and this is seen as the biggest obstacle to significant amendments to the Charter, in addition to the requirement for two-thirds of the UN member States to vote for and ratify any proposed amendment.

The Charter has been amended five times, always to reflect the increase in UN membership.[1] The Security Council amendments are Amendment 23 to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members; and Amendment

[1] Amendment 23 to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members (came into force on 31 August 1965); Amendment 27 to increase the required number of Security Council votes from 7 to 9 (came into force on 31 August 1965); Amendment 61 to enlarge the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members (came into force on 31 August 1965); Amendment 109 to change the requirements for a General Conference of Member States for reviewing the Charter (came into force on 12 June 1968); Amendment 61 to further enlarge the Economic and Social Council from 27 to 54 members (came into force on 24 September 1973).

Note: The UN Charter still refers to the original permanent members, the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, although the former was replaced at the UN by the People’s Republic of China on 25 October 1971, and the latter was superseded by the Russian Federation on 24 December 1991. The wording of Article 23 (1) has not been amended.

[1] Amendment 23 to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members (came into force on 31 August 1965); Amendment 27 to increase the required number of Security Council votes from 7 to 9 (came into force on 31 August 1965); Amendment 61 to enlarge the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members (came into force on 31 August 1965); Amendment 109 to change the requirements for a General Conference of Member States for reviewing the Charter (came into force on 12 June 1968); Amendment 61 to further enlarge the Economic and Social Council from 27 to 54 members (came into force on 24 September 1973).Note: The UN Charter still refers to the original permanent members, the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, although the former was replaced at the UN by the People’s Republic of China on 25 October 1971, and the latter was superseded by the Russian Federation on 24 December 1991. The wording of Article 23 (1) has not been amended.

  1. to increase the required number of Security Council votes from 7 to 9 (both came into force on 31 August 1965).
  2. As the Coordinator of the African Union Committee of Ten on the reform of the UN Security Council, Sierra Leone fully reiterates its commitment to the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in the General Assembly.
  3. In this regard, Sierra Leone will continue to canvass support for the Common African Position as espoused in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration and build consensus that is in accord with the UN General Assembly Decision 62/557. In this context, Sierra Leone as a Non-Permanent member of the Security Council will work to enhance the working methods and reporting obligations of the Security Council to foster efficiency, transparency, and accountability. This is the reform effort that is in accord with the UN General Assembly Decision 62/557.
  4. For the priorities to be achieved for each and every member of the 15-member States Council, trust, partnership, and representation is fundamental. The article 24 para 1 of the UN Charter which gives the Security Council responsibility to act on behalf of the United Nations is unparalleled and this has been done in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN, in the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, even where there are disagreements, the Council must be able to work effectively. The members of Council must be committed and must continue to adapt its practices, crafting new practices to contribute to a culture where better decisions are taken, more consultatively.
  5. For the newly elected members, this is our task too, and we therefore thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China for organizing the workshop on Security Council Affairs as part of our preparation for Council. This can only enhance our cooperation and consultative approach to ensure the effectiveness of Council.
  6. I thank you.

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